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ABSTRACT
The object of this thesis is to ascertain the domestic
causes of the Depression in Germany, and to assess their
importance. In the earlier chapters I construct a simple,
static, macro-economic model capable of generating those
features which distinguish the operation of the German Economy
during 1924-9, from that before 1913 or after 1948. Three
sources of instability in 1924-9 are highlighted: the
reduced willingness to hold long-term debt; the lower
propensity to save; and the persistent inflationary pressures
in labour and product markets. Jointly, these explain the
low prices and short maturity distribution of German
financial assets, the large capital imports, the Balance of
Payments deficit on current account, the apparent over¬
valuation of the exchange rate, and the low rate of
investment. And these together explain the especial
instability of the German economy at that time.
Chapters 6 to 9 consider the short-run behaviour of
investment in the later 1920s. Fluctuations of inventory
investment, which had been seriously destabilising during
1924-7, were less significant during 1927-9- The collapse
of the domestic stock market in early 1927 bad identifiable
effects on the fixed investment activity of the railways,
communes, and smaller-scale industry. The 'closure' of
foreign capital markets after mid 1928 had however no such
discernible effects. The endemically low capacity utilis¬
ation, wages pressure, and the short-run nature of much invest¬
ment activity associated with expectations of lower costs of
finance in the future, are more apposite explanations of the
bulk of the reduction of industrial fixed investment in 1928-9.
The basic economic instability (especially the financial
- affecting the public and the agricultural sectors), coupled
with the export collapse, converted the recession into a
crisis.






The economic history of the Weimar Republic can, in the best Caesarian
tradition, be divided into three parts: the inflation (l9l8-?3;; the
period of relative stability (1924-1929;; and the depression (1929-33'*
The aim of this thesis is to explain the transition from part two to
part three - the 'beginning of the depression in Germany'. I conceive
this primarily as a contribution to the international economic history
of the interwar years; secondarily as a contribution to the 'total'
history of Weimar Germany. This being so, the appropriate organising
picture seemed to me to view the German economy as a system subject to
external shocks, and to ask as a basic question: was the depression
in Germany the result of the impact of massive exogenous shocks on an
otherv/ise stable system, or of the impact of milder shocks on an
/
inherently unstable system?
Such a characterisation of the problem also narrows the choice of
theoretical paradigm. I have aimed to follow the signposts provided
by the broad consensus of neoclassical/neoKeynesian theory; but it is
increasingly conventional among historians of modern Germany to dis¬
parage this theoretical corpus as 'bourgeois superficiality' *1.
i
In my experience however, the pro^Terred alternatives - be they the
*1 G D Peldman, Iron and Steel in the German Inflation, p 8;
C-D Krohn, Stabilisierung und Ukonomische Interessen p 10.
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menu of 'ideal types' or 'working concepts' of collectivist capital¬
ism *2, or the menu of underconsumptionist theories *3 - are either
empty, or empirically inapplicable guides to the problem in hand,
despite their claims to take better account of the cyclical essence
of capitalism than does the theory I follow. To engage in the relent¬
less pursuit of 'Anglo-Saxon' economic history is not thereby to
devalue the political and social questions: economic analysis can be
conceived of as defining the freedom of action of policy makers, the
latent function of their policies or the economic projections of
the interaction between the classes *6. Some determinants of macro-
economic behaviour are more durable than the corresponding social/
*2 Leading candidate is 'Organised Capitalism', invented by
Rilferding, resurrected recently by H-U Wehler and J Kocka,
and evaluated in H-A Winkler (ed/, Organisierter Kapitalismus.
More modest in scope is 'collective capitalism' championed by
G D feldman (see esp. his contribution to Winkler op.cit. ;;
'corporative pluralism', projferred by CIS' Kaier has a different
slant (see his contribution to Winkler op.cit; also his
Recasting Bourgeois Europe;. The first is compared with its
inferior East European cousin. State Monopoly Capitalism, in
Winkler op.cit. by J Kocka.
An older variant of these theories is the Schumpeterian, rich
in analysis of the socio-politico-economic interaction. See his
Business Cycles Vol II pp 692 ff; also A PredOhl, Las Ende der
Weltwirtschaftkrise.
*3 These are discussed immediately below pp5 ff.
H Medick, '...Organisierter Kapitalismus in Grossbritannien...'
(in Winkler op.cit.)
*5 In this case, notably in relation to Reichsbank policy. See
above all G Hardach, 'Reichsbankpolitik und wirtschaftliche
Entwicklung...' also chs. 3 and 5 below.
*6 Eg capital and labour (pp 307 ff below or agriculture and the
rest (pp 3^8ff below,.
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political structures ■ *7; others are contemporaneously present in
economies having different social and political structures *8; but
frd>m my standpoint, more relevantly, some determinants of macro-
economic behaviour are less durable than the corresponding social/
political structures *8a.
To return to the picture of a system and its shocks. Three 'shocks*
stand out: the cessation of the foreign credit inflow some time in
1928-29 (insofar as consequent on events in foreign financial markets; *9-
J
the export decline from 1929 because of falling aggregate demand
abroad; and lastly, Brtfning's deflationary policy, as usually under¬
stood to have been dictated by foreign and domestic policy objectives
rather than by economic constraints on his freedom of action *10.
*7 An aspect stressed by D Petzina,'Die Deutsche Wirtschaft in der
Zwischenkriegszeit: see pp 2-4. The basic question of contin¬
uity is posed by K Borchardt, 'Treid, Zyklus, Strukturbrtiche.
Zufglle ...'
*8 An aspect stressed ty W Fischer, 'Die Weimarer Republik unter
den weltwirtschaftlichen Bedingungen fler Zwischenkriegszeit';
also D Petzina and W Abelshauser, 'Zum Problem relativer
Stagnation ...'
*8a Eg The power of labour, relative to that of capital, must surely
be judged greater in Germany of the 1920s than pre-war. Yet
labour's share of income generated in industry and commerce
surely fell up to 1923» and rose thereafter, rising fastest in
1924-25, when union strength, incidence of collective agreements
etc were at their weakest. Only an 'independent' economic
analysis can, 1 submit, account for such observations. So too
for the analysis of financial markets. See pp l49ff below.
*9 The importance of this 'shock* was recently defended by
M E Palkus, 'The German Business Cycle of the 1920s'.
*10 Esp. H Sanmann, 'Paten und Altemativen.?. '
An analysis which stresses the cruciality of these 'exogenous' pre-
cipitants of the depression presupposes a view of the operation of the
economy in the 1920s. Some writers have stressed exogenous factors;
the deflationary impact already in those years of the sluggish growth
of world trade *11. If sluggish exports plus reparations tended to
drain foreign exchange reserves, then we are on the way to an explan¬
ation of the passive Balance of Payments, the high interest rates and
the foreign capital inflow. The theory can be completed by some
policy hypothesis: eg an overvalued exchange rate and/or overly
restrictive Reichsbank policy; the policy decisions of the '20s pave
the way for the disasters of the '30s *12.
Questions immediately arise however about the stability of the implicit
models. Borchardt notes that the very emphasis on capital gooas
which made trade such an 'engine of growth' in Germany before 191^ and
after 1950, also exposed Germany acutely to the negative side of the
international trade cycle *13» Similarly, in an explanation of the
influx of fore;ifih credit, one need not view the exogenously determined
commodity market imbalance (plus the political disturbance of repar¬
ations; as 'primary' disorders, to accommodate which the capital
balance passively adjusts; one can alternatively view as primary the
*11 See the work cited in *8; in a more comprehensive framework,
I Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy.
*12 G Hardach: see esp. article cited in *5; also 'Zur
politischen Okonomie der Weimarer Republik'. Further V Fischer
op.cit. pp 39-50? D Petzina, Die Deutsche Wirtschaft...
pp 95-7.
*13 K Borchardt, 'Wachstum und Wechsellagen...' p 689. He notes
also that in Germany exports have long been a 'safety valve',
standing in inverse relation to domestic activity: the very




disorders of the domestic capital market (eg its 'destruction' by the
inflation/ which actuated the capital inflow, to accommodate which
the current account balance adjusted *14.
Finally, a question, I believe not yet properly considered: was it
merely political goals and constraints that shunted Brilning on to
the most deflationary policy of all western industrial countries?
The writers cited up to now mostly focus on stability problems of
the external balance; another group focusses on the internal balance.
Underconsumption!sm is popular with these. Underlying Krohn's recent
study *15 is a Hobson/Luxemburg version: excessive capital accumu¬
lation during the inflation generated a level of output which could
not be 'realised' after the stabilisation, given the distribution of
income. Government fiscal policy reinforced this failure. Kroll *16,
starting, (it seems.- from the axiom that capitalists desire money
profits to hold, shows that deflationary leakages from the flow of
income are inherent in capitalism, and effective if not offset by
exogenous expenditure (eg credit-financed investment, public works v.
*14 Borchardt, 'Wachstum...' p 705? Fetzina (Die Deutsche
Wirtschaft... pp 95-7/ opts for a combination of commodity
market and capital market disorders, plus restrictive monetary
policy.
♦15 G-D Krohn op.cit. esp. pp. 223-5, 54-60, 100-105, 128, 137-41,
173» 195» 210. The vital feature - the investment function
which failed, after stabilisation, to generate adequate demand
for capital goods - is not specified; nor is the other par¬
ticular assumption spelled out or verified: that the marginal
propensity of capitalists to save exceeds that of workers.
*16 G Kroll, Von der Weltwirtschafts, krise zur Staatskon.junktur
pp 314-327, 352-60. This work remains the most detailed account
of the depression in Germany.
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When conjoined with the hypothesis of a rising profits' share in the
later 'twenties, we get an explanation of the extreme severity of the
depression *17»
All underconsumptionist explanations of the German depression suffer
however from the severe objection that, as far as can be ascertained,
labour's share of income generated in the private sector rose in the
period 1927-9 *18.
J Kuczynski offers an empirically based overproduction theory, based
on the contradictions implied by the increases in the output, prices
and inventories of producer goods, relative to consumer goods, the
severity of the contraction being a result of the stage of "state
monopoly capitalism' reached *19.
Of the writers focussing on the internal balance, all propose models
marked by instability, except P Temin, who offers a neo-Keynesian
*17 P C Martin, Die deutsche Wirtschaftsentwicklung vor der
Weltwirtschaftskrise.«.
The role of credit creation is also stressed by W Ehrlicher,
Geldkapitalbildung und Realkapitalbildung (esp. pp 15-80;.
Ke juxtaposes realised investment and realised credit expansion
(neglecting prices and interest rates- to evolve^theory by
which he predicts a more severe recession in 1950s than that of
the 1920s.
In addition to the above, the role of excess capacity in the
later 1920s, created by the 'rationalisation boom' is stressed
by eg K E Born, Die deutsche Bankenkrise pp 3^-5t K W iiardach,
Germany 1920-1970 PP 195-6; Petzina/Abelshauser op.cit.
pp 62-3; 0 Hardach, 'Zur politischen Okonomie...' pp 22-5« and
others.
*18 For data see below pp 152 ; also W G Hoffmann, F Grumbach,
H Hesse, Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft... p 508.
For comment see K Borchardt, 'Wachstum... p 690,705.
*19 J Kuczynski, Studien zur Geschichte der Zyklischen
Hberproduktionskrisen in Deutschland 1925-^5. PP 103-15»
inventory cycle model, presumably implying that per se the economic
structure was stable *20.
A last important class, difficult to fit into this classification, is
composed bf^theories which explain the depression by means of the
increasing price and output rigidity which cartels and trusts imparted
to the economy *21•
To evaluate all these views would require unobtainable space. Instead
I will seek in the next four chapters to assess the stability of the
macro-economic structure by developing a simple neo-Keynesian model
which is capable of explaining the characteristic differences of the
German economy in three periods: 1899-1913? 1924-1929; and 1950-1955
(ie after a second inflation, *22. I select the following differences
*20 P Temin, 'The Beginnings of the Depression in Germany', esp.
pp 246 ff. I assume that his model implies a stable economic
structure, because most modern theories of inventory invest¬
ment would imply such; having modified the consumption function
and the rigid orders and production lags which rendered
instability plausible in Metzler's model. For literature:
L Metzler, 'The Nature and Stability of Inventory Cycles',
I-i Lovell, 'Sales Anticipations...', esp. pp 576-9, M Evans,
Macroeconomic A tivity. pp 201 ff.
A further thrust of Temin's article is his rejection of financial
factors as explanations of the German depression. D Keese,
'Die volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtgrtissen...' provides the data
for a Keynesian analysis, especially of the internal balance,
but without clear enough specification, especially of his
investment function, to assess the stability properties of his
system.
*21 D Petzina, 'Germany and the Great Depression' esp. pp 60-1,
also his Die deutsche Wirtschaft... p 17? P C Kartin op.cit.
pp 16-30, who also offers an attempted verification.
*22 Only G Hardach (*12) and P Temin (*20) have hitherto tried to
develop complete (if, like that offered here, simple, models
of the economy 1924-29? and they did not try to relate them
to the features of the pre-First and post-Second World War




A. The higher average rate of unemployment of labour and capital *23
during 1924-29 than before 1913 or after 1953* Estimates of unemploy¬
ment differ. Most derive from Galenson and Zellner's (adjusted,
estimates of unemployed trade-unionists *24. See Table 1 below.
Table 1 Unemployment in Germany



















NOTES a. and b. have same numerators but different denominators as
stated, and described in sources. c. spliced T.U. unemploy¬
ment data to absolute numbers reported unemployed in 1929;
thus obtaining a higher numerator to divide by approx. the same
denominator as in b.
SOURCES: a. W Galenson and A Zellner, International Comparisons ...
P 455; E. A Maddison, Economic Growth in the West,
pp 216-220; c. E H P Brown and M Browne, A Century of Pay.
pp 381-2.
1904 3.6 1913 4.2
1905 3.0
1906 2.7 1920 3.8
1907 2.9 1921 2.8
1908 4.4 1922 1.5
1909 4.3 1923 10.2
1910 3.5 1924 13.1
1911 3.1 1925 6.8












•23 For detailed evaluation of capital stock utilisation data see
pp 253ffbelow.
•24 w Galenson and A Zellner, International Comparisons of Unemploy¬
ment Rates, pp 455» 459» 526-37. They increased the pre-1913
estimates, mainly to allow for the seasonal unemployment of
ununionised labour.
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I suppose Phelps Brown and Browne's data are the most accurate, but
only Galenson/Zellner and Kaddison permit of long-period, and inter¬
national comparison.
B. The low investment ratio in 1925-29« by comparison with the other
two periods. *25
C. The Balance of Payments surplus on current account before 1915 and
after 1950$ but deficit (on average) 192*f-29, plus the implied capital
flows and their maturities *26.
D. The relative rate of wage and price increase: equal to or less
than that abroad in the first and last periods; greater in 192*+-29 *27.
E. The much higher interest rates and bond yields, relative to abroad,
in the middle period than before 1913- Tbe post-1950 short rates were
below those of 192^-29; long rates were administered *28,
F. The much lower level of private sector saving in the middle period
than either the first or the last *29.
G- The much severer cyclical experience of the economy during 1925-29
(and 1929-551) than in either other period. This point holds even
when corrected for international comparisons *50.
*25 See p 135 below
*26 See p 131 below
*2y See PP152,l62below
*28 See pp 55567 below
*29 See p 135 below
*30 Except, possibly, in the case of a comparison with the U.S.A.
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Point G leads over to the second stage of the thesis. Prompted by the
focus of Keynesian analysis, by the predilections of students of the
internal balance, and by the data (Table ? p 11 ), I examine, in
chapters 6 to 9, investment activity, disaggregated by major classes,
in an attempt to obtain an explanation, within the framework already
developed, of the actual cyclical history of the period. It will be
as well to establish this history at the outset. Mainly following
Schmidt *31* we can periodise the turning points from January 19?^ as
follows: To April 192^ there was a brief recovery, which in that
month v/as abruptly reversed into a recession lasting until June. From
about September recovery resumed till some time in 1925* Schmidt
dates the turning point at March//pril 1925; in fact equity prices,
and industrial production peaked in February, but a definite recession
did not get under way till the end of the year. When it came, it was
precipitous. A lower turning point was reached (according to Schmidt,
in March/April 1926. The lively upswing which ensued petered out in
late 192?; the actual turning point is imprecise. Schmidt gives
ilarch/April 1928. But the important thing to note is that a domestic
investment recession (as marked eg by a decline in domestic machinery
orders *32 and slackened pace of inventory investment *33/ can be
detected from late 192? or early 1928. But this was offset by an
export boom. Only when this gave way in later 1929 did domestic econ¬
omic activity collapse.
*31 C T Schmidt, German Business Cycles 1924-33, PP 129-31*
*32 See p; 2k? below.
*33 See p^ 230 below.
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Table 2 summarises the annual value of the major national accounting
variables in the period.
Table 2a Components of NNP 1925-30 Current Prices Hrd.Rm.
1925 1926 1927 1328 1929 im
NNF 67.3 65.5 80.5 84.0 79.5 71.9
Government Consumption 7.9 8.2 8.8 9.9 9.9 9.7
Commodity Exports 9.6 10.7 11.1 12.6 13.6 12.2
Net Investment*** 8.1 4.5 11.3 10.3 6.2 1.7
of which:
Inventory Investment ** 2.3 -1.7 3.4 2.0 -1.0 -3.3
Fixed:Industry/Commerce** 2.8 2.3 3.1 3.5 2.7 1.6
Public; Railways 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.4
Housebuilding* 1.7 2.2 2.6 2.7 2.5 1.7
Agric: Fixed* 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 O.k
Fiscal Surplus (+)**** -0,.7 -1 .3 -0 .4 -o.s -1 .5
Balance of Payments -2.0 +1.1 -2.7 -1.2 -0.1 +1.1












kl.2 47.2 52.8 54.2 52.0 48.8
29.7 27.8 34.1 34.5 35-3 31.2
6.7 7.7 7.8 8.6 9.9 9.3
5.3 4.3 6.9 6.6 4.3 1.5
1.5 0.1 1.8 1.4 0.0 -1.6
1.9 1.6 2.1 2.3 1.7 1.0
0.7 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9
1.0 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.0
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2
* Hoffmann publishes estimates of non-agricultural housebuilding.
He states however that 50# of his estimates of investment in
agricultural buildings is composed of housebuilding in that
sector. In these Tables this element has been subtracted from
'Agricultural Fixed Investment' and added to other housebuilding
to obtain aggregate estimates of housebuilding investment.
** ie mining, manufacturing, transport, trade and commerce.
*** excluding investment in crops and livestock.
***• fiscal Year ran from 1.4 to 31 «3
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SOURCES: for Table 2a, except line 'Fiscal Surplus', and 2b, except
lines 'NNP', 'Net Investment', and 'Inventory Investment':
Hoffmann... pp 236. 237. 2b6, 2k?, 260. 818. 826, 828.
2a, 'Fiscal Surplus': Table 2 p 91 below.
?b, 'Inventory Investment' 1925-6: Table 1d, line '2HD',
p2l9 below. 1927-9' Table 2, line '2ED', p 215 below.
2b, 'Net Investment'. 'NNP': Hoffmann's estimates of these
were adjusted by the substitution of my revised estimates
of constant price inventory investment.
CHAPTER 2 i-TRARClAL i-;AM£TS ANL MONETARY POLICY - DESCRIPTION
2.1. Introduction: The Structure of financial Markets
2.1.1. There are two reasons for placing this chapter so early,
xirstly, in an economy which has just emerged from the chaos of
hyperinflation, and in whose external balance financial transfers
were so significant, intuition suggests that analysis of the financial
sector might provide a key to the understanding of its operation.
Secondly, in Weimar Germany, as elsewhere at the time, macro-economic
policy was, in effect, monetary policy. _v ? A good number of
studies of monetary policy have been published *1, but the broader
analysis of financial markets has received less attention.
In this chapter and the next, 1 wish to confine attention as far as
possible to monetary and financial variables. In this chapter three
financial markets are discussed, firstly, the market in short-teim
'money market' debt and commercial bills. Secondly, the market in
long-term bonds and equity. Thirdly, the market in bank credit. The
changing conditions in these markets, and in the relationships between
them, is analysed especially with respect to the after-effects of the
*1 Especially Salomon Wr xlink, The R». ichsbank and Economic Germany
(1929 ; K R Bopp, lie Politik der Reichsbank seit der
Stabilisierung (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv h?./2 (1935 ;
R Stucken, Leutsche Celd- und Kredi jpo litik 191 '>-63 (196?
1st ed. 1937 ; 1 B Korthrop, Control Policies of the Reichsbank
(19?8 ; G Hardach, Weltmarktorientierung und relative Stagnation
(1976/. More political than economic is H Kuller, 'Lie Reichsbank
eine Nebenregierung .».'(1973 <•
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inflation, the impact of monetary policy, and to the interaction
with the external trade balance and with foreign financial markets.
Then, in the third chapter I develop a simple analytical model of
the interrelationships between these markets, to test a hypothesis
of the after-effects of the inflation upon willingness to hold
different classes of debt. In the fifth chapter this financial model
is built into a general model of the comparative statics of the macro-
economy.
2.1.?. In Germany in the period under review the manufacture of money
was effected by *2
i the Reichsbank, as the central bank, ie the note-issuing bank,
\
and bankers' bank to the financial system. Four other note-issuing
banks were too small to matter in this context. The bank issued money
a by buying gold and foreign exchange (including foreign bills close
to maturity/ at a fixed price, and b, by discounting 'eligible'
domestic paper of (after September 192^) lees than three months maturity.
In practice 'eligibility' was defined rather strictly, not only with
respect to the bill itself, but also to the status and solidity of the
discounter *3. Finally c/ the Reichsbank also lent against eligible
collateral (Lombardkredit , but the securities, bills etc which it
gained through its lombard business were, unlike the assets obtained
*2 An estimate of the total money stock in 1929 is given by
J harschak and W Lederer, 'Grflssenoranungen des deutschen
Geldsystems', p 391. This should be read in conjunction with
Northrop op.cit. p ^5, where estimates of the turnover of giral
balances are provided.
*3 G Hardach, teeltmarktorientierung ... p 153*
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via transactions a and b , not available as reserves to 'back'
the currency issue *4.
Despite its near monopoly of the currency issue, the Reichsbank's
control of the money supply was vitiated by the fact that in two
senses it was not fully banker to the government.
Firstly, its credit business with the Reich was limited, after its
reconstruction in 19?4, to the extension of a 100 mill.Rm. overdraft
(Kontokorrentkredit,. Not till 1926 was the Reichsbank law amended
to enable it to rediscount up to 400 mill.Rm. of Reich treasury bills
of less than three months maturity (and actually, such bills were not
issued till 1928,. Initially there was no provision for holding
longer term government securities; not until 1933 was government stock
of above one year maturity admitted as eligible collateral for
'lombard credit'. During the period 1924-29 it may be said that the
Reichsbank was not equipped for the conduct of open-market operations
in long term stock *5» Secondly, the Reichsbank was not the sole
depositary of government funds, and was further disadvantaged by its
statutory inability to pay interest on such deposits. Hence large
quantities of public moneys were also deposited with the Prussian State
Bank (Seehandlung,, with the 'concern' banks of public enterprises,
such as the Keichskreditgesellschaft (banker to Reich industrial enter¬
prises; or the Deutsche Verkehrshank (railway bank,, or with other
banks, tven departments of the Reich did not necessarily bank with
*4 Currency in circulation had to be backed to 40% by gold and
foreign exchange; the residual (to 100%. by 'eligible' domestic
bills. ■ tax was payable if the 40% limit was breached.
Northrop op.cit. p 32; K Stucken op.cit. pp 65-6.
*5 Northrop op.cit. pp 35ff» 56, 147; Bopp op.cit. p 4?6.
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the keichsbank *6. This circumscribed its control of the money
market. Thus both in respect of long and short term debt, the fact
that the Keichsbank (largely as a consequence of the inflation was
not fully banker to the government impaired its control of the
financial markets.
ii; In the 'second line' of money creation may be placed the balances
in the giro accounts which handled the bulk of non-cash transfers.
The Eeichsbank itself was of major importance in this field. Giral
balances with it were held not only by the commercial banks to
facilitate inter-bank clearances, but also by a large number of firms,
by government departments and a few individuals. Giral business was
also conducted by the Post Office and by the Giral Clearing Associations
(CiroverbMnde; of local savings banks and of producers* (and some
consumers') co-operatives. There was lastly a certain amount of direct
clearance between commercial banks, of cheques drawn on their 'sight'
deposits (tHglich ffillige Guthaben/, but this seems to have been still
relatively underdeveloped *7-
iii/ In the 'third line' of money creation stood the deposits with
the commercial (ie the Privatkcedit-/ banks - that is, deposits at
between 7 days and three months notice, - and deposits in Post Office
savings accounts. As rather liquid assets these functioned as 'near
moneys'.
*6 See J Popitz, Die Kapitalwirtschaft der 'offentlichen hand',
PP 233-9; As evidence of the competition of the 'Seehandlunp'
to attract public deposits, see the article by its President,
1 Schrtider, 'Der Ausgleich auf dera Geldmarkt', in Bankarchiv
XXVI (1926/7/.
*7 Northrop op.cit. pp ^2-8, 15&-9» J J Klein, 'German honey and
Prices' pp 133-6.
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Iinally, it should be said that commercial and savings banks were
subject to no official reserve ratios *8.
It is convenient to summarise at this point the other classes of debt
which made up the financial structure *9. Starting at the most liquid
end we have the daily and monthly money (Tages und Honats&eld, lent
by banks to each other or to third parties, usually in connection with
transactions on the stock or commodities markets, iorwara transactions
on the stock market could be prolonged by a device of bank lending
called 'heport credit'. Closely related to this was the market in
bills (Privatdiskont. or the market in bankgirierte Warenwechsel/.
When the lending was against securities, it was lombard business;
and as this was usually associated with stock market transactions,
bank credit under the head of Beports and Lombards is usually con¬
sidered an indicator of bank lending to the stock market *10.
So much for what might be termed 'debt pertaining to the 'formal'
money market'. A second, much less liquid, class of debt was that
created by customer borrowing from banks; eg the well-known
Kontokorrentkredit. This was a field of fierce competition. The
Berlin great banks competed with each other for the large scale
credits to 'big' business and commerce; the needs of small business,
*8 Bopp op.cit. p kky.
*9 On this see W Prion, 'Organisation des deutschen Kapitalmarktes
und der deutschen Bankwirtschaft'; I During, 'KreditmSrkte und
Zinesiitze seit der Stabilisierung; ' Northrop op.cit. pp 70-16?.
*10 A considerable proportion of bank overdrafts was also related
to stock market business, but these cannot be isolated.
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formerly met by a mass of private and local bankers, were now increas¬
ingly competed for by public sector (eg municipal and savings, banks *11.
Export credits were a field of competition between the great banks,
certain private banks and, in this period, foreign banks.
To conclude this rapid review of the financial structure, 1 consider
long term securities. This market had suffered grievously from the
obliteration of its stock ii the inflation, a condition hardly remedied
by the legislative revaluation of debt in July 1925 *12. The basis
of the long term securities maritet is usually the debt of the central
government; in this period the revalued pre-192^ Reich debt (which was
subject to peculiar conditions;, and the small amount of post-192*t
Reich debt, could not serve this purpose. Then there came the bonds
of the states and the multifarious local authorities, the stock of
which was growing at a faster rate *13. Ferhaps aa antique and as
solid in the German financial structure are the mortgage bonds
(Pfandbriefe/. ie the bonds secured against loans on agricultural,
residential and, more rarely, industrial property. In the 1920s the
'best' mortgage bonds were issued by a class of private (Hypotheken-
Aktien-.; or public (Kommunal-cD credit institutions.
*11 See k Prion, article cit. *9; E-A V/2 Die Bankkredite,
PP 155-162; Northrop op.cit. pp 90-95«
'12 See p 123 below for details.
*13 From Hoffmann ... p 790 it appears that the nominal value of
the total stock of government debt (all levels) in 1913 was
27 mrd.km.; in 1929 it was 12 mrd.Rm. of which 3.2 mrd.kra.
had been issued abroad.
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The last major type of long, term security was the equity and bonds
of industrial/commercial companies. Equity was of c urse less affected
by the inflation, but the value of the domestic stock of industrial/
commercial bonds was in 1929 still only c. of that in 1913 *1*+.
The major holders of long term securities were (not in order of
importance , the private rentier, private savings institutions such
as savings banks and insurance companies, and the state-run social
insurance schemes. Commercial banks acted as issuing houses for all
I
classes of long term security (except mor|age bonds but preferred
not to hold more than small quantities on their own account as
'permanent' assets *15*
?.?. The Cyclical Development of linancial Karkets: Data
In this section I assemble data on short term interest rates, domestic
and foreign bond prices, equity prices, domestic and foreign new issues,
and short term capital flows. These are to be referred to when reading
*1C Hoffmann... p 785 (Obligationen aer Aktiengesellschaften/.
The 1929 figure must be multiplied by 0.3 since c.70% of the
total stock as of 31*12.29 had been issued abroad.
Cf. Wi.u.Stat. 1930 p 386. The total nominal value of equity
(of which almost all was issued at home; was in 1929 c.180%
of the 1913 value. Hoffmann ... loc.cit.
*15 W Hagemann, Das VerhSltnis der Orossbanken zur Industrie,
pp 63-73; G Bernhard, 'Die Liquiditfltssttirungen und die Krise
des deutschen Bankensystems, passim; E Wolfgang, 'Kritische
larstellung der Kreditbeschaffungstechnik der flffentlichen
Kflrperschaften', pp 793-806 (on public sector/.
20
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Table 1 Short Term Interest Rates










12. 1.29 .... 6-)%
25. **.29 .... 9§*
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1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
9.1 5.3 6.1 6.7 7.8
10.8 6.6 7.8 8.2 9.0
7.6 k.9 5.5 6.5 6.9
9.0 5.8 5.8 6.9 7.3
9.2 6.7 5.8 7.0 7.1
















* Monthly honey only in 192^
Sources to TABLE 1a: Konj.Stat.Ildb. (1936 p 109.
1b: 192^: Statistisches Jahrbuch f.d. deutsche
Reich 1926 p 539.
1925: Konj.Stat.Hdb.(1936. pp 112-5.
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TABLE 2 BOKb AND EQUITY PRICES
v • -r
Pa Quarterly Average Price of 8% Gold M rtgage Bonds
i22i 1923 1926 1927 2221 2221
1st Quarter • 88.1 89.5 103.2 98.0 95.'+
2nd Quarter - 85.3 98.2 102.3 97.3 94.2
3rd Quarter 86.4 82.9 98.9 100.5 97.0 93-*+
4th Quarter 85.1 82.2 100.0 98.4 96.6 92.2
2b Bond Prices in New York (Index: 1927=100- Quarterly
i; Moody's Aaa US Bonus ii, 1st Class German hey York Bonds
2221 1928 2221 2221 102S 1929
1st Qu. 98.3 102.5 98.1 100.5 99.3 97.8
2nd Qu. 99.8 101.4 96.8 100.5 99.5 96.5
3rd Qu. 100.1 98.9 95.'' 100.0 98.7 96.7
4th Qu. 101.8 99.3 97.0 98.9 98.2 95.4
2c PciEeetic Share Price Index
1924 1925 2221 2221 1228 1929
1st Quarter 120 82 168 145 143
2nd Quarter 99 97 168 152 138
3rd Quarter 82 117 157 149 134
4th Quarter 72 140 140 148 120
Sources to TABLE 2: a. Stat.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1926 p 337, 192? pp 372-3.
19?8 pp *+38-9; E Wolfgang, Lie Kursbildung...
P 91.
bi C C Abbott, The Nev York Bond harket,
pp 167-8 (inverse of yields adjusted to
1927=100 .
biij Vk 6(1927 p 392; 7(1928/ pp 35,327;
BT1929' PP 107,435; 9(1930/ p 107.
c, Konj.Stat.Kdb. (1936 p 115-
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3a New Issues of Equity on the Lomestic Market
(Nominal Value excl. Mergers ) Mill.Em.
1924 mi 1926 mi 1928 1929
1st Quarter 219 99 379 201 357
2nd Quarter 142 120 432 412 338
3rd Quarter 151 305 248 324 165
4 th Quarter 149 374 310 385 104
Annual Average 588 656 988 1438 1339 979
3b New IBond Issues on the Domestic Market Mill.Em.
1st Quarter 338 436 1432 984 582
2nd Quarter 346 918 702 881 362
3rd Quarter 159 825 362 407 386
4th Quarter 187 1034 358 543 223
Annual Total 44o 1080 3579 2854 2905 1553
3c Gtrman Bond Issues on Foreign Capital Markets 1 ill..
1st Quarter 287 324 '85 342 235
2nd Quarter 54 450 89 735 75
3rd Quarter 307 346 670 114 8
4tn Quarter 671 397 565 273 35
Annual Total 1265 1555 1412 1465 349
3d German Public Authority 5e Aggregate Foreign Govt.
Issues Abroad Kill.Em. Bond Issues in New York
Mill.Rm. (for comparison
mi 1928 1929 mi 192811 if mi
1st Qu. 2 1? 886 1189 151
2nd Qu. 95 - 836 920 25
3rd Qu. 103 24 - 580 357 97
4th Qu. 150 62 15 1604 273 17
SOURCES to TABLE ?: All sections excppt 3c (1923-26) and 3e:
Stat.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 19?7 p 389; 1928 p 433;
1929 p 315; 1930 p 369.
3c: 1925-26 data - Wk 6(1927) p 384.
3e: C C Abbot op.cit. pp 200-202.
23 2/11
TABLE 4 QUARTERLY INFLOW OF SHORT TERM CAPITAL Kill.Rm.
1924 1925 1926 1927 M 1929
1st Quarter 905 -491 333 819 143
2nd Quarter *»91 -788 1066 445 -
3rd Quarter 497 3 3^7 698 812 -
4th Quarter k? 366 802 1103 -
Annual Total 1112 1937 -566 2899 3179 «■
SOURCE TO TABLE 4: V.jh.Kon.i.forsch. 1929 H1A p y6. The data
is related to the Balance of Payments residual.
2.3. The cyclical Development of Pinancial Markets 1924-29
description
It is a well-established generalisation that the demand for real
money balances falls as the expected rate of price inflation rises *16.
When therefore inflationary expectations collapsed as the Reichebank
ceased its discounting of paper mark Treasury Bills in November 1923*
and succeeded in holding its exchange rate steady in the face of b<ear
speculation, the existing stock of money proved totally inadequate,
at the emerging price level,to meet the revised demand *17- This
excess demand for money manifested itself in a huge excess supply of
*16 P Cagan, 'The Monetary dynamics of Hyperinflation';
A I) Bain, The Control of the koney Supply,' pp 104-5.
*17 Currency (Renten- and Billmark. plus emergency cash (Notgeld.
were estimated at c. 2.5 mrd. gold mark in December 1923* as
against 6.9 mrd.fi. in 1913 (when the price level had been
lower. Cf. Bardach, Weltrnarktorientierung ... p 315 also
Piink op.cit. pp 88-93-
other debt: daily and monthly rr.unoy rates jumped to several hundred
percent; longer term debt could not be sold. To be sure, this
incorporated a large inflation risk premium, but even when general
indexing of loans (Entwertungsklausel) was introduced in early 1924,
daily and monthly money rates remained at c.2% per month *18. The
high rates offered by banks for deposits and the abnormally large gap
between bank lending and borrowing rates, coupled with bank reluctance
to lend except to clients of known reputation, presumably betrays their
avid attempts to rebuild cash balances, as well as their high subjective
discounting of business risks *19, The keichsbank had however pegged
its discount rate at 10%, so that discount business was extremely brisk
in the first few months of 1924; in consequence notes and coin in
circulation increased by nearly 25% by the end of March *20,
The price cf conwodity and gold mark bonds rose steeply in the uncertain
period between November and the end of 1925» but thereafter, as an
expression of the general excess supply, fell steeply, Eeuity prices
behaved similarly. New issue markets for all long term debt and
equity were practically closed *21. Luring this time demand for
*18 Wk 5(1924) pp 74-5, 155; Wd 10/1 (1925 PP 207, 247, ter GeH und
Kapitalmarkt im Jahre 1924'. The indexing of loans against
inflation ceased with the introduction of the Keichsmark in
October 1924.
*19 See Table 5 p 52 . Wd_ 9/1(1924, pp 221ff, 'Starres oder
elastisches System?'; Wk 5(1924; pp 281-5; F hllller, hie
Reichsbank ... in lintersuchun. des Bankwesens 1 Vol 2 pp 202-5.
See too pp 46-7 below.
*20 Wk 5(1924 pp 86ff; Hardach, Weltmarktorientierunr ... P 51*
*21 Wd 10/1(1975. PP 207-9, Tie Geld- und KapitalmSrkte im Jahre
1924'; Wlc 5(1924) pp 66ff, l49ff. In Kay 1924 the current
yield (coupon value divided by price) on good bonds was 14% -
ibid, p 155» (True yield were much higher, since bond prices
were below parity;.
foreign exchange was so heavy, owing largely to the deteriorating
Balance of Faytnents, and reserves so small, that the Reichsbank could
only provide a small percentage of the quantities of foreign exchange
demanded *22, In consequence of this, and of signs of renewed price
rise within Germany, the 'Billmark* sank below parity in February and
again in early April. Schaeht decided on a stern remedy: "a rest
cure for the currency coupled with a hunger cure for the economy" *23»
and on 7«*+»2*+ he announced a 'Kreditstopp'. Reichsbank holdings of
discounted and lombarded paper were to be frozen at current levels,
'
and within this total gradually to be redistributed in a desirable
manner (above all in the interests of exports and agriculture!. *2*+.
The price of daily money shot up temporarily to 50% and the bankruptcy
rate soared, but the mark recovered quickly in foreign markets, the
Balance of Payments improved dramatically, and the domestic price
level fell *25. In the long term perhaps the most serious aspect of
the 'Stopp' was that it signalised the abandonment by the Reichsbank
of its hitherto unfailing commitment to act as lender of the last
resort, thus nullifying the traditional (low, cash ratio policies of
*22 Wd_ 10/1 (19?5 PP 9ff» 'Ein Jshr fester Wflhrung*: Wk 3(192*o
PP *+1. Cf.Kardach, Weltmarktorientierung ... pp 33* Buoyant
foreign expectations had otherwise prevented a slippage: Wd_ 9/1
(192*o p 169, 'Eer I'arkkurs und der Spekulation'; Wk 3(192'+ -
p 109.
*23 Wd 9/1(192E}, 'Starres oder elastisches System?' Already in
Feb. rediscount facilities of banks trying to evade exchange
controls load been suspended: F Miller, article cit. *19 P 200.
K r.'tiller, hie Zetntralbank ... p 55 makes heavy weather of the
fact that the banks long term aim was to accumulate enough
reserves to enable convertibility.
•?*+ Wk 3(192*+, P 153; Wd 10/1(1925/ PP 9ff (see *22); pp 207-209
(see *21). F Miller loc.cit. *?3; also the studies in *1,
especially Hardach pp 51ff«
*25 Wk 3(192*+ pp 212, 21*+, 280ff, 387ff, *+25.
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the commercial banks *26.
The renewed fall in bond and equity prices is probably also partly
related to the 'Stopp', but the effects in this market were less
dramatic. Short term interest rates remained high until June, and
at the same time, aided perhaps by a support initiative of the banks,
share prices seemed to bottom out. From then on till the end of tne
year interest rates fell and bank lending conditions eased teee Table 5
p 2/20j. Improved confidence in the currency is reflected in the
reduced gap between interest rates on indexed and non-indexed loans *27.
In September the Eeichsbank relaxed its credit quota by 10% and
increased the allowable maturity of eligible bills from six/gight
weeks to three months *28. But this was not the major reason for the
easing of financial conditions. Of great significance was the incipient
inflow cf foreign funds, signalised by the ability of the Keichsbank
to abolish its foreign exchange quotas from June 1924. Initially this
was a consequence of the improved Balance of Payments; from September,
when the external balance again began to deteriorate, it must reflect
a considerable inflow of short term funds in response tc interest rate
differentials; this was the impression of contemporaries *29.
*26 yk 3(1924; pp 213,281; Wd 9/1(1924, pp 384ff, 'Reichsbank und
Kreditinstitute'; R P Ltflce, Von der Stabilisierung zur Krise.
pp 200,213* The Bank used restrictions because it believed
that no feasible rise in discount would have been effective.
Cf.Schacht's statement E-A V/1 Die Reichsbank, p 147; W Prion,
Per Deutsche Geld- und Kredit-harkt .... p 340; Wd 10/1(1925/*
p 588, 'Per Kreditmarkt und die Industrie III'.
♦27 Wk 3(1924), pp 150, 282, 391-2, 396; Wd art.cit. *24; 9/1
7T924) pp 80?ff, 'Per Pcvisenmarkt in den letzten Fonaten'.
•28 F Muller art.cit. *19» p 203. Hardach, Weltmarktorientierung,
P 39.
*29 Wd 10/1(1925/ PP 9ff (cf.*22/{ Wk loc.cit. *27.
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By the last months of the year the first (post-stabilisation; formal
flotations of German bonds abroad were registered *30. Secondly, the
easing of the money market was probably also related to the reflux of
cash balances belonging to the public sector, and generated by the
strongly developing fiscal surplus, which was seeking short term and
licuid employment. Thirdly, the liquidity preference of the banks
themselves, aware of their limited rediscount facilities at the
Eeichsbank, probably contributed to the easing of the money market *31.
The recovery of the capital market was much less definite in the latter
half of 192*4. Equity prices recovered weakly and irregularly between
July and 0 tober, though more strongly thereafter, and the current
yield on bonds fell to nearly 9% by October *32. New domestic share
issues and a number of 10$: gold mortgage bond flotations also began to
appear from that month *33» The fact that the increasing fluidity of
the money market was to no small degree an expression of the liquidity
preference of some of its main participants implies relative
*30 «k 3(192^; p '406; *4(1925- pp 88ff; E Kuczynski, Deutsche
Anleihen im Ausland, p 21.
*31 On the fiscal surplus see below pp 92ff. Wk 3(192*4. p 282;
Wd 9/2(19?*+- P 110'+; 10/1(1925- PP 209ff (articles on money
market ; E Arzet, 'Die Entwicklung der Dinss&tze ...'
(in Centralverband ... i'aterialien ... p 23;
Bopp op.cit. p D80.
*3? Currient Yield = coupon rate divided by price. True yields
were doubtless higher (see *21-.
*33 Wk 3(192*4, pp 393, 399; Wd 9/2(192*4, pp no*+ff.
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retardation of the recovery of the capital market *Jk,
koney rates levelled off at 9-1 in early 1925 - ie at around
Reich6bank discount rate which was cut from 10£ to 9% on 26 February,
and at a level still considerably above foreign market rates (A-5%>,
or foragn currency borrowing rates in Germany *35« This levelling
off is usually ascribed however to a reduction in the rate of inflow
of foreign funds in early 1925, associated with the raising of
discount rates at that time by both the i > deral Reserve Bank of New
York and the Bank of England, and with the 'hot money' flows into
sterling (connected with sterling's expected return to gold *36.
At the same time the heichsbank initiated s kind of open market policy
which reduced the fluidity of the money market. The aim of this
policy was to re-establish Reichsbank control over the administration
of public sector moneys which it had lost during the inflation the
method was the sale of rediscounted bills from its own portfolio to
the various public funds' managers, thu6 providinf them with a
*3*+ R Arzet, loc.cit. *31: "Durch diese Tendenz (sc. 'die Neigung
der Bffentlichen Ktfrperschaften, Geld entweder nur kurfrietig
als Tagesgeld, oder liquide in Privatdiskont anzulegen'/ wurde
auch die Wiederherstellung ausreichender Verbinduni skanifle zuro
Anlagemarkt verhindert".
*35 Wk ^(1925) PP 77-51, 178, l82ff.
*36 R Arzet op.cit. p 23; Wc M1925) pp 77, 177, 182-3; Wd 10/1
(19?5- P 10/2(1925-' p 1132. Tables 3 and k on pp 22-3
above do not support the theory of a decline in capital inflow
before the 2nd quarter of 1925» The domestic blade of the
scissors - the inventory boom and the related Balance of Trade
deficit - are probably equally important to the explanation.
profitable but still liquid investment *37. The Reichsbank's stock
of bills and collateral paper, which had been steady at the quota
maximum (2 mrd.Rm.} ever since April 1924, began to drop from December
1924; by April 1925 it was only 1.35 mrd.Rm. *38.
A more dramatic development in early 1925 was the collapse of share
prices (from February). The causes do not seem clear. Since bond
prices scarcely fell at this time, it cannot be explained very well
as the reflex of stiffening conditions in other markets *39. It
was variously ascribed to disillusionment with the gold mark initial
balance sheets of the companies, (of which the majority appeared in
late 1924-early 1925 and with the failure of many companies to return
dividends *40. Kowever one explains the reversal of expectations
which caused the turning point, the severity of the decline must be
related to the extreme decline in stock exchange turnover after february;
*3? E-A V/1 Die r.eichsbank, p 65; E Puhl, Reichsbank: Wiederaufbau
des Geld- und Kapitalmarktee (Untersuchung des Bankwesens Teil I,
II-/2> p 219; tiardach stresses this policy: Weltmarktorient-
ierung;,-.. pp 52ff. Contemporary comment suggests that it became
effective from Feb.-larch 1925. Dee Wd 10/1(1925/ P 209, 641;
Wk 4(1925/ pp 76-7,177 - these report continued excess liquidity
on the money market in Dec/Jan because of public funds, but
Wd 10/1(1925/ P 404, and Wk 4(1925) p 325 report the effects of
Reichsbank measures.
*38 Data from Hardach, Thesis P 249. LUke, op.cit. p 213 seems to
ascribe this decline to the fact that discounters were bypassing
the Reichsbank in favour of cheaper foreign facilities. This
theory (doubtless true of 1926. has to explain why the gap between
German and foreign interest rates failed to narrow before the end
of 1925.
*39 Wk 4(1925/ PP 68-9, 172-3, and eep. 427 :"^fbie sogenannte
wertbest&ndige Anleihen_/ blieb von der allgemeinen Baisse des
Aktienmarktes verschont, obwohl im laufenden Jahr eine
betr&'chtliche Zunahme an festver^inslichen Reuemissionen (ie
mortgage bonds - TB/ erfolgte".
*40 S W Flink, op.cit. p 170
the resultant 'thinness' of the market would reduce the potential
liquidity of security holdings, and thus tend to intensify the
speculative movements *4i.
In the wake of expectations depressed by the general financial and
business crisis from mid-year *42, the capital market remained
inactive, and prices low till the end of 1925? by contrast, Gem: n
capital issuing abroad picked up from the last quarter and at the same
time (owing to renewed influx of foreign funds, the money market
eased *43*
Piom the beginning of 1926 money rates began to fall rapidly and by
mid-year, at 4-6%,were close to international levels. Reichsbank rate
followed the easing of the market reluctantly; as a result rediscount-
ing at the Reichsbank fell steeply since it was cheaper to rediscount
abroad *44. Thus there developed "two Reichsbanks in Germany;
firstly the bank which £~Lt £chacht_/7 represented, and secondly that
*41 See Kon.j,Stat.Hdb.(1936 p 115- Mt 4(1925) P 317 (esp. on
Stinnes crash.. See also for theoretical discussion P Davison,
honey and the Peal World, up 61-69, 319-335*
*42 Notably affected by the 'Stinnes crash* in July. Wk 4(1925/'
pp 251-2, 363—4; Wd 10/2(1925) P 1319.
•43 Wk 4(1925) pp 425, 434 ff; Wd 10/2(1925/ 'Geldmarkt und
E%se', pp 1513, 1696, 1805, 1951* The simultaneous swing of
the Balance of Payments into surplus, owing to the recession,
would work in the same direction.
*44 Wd, 'Der Geldmarkt', 11/1(1926; p 709, 11/2(1926/ pp 1063,1378,
1708; Wk 5(1926, pp 153*391* Reichsbank holdings of eligible
bills and collateral fell from 1.7 mrd.Rm. in August 1925 to
0.9 mrd.Rm. in Nov. 1926: Hardach, Thesis, p 249. See too
Hardach, Weltmarktorientierung ... pp 69ff*
The Reichsbank abolished the now irrelevant aucta at the end of
1925*
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which consisted in foreign credits" *45. The 'second' robbed the
'first' of its ability to control the development of the money supply,
since the 'first' Reichsbank's stock of assets was too small for the
conduct of effective open market operations *46. In July 1926 Schacht
abolished the fixed exchange rate (thus freeing the exchanges within
the gold points, to discourage the short term inflow; it had little
effect *^7. To the end of 1926 public authorities were still awash
with cash (not now so much through current surpluses, as through the
need to retain large precautionary balances in view of inadequate
borrowing rights at the central bank *48 and these too were likely
to depress money market rates *49.
What effect had this easing of the money market on bank lending
conditions? The general reduction is obvious from Table 5 overleaf.
*45 Schacht before the bank commission of enquiry (Dnquete
Ausschuss according to Hardach, Lie beide heichsbanken ...
PP 373-''* See also B-A V/1 Die keichsbank, pp 63-4.
*46 H Neisser, Die alte und die nene Reichsbank ... pp 31^-6;
Wd 12/1(1927, p11; also refs. *45. The Reichsbank tried to
reduce market fluidity by the issue of 'sola* bills through
the Golddiskontbank, but evidently with small effect.
*47 E-A V/1 Die Reichsbank, p 76; Hardach, Weltmarktorientierung ...
PP 75-6.
*48 E Neisser op.cit. pp 324-6; Use Kaurer, Reichsfinanzen und
Grosse Koalltion ... p 14.
*49 Wk refs. *45; Wd 'Geldmarkt und Btfrse' 11/1(1926, p 601, 11/2
(1926; pp1G63,1378,1708. See too Schacht's report to the Reich
government on 7.3*27s BA R43 1/655, Bericht des Herrn Reichsbank-
prSsidenten ... Schacht tried to keep control of public moneys
by fulmination (see report just cited; also Wd 11/2(1926, pl8l0,
'Reichsbank gegen Kreditanarchie'. and by negotiation (Wd 12/1
(1927,' PP 665-7 • Neither was very successful.
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Beposit i--ates and Lancing Charges of Berlin Credit
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SOUKCKS; 1.7.24 - 12.1.27: Wk 3(1924; p 398; 4(1925; P 179;
5(1926/ pp 154,272; 6(1927) P 37.
lec 1927-Jan 1930- Konj.Stat.Hdb. (1936/ pp 110-111.
(Tables *8, *10, +T% "5.
I turn to consider the difference between bank lending and borrowing
rates. If in this Table we consider the gap between column ii; -
deposits at 15-30 days notice, and column iv; - Kontokorrentkredite',
v.e see that between July 1924 and March 1925 it was reduced from
c.18% to THs gap fell slightly to 6~I% by the end of 1925* It
then fell to by early 1927. This implies that bank policy closely
followed the development of t e money and capital markets except that
the effects of the crisis of the summer of 1925 may not be fully
reflected in these data. The comments of Lie Wirtschaftskurve suggest
that between July-October 1925 banks were seeking to improve their
liquidity as a result perhaps of their involvement in the bank¬
ruptcy crisis *50.
The earing of 'Kontokorrent' charges in October 1925 probably reflects
a slackening in the demand for credit, but certainly from 1926 the
easing of bank licuiaity and lending policies again runs parallel with
the easing of market conditions - and the renewed inflow of funds *51•
Since the easing of the money market in late 1925 was largely an
expression of the liquidity preference of financial institutions, bond
*50 klc 4(1925; PP 328-9» 4*4, 436-7. According to p 435 real cost
of bank credit to industrial/commercial clients may be "some¬
what dearer, where obtainable" in Autumn 1925» despite unaltered
official charges, because of stricter collateral requirements.
In early 1926 the liquidity preference of banks is said to have
diminished: Wk 5(19?6; p 151» and S W Flink, op.cit. pp 177-8.
*51 But in 1926 the Reichsbank had to urge banks to reduce their
charges, according to Bcpp, op.cit. p 478.
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prices failed to rise; share prices continued to fall *52 • New
issues of both were very small, and stock market turnover reached a
minimum *53« But fr m the beginning of 1926 bond and share prices
began a climb which continued without interruption till February 192?,
and, on its crest, new capital issues, beginning with gold mortgage
bonds and spreading to other classes of bonds and equity, gathered
momentum throughout the year. Stock market turnover rose rapidly;
from the beginning of 1926 foreign participation was deemed an important
element. 1926 is often regarded as the year when the German stock
market 'reopened' *5^#
Foreign capital imports recovered strongly from as early as autumn
1925, and remained at a high level throughout 1926 *55» In December
1926 Dr Schacht, alarmed at the rate of increase of foreign indebted¬
ness, prevailed on the government to suspend the exemption from capital
yield tax which had hitherto (in practice; been enjoyed by all private
ector foreign bonds (and by 'approved' public sector foreign bondei.
As a result, foreign capital issues practically ceased in the first half
of 1927 *56. A few weeks later Schacht reduced keichsbank discount
*52 Wk A(1925 p J-6h, 'Kissverh&ltnis zwischen kurz- una langfristigen
Krediten', 5(1926, p 30; tod 10/2(1925 'Geldmarkt . nd Bd'rse',
pp 1805,1951.
*53 Konj.Stat.Hdb. (1936, p 115*
*5^ Wk 5(1926, pp 1^-158,3781,39/i ('He-opening' - p 393-5
Wd 11/1(1926- pp 123,601, 11/2(1926. pp 1063,1708.
B Benning, Per 'schwarze Freitag'... p 88.
♦55 Wk refs *53, *5*u
*56 F kpeth, Deutschlands Auslandverschuldung ... pp 72-U; Mt 6
(1927> p ^+1,152. Thus German borrowers were excluded from a
very buoyant period on the New York market: C C Abbott, The
New York Bond f-arket 1920-1930 PP 108ff. For the 'approval'
procedure for public foreig-n bond issues, see below PP-io^ff •
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rate to 5$ to cL ecourage the foreign short term inflow *57,
Scliacht evidently believed thet the domestic capital market could
cope on its own. Already however, in autumn 1926 there had been signs
that it was absorbing the flood of new issues with a little difficulty
This of itself was not unusual in relation to pre-war experience *59*
but in February 1927 the first post-stabilisation bond issue of the
Reich (for 500 raill.km.) proved a failure; considerable quantities
were quickly resold by first (speculative/ buyers, so that the issuing
consortium had to support its price heavily *60, The failure ras
variously ascribed to i; the low coupon rate - 5% (issued at 92$ of
par ; the loan was intended to establish the 5% rate as 'standard' *61
ii, the- Bheer size of the issue *62, At any rate the experience
gravely weakened the domestic bond market for the rest of the year,
*57 Bericht «,, 7-3-27 (ref *h9,. A further aim may have been to
ease the Reich's bond issue: A G for Reparations, Memorandum
of 20.10t27, P 17(manuscript copy,. But see *6? below.
*58 Wd 11/2(1926/ P 1378; Wk 5(1926, P 393; 5-1.28, 'her
deutsche Kapitalmarkt im Jahre 1927',
*59 P Kempner, hie VerhHltnisse am Geldmarkt (Centralverband ...
katerialien ..., p 33-
*60 Wd 12/1(1927' PP 316,617; 12/2(1927 p 1252 (coupon raised to
"W, in August.; Wk 6(1927/ PP 36,40,151-
*61 Wri 12/1,(1927/ P 159, 'Geldmarkt und Bt'rse': "Hierdurch sucht
man den VorkriegsverhSltnissen zu n£hern." Wk 5(1927/ P ^0.
It was also the first mapor post-stabilisation bond without a
fine gold clause.
*62 View of Schacht; see Bericht ,., 7-3-27 (ref *^9/. But seme
blamed the failure on the unccoperativeness of the Reichsbank:
hBZ 21,6.27 P 11, 'Kreditbarometer'.
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inhibiting new domestic issues till early 1928, and engendering a slow
price fall which lasted (as it turned out/ till the end of the decade ♦63#
The domestic share price index also faltered in February, probably as
a repercussion of the overloaded bond market, but it recovered its
momentum in March-April *6^. From February most money market rates
began to rise. In addition to the 'open market' effect of the Reich
flotation, this can be ascribed to i, the reduced inflow of the
proceeds of foreign capital issues *65» and ii/ the deterioration of
the balance of payments (current account . . Throughout the first half
of 1927 the Reichemark was below parity on the exchanges *66. finally
iii the gathering domestic upswing would increase the demand for
'transactions balances'•
But the share price index drove relentlessly upwards. Most contem¬
poraries seemed to believe that, by spring 1927* prices were 'too
high' *67, and probably a consensus was worried by the degree to which
*63 Tatole 2a p 21 . W Hagemann op.cit. p 67 (re industrial bonds/.
On public sector bonds, see belcv/ pp 101 ff .
*6A Wd 12/1(1927/ pp 316,^73. Wk refs *60.
*65 The fluidity at the turn of 19?6/7 was commonly traced to short-
term employment of the proceeds of foreign bond issues:
Wd 10/2(1926; p 1709; Schacht, Bericht ... (ref *h9,.
*66 Wk 6(1927) p 3§8; cf. Wd 12/1(1927. p £*62.
*67 eg Wd 12/1(1927 pp *<62,665-7; Wk 6(1927; PP *+2-3. C I/uisberg
(chairman, IG larben expressed himself against the speculation:
B Be-nning, op.cit. pp 9^,112; also C f von Siemens:
Wk 6(1927. P 153. The 'realism' of share prices was calculated
with respect to 1926 dividends, cf. V.jh.Kon.i.forsch. 1927 H1
p 19(which thus g.ives the return on equity as 5«67% in 1913*
3,56>t,. For further discussion see B Benning op.cit. pp 112ff;
also pp7l below.
Margin requirements were raised in Jan/Feb Ibid, pp 117-8.
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the speculation seemed to be supported by foreign funds. Among these
was Dr Schacht *68. To this he added worries about the declining
gold and foreign exchange reserves of the bank, and the growing bill
portfolio; yet he wished to avoid an increase in discount rate which
would merely attract more foreign funds. Believing that in the long
run the foreign exchange weakness would be aggravated by the repatri¬
ation of profits from the stock market, and believing also that cash
balances ought to be diverted from unprodu tive, speculative employ¬
ments to the productive use of financing industry and trade *69, he
sought to persuade the credit banks to reduce their lending to the
stock market, reinforcing his 'suasion' with the threat of the selective
restriction of rediscount facilities to recalcitrants *70. The
relationship between Schacht's 'suasion' and the credit bank's action
is not quite clear *71, but on 13 hay 1927 the Association of Berlin
Banks issued the following communique:
*68 See the documentation of his utterances in B Benning op.cit.
pp 93-ff; also in Schacht's Bericht ... (ref *^9'»
*69 Schacht's views can be gleaned from his Bericht ... (ref *h9);
from E-A V/1 Die heichsbank pp 65ff, 200ff; and . 3D 31.5*27,
'Schachts hechtfertigung' (report of his Stralsund speech.;
further B Benning op.cit. pp 10? and especially pp 119-132.
Benning (pp 13Sff asserts that Schacht himself added fuel to
the speculation by failing to reduce Lombard rate in January
when he cut discount rate, thus supporting the high stock
market money rates.
"70 Kardach, V-eltmarktorientierunj, ... pp ?'8ff; Boop op.cit.
p L78.
*71 In his Bericht..»« of 20.1.28 (BA K L3/I 635-» Schacht refers
to "the somewhat curious communique". The banks sought to blame
Schacht. Some blamed the government, who vigorously denied
cognizance: Benning op.cit. pp 98-9.
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"The members of the Association of Berlin Banks ad Bankers
(fctempelvereinipunp have reached an agreement today to
effect a gradual but significant reduction in moneys lent
*"or Report- and Lombard purposes, and in other forms of
credit on securities. As immediate action they will reduce
stock exchange Report and Lombard lending by 23% before the
mid-June settlement, and undertake further restrictions by
the following settlement dates. leans to clients (sc.
'against securities' will be treated in the same manner.
The cooperation of financial institutions outside the
Association is expected" *72.
The communique was issued just before the mid-i>ay settlement date;
it caused a dramatic fall in forward prices (pertaining to the mid-
June date and hence in current prices *73• The share price collapse
seems grossly to have exceeded the intentions of the instigators of
the action. Report and Lombard lending was indeed reduced by c.25%
by mid-June; thereupon the Association, after discussion with
Schacht, issued a second statement that further credit restrictions
were not intended *7-'>. A brief recovery of share prices in July was
followed by a renewed decline, which continued, punctuated by weak,
irregular recoveries, to 1932» Stock Exchange turnover slumped *75»
Despite his efforts, Schacht had to raise discount rate to 6% in May,
and the next month, following the evident double collapse on the stock
*72 Translated from Benning op.cit. p 93» Ln explanation: forward
contracts on the Berlin stock exchange were made usually for
settlement on either the middle or the end of the month; cf.
Northrop op.cit. p 1?8. See too p 17 above.
*73 B Banning op.cit. p 97.
*7k B Banning op.cit. pp 98,l'+5« The statement said that "the aims
of the action of 13»5«?7 had already been achieved". Wd 12/2
(1927; P 1009 reports a slight price recovery in July - but a
very small turnover.
*75 Kon.j.Stat.Hdb. (1936 p 115» Benning op.cit. p 1*+7: "Es wurde
bald offenbar dass eich ... die Struktur der Bdrse entscheidend
verSndert hatte".
market (shares and bonds) exemption of foreign issues from capital
yield tax (under certain conditions was reintroduced *76. Thereafter
German borrowers floated large quantities of bonds in the U.S. (and
increasingly, on European markets, for about a year. But issuing was
never again as trouble-free as it had been before December 1926.
Repeatedly one reads reports of the temporary saturation of the
American market, and of the inability of issuing houses there to achieve
a final placement of bonds *77. German borrowers were compelled to
'drees up' their bonds by a variety of adornments to render them
attractive, eg with option rights to equity *78. There were probably
three reasons for these symptoms of deficient demand for German long-
term debt:
i The backlog of the supply of German bonds, pent up in the first
half of 1927 'overloaded' the market. It can be seen from Table Jc
p 2'10 that the nominal values of bends issued abroad in each of the
four quarters July 1927 - June 1928 exceeded that of practically every
other quarter during 1925-29#
ii, Political controversies, stirred up by the foreign press and the
Agent-General for Reparations, about the priority of Reparations claims
over other foreign-owned debt, and about the 'unsoundness' of German
*76 Wk 6(1927/ pp 1^8,262. DBZ 21.7.27 P 1, 'Kapitalschutzzoll'.
•77 Mc 6(1927) p ($5, 7(1928, pp 1^5, 150, 255; Wd 13/1(1928)
articles 'Zur Lage' pp 1, 165, 5^9. W Hagemann op.cit. pp 68-9.
*78 IHZ 16.7»27$ 'Lie Speculation sondiert'; DBZ 28.2.29 p 5»
'Vtachsende Schwierigkeiten bei der Kapitalbeschaffung' •
public financial policies, reduced foreign willingness to hold German
bonds *79.
iii) The stock market boom in the U.S. tended to reduce bond prices
(even of domestic U.S. bonds; and hence their saleability, because
of the speculative gains to be expected on equity holdinge *80.
Other capital markets were smaller and their absorbtive capacities more
quickly exhausted *81. After mid-1928, when German bonds became
practically unsaleable in the U.S. *82, certain firms sold equity
abroad, but public disapprobation of the 'alienation' (Uberfremdung/
of German property to foreigners inhibited its being largely prac¬
tised *83. Public Authorities could of course only issue bonds.
The1 domestic capital market remained very unreceptive to new issues
i
*79 P Arzet op.cit. p ?b. In the source to Table 2bii/ p 2/9, the
price index of German bonds in hew York dips perceptibly in
N vember 1927. See Wk 6(1927. FP 38'+-5i J£d 12/2(1927/ P 1693.
The general failure of German New York bond prices to rise as
did domestic U.S. bond prices in later 1927, may reflect the
above-mentioned 'overloading1. See Table p'b p 21 •
♦80 C C Abbott op.cit. pp 116-127, 167, 200-202.
*81 Vvk 6*1927 / P 262: ''/"die/" allerdings raech eintretende
Lrschtipfung des f-arktes". 8(19?9 P 25*
*82 I.'BZ 24.8.28, p 8, 'Kreditbarometer'; 28.2.29, P 5 (see *78/.
*83 eg Commerce Keports 28.10.29, P 203, 'foreign Capital Issues'.
Cf. the controversy over the sale by AEG of a minority share¬
holding to General Electric, and over the sale of Opel to GK.
Wd 1V2(1929/ P 1361, 'General Electric - AEG'; Berliner
Tageblatt 15.10.2?. 'Siemens gegen AEG'; BBZ 16.10.29, 'Der AEG
erwiaert Herrn von Siemens'; DBZ 12.3.29, P 1, 'Die tberfremdung
der Opelwerke'. fore generally, Neue SUrcher Zeitung h.9.29,
'Deutsche Kapitalwanderungen'. lor a recent discussion:
K Gossweiler, Grossbanken, Industriemonopole, Staat, pp 331,
3*H ff.
for the rest of 1927 *84. In 1928 the stock market turnover remained
generally at the low level of later 1927, and heavily dependent on
foreign participation *85. Domestic share and bond issues exceeded
those of 1927 substantially, but at the expense of higher yields *86,
and of recurrent 'overloading* of the market *87. The state of the
bond market deteriorated in the last months of 1928, recovered some¬
what in early 1929, then relapsed to a poor state for the remainder of
the year *88.
Perhaps the most significant wider consequence of the stock market
collapse of May 1927 was a signal deterioration of the liouidity of the
*84 Wd_ 12/1 (1927/ pp 96'", 12/2(1927) p 1168; 13/1(1928/ p 1;
kk 6(1927 p 3''9; IHZ 31.12.27, p 5, 'Gute Nerven';
DBS 29.9.27, p 7, 'Kreditbarometer'; 25.10.27 p 5, 'her
Induetrielle Kapitalmarkt'; 25.11.27 p 8 and 22.12.27 p 5,
'Kreditbarometer'; 5-1.28, 'Der deutsche Kapitalmarkt im
Jahre 1927'; Vjh .Kon.j. forsch. 1927 H3 p 10.
*85 Kon.i.Stat.Hdb. (1936 p 113; Wk 7(1928 pp 24-5,31,250;
Bericht des Herra P.eichsbankprasidenten 13.4.28 (BA B 43 1/635 ;
liiZ 23*6.28 p 3, ' BtJrse und Kapitalmangel'; DBS 23.5*28 p 6,
Kreditbarometer'; I Schrifder, '.ragen des Kapitalmarktes' in
Bankarchiv ...-.VIII (1928 pp ?8ff.
*86 Alternatively, bonds had to be decked out with special
attractions; eg the preference shares sold by the German Bailway
Co. in early 1928: Wk 7(1928; pp 24-5: or the bond issue of
IG iarben: DBS 22.12.27 P 5, 'Kreditbarometer'.
*87 Wk 7(1928/ p 145, 250; 1HZ 10.3.28 p 3, 'Abschwflchung der
BSrse'; 26.4.28 p 1, 'Drosselung der Xommunalen Auslands-
anleihen'; DBS 24.2.?8 p 7, 23.3.28 p 1, 23.5.28 p 6, 'Kredit¬
barometer'.
•88 Wk 7(1928. p 359; 8(1929/ pp 23,139,242,359; IBS 15-12.28,
p 3, 'Schwache Btirse ohne Auslandsinteresse'; SIT.29 p 1,
'Schonung fur den Kapitalmarkti'; 25.1.29 p 1, 'BeschUft.-
igungsloses Geld?'
The most notable event was the failure of the Beich 300 mill.Km.
bond flotation in i ay 1929. See below f. 120
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economy as a whole - evidence of a reduction in the supply of, or
increase in the demand for, money. Statistically this is expressed
in the c.2-3# rise in market bill rates in 1927» and in the increasing
number of protested bills, despite continued economic prosperity *89.
Contemporary impressionistic evidence of the deterioration of payments
habits, lengthening of (involuntary trade credit, is multiple *90-
This deterioration in general liquidity seems to be related to the
fact that the liquidity ratios of the banking sector improved between
1926-27 - the only improvement registered in the period 192^-31 *91•
The rise in interest rates shows that this improvement cannot be
ascribed to an excess supply of money. Bather it seems to have been
caused by a redistribution of bank assets, reducing loans to clients
relative to liquid assets. This is indicated by the fact that credit
bank charges on i.ontokorrent and overdraft increased, as did the gap
*89 Table 1 p 2/8. Protested bills: Wk 7(1928, p k29; cf.
Vjh.Kon.j.forsch. 1928 H1A pp 15-l£T~
*90 A high level of 'tension' in trade credit was a characteristic
of the years after stabilisation: to Prion, Per deutsche Geld-
una hapitalmarkt pp 353-*t« It seems to have increased in later
1927 vis a vis the turn of 1926/27: Pdto 11.8.27, 'Pahlungs-
stockungen'; 2.2.28 p 161, 'Devieenpolitik una Geldsch8pfung';
IV_ 16.12.27 P 3^1; V.lh.Kon.i.forsch. 1927 K2 p 5, p 5;
tok 6(1927. p 350; 7(1928) p 7; Wd 12/2(1927- PP 1321, 1^81.
Significant in this context is the lively controversy in the
National Association of Chambers of Commerce (DeutscherIndustrie-
und Handelstag. about the growing practice of allowing cash
disccunts on payments by commercial bills. This, together with
the results of a questionnaire issued to ascertain attitudes to,
and the prevalence of this practice is to be found in
BA R1V1375.
*91 P to Henning, 'Die Licuiaitgt der Banken in der Weimarer Republik1,
PP 51«55»59» lor a parallel analysis with respect to the post-war
L-.S.A. see A H Keltzer, Monetary Policy and the Trade Credit
Fractice of Firms'.
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between these and interest paid on deposits *92. Three reasons can
be adduced for this renewed search for liquidity by the banking, sector.
Firstly there was the effect of the collapse of the domestic stock
market on the liquidity of their long term assets. Secondly, the
same collapse, plus the difficulties of foreign placement in later
1927 increased the likelihood that bank loans to clients could not
be released by capital issues in the normal way, le that they would
be 'frozen in'. Thirdly, the action of the Keichsbank may have renewed
apprehension that in an emergency it would not act as a lender of the
last resort *97,
Between mid-1977 and the end of 1928 the keichsmark was consistently
above parity (though tending to weaken in later 1928 despite a passive
Balance of Payments current account *9'+» This implies that in the
whole period the inflow of funds was considerable; and other sources
confirm that it was *95* Bespite this, the money market remained
*9? Table 5. p 32 ,
*93 E-A V/'1 lie keichsbank p 700:
"Vorsitzender■ fan kann also feststellen, dass, durch die
Vorg&nge der Btfrsenrestriktion, die LiquiditMt cer deutschen
Grossbanken vermindert worden ist?
Schacht: Ich miJchte sa^en noch nicht ve-rbessert worden ist".
See whole section, further, Bcricht .,.(ref *85 pp 17-18;
Wd 17/2(1977. P 1009; IV 11.11.77 P 163; Bopp op.cit. p 1h80.
Signs of increasing unconsolidated bank credit in the economy
are discussed below pp 73-k .
*9^ 7(1978; ppJO, J-63; Reichsbank reserves reached a peak for the
decade in hecember 19?8: iiardach, Thesi s p 2^9.
*95 PBZ 1.4.28 pi, 'Kurzfristiges Auslandsgeld'; V.jh.Kon.j.forsch.1928
H1A p5. The inflow/ took the form especially of short term bank
deposits: F W Kenning op.cit. p 75; also Wk 8(1929/ PP ^3ff, Bie
Crossbanken als Kapitalimporteure', according to which c.k3% of
bank deposits were currently foreign; V.jh.Kon.1.forsch. 1928 H3A
p 11. The short term inflow may partly express a 'spillover'
interest in German shares from the Wall St. boom: K Arzet op.cit.
pp 25-6; V,jh.Kon.1. forsch. 1929 H1A p ^7, ' Auswi rkungen der
internationalen Kreditverhaltnisse'; also k £ iuke op.cit. p 2k2.
tight and relevant interest rates continued to rise to c.August 1928.
(One subsidiary reason for this was probably the growing deficits and
declining cash balances of the public sector *96/. Thereafter money
market conditions eased a little, perhaps in consequence of the domestic
recession, and continued so till March-April 1929, yet the huge amount
of foreign financed short-term debt was said to create a platform
below which rates could not fall without prompting withdrawals *97.
Nevertheless the htichsbank felt it safe to cut discount rate to 6$/c
on 12.1.29 *98. But these conditions did not last. The speculative
flows out of the Reichsmark in i ay 1929 ^actuated by the crisis in the
Reparations negotiations, caused a tightening in money market conditions
which lasted till the Wall Street crash *99.
Bonk credit ana liquidity conditions in the economy at large seem to have
remained very tight throughout 1928, no doubt because of the huge short
term debt 'overhang'. In early 1929 bank cliarges were reduced, yet the
files of the National Association of Chamber of Commerce (Deutscher
Industrie- und Handelstag)point to scarcely diminished difficulties in
securing prompt payment and the like *100. Bankruptcy statistics,
*96 Wd 15/1(1928; p 785; Bericht ... (ref *85 p 17-18; E Stuchen
op.cit. p 75 stresses this aspect. More generally see below
pp 101ff .
*97 German banks paid surcharges on foreign deposits in later 1928
to prevent their withdrawal, according; to E Arzet op.cit. p 24.
See too Vk 7(1928; p 250; 8(1929 PP 40,45.
*98 BBZ 6.1.29 P 1, '^aktoren der Liskontpolitik'; IHZ 12.1.29
P 1. 'hie Begrtfadung der DiskontermHssigung'; 18.1.29 P 1,
'Ler Geldmarkt nach der liskontermgssigung'.
*99 Wk 8(1929; PP 155.259,355.
*100 BA E 11/1570 (files of Beutscher Industrie- und Handelstag/.
LBZ 5.4.28 p 1, 'Abnehmende ZahlungsfiHhigkeit der Industrie';
Vjh.Kon.1.forsch. 1928 H1A p 10; Bericht des Herrn Eeichsbank-
prasident ... 7.2.29 PP 4-7 (3A R 45 I/636 . ™~
^5
protested bills of exchange, fell a little in later 1928 after
mid-year peak, but remained higher than in 192? *101.
*101 Wk 7(1928 pp if?9; 8(19?9 P 'O**.
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CHAPTER 5 FINANCIAL MARKETS and MONETARY POLICY - ANALYSIS
3»1. The Relationship between Short and Long, Rates: Preliminaries
High interest rates were the most obvious characteristic of the post-
stabilisation financial markets. The counterpart of this in the
banking sector is the larger gap (than pre-war between lending and
borrowing rates, which, in a severely competitive banking system *1,
presumably shows that the price at which banks were willing to sacri¬
fice liquidity had risen *2. Widespread evidence that the banks
demanded much better *3 (and more liquid/ security on loans probably
*1 On competition in the banking sector see above pp 17-18 . Further
K J Bonn, 'Die Wirkung des hohen Zinsftisses auf Handel una
Bankwesen', pp 375-6; K E Born, Die Deutsche Bankenkrise pp 24-7.
The credit banks' own view is found in Centralverband des deutschen
Bank- und Bankiergewerbes, Materialien ... pp l46ff, 'Die verHnd-
erte Kosten- und RentabilitHtsverMltnisse'. The prevalent
charge of bank monopoly seems hard to reconcile with this evidence-
see K Diehl, 'Drsachen des hohen Zinsftfsses', pp 896-7;
H Rummel, 'Wie wirkt sich die Kostenelemente im Zinssatz aus?'
p 436. Contemporaries also blame high handling costs, due to
higher wage bills. But this was a universal grumble.
*2 Cf. F DiJring, 'KreditmHrkte und ZinssHtze ...', pp 419-20:
'Die vielfachen Bestrebungen der Reichsbank und auch der Hffent-
lichen Stellen, die Kreditkosten im allgemeinen zu senken,
griffen in der Kegel bei der Zinsspanne ein ... Die Banken
verteidigten ihre H8he mit der Steigerung der linkosten und mit
der Etragsverminderung infolge der Notwendigkeit, ihre im
Durchschnitt gegenfiber der Vorkriegszeit verringerte LiquiditHt...
zu erhflhen ...'. But see too *17.
E-A V/1 Die Bankkredite pp155-67; W Prion, 'Der deutsche Geld-
und Kapitalmarkt' pp352-3« The 'widespread comment' arose because
the practice was thought to discriminate against smaller business.
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tells the same story *4.
How are these manifestations of monetary stringency to be explained?
In the common contemporary view the 'basic' interest rate
(Landeszinsfuss, was the rate on long bonds. Following a 'real'
theory of interest, which conceived of the financial markets as merely
the equilibrators of the supply of savings and the demand for capital,
they viewed financial assets as standing in a one-to-one correspondence
with the physical capital stock of the economy. Hence they evolved
a theory of 'capital scarcity' iKapitalmangel, Kapitalarmutt which
led them to blame (i, the poor state of the physical capital stock
(as the cause of the heavy demand for capital, and (ii; the low rate
of savings *5.
Other explanations start at the other end, viewing short rates as
'basic', and thus relating the high level of all interest rates to
the increased demand for money. G Hardach's recent study, notably,
•4 Cf. A D Bain, The Control of the Money Supply, p 114. Never¬
theless, in spite of the increased liquidity preference thus
expressed, the liquidity ratios of banks actually fell, both
within the period and relative to 1913* See F W Henning, 'Die
LiquiditMt der Banken ...', pp 51»55»59» (Actually this state¬
ment is true for pure cash ratios, and for the sum of cash +
deposits at other banks + short term first class paper, but not,
for some reason, for cash + deposits alone.) This is presumably
because the 'selling' of money is the business of banks, so
that their own demand schedule for money, though higher than pre¬
war, had not risen so much as that of the non-banking sector.
The non-banking sector was willing to pay thehigher charges for
money which the banks demanded, to such a degree that the net
effect of the interaction between the two sectors was lower bank
liouidity ratios.
*5 See eg Adolf Weber, Allgemeine Volkswirtschaftslehre, pp 124-41,
311-21; Gustav Cassel, Theory of Social Economy Vol. 1,
pp 189-248 (esp. pp 224ff,;.
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emphasises restrictions on the money supply, proximately because of
Keichsbank policy, but ultimately because of the inherent weakness of
Germany's external position, related above all to an overvalued
exchange rate *6.
These views can be evaluated adequately only with the aid of a complete
model of the economy. At present I confine myself to an attempt to
build up a simple model of the financial markets, which is capable of
explaining the observed phenomena.
5.2. The Behaviour of Short Term Interest Kates
In modern theory the analysis of the rate of interest begins from its
role as the price relation between money now, and money in the future
The upward displacement of interest rates is hence capable in prin¬
ciple of only two explanations. Firstly by positing an increase in
the stock of interest-bearing debt relative to money, so that the price
of the former in terms of the latter falls. Secondly by positing a
shift in the preferences of asset holders in favour of money, with the
same effect on prices, given relative stocks.
In 1925/29 the German currency stock averaged 6.1 mrd.Bm., whereas
in 1907/11 it had averaged 5-9 mrd.Rm. Of course non-cash payments
*6 G Hardach, loc.cit. in *5»
♦7 T Scitovsky, Money and the Balance of Payments pp ^9-65* Changes
in interest rates are evidence only of 'unbalanced' excess
supply/demand for different financial assets; balanced excess
supply/demand of all such assets would only affect real variables
not interest rates.
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methods were increasingly important, but I compare the fact that in
the USA the currency stock grew two-and-a-half fold in the same
period, and grew faster, relative to NNP/GNP than did the German *8.
Estimates of the change in the total quantity of interest bearing
debt are hardly obtainable. It is practically certain that the
aggregate stock of long term debt in 1929 was 75% or less than that
of 1913 *9» The available estimates of the stock of shorter debt
indicate that, by contrast this was c.33% greater *10. The seme
sources indicates that the total stock of debt was less. But it seems
to exclude large items of shorter debt eg bank advances, trade credit.
If it can be assumed that the excluded items grew at the same rate as
the included, then we may suppose that the 'true' total stock of
interest bearing debt was greater in 19?9 than in 1913* but of shorter
maturity. Such a conclusion would certainly coincide with the
unsystematic impressions gleaned from contemporary writing.
To what extent would such an alteration in the relative financial
stocks be attributable to the policies of the Eeichsbank? The
description in the last chapter certainly conveys the impression of
an attempt during 1924-26 to restrict the growth of the money supply,
an attempt frustrated in consequence of the difficulty of operation
of an independent monetary policy where exchange rates are fixed,
*8 From date in Hoffmann ... p 815, 826; Historical Statistics
of the USA, pp 6A7.
*9 Cf. the estimates in E Wolfgang (a leading expert in the field,,
'Per Meuaufbau des Rentenmarktes' - Wk 9(1930/ p 8A; also
Centralverband ... Materialien ... pp 11-12, 27-29.
*10 Centralverband ... op.cit. pp 11-12.
50 3/5
and capital flows unrestricted *11. Between early 1924 and late
1925 (except for Sept. '24 to Feb. '251 the sluggishness of the capital
inflow seems to have left Schacht room for his independent 'dear
money' policy (credit quotas and high discount rates;, actuated
doubtless by a desire to maintain currency stability *12. But in
later 1924 and again in 1926, rediscount abroad was a cheaper alter¬
native, so that domestic rates fell towards international levels.
Having realised the 'two Reichsbanks' problem, Reichsbank discount
rate became, from January 1927$ more often below than above market
levels - in contrast not only with 1924-26, but als^ with pre-war
practice *13. It seems that Eeichsbank rate was raised reluctantly
to 6% in May 1927 and to 6i% in Cctober. In the former case Schacht
engineered the stock market collapse to try to evade an increase *14;
in the latter for the same reason he refused for a period to rediscount
otherwise eligible foreign currency bills. However the data suggests
that Schacht raised the discount rate whenever foreign exchange
reserves were approaching 50% rather than the statutory 40%, and not
until they reached 70% did he consider reducing the rate to 6y% again
*11 R A Mundell, International Economics, pp 250ff, 'Capital Mobility
and Stabilisation Policy'.
*12 Eg Schacht's resistance to government pressure in Feb.1925 to
reduce rates further: G Hardach, 'Die beide Eeichsbanken ...'
p 318; H Mfiller, Die Zentralbank ... p 40.
*13 See Table 1b p 2 O. For pre-war rates see Stat*Jb.f.d.Dt.R. as
cited in sources to Table 2 p 57 •
*14 K R Bopp, 'Die Politik der Reichsbank...' p 472; Wd_ 12/1 (1927
p 746, 'Die Reroute an der Bdrse'; G Hardach, Weltmarkt-
orientierung ... pp 78-9-
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in Jan. 1929 *15» A 50% reserve ratio was not unusi'.al pre-war *16;
still, there would seem to have been room in 1927-29 for an easier
policy; the fact that the Reichsmark remained above parity throughout
June 1927 - Dec. 1928 supports this. How much room is a counter-
factual question which can only be answered in the light of a macro-
economic model; here it suffices to note the plentiful evidence
that contemporaries believed that the great dependence of the financial
system on foreign short credits created a platform below which interest
rates could not fall without provoking serious withdrawals, and the
fact that banks paid higher rates in later 1928 on foreign than on
domestic deposits *17*
Tne sum of this section is then i that it is likely that the stock of
interest bearing; debt v~as larger, relative to the money stock than it
had been before 1913> ii that the restrictive rediscount policies of
the Reichsbank bear some responsibility for this *17A.
*15 G Hardach, Thesis p 250. This was partly related to a desire
to gain reserves in view of impending reparations negotiations.
*16 E-A V/1 Die Reichsbank p 146 (Schacht s testimony ; cf A I
Bloomfield, Monetary Policy under the International Cold
Standard, pp 30ff.
"17 See above p 44 ; also V.jh.Kon.i.forsch. 1929 H1A pp Vjff»
1Auswirkungen der internationalen KreditverhHltnisse'; pp 24-5
R Arzet, 'Die einzelne Phasen ...' pp 24-5. When credit banks
extended loans in foreign currency, the gap between their
borrowing and lending rates was less (H Rummel, 'Die Bank-
fragen ...' p 153)-
"17A I cannot follow the argument which blames the persistent high
interest rates on the gap between gross and net capital inflows
created by the Reparations transfer. This drained foreign
exchange, thus inducing a rise in Reichsbank rates, but did
not otherwise affect the stock of financial assets.
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3»5» The Determination of Interest Rates: Demand Side Factors
3.3«1« An analysis of 'demand side' factors of the determination of
interest rates can best be approached via analysis of their term
structure. Before doing so certain presuppositions must be clarified.
Firstly, do I assume that there exists a set of high quality debt
covering the maturity spectrum, all of whose members are perfect
substitutes for each other?
If so, then long rates of interest, properly defined, must stand in a
definite relationship to current and expected short rates over the
expected holuing period of the long term debt *18. According to the
'pure' theory, then, the 'holding period yield' (defined as that
discount factor which eoualises the net present value of coupon pay¬
ments to be received over the expected holding period plus the selling
price expected at the end of it, with the current purchase price- will
be identical on debt of all maturities. Thus, if future short rates
are expected to fall, ^eurront long yields (as just defined; will be
below current short rates, and vice versa.
However, it is conceivable that a liquidity or risk premium is added
to the discount factor which is applied to long term debt *19»
*18 The main theories of the term structure of interest rates are
discussed in H G Johnson, Macroeconomics and Monetary Theory,
pp 86-92; J C Fodds and J L Ford, Expectations, Incertainty
and the Term Structure of Interest Bates.
*19 See Dodds and Ford op.cit. pp 31-57» 115ff (esp. p 128). The
•Malkiel' version of the 'pure' theory yields the same pre¬
diction. Under some formulations the liquidity preference
theory could breach the assumption of perfect substitutability
between maturities. The text implies that the premia added to
longer maturity yields are invariant to the relative quantities
of the maturities supplied, but it is not materal to the argument.
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But if substitutability is imperfect then on the above considerations
is superimposed the effect of alterations in the relative stocks of
debt of different maturities. If the argument of the last section is
accepted, then the stock of long debt fell relative to 1913» the money
stock was much the same, and the stock of short debt probably rose.
Given imperfect substitutability, this would imply a fall in long'
rates relative to short, as compared with 1913* (unless there was an
offsetting change in demand preferences,.
Secondly, before proceeding to an analysis of the term structure it
is vital to note that the Reichsbank could not affect the stock of
long dated bonds directly, because of its inability to conduct open
market operations in long debt. Thus it could only affect long yields
as its operations on the short stock affected the aggregate maturity
distribution, and as they affected expectations of future short rates.
There is not neafiy enough readily available information to undertake
a complete analysis of the alterations in the term structure from pre-
191^ to post-192^. In the following I shall concentrate on two interest
rates: (a a representative index of short rates and (b, suitable
holding period yields of low-risk long-dated bonds *20. The latter
have to be inferred by informed guesswork. Nor is it clear what the
*20 Holding period yield calculated from the formula :




where t = current period; t+x = expected date of resale;
P = current price; E(F)= expected selling price;
C = coupon value; R = holding period yield.
A description of bond types and of contemporary (approximating/
yield formulae is given in Uk_ 7(1928) pp 80ff, 'Verbesserung
der Renditenberechnung'.
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'representative' short term rate is. There were broadly two classes
of such rates: bill rates, and stock market money rates (daily and,
post-war, monthly money). Before 1913 the former generally exceeded
✓
the latter; after 1924, the converse *21. For 1925-29 1 use the
average of two bill rates and of daily and monthly money *22. For
pre-1913 I had estimates of market discount on first class bills
only (Marktdiskont = Privatdiskont;. The daily money rates were
c.-^- lower during 1909-1913 *23, hut I lack year-by-year estimates.
3«3»2. To deal with the earlier period first. Price data for undated
bonds of the Reich are printed in the Stat. Jahrbtlcher. Before we
can estimate the expected holding period yields which these prices
inply, we must specify the holders' probable expectations about selling
prices. We can attempt this either by examination of the relationship
between the prices of bonds of different coupons or_ by application of
the type of error-learning expectational hypothesis commonly used in
economics.
Firstly, then, the relationship between the prices of bonds bearing
different coupons. In the period 1909-1913 Reich undated bonds with 3%»
3?% and k% coupons circulated together *24. Their average prices and
*21 This reversal also occurred in the USA. See Historical Statistics
of the USA pp 654, 656.
*22 See Table 1b p 20 . For a discussion of these rates see
F DSring op.cit. pp 403-8.
*23 Ibid, loc.cit. ?22»o:;.
*24 St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. price quotations date from 188?» 3bonds
are quoted throughout the period; 4# bonds before 1892 and
after 1909; 3% after 1892. Market discount rates are recorded
from 1896.
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current yields (which I define as coupon value divided by priced
were as follows:
Table 1 Average Price and Current Yield* of Beich Bonds










3.65 3.82 3.9^ 3.80 3.39
* Coupon Value Divided by Price
SOURCE St.Jb.f.d.Dt.K. 1909 pp 26A-6; i9l*f pp 29*f-6.i
Imagine to start v/ith that all. investors shared identical and definite
expectations of future bend prices. Then it seems plausible to state
that the three different coupon classes of Reich bonds, beng identical
in all other respects, would be perfect substitutes and that investors
would share identical expectations as to the yield from holding each.
The prices of such bends will always move in the same direction, but
they seldom move far above parity *25« So the common expected holding
period yield cannot greatly exceed 3*9^ - the current yield on k%
bonds. Indeed it is likely to have been less. The expectation of price
appreciation (implied by a 3«9*$ yield on 3% and 3^% bonds) entails
the expectation that lower coupon bonds will reach parity; at which
point higher coupons are liable to be converted to lower. If the
conversion price is parity, then the holders of k% bonds must expect
*25 For the following argument cf. E Wolfgang, Die Kursbildun;;
pp 82ff.
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some capital loss at the current price. Given definite expectations,
and the prices overleaf, an expected yield of 3»95$ is consistent with
the expectation that 3?% bonds will reach parity in 25 years, and
hence at that time conversion of h% bonds to 3j$ be possible; and
that 3% bonds reach parity in c.35 years. But of course expectations
were uncertain. Since higher coupons are liable to conversion to
lower, but the converse almost never occurs, we can infer (assuming
bond holders are risk averters; that the mean expectation of the market
was for stable future prices, but that it allowed a 'risk premium' on
higher coupons for the ever-present (albeit slightrisk of conversion *26.
Broadly speaking, this implies that, over 25 years or so, mean expected
yields were below 3»9*+%» and probably below the bond current
yield of 3*825i but above the 3% bond current yield of 3*65% *27* The
mean expected holding period yield was then close to the market discount
rate but above the daily money rate. Thus the 'informed guess' about
pre-war yields from analysis of the prices of bonds of different coupons
suggests that they did not differ significantly from bill rates
(market discount)•
*26 The holder of a k% bond converted at parity to 3z% will
thereafter be in a worse position than someone who bought
a 3^% bond at less than parity in the first place.
*27 Under uncertain expectations, the different coupon classes
are imperfect substitutes, because each is subject to a different
probability of conversion. Hence if investors are risk-
averters, the 3% bond probably enjoyed a higher price than
it would have done, had all classes been guaranteed free of
conversion risk. The stock of 3%s was relatively small.
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ior the second approach to this question I follow Wolfgang and others,
and treat the 3r?% bond as the 'standard' bond *28. I deal with a
holding period of 10 years. A longer period would unduly reduce the
number of observations; a shorter seems unreasonable. Price and
market discount data follow in Table 2.
Table 2a Prices of 3%% Bonds 1887-1913
Year Bond Price Year Bond Price Year Eond trice
1887 102.1 1896 104.6 1905 101.3
1888 102.5 1897 103.6 1906 99.5
1889 103.7 1898 102.6 "907 94.7
1890 100.4 1899 99.8 1908 92.6
1891 98.4 1900 95.8 1909 95.2
1892 100.0 1901 99.5 1910 93-2
1893 100.4 1902 102.1 1911 93-3
1894 102.4 1903 102.3 1912 89.8
1895 104.4 1904 101.4 1913 85.8
Table 2b Average Yields on 34% Bonds over 10 Year Holding











NOTE The bond yields are to be read as the average of the 10 year
yields expected/realised in each year of the noted period.
For method of obtaining expected yields, see text.
SOURCE St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1892. pp 128,131; 1897, PP 138,140; 1901,
pp 150; 1909, PP 264-6; 1914, pp 294,296.
*28 E Wolfgang, Pie Kursbildung ... pp 157ff; Centralverband ...
Paterialien ... pp 18-19.
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I hypothesise that the expected selling price after 10 years was
determined by the following crude distributed lag:
(^1) E(P"t+10 - °-19Pt + °-17Pt-1 + °-15Pt-2 + —
... 0.0JPt_g + 0.01F1
where P. = selling price in year t;
E(P/t = expected selling price in year t
In Table 2b we see the average value of the holding period yield *29
implied by this expression, for each of two periods - 1096-1903
and 1906-1913* It is higher in the second period because of the
secular price fall (See Table 2a . But this also means that the yield
actually realised in 1Q06/13 on bonds bought 10 years earlier was much
less than that predicted by this hypothesis - 2,b% as against 3«if8%*
It seems plausible that consistent disappointment of expectations (ie
persistent failure of prices to return to earlier levels; would promote
a downward revision of expectations. Suppose that, instead of (3/U
above, holders expected selling prices to be the same as current prices.
For simplicity, I calculated expected and realised one-year yields on
this hypothesis:
Taking 10-year moving averages, I find that up to the decade 1895/190^
expectations are broadly realised. Thereafter the gap widens pro¬
gressively, until the average one-year expectation in the decade
(3/2 E(P).t+1 Pt
*29 The definition of holding period yield is given in *20.
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1903/1912 of 3»S2% is matched by the realisation in 190^/13 of 1.92$.
Thus even liypothesis (3/2) would exaggerate 'true' realisations over
an extended period, and hence probably be subjected to downward
revision.
Both from an analysis of the 'logic' of the relationship between
prices of bonds bearing different coupons, and of the 'logic' of error-
learning hypotheses about the formation of expectations, it seems fair
to conclude that mean expected bond yields were no higher than the
observed market rates of discoixnt, but somewhat above daily money
rates.
3.3.3. In the period after the stabilisation we have to use, as
'standard' bonds, the gold mortgage bonds of first class credit
institutions, in place of the hardly-existent bonds of the Reich *30*
Because of the simultaneous circulation of such bonds bearing a wide
variety of coupons (10%, 8$, 7$, 6%, 5$)» we can analyse the 'logic'
of their price relationships, and reach fairly definite conclusions
about expected future prices. But, because of the (presumably perceived)
irrelevance of the experience of the decade 191^-24, and the great
fluctuations in bond prices thereafter, it would be hard to specify
expectations on the basis of an error-learning model.
*30 Thus following contemporary practice. See refs. in *28.
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Table 3 Price and Current Yield* of Gold Mortgage Bonds
bearing Different Coupons 1925-29
Coupon 10% 8% 7% 6% 2%
93.7 84.6 81.2 72.8 64.5
10.67 9.46 8.62 8.24 7.75
103.0 96.6 91.7 87.3 80.9
9.71 8.28 7.64 6.87 6.18
105.1 101.1 98.8 95.2 87.5
9.51 7.91 7.09 6.30 5.71
104 97.2 90.1 86.4 80.7
9.62 8.23 7.77 6.94 6.20
Price
vGY*
102i 94.4 84.9 82.1 78.3
9.80 8.47 8.25 7.30 6.37
*CY - Current Yield; ie coupon value divided by price.
LOULCE Stat.Jb.f.d.lt.K. 1928 p 438; E Wolfgang Pie Kursbildung ...
p 91; Kon j.Stat.Hdb. (1936 p 119; V.jh.Kon.i.forsch 1930
H1A P 23; H1B p 48; H2B p 56; H4B p 50; 1931 H1B p 49.
Let us imagine again that investors shared identical and definite
expectations about future bond prices, and therefore that expected
holding period yields of bonds of all coupons were identical. Assuming
that their respective prices always move in the same direction, then,
if we exclude the possibility of conversion, the expected 'true'
yields must lie outside the extreme current yields shown in Table 3;
eg for 1925, above 10.67% or below 7.75%. The latter value could only
be expected if the prices of higher coupon bonds were expected to fall
faster than the prices of lower ones. This however is contrary to
experience *31. But if expected yield exceeds 10.67% then it can be
*31 E Wolfgang, Lie Kursbildung ... pp 82-91. The prices of lower
coupon bonds generally fall and rise faster than those of higher
ones
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shown that lower coupon bond prices are also expected to exceed higher
coupon bond prices after 6-7 years. This is illogical. Hence the
pattern observed in Table 3 is only consistent with the expectation of
conversion *32.
Identical expected holding period yields, such as to satisfy the follow¬
ing criteria, were obtained by trial and error *33 for bonds of all
coupons, for each of the years 1925-29?
a J Bonds which at the end of the period have identical coupons should
be expected to sell at roughly the same price. Bonds with higher coupons
should be expected to sell at higher prices then those with lover
coupons.
b If a bond of coupon value 'x' is expected to have been converted to
value 'y' within a given holding period, then it must also be expected
that bonds of coupon 'y' will have reached parity within that period *3^.
Calculations were made in respect of two holding:periods - 10 and 15
years. The results are shown in Table k, together with the average of
*32 This agrees with the construction put upon the data by E Wolfgang,
Cer Neuaufbau ...' p 89. Conversions of 10% bonds seem to have
occurred: F DBring op.cit. p 397*
*33 By application of the formula in *20. Where conversion was
deemed expected after m years, then for years t to m,
C was given original coupon value; for years m+1 to end of
period, or next conversion, the converted value; thus implying
conversion at year-ends, and at parity.
*J>k Whereas my results present a constant expected annual yield
throughout the holding period, this is best regarded as an
'average' of a set of constantly changing (in this case,
declining) expected yields. Thus eg if we consider yields in
1926 (Table then 8% bonds must have been expected to reach
parity by year '+ (implying an expected yield of 9% in the first
k years; and 6% bonds to reach parity by year 6 (implying an
expected yield of 8^% in the first 6 years;.
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Table 4 Expected Bond Yields consistent with the Price Pattern
in Table 3; and Average Short Term hates 1925-29
v Short Holding Bondypar< — - ■ ■..... ■■ ■ , im , ,■■■!■ ■ ,
Rate Period Yield
Price at end of Period
10% 8% 7% 6%
.qpc q 1° 10.10 (103.4) (99.4) 100.4 94.4 :68.7^ ^ 15 9.50 (106.8) (101.3; 103.0 100.0 9S.9
r t- t-p 10 8^0 (101.2/ (101.7) (99.8; 101.6 102.3* PO
15 7.25 (100.0) (101.0J (101.0; (100.6; 103.1
1QP7 6 PQ 10 6.75 (100.0; (99.9) (100.0/ (101.0) 99.9J y
15 6.40 (101.6) (100.7) (101.6) (102.1; 101.9
1cno 7 n 10 SjO (101.9) (101.5) (97.4) (100.6/ 101.7y '
15 7.25 (100.9) (100.7) (95.7) (100.3; 102.3
10 8^ (102.1) (100.6) (90.9) (96.2) 100.2
15 7.50 (103.0) (100.1) (87.6) (95.0; 100.9
NOTES: Prices in Parentheses are of bonds assumed to be bearing, at
end of period, converted coupons, as follows:
1925: 10%, 8% bonds to 6% at end of year 5«
1926: 10% to 8% at end of year 4; 8%, 7% to 6% at end of year
6; 6% to 5% at end of year 11.
1927• 10% to 8% at end of year 2; 8%, 7% to 6% at end of
year 4; 6% to 5% at end of year 11.
1928: 10% to 8% at end of year 4; 8%, 7% to 6% at end of
year 7; 6% to 5% at end of year 9.
1929: 10% to 8% at end of year 4; 8%, 7% to 6% at end of
year 7; 6% to 5% at end of year 8.
SOURCES: Bonds - Table 3 P go ' Short Rates: Table 1c p 20
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the four short term interest rates *3*t-A. These results are however
predicated upon definite expectations. Under uncertainty, because
conversions are only made to lower coupons, high coupon bond prices
will be lower, and low coupon bond prices higher, than under certain
conditions. Thus the estimated yields in Table k should not be biassea
on this account.
From Table k it appears that:
i/ Investors held strong expectations of conversions, commencing in
the near future down to coupons below current normal issuing rates *35:
ie they expected a speedy 'normalisation' of bond market conditions.
Such expectations would significantly weaken the impact of keichsbank
manipulation of short rates upon long term rates, hence upon the cost of
long term capital, since it failed to engender expectations of high
future long rates. They also go a long way toward explaining the pro¬
nounced preference of borrowers for the issuing of short term debt.
ii) But despite the evidence of definite expectations of declines in
long yields to levels generally below current short rates, expected bond
*J>kA From Table k it is clear that the 7% bonds were 'out of line'
relative to other coupons in 1928 and 1929; likewise for 6%e
in 1929* By hypothesising an alternative, speedier conversions
of coupons, but the same bond yields, one can bring the 6%s and
7%s into alignment with the 5%s, but at the expense in both
years, of knocking the 89bs and 10%s seriously 'out of line'. I
do not know what special features attach to certain of these bonds
to cause this. The variant actually shown in the Table was
adopted a/ because it minimised the 'out of line' observations,
and b) because it specifies a conversion pattern less agreeable
(ie less immediate) to the general hypothesis of the chapter,
than that specified by the other variant.
*35 Only for a brief period in late 1926- early 1927 did issuing
rates fall as low as 6%: DBZ 5»1«28, 'Der deutsche kapital-
markt im Jahre 1927'.
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yields appear, at least for holding period of up to 10 years, to have
exceeded average current short rates *36, whereas the 'pure expect¬
ations' theory would tend to predict the reverse under these circum¬
stances *37. Another calculation, that of yields to maturity of newly
issued domestic bonds (on assumed terms of 10 or 15 years/, confirms
this. See Table 5«
From my information it seems unlikely that average term to maturity
would exceed 15 years *38. The estimates in Table 5 are subject to
offsetting biasses. On the one hand they may be regarded as on the
high side since they fail to allow for expectations of conversion; but
on tne other hand they are also on the low side for two reasons.
Firstly in the post-war period redemption was usually at 101-105% of
par. This is a minor factor. Secondly borrowers, especially from the
public sector were chronically prone to overpricing their bond issues,
hence suffering undersubscription *39. The effect of this in 1927 can
be roughly quantified. About half of the non-mortgage bond issue in
that year comprised the single Reich flotation in February (5%» issued
at 92% of par) which failed and had to be converted to 6% in August *40.
*36 Alternatively they exceeded bill rates and daily money rates, but
were usually below monthly money. Table 1a p 20
*37 Dodds and Ford op.cit. p 42.
*38 See below pi 70 .
*39 After mortgage bonds (excluded from the Table) the market was
dominated by Public bonds. See E Wolfgang, 'Kritische
Darstellung ... p 786; P Hertz, 'Reich und Reichsbetriebe ...'
PP 536-7.
♦40 See below p 119 .
65 3/20
Had it originally been issued at 6%, the average 15-year yield to
maturity on all 192? bonds would have been 7.1%, not 6.2% as shown.
Thus, I think we may regard the estimates of Table 5 as roughly
'right'.
Table 5 Yields to Maturity on Newly Issued Domestic Bonds
(excluding Mortgage, and Undated Bonds.. 1926-29
1926 1927 1928 1929
■! 1| | .Ill ■
Average Coupon Value 7*22 5»56 6.35 7«5^
Average Price of Issue 9^*2 93*8 9^.^ 96.6
Yield to Maturity*
if Term = 10 years 8.1 6.A 7.1 8.1
if Term = 15 years 7.9 6.2 7*0 7.9
Adjusted Average Short _ Q .
Rates** 5,9 ' '
* Assuming Redemption at 100% of Par.
** The monthly average of the 4 short rates was weighted by the
bond issue of that month.
SOURCE: St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1930 p 369; Table 1a p 2-0 above.
Contemporaries held that bond yields exceeded short rates *M. This
must have been so despite the smaller size of the long stock relative
to the short, than pre-war, and despite definite expectations of falling
future yields (and hence, presumably of future short rates at the 'low*
end of the recently experienced range/. Hence it can only be explained
from the demand side, on the hypothesis of a change in the types of
*D1 E Wolfgang, Die Kursbildung ... pp 27ff; followed by Central-
verband ... Materialien ... pp 18,19,35; also J Barais,
article cit. *60 below.Their proof takes no explicit account
of capital gains/losses however.
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asset holders ('preferred habitat' theory;, or of a shift in the
preferences of existing asset holders.
Little can be said definitely about changes in the type of asset holder.
Contemporary, and subsequent belief in the disappearance of the
'rentier' cannot be validated simply by reference to the expropriation
wrought by the inflation; some mechanism to explain why such people
and institutions were not avidly rebuilding their portfolios must also
be specified - eg changes in the income distribution. Adequate data
is lacking for the pursuit of this type of explanation *42.
What about foreign influence on the demand structure? The term structure
seems to have altered similarly in the USA and the UK too; see Table 6.
For the UK, Howson has recently explained this as a consequence of
government funding operations, ie a relative increase in the quantity of
long term debt *43. I know of no explanation of the shift in the US
structure. The relevance of these foreign changes for Germany is
however doubtful. Before 1913 her chief link with v/orld financial
markets was presumably London. After 1924, definitely New York. The
relevant comparison is therefore London pre-1913 with New York post-
1924, and between these two the term structure seems to have altered little.
*42 F W Henning, Das Industrialisierte Deutschtand, remarks (p 82)
that the bulk of war loans was subscribed by only 4000 sub¬
scribers. However, F Hartmann, 'Die Verh&ltnisse ...' pp 46-7,
and W Prion, 'Die Organisation ...' pp 349-53» believe that
long-period bond holding had diminished.
See also K Borchardt, 'Wachstum ...' p 690.
*43 S Howson, Domestic Monetary lianagement ... pp 47-54.
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* (i) = Average of Prime Commercial Paper 4-6 months; Stock
Exchange 90-day loans and Stock Exchange Call honey,
(ii; = Prime Commercial Paper 4-6 months only.
SOUKCES: USA: Historical Statistics of the USA pp 654, 656.
UK: BR Mitchell and P Deane, Abstract ... pp 455* 460.
A second foreign influence on the German term structure might be
inferred from the fact that the long term capital inflow was more
strictly controlled than the short term. Such an argument would
presuppose imperfect substitutability between long and short debt, so
that, were both forms of inflow uncontrolled, Germans would hold
relatively less long term debt, at a higher price. The relevant
comparison here however is with the proportions of the pre-war port¬
folio, not with a counterfactual contemporary distribution. Even
under the existing controls, it has already been shown that the
domestically held bond stock was smaller, relative to the domestically
held short term debt stock, than it had been in 1913 (given the great
fall in the size of the former) *44.
*44 In any case this effect would be offset by foreign holdings of
domestically quoted stock, believed by contemporaries to have
been accentuated by the restrictions (eg Dec'.26-Jan '27;
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Lven if the above argument be not accepted, it is unlikely that the
actual effect of having removed controls would have been to eliminate
the observed term, structure. The effect is depicted in diagram 3/1:
= Bond Yield
= exogenous supply of bonds
(measured from 0-
= domestic demand schedule
(measured from 0,




In an uncontrolled market, domestic bond holders would hold CB* of the
bend stock; foreigners B*BS and the market-clearing price be H*.
But controls limit foreign holdings to B'BS; hence the yield on
foreign-held German bonds is K"; that cn the domestic-held stock is
R'. The effect of removing the controls clearly depends on a. the size
of the gap R'-F" **+5» and b, the relative elasticities of foreign
and domestic demand (ie the slopes of BDF and BDDj; c, the effect of
reduced supply of German short term debt on domestic short rates. It
•/.5 This is consistent with the view of F richer, 'Auslandskrecit
und Eeratungsstelle ...' pp 670-9t that there was little dif¬
ference between the yields of domestically and foreign issued
German bonds, after taking into account stipulations other than
coupon, price of issue, and maturity. This view is shared by
I 1(3ring op.cit. p 399-^00. (Both articles in K Liehl op.cit. ,
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is unlikely that the observed bond-bill gap wouB have been reversed,
at least after mid-1926, because never thereafter were the yields on
German foreign bonds below German bill rates. See Table 7 *45A.
Table 7 Yields to Maturity of New German Bonds Floated Abroad
1924/5 1925/6 1926/7 1927/8 1928/9
Average Coupon Value 6.89 6.74 6.06 6.20 6.48
Average Price of Issue 93*8 95*7 96.4 93*2 94.5
Yields to Maturity*
if average term = 10 years 7*8 7*3 6.5 7.2 7*3
if average term = 15 years 7*6 7.2 6.2 7.0 7*1
Adjusted Average German
Short hate 8.3 5.3 7.0 7.0
NOTES: (1 I assume that the period in question is the financial
year 1.4. - 31.3.
(? For other notes see Table 5 P 3/19. The yields in this
Table are subject to the same qualifications as discussed
in the Text describing that Table.
SOURCES: St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1930 p 369; Table 1a p 20 above.
To explain the exhibited term structure, given the change in the maturity
distribution and the evidence about investors' expectations, we are
left, then, with the hypothesis of a shift in the preferences of asset
holders. Specifically, that investors superimposed liquidity or risk
premia on strong expectations of future bond yield decline. Believing
that, in the normal course, interest rates would fall toward pre-war
*45A The foreign issue of mortgage bonds was more severely controlled
than that of any other type; hence the use of this type as a
'standard' bond may import upward bias into the yield estimates.
But there seems, on other grounds, to have been an offsetting
rise in domestic preference for this, relative to other bond
types, thus nullifying the objection. For full discussion see
pp 121ff below.
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levels, but, given the uncertainty of the recent past, being also
apprehensive of events which might rob bonds of all value, investors
demanded in effect very high compensation in the short run for the
probable reduction in longer term yields *^6. Contemporary circum¬
stances and comment abundantly confirm that bond holding was viewed as
a risky occupation. The fact that all bonds (save only those of the
Reich; were denominated in fine gold betrays this right away
Equally, the impossibility, except in the case of first-class mort¬
gage bonds, of selling very long-dated debt speaks the same message *^8.
A third pointer in the same direction is the lowness of the share
price-earnings ratio - and this although the equity market itself was
flourishing only in the brief periods autumn 192*+ - February 1925* and
summer 1926 - May 1927. Table 8, though doubtless rough, seems to
*kS That even over 15 years expected bond yields exceeded expected
yields from short term investments can be suggested thus:
Suppose in 1927 an investor expected to be able to buy and sell
at par a succession of 1-year bonds bearing coupon values of
6.3# (the 1927 average short rate) in years 1-*+, 6.0% in years
5-10, and 5*0% in years 11-15 (following the conversion expect¬
ations implicit in Table *t). Then his 15-year yield would be
5*8%; whereas the corresponding bond yield is 6.h%.
*k7 But would not eliminate fears: inflation and other threats to
bond values need not be accompanied by legal devaluation.
Foreigners often demanded a gold clause in addition to denom¬
ination in their own currency!
*kS Mortgage bonds benefited., from their real estate backing and
their favourable revaluation. See p 123 below. On the dif¬
ficulties of selling long-dated bonds see / Jamin, 'Beyerische
Kreditpolitik* pp 705ff* K Saenger, 'Die liitwicklung der
Preussischen Staatsschulden', pp 688-93* From these it seems
that the average term of state bonds was 12-15 years (amort¬
isation being spread over some years/. The Reich had to be
content with 20 years. The amortisation of municipal bonds was
completed pre-war in c.M+ years; post-stabilisation in c.20-2*f
years. E Wolfgang, 'Kritische Darstellung ...' pp 787ff»
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confirm the preference for ownership rather than debt rights *49.
Table 8 Equity Price-Earnings Ratios and Current Bond Yields
(bdh excluding expected capital gains/losses)
1900-1908 1926-1929
Equity Ratio Bond Yield Equity Ratio Bond Yield
Max. 5.8*+ ) 3.81 6.50 8.0
Min. 4.51 3.51 3-33 6.4
Mean 5.22 3-62 4.83 7-23
METHOD: Current dividend/coupon value divided by price.
DATA Pre-war: Shares: leading industrial, banking, shipping.
Bonds: 5 each of state, municipal, mortgage; all 3i#»
Post-war: Shares: the comprehensive Stat.Reichsamt index.
Bonds: Table 4 p 3/17 above.
SOURCE: E Wolfgang, Die Kursbildung ... pp 51-2; Table 4 p 3/17 above.
A fourth pointer, in this case common to bonds and equity, is fragility
of the stock market. Contemporary reports are replete with comment©'
about its thinness' *50. This could be both cause and effect of the
depression and variability of prices *51. The point can perhaps be
quantified by comparing the effect on market turnover-of the German and
US stock market crashes:
*49 Other influence are doubtless relevant: 'insider' knowledge;
better capital appreciation prospects. The larger size of the
equity relative to the debt stock would work the other way.
See E Rosier, 'Fragen des Aktienwesens' pp 77-8; W Prion,
Die Preisbildung an der Effektenbflrse pp 243ff. F During
op.cit. pp 391-2, and D Petzina, Die Deutsche Wirtschaft ...
p 94 seem to me to present a confused discussion of this
relationship.
*50 See above pp 29, 41. Also Centralverband ... Materialien ...
pp 90ff, 'Die Bedeutung der Bdrsenorganisation'.
*51 Of. Paul Davison op.cit. pp 63ff, 264.
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Table 9 Stock Market Turnover in Germany and the USA
Germany USA
(mill Rm per month) //bill p.a.
July '26 - June '27 102 1929 4.11
July '27 - June '28 52 1930 5.6
1926 + 1927 73 1928+1929 4*0
1928 + 1929 46 1930+1931 3.6
SOURCES: Germany: Konj.Stat.Hdb. (1936; p 115; derived from Stock
Exchange Turnover Tax.
USA: Historical Statistics of the USA, p 659•
The much severer reduction in Germany than in the USA suggests that the
power of Dr Schacht to break the market rested largely upon the ease
with which he frightened investors off, because of their inherent
nervousness *52.
A fifth pointer is to be found in the evidence, cited by Hardach and
others, of the abnormally high rate of capital export from Germany,
despite the (apparent) negative yield gap thus incurred *53«
A sixth pointer to the existence of risk/liquidity premia lies in the
fact that even in 1935 the general state-sponsored conversion of bonds
from the hitherto normal coupon of 6% to could only be effectuated
by very considerable coercion of financial institutions, inducements,
by closing the market to new issues for months before the operation,
*52 The stock market collapse of Feb.1925 had identical consequences
on turnover, which in this case built up again from early 1926.
Kon.j.Stat.Hdb. (1936) p 115« The 'thinness' of the market also
reduces the liquidity of bond-holders both ex ante and ex post.
See G Bernhard, 'Die Liquiditatsstiirungen ... pp 336-9.
*53 G Hardach, Weltmarktorientierung ... pp 71. Also K Diehl,
'Ursachen des hohen Zinsfusses' pp 875ff» or E-A 1/6 Die Deutsche
Zahlungsbilanz p 136.
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and so on *5*+. In the same vein I note the ample evidence of the
weakness of the German bond market after 19^8 (ie after another
inflation *55.
Finally I come to contemporary comment. One of the main testimonies
to contemporary concern about high interest rates is the 1932 symposium
edited by Karl Diehl. In his own contribution he analyses the causes
of high rates. After reviewing theories he rejects, such as those
blaming the inadequate supply, or distribution of gold, or those
ascribing to Germany a high marginal efficiency of capital *56, and
the theories he partly accepts, such as those blaming inadequate savings
and high wages, finally, as the most basic of explanations, he states
that interest rates are high because of the abnormally large risk premia
they contain *57. These he relates especially to the political
uncertainties attendant on the reparations issue *57*
Other contributors also stress perceived risk, relating it rather to the
aftermath of the inflation. Amongst these the introduction to to
Hartmann's contribution deserves translation in extenso:
*54 6% became the standard coupon rate after the decree reducing
interest rates in 1931- (This of course would not help con¬
fidence,. For details of the 1935 conversion see K E Poole
German Financial Policies 1932-39 P 165-6; R Stucken op.cit.
p 1^5 esteems the conversion a 'complete success', in which the
'national discipline of the population was decisive; but adds in
parentheses "man weiss, dass diese Haltung nicht ganz freiwillig
war". See also J J Klein, 'German Honey and Prices 1923-^'
pp 156-7.
*55 H Menderhausen, Two Post-War Recoveries in Germany pp 75-7,115ffj
H C Wallich, The Mainsprings of German Revival, pp 166, 18^-192;
R Stucken, op.cit. pp 232-2^1, esp. 235-6.
*56 The theory of J to Angell, The Recovery of Germany pp 211-5.
*57 K Diehl, 'Ursachen des hohen Zinsfusses', in K Diehl (ed;,
toirkungen und Ursachen des hohen Zinsfusses in Deutschland,
PP 833ff, esp. pp 91 *+-9.
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"l_ sc. Under post-stabilisation conditions_/ the natural
selection of debtors is effected not merely according to
the rate of return these are able to offer the investor;
the predominance of the risk element causes the selection
to be effected rather from the point of view of the great¬
est possible security for the capital that is lent. The
intensified 'weeding out' of debtors which high interest
rates (high because of the risk element) naturally cause,
is effectuated by means of:
(i) a replacement of long term by medium and short term
credit, and
(ii) a replacement of unsecured by secured credit.
The inclination of capital to long term placement presup¬
poses a certain foresee-ability (Ubersehbarkeit; of the
development of the status of the debtor, or debtor country,
over the term of the loan. Such a 'foresee-ability' has
not infrequently since the war been totally lacking in
German conditions. One remembers the time of the occupation
of the Ruhr... In later times also capital for long term
placement has dried up almost completely. That occurred
for example in the last two-thirds of 1929 as a result of
the Paris negotiations ...
But even outwith these crisis periods ... there existed in
Germany, and exists today (early 1931 - TB, a general
aversion from long term placement (eine allgemeine Scheu
vor fester, langfristiger Kapitals-anlage in Deutschland..
Despite the attraction of high interest rates in the capital „
market, many investors preferred to deposit their capital
at lower rates with banks and giral clearing associations
(but immediately at their disposal;, rather than tie them
up for years in long term assets ... These considerations
explain the strange state of affairs described by Gskar
Wassermann at this year's general meeting of the Deutsche
Bank und Diskontogesellschaft, that "to some extent types
of business were financed with these moneys (ie daily and
monthly stock market money/ whose financing would normally
have bean the job of the bond and equity market (Kapital-
markt/ and that, owing to the influx of money to the money
market, bank credit, which in normal times has to be the
dearest form of credit ... has become the cheapest, so that
there exists no incentive to consolidate bank credit through
taking up mortgages or other types of long term loans ..." *58»
W Hartmann, 'Wie wirkt sich der hohe Kapitalzinsfuss auf
Auflese und Sicherheit im Immobiliarkreditwesen?' p Vj9»
He proceeds to explain by contrast the rather better status of
real estate debt. Like many contemporaries he seems not fully
to weigh the fact that bond holding can be quite a liquid
investment in a well-functioning stock market.
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Other contributors make the same point: F Neurnark (in connection with
the failure of the Hilferding loan of 1929-); F Eicher (on foreign
flotations;; K Saenger (on Prussian bonds; *59. The same point is
found not infrequently in other works *60. I also note evidence that
the same uncertainty dictated banking policy *61.
Thus I conclude, from behavioural analysis and from contemporary
comment, that the bond market was characterised both by strong expect¬
ations of future decline in yields, and by strong liquidity preference.
*59 F Neumark, 'Per tfffentliche Haushalt unter Einwirkung der
Kreditschvierigkeiten p 584; also P Hertz op.cit. p 517.
For Eicher, see footnotes *45 and *65. K Saenger op.cit.
pp 688-93* The effective coupon on the Hilferding loan was
10-12%:
*60 J Barais, 'Zins und Konjunktur', in Wk 9(1930) PP 302ff;
"Der ungewtihnlich grosse Unterschied zwischen den Zinss&tzen
ftlr langfristige und kurzfristige Gelder ist immer ein Zeichen
dafitr, aass das Vertrauen in die Wirtschaft schwer erschuttert
ist; selbst die hohen Zinss&tze ... vermHgen nicht, Gelder
von der verh&ltnissmMssig risikolosen kurzfristigen Anlage in
eine langfristige Anlage mit hoheren Risiko umzulenken. Nur
so ist erkl&rlich, dass zur selben Zeit wo sich die Tagesgeld-
s&tze um 1-J bis 2% bewegen, die Kosten einer erststelligen
Hypothek noch immer ca. 9% ausmachen" (p 307 • Also F Haitnann
op.cit. p 50, "An Stelle der kontinuierlichen AufnahmefHhigkeit
des deutschen Kapitalmarktes ^sc. 'vor dem KriegJ/ bestand
eine ausgesprochene Kapitalarmut und eine starke Scheu, sich in
typische langfristige Anlagen festzulegen". Or K E Poole op.cit.
pp 189-90, "It was difficult /"sc. 'in the early 1930s/ to find
those who were willing to lend at long term".
*61 K Diehl, 'lirsachen ...' p 897, "Auch hier /"sc. 'in connection
with the gap between bank lending and borrowing rates4/ spielt
die Risikoprfimie, ... eine wichtige Rolle". Cf. H Hummel,
'Wie wirkt sich die Kostenelemente im Zdnssatz aus?' p 438.
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3»4. Summary: A Simple Model of the Financial Markets
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Neither of the two 'extreme' theories of interest rate determination
described on p k? above is sufficient to account for the observed
behaviour of the bond and money markets. On the one hand the importance
of the Reichsbank policy in maintaining high short rates 15?b-29
cannot be doubted - both directly, in discount policy, and indirectly,
in encouraging German dependence on dear foreign deposits. But the
Reichsbank could not operate in long term markets. Hence its ability
to affect bond yields depended on how far it could alter the maturity
distribution of the interest bearing debt, or affect expected future
short rates. It affected neither significantly; and a detailed
argument showed that high bond yields are best explained by enlarged
liquidity premia, owing to increased uncertainty.
There is a complex interaction between long and short rates, as
between these and the supply and demand for money. I wish to conclude
by distilling what seem to me to be the salient features into a very
simple model of financial markets.
In this model there are only three financial assets: bonds, bills and
money. Let -
Ms, Md be supply of and demand for money
r, rf be domestic and foreign bill rate
F be the net supply of foreign short term credit (ie bills
BDD, BDF be domestic and foreign demand to hold German bonds
BS be the stock of German bonds
R. Rf be the yield on domestic and foreign bonds
NBdD, NBdF be domestic and foreign demand for new German bonds
NBs be the supply of new German bonds
Rn be the yield on new German bonds
Bexp be the net export of bonds
y be aggregate income at current prices
Po be a policy variable
U be a scale which is an increasing function of the degree
of uncertainty.
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Then I specify the following relationships:
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(3/1) Md = Md(Y,r,U) Md' (Y), Kd' (U) > 0; Md'(r)<0
The demand for money is an increasing function of the level
of income and the level of uncertainty, and a decreasing
function of the bill rate.
(3/2) Ms = Ms(Po,r) Ms'(r; > 0
The supply of money is an increasing function of the bill rate,
and a function of policy decisions.
(3/3) Md = Ms The money market must clear.
OA) = r^ Foreign bill rates are constant.
(3/5) F = F(r; F'(r) > 0
The excess supply of foreign short term credit is an increasing
function of the bill rate.
(3/6. BLd = SDD(R,r,U ' BDD' (R> > 0; BDB' (r,, MDD*(U) <0
The domestic demand for holding bonds is an increasing function
of their yield, and a decreasing function of bill rate and of
the degree of uncertainty.
(3/7) Fj. = Rj. Foreign bond yields are constant.
(3/8, BDF = BDF(R,U) BDF» (R;>0; BDF'(U)< 0
Foreign demand for holding German bonds is an increasing function
of their yield, and a decreasing function of the degree of
uncertainty.
(3/9j BS = BS The size of the bond stock is exogenous (this is
an obvious simplification;
(3/10) BS = BDD + BDF The bond market must clear.
(3/11) Rn = R The yields on new bonds equals that on the
existing stock.
(3/12) NBdD
_ BDD Demand for new bonds is divided between home
,IT.,r ~ and abroad in the same proportions as is theNBdF BDI ... , .
existing stock.
(3/13) NBs = NBdD + NBdF The market in new bonds clears.
(3/1^) Bexp = NBdF + ABDF Bond exports equal foreign purchases of
new German bonds plus net change in
foreign holdings of the existing stock.
3/33
These relationships can be summarised in four simple diagrams:





Fanel a/ reproduces in a familiar diagram the demand for and the
supply of money, given the level of income and 'uncertainty'.
Panel b shows the implications of the bill rate determined in panel ai
for the net inflow of foragn short credits. In both panels the
superscript refers to pre-l9l3» " to post-192^. Thus in both periods
German bill rates created a short term net inflow *6?, but this was
*62 E-A 1/6 Die deutsche Zahlungsbilanz p 1JOff.
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very much larger in the second, the higher bill rates being the
result of an enlarged demand for money (at given income levels) owing
to greater uncertainty, and of reduced supply, owing to Reichsbark
policy. Moreover, as the period advanced, the level of bill rate
required to sustain a given rate of inflow of short term credit
increased, owing to the growing dependence of the German money supply
on this foreign base - ie, in panel b), F shifted to F*.
Panel c), describing the bond market, is a simplified version of that
diagram already met on p 68 • BDF - the pre-1913 foreign demand
schedule for German bonds - represents 'negative' foreign demand to
the right of BS, ie supply of foreign bonds. At the pre-1913 equilibrium
1 1
of B R , German hold (in a 'net' sense.' the entire domestic stock
(BS , and BSB of foreign bonds in addition. After 1924 the domestic
2
bond demand schedule - BDD - has shifted up, mainly because of
increased uncertainty, but partly also because of high bill rates .
Presumably foreign demand for German bonds has shifted up also but
evidently not so much. This may be for some or all of the following
reasons:
(i) German bill rates were higher than abroad, largely because of
Reichsbank policy. Thus, to the (small/ extent that high Gorman bond
yields reflected a 'sympathetic' rise with bill rates, the attractive¬
ness of German bonds to foreigners will have increased, relative to
pre-war. Given that this 'sympathetic' movement was slight however
(as argued in this chapter) this reason seems insufficient to explain
such observations as that 70% of the German private bond stock issued
between 1924-29 was issued abroad *64.
*64 Cf. Wi.und Stat. 1930 p 386.
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(ii) Foreign investors, having no immediate experience of the
inflation, exhibited a lesser increase in 'uncertainty'•
(iii) Since a foreign investor would hold relatively fewer German
bonds in his portfolio than would a German, and hence enjoy greater
possibilities of risk diversification, his risk-aversion from German
bonds would be less *65.
Because of these shifts in BCD and BDF, foreigners after 192L hold
2(net) German bonds to B BS, and the equilibrium yield has risen to
2
R (I neglect here the impact of controls, analysed in Diagram 3/i
above;.
Fanel d;, representing the yields and distribution cf purchases of new
bonds, is a replica of Panel c;, on the assumptions enbodied in
expressions (3/11) to (3/l3^» But if the positions of BDD and BDF in
Panel c; are changing relative to each other, then Panel d) does not
represent net capital export. To obtain this one must add to the flow
shown in Panel d/ the net change in ownership of existing stock. See
expression (3/1^).
*65 Thus the high German bill rates probably played a bigger role in
determining the distribution of bond holdings between home and
abroad, than in determining actual yields. Witnesses differ as
to the actual degree of foreign risk-aversion from German bonds.
Wd 10/1 (1925)» 'Amerikanische Finanzierung ...', p ^*+0 suggests
it was not as great as German; on the other hand, F Richer,
op.cit. p 6?'9• 'That lower foreign interest rates have hardly had
any effect on German issues /"sc. 'abroad/7 is a sign of the
level of risk premium which was brought into play ... by foreign
investors. The prices of the German foreign loans have orientated
themselves, not according to low interest rates abro_ad, but
according to the high demands of the /_ sc. 'German^/ borrowers.'
As this implicitly concedes however, the actually observed yield
is a function not only of risk premia etc., but also of foreign
and domestic demand elasticities (slopes of BDD and BDF). And
the very success of the Dawes Loan, when German domestic markets
were still closed to new issues, suggests a speedier recovery of




FISCAL POLICY AND FISCAL STRUCTURE
k/1
b.1. Introduction
Important aspects of fiscal policy have already been described,
notably by D Baumgarten *1. As a result, part of this chapter is
only a resume and assessment of this work. Other important aspects
have required more original treatment.
The study of fiscal policy and structure may be defined for the
purposes of this thesis in a two-fold manner. Firstly, as the study
of the effects of the relationship between public expenditure and
current revenues (as also, of their aggregate levels; on aggregate
employment and output. Secondly, as the study of the effects of the
methods of finance of the excess of expenditure over current revenues
(and its converse) on the state of the financial markets.
The central indicator of the effects of fiscal policy - the government
surplus or deficit - may be a clearly defined magnitude in elementary
economic theory, but it is harder to distinguish empirically. In
Weimar Germany, as in most places, the boundaries of government were
not sharply defined.
*1 D Baumgarten, Deutsche Finanzpolitik 192^-1928.
82 V2
Firstly, government was carried on at three (or four; levels - the
Reich, the states (Lender/ including the Hanse cities of North Germany,
the provinces (in Prussia;, and lastly the communes (Gemeindenj whbh
for certain purposes, such as public utility provision, often united
in communal associations (Gemeindeverbflnde >. Where the term local
authority is used, it will cover provinces and communes in general.
In this chapter it is appropriate to define 'government1 to include all
these levels.
Secondly, the boundaries of government were much more indistinct in
a lateral sense. That is, a significant proportion of industrial
and commercial enterprise was owned, wholly or in part, by government
at all these levels and was subject to varying degrees of governmental
direction. The Reich controlled a bewildering variety of industrial
concerns *2, the ownership of many of which was consolidated into a
holding company - the Vereinigte Industrie-Aktiengesellschaften (Viag,.
The railways and the Post Office were run after 192^ as independent
but Reich-owned enterprises. The Reich also had significant part
interests *3» Prussia also owned an impressive array of firms, above
all in heavy industry, eg the Preussische Bergwerks- und Htttten-
gesellschaft in Silesia or the Hibemia and Recklinghausen coal mining
concerns in the Ruhr; also considerable electricity interests, or
*2 Lists of the companies wholly or partly owned by the Reich
at 1.7.27 and 1.7.29 are found in BA R2/127^« There seems
to have been considerable expansion between the two dates.
*3 K Sautter, 'Der Kapital- und Zinsendienst der deutschen
Reichspost p J16'; J Vogt, 'Wandlungen im deutschen Eisen-
bahnwesen'; an example of a part Reich-owned iron/steel




Other states were not without industrial interests. But much more
important were the commercial and industrial interests of the communes.
These included above all public utilities and transport undertakings,
but also agriculture and forestry interests, market halls, slaughter¬
houses, port facilities, recreational facilities etc. Local authority
revenues from such enterprises came to about one-tenth of their aggregate
tax revenues *5» In addition to these, we must take into account
the penumbra of credit institutions, ranging from 'state banks' like
the Freussische Staatsbank, down to the municipal savings banks, and
to institutions like the 'Preussenkasse' with a measure of public
funding.
The relevant criterion for inclusion or exclusion of these manifold
enterprises seems to be the degree to which their pricing, output and
financing policies were dictated by commercial (ie, in the theory,
'profit maximising') objectives. As a broad principle it seems to be
the case that enterprises of the Reich and Prussia were allowed con¬
siderable autonomy to pursue commercial objectives *6. They impinged
on the fiscal structure strictly defined insofar as they transferred
surpluses to, or received subsidies from government treasuries, and
*4 H J Winkler, Freussen als Unternehmer 1925-3P-i M Schulz-Briesen,
Per Preussische Staatsbergbau im Wandel der Zeiten, vol 2.
*5 Wi.u.Stat. 193? p 296. These estimates exclude income from
agriculture, forestry and credit institutions. See too Stat.
P.eichsamt, Linzelschr ... no. 15, Die kommunale Betriebe ...
and 0 Btisch, Geschichte der Berliner Kommunalwirtschaft in
der Weimarer Epoche pp l8ff.
*6 For Prussia, H J Winkler op.cit. chs. 3 4 passim.
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this is captured in the budget statistics. At a communal level, it
is far from clear that commercial objectives were pursued *7.
Communal enterprises were operated either in commercial form (eg as
A.G. or G.m.b.H.), or as actual communal departments ('in eigener
Regie') *8. In the former case only the net transfer of funds to and
from treasuries appears in budgetary statistics; in the latter, the
gross operating account is in effect incorporated *9* This will
probably be adequate, if not quite accurate from a theoretical point
of view.
As far as publicly owned credit institutions are concerned, I shall
treat transactions between these and the treasuries indistinguishably
from transactions with the private banking sector, although this is
arguably inaccurate, to the extent that the liabilities of these banks
were public monies, and that their policies were dictated by fiscal
pressure rather than banking objectives - as eg in the case of communal
borrowing from the banks they owned, in the financial crisis after
1928 *10.
Finally, we must consider the status of the social insurance institutions
*7 0 Busch op.cit. pp 23ff, 158ff; also pp 115-7 below.
E-A III/2, Die deutsche ElektrizitStswirtschaft pp 59-61.
*8 By uniting estimates of the proportion of publicly sold elec¬
tricity generated in communal plants (E-A III/2 op.cit. p 69;
with estimates of the proportion of publicly sold electricity
generated in communal plants 'in eigener Regie', (ibid, p 68),
I infer that (by output/ c.^ of communal power stations were
'in eigener Regie'. For other public utilities the proportion
was probably higher.
*9 The 'cameralist' mode of bookkeeping also impeded the pursuit of
commercial objectives in plants 'in e&gener Regie': G BUsch
op.cit. pp 6ff; Bankarchiv (193°/1 > PP 209ff, 'Die Gest-altung
des kommunalen Revisionswesens'; pp 65ff, 'Finanzielle
Zwickmiihle kommunaler Betriebe'.
*10 Wd 1^/1(1929^ P 1581, 'hie kommunale Verschuldung seit 192V.
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(Invalid and Dependents', Accident, Illness, Salary Earners'>. These
are excluded from the official budget statistics. Nevertheless, it
seems clear they should appear. Throughout the quinquennium after
1924 these were rebuilding their assets by, presumably, an excess of
contributions and govemnent subsidy over outpayments. This would
have, in fiscal terms, a deflationary impact *11. See Table 1.
Tattle 1a Reconstruction of Social Insurance Institutions
































col 1) and 2 :
col 3':
col 4;:
Crude Receipts minus Outpayments and
Administrative Costs.
Hoffmann ... p 763*
St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1928 p 479, 1929 P 375,
1930 P 417.
Stat.Reichsamt, Einzelschr ... no. 14,
Die dffentliche Finanzwirtschaft ... p 89.
*11 Baumgarten op.cit. pp 169-72, 206-7, holds that Social Insurance
surpluses had no fiscal significance since they were re-lent
on the financial markets. Surely however one must distinguish
the analysis of the fiscal balance from that of its financial
repercussions.
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Table 1b Income and Expenditure of the Reich Institute of
Employment and Unemployment Insurance Mill.Em.













NOTE: Expenditure = Outpayments and Admin. Costs. It excludes
accumulation of assets.
SOURCE: St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1929 P 375, 1930 p 4l6-7.
The second column of Table 1a indicates the deflationary impact. In
assessing the overall surplus or deficit of the public household this
item should be entered on the surplus side, the Reich subsidy on the
deficit side.
Unemployment Insurance was only set up in October 1927, in the Reich
Institute of Employment and Unemployment Insurance *12. Thus unemploy¬
ment relief, which before them was disbursed in various forms by all
levels of government, and appeared in full in the budget statistics,
after 1927 appeared therein only in the form of subsidies to the above
institute, and of the various types of supplementary relief still
provided for those who failed to qualify for the insurance. Contri¬
butions paid to, and relief paid by the institute do not appear,
hence neither does any net asset building by it. In practice the
institute had hardly any time to accumulate assets before the slump
was upon it, so we can assume that its expenditure overbalanced its
*12 Stat.Reichsamt, Einzelschr ... no 14, hie deitsche iinan_z-
wirtschaft vor und nach dem Kriege, pp I9ff«
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revenue by roughly the amount of the R< ich subsidy; and that this
subsidy itself captures the fiscal impact of the institute#
Before examining the evidence of fiscal policy we must ask who controlled
it? Only about 60% of current government expenditure was undertaken
directly by the Reich *14, and about 12% of government net capital
expenditure *15. Bid the Reich then exert effective fiscal control
by its control of revenue? The Reich levied a larger proportion of
taxes than it controlled of total expenditure - about two-thirds,
reserving to itself all the most flexible taxes: the bulk of those
left to lower levels of government were land and property taxes *16.
The lower levels made good their revenue shortfall by tax transfers
from ihe Reich (Steueriiberweisunf;eni. Throughout the period the
regulation of these transfers was a matter of controversy between the.
Reich and the states, and a provisional arrangement remained in force.
By this the Reich transferred 75% of Income and Corporation Taxes
and 33% of Turnover Tax to the states, who in turn transferred a pro¬
portion to the communes. In the end tlerefore the states and communes
probably enjoyed a larger share of the proceeds of the cyclically sen¬
sitive taxes than tie Reich (cf Table 4 p 9^) *17* But given the
•1R Hoffmann ... pp 720-1.
*15 0 Keiser and B Benning, Kapitalbildung und Investionen in der
deutschen Volkswirtschaft 192*+-2& p 158. One assumes the gross
proportion was similar to the net.
*16 Baumgarten op.cit. p 218.
*17 K B Hansmeyer (ed) Kommunale Finanzpolitik in der Weimarer
Republik pp 125-8; I Maurer, Reichsfinanzen und Grosse
Koalition pp 18-19. The precise share-out varied from year to
year: Stat.Reichsamt Einzelschr ... no 14 op.cit. pp 61-3.
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sharing arrangement (Finanzausgleich;, the government and parliament
of the Reich shared the initiative in setting tax rates, in the main,
and not the other levels of government. However, Reich control of
the borrowing policies of lower levels of government was very much
weaker. It had, till 1930, no effective control over the domestic
borrowing policies of states and communes (the states having the control
of communal borrowing *18;. Foreign borrowing by the states and
communes was controlled by the so-called Advisory Council for foreign
Credits (Beratungsstele ftir Auslandskredite j, in which the Reich,
the states and the Reichsbank had roughly equal voices; it could
hardly be called an organ of the Reich *19«
In seeking to ascertain the empirical counterpart of the 'theoretical'
fiscal surplus/deficit, the 'crude' surplus/deficit of the official
statistics requires certain adjustments. Baumgarten works in terms of
'domestically effective expenditure and revenue' *20. Domestically
effective expenditure would exclude Reparations cash payments to the
Agent-General. These would have no domestic fiscal demand-stimulating
effect (though, pending their transfer abroad, would be re-lent on the
money market). Reparations payments in kind, by contrast are to be
included. He also excludes debt repayments to the Reichsbank and state
banks, but includes those to private banks. This seems a dubious
distinction, but is unimportant in practice.
*18 R Ott, Die Beratungsstelle fur Auslandskredite ... pp 93-^5
K H Hansmeyer (ed) op.cit. pp 217-8.
*19 This is discussed on pplO^ff below.
*20 The following discussion is based on Baumgarten op.cit.
pp 205-211.
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On the revenue side, Baumgarten advocates the exclusion of appro¬
priations from surpluses accumulated in previous years. But all
duties levied for Reparations purposes (including eg the special
•obligations' on industry end railways) are included. Both decisions
seem valid.
The analysis of the macro-economic impact of fiscal policy is under¬
taken with the implicit counterfactual of a feasible alternative
fiscal policy; different expenditure programmes, different tax rates.
Since the observed fiscal balance alters not only as a result of
conscious policy, but also as a result of change in the level of
economic activity, modern fiscal theory seeks to capture this counter-
factual by analysing notional constant employment (usually full
employment) surpluses/deficits *21. I lack the information
necessary to construct such a measure. However the qualitative analysis
here undertaken is well served by a simple examination of change in
expenditure policies, tax rates and the like. Analysis of change in
the 'constant employment' fiscal balance ought also to be complemented
by a disaggregated analysis of the types of policy change; eg it is
often held that an expenditure increase is more expansionary than an
equivalent cut in tax rates, and increase in some types of expenditure
is more expansionary than in others. This type of analysis will
scarcely be attempted here.
*21 For a textbook treatment see G Fromm and P Taubmann, Public
Economic Theory and Policy, pp 20Aff.
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k.2. The Fiscal Balance of the Aggregate Public Household
The public financial year ran from 1st April; I shall follow this
periodisation *22.
Only from 1925/26 is sufficient data available to construct a measure of
the consolidated fiscal balance of the entire public household (ie
all levels of government plus social insurance; *23• Estimates of
this balance (as described and defined in the first section; for
1925/26 to 1928/29 can be taken directly from Baumgarten, with two
adjustments: (i/ the 'social insurance balance' has to be added,
and (ii; I could not trace the source of his cash Reparations data,
so, since 1 wished to extend the estimates to 1929/30» 1 replaced them
by data available for the whole period in the Stat. Jahrbticher.
Otherwise the estimates for 1929/30 can be constructed out of the
Stat.Reichsamt ©gries from which Baumgarten constructed his own
estimates. The result is presented in Table 2 overleaf.
The measure of the fiscal balance in this Table fails to deduct from
expenditure a; interest payments on public authority foreign borrowing,
which Baumgarten estimates at c.50 milLHm. per year *2*+, and b) the
cost of upkeep of diplomatic missions. At a guess, therefore, the
estimated deficit in Table 2 line 7) should be reduced by a further
c.100 mill, per annum.
*22 This is the stated practice of all official statistics including
those of the Inst.f.Kon.i.forsch. (including Reiser and Benning
op.cit. see p 202). It is followed by ftiumgarten, and com¬
parison of Hoffmann's data with that of the Stat. Reichsamt
suggests he does also; although professedly presenting calendar
year data. Cf. pp i^ff below.
*23 Baumgarten op.cit. p 6?.
*2k Ibid, pp 169-70; Tables 7. 12, 13i PP 101 > 118 below.
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Household hrd.Rm. Current Prices*
1925/6 1926/7 1927/8 1928/9 1929/30
^ Aggregate
Expenditure








16.6* * 17.7 19.5 20.3
L Aggregate Currentn y
Revenue
12.8 14.7 16.7 17.8 17.9
Deficit excluding
->/ S.I.F.B.***
1.1 1.9 1.0 1.7 2.3
6; S.I.F.B.*** 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8
r Deficit including
'' S.I.F.B.*** 0.7 1.3 0.4 0.9 1.5





0.1 mrd. Rm. payments to Reichsbank
from aggregate expenditure.
*** S.I.F.B. = Social Insurance (excluding Unemployment Insur¬
ance) Fund Building.
SOURCES: Lines 1kj: 1925/6 to 1928/9: Baumgarten op.cit. pp 94, 96,
168, 170.
1929/30: Kon.j.Stat.Hdb. (1936) p 161. To cal¬
culate revenue from this source deduct from the
aggregate (L) Seignorage ('aus der hunzprggung' j
(ii; borrowing, reduction of funds etc
('Schuldenaufnahme, Fondsentnahme u.dgl. ,
(iii) transfers of surpluses from previous years
(sonstige Einnahmen - see footnote thereto).
Line 2): St.Jb.f«d.Dt.fi. 1929 P 427, 1930 p 477, and cal¬
culated thus: from total payments to the Agent-
General, subtract Occupation Costs (Besatzungs-
kostenand Payments in Kind plus Transport
(Sachlieferunp^en und Transporte,
Line 3-> '• for source to footnote **; Bavungarten p 220;
I assume that these payments were negligible
in 1929/30 as in 1928/29#
Line 6: Hoffmann ... p 763# Of. Table 1 p 85 .
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It would be satisfying to be able to confirm these estimates from the
evidence of Hoffmann, but unfortunately he provides neither estimates
of gross investment, nor a satisfactory account of the depreciation
procedures by which he obtains net investment; evidence of the fiscal
balance is therefore not to be derived from his work.
So much for the ex post fiscal balance; but was the policy that
produced the deficit truly expansionary?
As far as revenue policy is concerned, it seems reasoxiable to concentrate
on the policy of the keich, since it controlled all the most variable
taxes.
Tax rates were raised sharply at the end of 1923 by means of series of
tax decrees, with e view to enforcing the currency stabilisation *25«
A number of 'once for all' taxes were imposed - eg the 'Khein-Auhr
'bgabe'. In respect of the regular taxes the major measures were
the raising of Turnover Tax as high as 24%, and the decision to base
the assessment of 'assessed' (veranlagte/ Income Tax and Corporation
Tax on the extremely 'gross' measure of turnover less wage and salary
payments. Some rather crude basis was inevitable in the aftermath of
the inflation, but this basis deliberately expanded tax receipts.
Other tax rates were also raised, such as excises on luxuries
(Luxussteuer;, on stock exchange turnover etc.
With these measures however tas rates reached a maximum.
Already in the autumn of 192k Turnover Tax was reduced in two stages
*25 A complete list of tax rate changes to 1927/8 appears in
Stat.Eeichsamt, Einzelschr ... no. 1^ pp ^3-5» See also
Baumgarten op.cit. pp 13, 16-17, 59-61, 76-79i 13^-6 on the
following.
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to 14%; Income and Corporation Tax receipts, if collected on the
temporary assessment basis, were reduced by 25%; Luxury Tax was cut
from 15% to 10% and Stock Exchange Turnover Tax was also reduced.
In 1925 tax revenues were increased by the reintroduction of tariffs,
but in general, the trend toward reduction of rates persisted. The
incidence of Income and Corporation Taxes fell as normal assessment
bases became more common; expense allowances rules were relaxed, and
marginal rates somewhat eased. Turnover Tax was cut to 1%; Stock
Exchange Turnover Tax and Company Tax (Cesellschaftssteuer/ further
reduced. The tax reduction perhaps raort potent in the long run came
about as a result of an amendment from the floor of the Reichstag -
the so-called ' Lex Eriining', whereby every time the monthly revenue
from Wage Tax (Lohnsteuer; exceeded 600 mill.Em for six consecutive
months, the rate of this tax was reduced. This measure operated
repeatedly during 1926-28; in these years further reductions in
turnover tax and some excises were offset by increases in others, and
in certain tariff rates.
The rates of taxes levied by the states and communes seem to have
altered little over the period. The most notable change was at the
beginning, when in 1924 a new tax was imposed on property, in an
attempt to capture some of the windfall gains accruing to property
owners whose mortgage burdens had been eroded. It was intended to
devote a substantial part of the revenues from this tax - the so-called
'GebMudeentschuldungssteuer' ('Hauszinssteuer1 in Prussia; - to the
provision of housebuilding finance *26.
*26 Baumgarten op.cit. p 15ff
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The general pattern of tax policy seems clear: rates raised to a
crisis level in 1924, then quickly reduced again by the end of 1925»
The effects of these measures on yields can be clearly seen in
Table 4 below.
Table 4 Selected Tax Revenues 1924/25 to 1929/30
Kill.Em. Current Prices
1924/5 1925/6 I9£611 1927/8 1528/9, 1929/30
A. Eeich Taxes
1 Reparations Dues 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.6
2 Wage Tax 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.4
3 Assessed Income Tax 0.9 0.8 1.1 10 1.5 1.4
b Corporation Tax 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6
5 Wealth Tax 0.5 0.3 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.0
6 Turnover Tax 1.9 1.4 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
7 Customs 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.1 1.1
£. State and Communal
Taxes





0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2
1.3 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6
0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.9








8 Grund- und Gebiiudesteuer;
9 GebSudee-ntschuldungs- (=Hauszins~; -steuer;
10 Gewerbesteuer.
SOURCES: Kcn.j.Stat.Hdb. (1936^ p 166; Baumgarten op.cit. pp 217-218.
The expenditure
that of revenue
policy of the Eeich followed
policy. Expenditure was cut
a path complementary to
back savagely in the
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period November 1923 to April 192*f; the aim was to make 15% of civil
servants redundant and to reduce the salaries of the remainder below
1913 levels; expenditure on materials was to be reduced to a minimum,
and new building programmes were suspended; payment of compensation
to industry in the Ruhr was also interrupted *27. But already by
later 192^ the cuts were gradually being restored on all the above
items, By 1925-26 the Reich was initiating schemes to ameliorate the
unemployment of those recession years (in addition to 'obligatory'
aid to local authorities for unemployment relief;. In 1Q?7 cyclical
recovery terminated these expenditures, but in the summer of that year
the Reich budget was further burdened - as a result of an initiative
from the floor of the Reichstag (though not unwillingly adopted by
the government. - with substantial increases in civil service salaries
and pensions. KBhler, the current Reich finance Kinister, estimated
that these would cost the Reich c»300 mill. p.a.
There was, it seems clear, also steady pressure for the expansion of
expenditure at the level of the states and communes. This is discussed
in more detail on pp i02ff below; here 1 note that the Reich's work
creation policies of 1926/7 and salary increases of 1927 had their
counterparts at these levels. The overall effect can be traced in
Table 5 (overleaf).
Thus, we see that the fiscal deficit which characterised the years
under review was not an automatic consequence of the initial fiscal
*27 This description of expenditure policies follows Baumgarten









n. • s. •
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structure, but the result of discretionary revenue-reducing and
expenditure-increasing policy changes.
The political bases of this development were several. Firstly, the severe
budgetary policy of 1924 was probably made possible only by the bypassing
of the Reichdag via the use of 'emergency tax decrees' *28. The fact
that two of the major deficit-creating measures - the 'Lex Brttning' of
1925 and the civil servant salary increase of 1927 - originated as Reich¬
stag initiatives indicates the part jiayed in generating the deficits by the
parliamentary weakness,of the unstable coalition governments. Nonetheless,
»
it is also of relevance that Reinhold, the Reich Finance Minister at a
critical period in 1926-27 (the period when deficits were beginning to be
a serious matter) was not a scrupulous adherent of the principle of balanced
budgets, and was in particular the initiator of the loan-financed work-
creation schemes.
*28 Ibid, pp 6ff. Wd 13/2(1928) pp l453ff* 'Zur Frage einer Reform
der parlamentarischen Ausgabebewilligungsrechts'.
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Table 5 Selected Items of Public Expenditure
Mill.Rm. Current Prices
Salaries and Fees 1925/6 1926/7 1927/8 1928/9
1 All Governments 4796 5076 5527 6487
2 Reich 741 787 922 986
3 States 1940 2039 2263 2591
4 Expenditure on Materials* 3320 3447 3741 3963
5 Economic Aid 846 11*8 1188 1298
6 Subsidies to Social
Insurance 259 286 346 416
7 Work-Creating Unemploy¬
ment Relief 135 206 118 108
* excluding investment expenditure.
SOURCES: Lines 1-4: Hoffmann ... pp 710-1.
Lines 5-7: Stat.Reichsamt, Einzelschr ... no 14 p
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Two of his predecessors - Luther and von Schlieben, \\'hile more insist¬
ent on budgetary balance, were nonetheless eager to reduce taxes which
in their view impaired 'Kapitalbildung' (saving, - such as turnover
tax. And von Schlieben initiated the subterfuge whereby previous
years' surpluses could be applied to cover present deficits. Rein-
hold's successor, Ktihler, may have expressed adherence to the balanced
budget principle, but himself bore a good deal of the responsibility
for the 1927 salary increase. Hilferding, his successor, was .neither
more nor less 'orthodox' in his budgetary views than his predecessors,
but the drastic circumstances of his period of office forced sub¬
scription to them *29.
The objectives of the government obviously did not include Keynesian
demand management; the counter-cyclical policies (at that time
frequently discussed in the press and in government circles^ that were
undertaken proved rather feeble *30. But an alternative policy is
quite conceivable, in which the expenditure raising and revenue reduc¬
ing measures had been much less vigorous; a state of affairs in which
the budget had been balanced over the quinquennium 1924/5-1929/30 is
therefore quite conceivable. Thus, one may fairly attribute to the
*29 For comments on the several linance Ministers see Baumgarten
op.cit. pp 16, 64-5, 129, 137-42; I Kaurer op.cit. pp 14-18,
50-1; E Wandel, Hans SchSffer. pp 152ff, I76ff.
*30 The Work Creation Programme of 1926/27 was initially planned to
cost 800 mill.Rm., financed by loans. See Xvorl&ufiger)
Reichswirtsehaftsrat, Bericht ... in BA Silverberg Rachlass 248.
In the event much was paid for out of revenue: I Kaurer op.cit.
p 18. See too tidW 5/4/28 p 53% 'Offentliche Auftr&ge als
Mittel aer Konjunkturpolitik'. The views of Schitffer, a leading
official in the Reich Finance Ministry, during 1929/30, are dis¬
cussed in E Wandel op.cit. pp 145-6. The sensitivity of the
authorities to the question is shoim by the publication of
monthly statistics of orders placed by the public sector: eg
Wi.u.Stat. 1930 PP 857-60.
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discretionary policy of governments and the political composition of
the parliaments at all levels, the aggregated public household deficit
of c.-j to Imrd.Em. per annum.
However the ultimate employment-generating effects of this deficit
were probably slight. A number of modern U.S. studies converge on a
multiplier which over two years rises to a value of about two *31 •
Because of the greater openness of the German economy, and the serious
financial repercussions of the deficit, describee in the next section,
the multiplier in Germany was probably less *32. If the multiplier
had a value of one, and the full-employment deficit was POO mill.Rm.,
then it added less than to aggregate demand. If the multiplier was
two, and the full employment deficit 1.0 mrd.Rm., then it added c.P-J/.
Comparable estimates of the fiscal balance do not exist for the pre-war
decade. Given the arms race and the revenue problems of the Reich
then, it seems unlikely to have been very deflationary; but probably
not significantly expansionary in relation to the economy as a whole
either *33« That is, the net impact was probably not dissimilar to
that of 19?^-P9. By contrast, the fiscal balance of the public house¬
hold of the Federal Republic in the decade after 19**8 appears generally
to have been in surplus *3^»
Eg Gary Fromm and Paul Taubmann, Policy Simulations with an
Econometric Kodel, pp 82ff (esp 84—S9^»
Note the parallel to the 'Treasury View' • But for evidence
that public borrowing did impair private, see DV III 11/1/29
P ^53, 10/5/29 0 1073 (re Reich and Prussian Loans).
P-C Witt, Die Finazpolitik des deutschen Rciches, 1903-13, passim,
See Tables therein pp 378-80.






Turning from long term to short term, would there be any grounds for
asserting that fiscal policy changes were partly responsible for the
recession in late 1927-1928? Two remarks are relevant:
1) The policy changes just discussed indicate that the 'constant
employment' deficit tended the rather to increase in 1927-28. This
would be the combined tendency of the civil service salary increase,
and the simultaneous institution of the Reich Institute for Employment
and Unemployment Insurance, which later committed the Reich to heavy
subsidies. Practically from the start, expenditure of the Institute
out-ran its 'additional' revenues from contributions. Ctn the other
side, revenue policy changed little at this time.
2 Kov/ever it is evident from Table 2 (p 91 above) that the aggregate
level of public household expenditure ceased to increase between 1928/29
and 1929/30* This is doubtless related to the growing public sector
financial crisis described in the next section. This plateau was
probably not reached till after the general upper turning point in
activity. If in the absence of financial constraints, public expend¬
iture would have continued to grow, then by the 'balanced budget
multiplier' this constraint aggravated the recession.
^.3« Financing the Deficit
h.3.1. The net public household deficit conceals the offsetting
surpluses of the social insurance institutions, and the larger 'gross'
deficits of certain governments, notably the Reich and certain communes.
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I confine the discussion of this section to these two levels of
government *35*
A public deficit can be financed by the issue of debt to
i) the central bahk. As has already beer noted, in this period
this form of financing was scarcely possible *36. Had the President
of the Reichsbank been amenable, doubtless the le; al restrictions could
have been circumvented, but Dr Schacht became increasingly hostile to
the Reich government after 1927* just as its financial difficulties
were multiplying; the legal provisions reinforced his political
independence *37*
ii, to the banking orstem. This could mean a; a public sector
bank (eg a communal savings bank,; b; a domestic private credit bank;
C/ a foreign bank. Direct borrowing from the last source was rather
slight up to 1929, as Tables 7* 10 and 11 pp 101, 118
indicate.
„• •
iii) to the public by the issuing of long term bonds (at home or
abroad), usually through the intermediation of a banking consortium;
or by the issuing of treasury bills.
I will discuss firstly the borrowing problems of the communes, then
those of the Reich.
*35 Re Prussian deficits see DV III 11/1/29 P 453; 18/1/29
p 485-6.
*36 See p, 15 above.
*37 H Kiiller, Die Zentralbank, eine Kebenregerierung p 39; for
the Reich Finance Ministry view of Schacht, E Wandel op.cit.
PP 137-9.
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^.3.2. Borrowing Problems of the Communes
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Statistics of the issue of new debt are not separately available for
the communes before the Stat.Reichsamt survey of the public debt at
31.3*28; for annual estimates the increase in total public debt must
do duty. Note however, that except for 192b (Dawes Loan • and 1930
(Young Loan; public foreign borrowing was dominated by the communes
Table 6 Annual Increase in Public Household Debt Hill.Rm.
Issued I92hr 1925 1926 192? 1928 1929 1930
At Home 27 37 1018 71^ 663 127^ ^57
Abroad n.a. 656 72b 361 1356 97 1172
SOURCE': Hoffmann ... pp 790-1.
Table 7 Communal Debt at 31 »3 Mill.Rm.
1928 1922 122°
I Pre-192i+ Debt (revalued; 1138 1202 1193
II Long Term Debt - Aggregate 3082 4276 ^962
a) Issued Abroad* 512 726 721
b) Issued At Home 2570 3550 b2bl
III Short Terra Debt - Aggregate 1555 2252 29^5
a) Issued Abroad 50 12 1^
b) Issued At Home 1525 22^0 2951
IV Debts held by Other Public Bodies 767 103*+ 1156
SUM New Debt (II + III) ^637 6527 7906
ANNUAL INCREASE (II + III) 1890 1379
SOURCE: (Proximate; Konj.Stat.Hdb. (1936) p 172; (ultimate; Stat.Reich¬
samt survey; cf. abqrve with Stat.Reichsamt, Einzelschr ...
no. 13, Die Hffentliche Verschuldung ... p 23^.
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(though the states also participated) *37A
Communal governments experienced constant pressure to increase
expenditure on the one hand, but on the other possessed a barely
adequate tax base - even including transfers *38.
So-called 'municipal socialism' *39» which had been observed before
the war, expanded after it both under the political pressure of enlarged
electorates and under the technical pressures which dictated improve¬
ments in infrastructure - electricity supply, public transport, the
housing shortage, etc *40. The pressure may have been intensified
by an unsatisfied backlog of projects due to the relative poverty of
communes during the inflation *41. The obverse of this is of course
*37A Of Tables 1? and 13 P' 118.
*38 Wk 12(1933) pp245ff, 'Die Finanzlage der aeutschen Gemeinden';
HdW 3/1/29 PPl-5» 'hie Finanzlage der Gemeinden'; 0 Biisch o£.
cit. pp22-50,155-6. Also on Berlin: DV I 13/5/27 p1021;
Wd 15/2(1928) pp I505ff, 'Die Kommunalfinanzen'.
*39 Eg Bankarchiv XXX (1930/1) pp503ff, 'Die Notlage der Kommunen';
0 Btisch op.cit. pp35ff; K H liansmeyer (ed; op.cit. p 80.
*40 As of 31.3.28 40% of total local authority post-stabilisation
borrowing was for public utilities and transport improvements.
A further 27% was for housebuilding: Stat.Reichsamt Einzelschr
no.13i Die Bffentliche Verschuldung ... p274. A close study of
the sources revealed little of the 'conspicuous consumption' by
communes of which they were often accused; although some of the
largest cities (Munich, Leipzig, Dresden, but not Berlin; were
!offenders'. See the discussions of communal financial policies
in the Advisory Council: BA R2/2067, 2126-30. Also 0 BUsch
op.cit. ref *39; Wd. 14/2 (1929) P 1583*
*41 Communes received a variety of subsidies and credits from the
Reich and states but, at least till December 1922, lags in
their transmission seriously eroded their value. Nevertheless,
general current expenditure seems not to have suffered greatly;
but adequate financing for capital projects was hard to get:
K H Hansmeyer (ed) op.cit. pp 60-64 (especially 88-9i 94;.
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that communes emerged from the inflation with a low fixed debt burden -
even allowing for likely debt revaluation *42, and hence felt free to
incur new debt. From the second half of 192k, at the latest, com¬
munes began to borrow, short term at first, at home and abroad *43.
The pressure which compelled a high level of borrowing were felt most
acutely by the large cities. The increase in their population com¬
pelled them to spend relatively more on social welfare and infra¬
structure, but the agreement (I inaasausgleich which determined their
share of tax transfers disadvantaged them the most, since it was
based on relative revenues in 19U *44.
In financing public works, the general practice of local authorities
was to draw on short term credits while the work was in progress, and
to consolidate these, when it was nearing completion, with a long term
*42 Assuming comparability of estimates, in 1928 the aggregate
value of (revalued; pre-1924 communal debt was 1.2 mrd.Rm.
(Table 7 above whereas from Hoffmann ... p 799 communal debt
in 1913 stood at 5 mrd.M. See too W Lotz, 'Finanzen ...'
P *+97 •
*43 E-A V/1 Die Reichsbank, pp 8lff; R Kuczynski, Deutsche
Anleihen im Ausland ... p 20. R Ott op.cit. pp 98, 103.
Since Prussia issued guidelines about communal foreign borrow¬
ing in November 192*+, it must have recommenced earlier.
Already during the inflation communes had borrowed abroad.
See K H Hansmeyer (ed) op.cit. pp 77-8.
*44 See refs *39» For this reason, large cities had super-
proportionate borrowing requirements. According to a survey
of communal indebtedness in early 1928, undertaken by the
Advisory Council, 4/5 of the borrowing by communes of above
80,000 population was accounted for by that of the six largest
cities of the Reich: BA R2/2128, sitting of 18/1/28. On
Berlin, see 0 Biisch op.cit. pp 3ff» I07ff» Berlin's share in
tax transfers fell relatively through 1924-31.
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flotation *45. The timing, indeed the possibility, of such a
flotation depended on the conditions of domestic and foreign markets.
Consonant with the already-described history of the capital
markets *46, we note in Table 6 ( p 101 - the earlier advance of
foreign than domestic issuing (in 1925/, but the rapid recovery of the
latter down to February 1927, and its deterioration thereafter.
Though there was some recovery from the low point of 1927, public
household, and therefore communal domestic bond issuing during
1928-29 remained less than that of 1926 *47. That this was a result
of failure of domestic demand for bonds rather than of a reduction in
their supply is evident both from the pressure of foreign issuing in
1928, and from the fact of undersubscribed domestic flotations *48.
Access to foreign markets was not however solely a function of their
inherent 'absorbtive capacity'. Alarmed by the flood of local authority
foreign issues in later 1924, the Reich agreed with the several states
to set up the already-mentioned Advisory Council for Foreign Credits
(Beratungsstelle ftir Auslandskredite/. Guidelines to govern its
. . t
*43 This is indicated by a perusal of applications considered by
the Advisory Council: BA R2/2126-30; especially R2/2128
sitting of 18/1/28. (But the Council actually stipulated
that it preferred to receive applications for foreign capital
issue at this stage: R Ott op.cit. p 147/. Cf. E-A III/2
op.cit. p 64. v
*46 See pp 23-45 above.
*47 Eg the failure of a 10 miil.Rm. domestic bond issue of the
Deutsche Sparkassen- und Giroverband: DV II 3/2/28 pp 551»
'Die Konjunktur'.
*48 Cf. a letter from 0 Mulert, President of the Association of
German Cities, to the Reich Finance Minister 1/10/27, in
BA R43 I/656. On undersubscription: BA R4; 1/635, 'Bericht
des Herrn ReichsbankprSsidenten ... ' 19/7/28 pp 16-18.
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'advice' were promulgated by decree in December 1924 and January
1925 *49# The states undertook to enforce the 'advice' of the
Council with respect to applications for i) direct communal foreign
credits; ii; foreign flotations on behalf of communes by communal
credit institutions; iii; communal Reichsmark credits whose creditor
was foreign. iv; The states and the Reich itself undertook to
abide by the advice/guidelines of the Council before borrowing abroad
themselves *50*
The Council sought to assess applications in terms of their effects on
the stability of the currency *51» on the finances of the applicant,
on the wider economy (eg effect of a given rate of public foreign
borrowing on private , and on generl political relations abroad
(especially in connection with reparations/. *52
To effectuate these considerations, the Council applied certain 'rules
of thumb'. For example short term credits were normally not subject
to scrutiny provided that they met certain conditions as to terms,
and that their repayment was assured *53» Secondly, for long term
*49 R Ott op.cit. pp 98-9; the operation of the Council, though
not its economic consequences, as described in detail by
H Dietrich-Troeltsch in K H Hansmeyer (ed) op.cit. pp 174-219*
*50 R Ott op.cit. pp 105-111. The Council had no powers over other
foreign credits. The decision whether or not to exempt these
from Capital Yield Tax was delegated (by the Reichstag; to a
committee of the Reich Finance Ministry, having a certain
membership overlap with the Council. A Norden, Hearing before
E-A V/1 Die Reichsbank op.cit. p 179*
*51 More generally, the Reichsbank wished to use the Council to
improve its control of the money market. Dietrich-Troeltsch,
in Hansmeyer (ed; op.cit. pp 179-80.
*52 R Ott op.cit. p 97.
*53 Ibid, pp 125-6. Short term foreign borrowing by the communes
was small. See Table 7 P 101 above, and the discussion in
the Council cited in *44.
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flotations standard terms of issue (varying with foreign market
conditions) had to be achieved or bettered. Thirdly a distinction
was drawn between 'productive' and 'unproductive' uses of the proceeds
from long term loans. To qualify as 'productive' the project in
question had to "serve the interests of the whole economy, and pre¬
ferably by enabling an increase in exports or reduction in imports,
in some clearly demonstrable manner" *$bm In practice the criterion
boiled down to the position that applications for foreign financing of
electricity, water or gas work construction were (at least up to mid-
1927/ approved without question; applications related to transport
developments would only be approved where direct benefit to industry
or agriculture could be shown, and applications related to house¬
building or recreational facilities would be refused *55* From the
standpoint of currency considerations at least, the rule seems reason¬
able, if necessarily rough, pace the criticisms of many contemporaries
and historians *56.
Quantitative assessment of the degree of restriction imposed by the
Advisory Council is problematical if only because public authorities
would naturally tend to overstate their financial needs in making
application *57* However, from Table 8, it appears that already in
*5^ Guidelines, Section Bill para.2, cited from K Ott oy.cit.
PP 135-6; see discussion there, pp 136-V3? also letter from
Schacht to the Keich Chancellor of 27/6/27 BA Rk3 I/6M.
*55 K Ott Qj «cit. pp 155-6; K H Hansmeyer (ed/ op.cit. pp 205-9;
E-A V/I Hie Eeichsbank pp 97-9» I73ff*
*56 K Ott loc.cit. 0 Mulert as cited in **f8. More pragmatic is
the criticism eg of H itisstenberg, 'Die Neuregelung der
Beratungsstelle', Bankarchiv XXIX (1929/50) PP 399ff* See the
defence of its chairman (A Norden in Wei 13/1 (1928/ pp 593-5*
*57 On the other hand, most applications had been vetted by the




Fercentage of Total Sums Applied for and Approved by the
Advisory Council for Foreign Credits Mill.Km. or %
T = Total Applied for (mill.Km.;
A = Percentage Approved (%1
Borrower
A A TT T A T A
Communes kk6 65 hk5 39 186 59 962 137
States 151 92 313 87 1A1 100 8A 100
Agric. 10 100 105 '100 336 100 231 93
Industry* 88 100 152 95 81 62 n*ci • n • © •
TOTAL 695 75 1016 68 86 (1277 (<51)
* with government guarantee provisional
SOUKCL. E-A V/1 Lie Keichsbank, p 85; based on information from the
Kcich Finance Ministry.
1925 and 1926 communal applications were severely cut down, more
severely than those of other types of borrower. My own calculations
from reports of the sittings of the Council indicate that in the year
1926 about A5% of sums applied for by local authorities were
approved *58. These percentages seem sufficiently low to constitute
* . ' v-
. •
evidence that the Council did from the start restrict communal foreign
*58 BA K2/2126-7. Calculated from a sample of 2/5 of applications
considered. Not all of the 2/5 could be included: for a
sizeable minority the sums applied for, or, less often,
approved, were not recorded. Cases where decision was post¬
poned were omitted; but those approved, subject to minor
improvement in terms of issue, were included. Where both
the original demand of the commune, and that approved by
the state were recorded, the former was used (but in some
cases only the latter was available,'.
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borrowing considerably *59- There were evasions, but not on such a
scale as to nullify the restrictions *60.
After December 1926, access to foreign capital markets was never as
straightforward again. First of all, there was the general suspension
of the exemption of foreign bonds from Capital Yield Tax in the first
half of 1927 *61. From the protocols it aoes not appear that the
Advisory Council met again till early Apt coer 1527« 'The reason for
this seems to have been dissension in its ranks *62. Cn the one hand
the Reichsbank represented - throughout the period 1926-29 - a
restrictive interest, constantly intervening to urge refusals or
reductions of sues applied for. This follows from its responsibility
*59 Against this must be set the fact that Local Authority foreign
bond prospectuses often traded, in a vague way, on the Council's
imprimatur. Lg in the prospectus for a Leipzig $5 mill, bond
issue approved 5/2/26 (BA R?/?1?6 - original application = ff6
mill., it was stated: "The bonds are issued with the approval
of Saxon and German governmental authorities". Foreigners may
have regarded this as a guarantee cf financial soundness, which
it was not. Cf. the discussion in BA 12/206?; also DV_ III
19/7/29 P 1426. Borden thought that the Council legitimately
enhanced issuing terms: see citation in *56; also E-A V/1
Lie Feichsbank p 18O. So did the Leichsbank: F Miller Keferat
m7T in Untersuchun,, des Bankwcsens Ft 1 vol 2 pp 209-11•
*60 See E Ott op.cit. pp l63ff; E-A V/1 Die Reichsbank pp 90-4.
Apart from the substition of uncontrolled short term debt (which
substantiates the arguments of the critics; the major method of
evasion was issue of bonds in the name of commercially organised
enterprises. See Wd article cit. in *41; also F Speth Leutsch-
lands Auslandsverschuldung pp 65-6. The new g-uidelines sought
to close some loopholes: E-A V/1 op-.cit. p 82.
*61 See pp 34-5 above.
*62 Actual membership of the Council is given by R Ott op.cit.
pp 151ff.
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for the currency, but was accentuated by the views of Lr Schacht *63-
The other pole was provided by the states' representatives, who
generally supported the expenditure and borrowing policies of the
communes and tended to minimise potential dangers *6L. The Reich
government tended to stand in the middle; hence broadly determined
the issue *65* But the Council could not operate in the face of
the implacable hostility of the Reichsbank to its policy, and the
reason for the long hiatus in its activity in the summer of 1925
probably lies in the attituae of Schacht himself.
Schacht's agitation about the level of communal foreign debt was
expressed in public speech *66; also in strong representations to
the Reich government *67. Shortly after the Advisory Council
reconvened in September, the Reichsbank representative moved the
*63 Schacht was initially quite favourable to foreign credits;
but between 1925-27 became increasingly hostile. E-A V/1 hie
Reichsbank pp 169-755 also C Hardach, Reltmarktorientierung ...
PP 55ff; R huller, hie hentralbank ... pp 62ff.
*6k The states' attitude can be detected in their voting on the
Council; cf. the remarks of Schrdder of the Prussian State
Bank and of Prussian officials, minimising the alarm over the
findings of the Council's survey of communal indebtedness:
BA R2/2128. sitting of 18/1/28.
*65 A clear example of this is the discussion of the Berlin appli¬
cation on 3O/V28: -BA R2/2129.
*66 Schacht's 'Bochumer Rede' (speech in Bochum , in DV II 25/11/27
p 2271 'Aus der \voche'; also B Benning, her'schwarze Ireitag' ...
p 1L9. Rnrlier, his statement in E-A V/1 hie Reichsbank pp 112ff,
17R.
*67 BA Rhj I/656. Letter of 18/7/27 from Curtius (Reich Economics
Minister to the State Secy, of the Reich Chancellery, request¬
ing a meeting of the cabinet with Schacht to discuss his views.
Letter of Mulert to Reich Finance Sinister (cited *L8 expressing
concern over the outcome of a meeting between the Minister and
Schacht on 28-29/9/27- Cf. K H Hansmeyer (ed/ op.cit. pp l6Lff.
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implementation of stricter guidelines, which were approved at the
meeting of 4 November *68.
Thus the attitude of the Reichsbank gravely impeded the activity of
the Council throughout 1927 *69. A further impediment arose in
the autumn of that year in the shape of foreign dissatisfaction
with the conduct of German public finances. This was crystallised
in the comments of the Agent-General for Reparations, in his half-
yearly report of June 1927» but more sensationally in October, when
he wrote and published a memo on the subject to the Reich government
*70. It seems clear that this plain criticism of tendencies toward
deficit in Reich and communal budgets added to the disquiet of
foreign lenders *71•
*68 BA R2/2128, sittings of 20/9/27 and 21/11/27.
*69 See the Prussian attack on the indecision of the Reich in the
face of Reichsbank pressure: BA R2/2128, sitting of 10/2/28.
On the Reich/Reichsbank disagreement see IV II 14/10/27 PP 35-6,
'Aus der Woche'.
*70 Cited according to typescript of memo in BA Rachlass Silverberg
10. More conveniently bound at end of the"Agent-General's
Report of Lec. 1927. The A-G seems to have been influenced by
Schacht, and by 'business' views: BA R4j I/6J5, Bericht ...
of 20/1/28; K H Hansmeyer (ed, op.cit. pp l64ff; H Briining,
Kemoiren p 129.
*71 Cf footnote *79 below. Already the indecision of the
US State Lept. in Sept. 1927 about granting admission to a
Prussian loan (because of the question as to primacy of
Reparations had heightened the nervousness of foreign markets:
LV II 7/10/27 p 25; G Hardach, Weltmarktorientierung ...
p 85; Centralverband ... I'aterialien ... p 24. An article in
the 'Times' expressing disauiet is cited in CV I 9/9/27 p 1564.
The Agent-General clearly believed that German deficits per se
weakened German bonds abroad.
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About this time the Council became dubious of the ability of foreign
markets to absorb the potential public authority demand for credit,
and instituted a survey of the credit demands of all communes with
populations above 80,000 *72. In September and early October 1927
it approved a small number of credits. Mot until 15/3/28 (ie after
receipt and consideration of the findings of the above survey did
it resume regular review of applications. Thus, in effect, the whole
of 1927 and the first quarter of 1928 v/ere periods of very intermittent
operation by the Council. This is reflected in Table 8 (p 107)
by the small total of sums considered in 1927.
The Council worked solidly till the end of June 1928, considering
the huge backlog of applications from individual communes, and also
the 'Satnmelanleihe' (consolidated loan issue; of the German Savings
and Clearing Institutes Association (Deutsche Sparkassen- und
Ciroverb; naj on behalf of a large number of smaller communes. There¬
after, till the end of 1929« its operation was again very intermittent.
Ott characterises the altered attitude of the Council after the summer
of 1927 by sayin( that whereas previously the 'productivity of use'
criterion predominated, thereafter sheer currency considerations
predominated. The new guidelines were explicit that flotations were
permitted only when domestic and foreign currency market considerations
*72 Cf *64. >
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allowed *73. Only after this time does one find applications
reduced merely on grounds of 'the general restriction' *7^» And
in fact, by my calculations from the protocols, only 28% of sums
applied for by local authorities were approved between September 1927
and the end of 1928, as against 45% in 1926 *75*
In broad terms of the politics of the Advisory Council, the swint. in
its attitude after mid 1927 is reflected in the fact that, whereas
*73 K Ott op.cit. p A8. See also the Report of the Commissioners
of the Reichsbank of 7/12/27 A3 1/633 , 'In the new formu¬
lation l_ sc. 'of the guidelinesit is expressly emphasised
that economic and political reasons dictate the utmost restrict¬
ion in the taking up of foreign credits by public authorities'.
For a clear dscursion, ement 1928 p 8l6, 'Neue kichtlinien ...'.
The Council seems to have agreed that the Reich should set
global maxima for issues in the forseeable future 1x2/2128,
sitting of 18/1/28 , a decision dictated, in Lietrich-
Troeltsch's view, by the failure of the 'productivity' criterion:
Hansmeyer (ed op.cit. pp 213-7* I am not sure whether the
proposal was implemented.
*7^ -Eg the discussion of the applications of Bramstedt and Weiss-
wasser on A/A/28, or of Hannover on 13A/28 - BA 2/2128."
*75 (i The method is described in *58. For 1927-28 however, I
included all applications for which enough information
is available. The reduction in the percentage approved may
partly reflect a conscious escalation of demands by local
authorities, but there is no evidence that the Council thought
this; and anyway it presupposes the point at issue: viz that
communes knew that stringency had increased.
(ii; My results are in conflict with the Council's published
data (Table 8 p107 , which show no decline in % approved.
Both from the arithmetic and the general tenor of the records
I find the constancy puzzling. My calculations for both perbds
are incomplete, but not, I think, unrepresentative. The pub¬
lished 1928 data are, however stated to be 'provisional'.
In any case absolute amounts rejected were, in 1928 twice as
great as in 1926; and according to the same source (E-A V/'1
lie Reichsbank p 87 this increased the gap between foragn and
domestic yields on municipal bonds.
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the Council had formerly tended to vote with the states against the
Reichsbank, thereafter the reverse was true. This implies that the
representatives of the Reich had 'changed sides'. But in seeking to
apportion responsibility for the decreasing proportion of communal
applications approved, we have to visualise the alternatives. It
is clear from the protocols that the Council itself believed that
its hand was forced by the unreceptive condition of the US market *76.
Lid, then, the increased restrictiveness of the Council exert a truly
autonomous influence, as many contemporaries believed *77? Two
answers are relevant:
i j If, in Table 9 ? -piA' ve compare the years 1927-28 and 1925-26,
it can be seen that the foreign borrowing of governments (all levels)
relative to that of private enterprises fell. (Private sector foreign
borrowing was not subject to the Council.)
ii) Of the common pressures causing a reduction in German foreign
borrowing in 1927-28, the bulk have domestic roots. See pp io8ff
above (if we allow that the criticisms of the Agent-General were in
large measure domestically inspired,.
It therefore seems fair to state that the policy of the Advisory Council
in particular and of the Government in general was the major cause of
the reduction in communal foreign borrowing, up to raid 1928.
*76 Eg the discussion on VH/27 (BA RP/2128) and, of the survey,
on 18/1/28 (Lid. ; also of the conditions of issue of the
German Clearing and Savings Institutes Association's loan on
15/3/28 (BA R2/P129/» Finally, the article by A Norden
(ref. *56; p 595.
See *56; further R Ott op.cit. pp 157-9» F Speth, op.cit.
pp 65-6. Dietrich-Troeltsch's attribution of the increased
stringency to an internal learning process reinforces this
conclusion. See *73»
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Table 9 Annual Rates of Issue of Fixed Interest Bonds at Home
and Abroad 1923-28 Hill.km.
1923 1926 1927 1228
A. At Home
Government (all levels) 15 654 698 463
Public and Cooperative Enterprises 22 366 16 224
Mortgage Bonds** 840 1628 1597 1459
Bonds of Other Private Enterprise* 79 322 194 285
B. Abroad
Government (all levels,- 379 3?7 254 166
Public and Cooperative Enterprises 260 334 78 419
Mortgage Bonds** 120 197 515 367
Other Private Enterprise* 16 64 14 32
TOTAL - At home 994 3435 2859 2920
TOTnL - Abroad 1267 1577 1412 1466
* including banks ** including 'Kommunalobligationen'.
SOURCE: I-," V/1 Die Heichsbank p 98 (from data of Stat. Reichsamt .
From about that date, a crisis began to develop in local authority
finances *79, as the consequence of 12 months of poor conditions on
the domestic market, and 18 months of sporadic access to foreign
capital markets. Thereby a huge overhang of short-term debt had been
created, whose constant renewal became ever harder *80. According to
the Association of German cities, whereas in 1913 towns of above
25,000 inhabitants had an aggregate short term debt of 60 mill.M.;
already in 1928 such had an aggregate short term debt of 706mill.Rm. *81.
*79 Wd_ 13/2(1928. p 1094, 'hie kommunale Auslandsanleihen'; DV II
13/3/28, pp 844-5, 'Aus der Woche'; Idlv 3/1/29 PP Iff, 'Die
Finanzlage der Gemeinden1.
*8° Wd loc.cit. *79; DV II 5/V28 p 881.
*81 As reported in E-A V/1 Die Reichsbank p 9k,
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In January the Advisory Council's survey reported that 70% of desired
foreign loans were to consolidate debts incurred in work in progress,
or completed *82. The purpose and urgency of the consolidated
loan of the German Savings and Clearing Institutes Association was
just this *8j. The emergence of the crisis can be traced with acute
force in the case of Berlin *84. In April 1928 the city's appli¬
cation to raise 227 mill.Km. abroad (of which the relevant Prussian
ministries had approved 80-100 mill.Km. • was pared down by the Council
to 60 mill.Km. Signs of strain in the Berlin finances reappeared in
the discussion of the application of the ssociation of German Savings
and Clearing Institutes, on 26/11/28. the end of 1929 the crisis
was extreme. The city's short term indebtedness had expanded from
107 milLRm. at the end of 1927 to 399 mill.Km. at the end of 1929*
An application to take up a huge medium terra foreign credit to repay
pressing obligations was grounded with the threat that the alternative
was bankruptcy - an eventuality with serious consequences for the
whole of German foreign credit. The Council was inclined to take
the threat seriously, though aware that it was, in measure, being
browbeaten. The crisis in Berlin finances persisted through 1930,
forcing sales of assets, increased appropriation of the surpluses of
communal enterprises etc. If most acute in Berlin, the same features
were reproduced across the entire local authority sector, and persisted,
indeed intensified into the depression, despite attempts at debt
*82 See *64. Also Stat.<Reichsamt, Einzelschr ... No 13 PP 321ff.
*83 BA K2/2128, sitting of 23/4/28.
*84 For the following see the relevant discussions in BA R2/2128
(30/4/28;; 2130 (especially 11/12/29); 0 Btisch op.cit.pc 1b5ff»
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consolidation, sale of assets, reconstruction of enterprises etc *85.
Bankruptcies seem to have been avoided in general, but at the cost of
sustained acute tension in the short term financial markets throughout
these years *86.
Table 10 Net Surpluses Transferred from Public Enterprises** to
Communes, Provinces, Communal Associations etc.
Mill.km. Current Prices


























TOTAL 211 378 516 488 539
Total excluding briC*Forestry 192 338 403 478 488
1925/6 - 1926/7 exclude







** The Survey comprehends communal enterprise irrespective of legal
form. See Stat.Reichsamt, Einzelschr ... No. 15» loc.cit. in
Sources below.
SOURCE: Wi.und Stat. 1931 P 296, 1932, pp 21,22; Stat. Reichsamt.
Einzelschr ... No. 15, hie kommunale Betriebe, pp 20-37.
*85 Eg the Council's discussion of towns in Hesse in May 1928
(BA R2/2037-; on Saxony, see Schacht's report of 13/V28
(BA R43 1/635'« Further: i-.dW 19/12/29 PP 1915~7» 'Sanierung
der StSdte'; Wd 14/2 (1929/ P 2116, 'Die Umschuldungs- und
Sparaktion der deutschen St&dte'; Stat. Reichsamt Einzelschr...
no. 32, hie 1ira^lage der deutschen Gemeinden, passim.
On sale of assets!E-A 111/2 Die deutsche ElektrizitMts-
wirtschaft pp 81-2.
*86 DV III 5A/29 P 876, 6/9/29 P 1668, 'Die Konjunktur1. On
the failure of the domestic bond issues of Frankfurt,
Braunschweig and Breslau etc; DV III 20/9/29 P 1714, 27/9/29
P 17^6, 23/8/29 P 1583.
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Table 11 Net Transfers from Public Enterprises to Communes,
per head df Population, by Size of Commune
Population Size 1913 1925/6 1926/7 1927/8 1928/9
Above 100,000 8.8 12.3 15-3 13.4 18.6
50,000 - 100,000 5.9 8.4 12.0 11.8 16.6
25,000 - 50,000 4.4 6.4 11.1 11.0 14.0
10,000 - 25,000 4.0 5.0 7.8 7.9 -9.3
5,000 - 10,000 3.3 3-8 6.2 6.1 7.5
2,000 - 5,000 3.2 4.2 4.9 5.3 5.6
Less than 2,000 1.4 2.2 3.7 3.8 3.8
SOURCES: Wi.und.Stat. 1931 PP 295« 299; Stat.Reichsamt, Einzelschr...
No. 15» Die kommunale Betriebe pp 18-19.
Another indication of the strain in local authority finances is the
attempt to increase the appropriation of surpluses from their enter¬
prises *8?» and the fact that this increase is most marked in the
case of the larger communes *88. Tables 10 and 11 illustrate this.
4.3»3« Borrowing Problems of the Reich
Tables 12 and 13 are the counterparts, for the Reich and the states,
of Table 7 on p 101 • A comparison of the three will show the relative
unimportance of the states' debt, both in respect of level and of
rate of increase during 1928-30 *89.
*87 Stat. Reichsamt, Einzelschr ... no. 32 pp 17ff« 0 Btisch
op.cit. p 115? E Wolfgang, 'Kritische Darstellung ..." p 816.
*88 Perhaps however the heavier dependence of the smaller communes
on agricultural income, which slumped in 1928/29 explains this.
See below pp 35O-356 .
*89 The states also had borrowing problems after 1927: W Lotz
op.cit. pp 480-90.
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Table 12 Debt of the Reich at 31st March Mill.Em.
1928 1929 m1
I Pre-1924 Debt (revalued; 5560 5215 4927
II Long Term Debt - Aggregate 1384 1918 2495
a; Issued Abroad (884; (856) (.824;
b; Issued at Home (500) (1026; (1671)
III Medium and Short Term Debt - Aggregate 187 1095 2208
a) Issued Abroad (-) (45) (240;
b) Issued at Home (187) (1050 J (1968)
TOTAL - New Debt (II + III; 1561 3013 4703
Annual Increase - New Debt (II + III; 1452 1690
Table 13 Debt of the States at 31st March (excluding Hanse Cities)
Mill.fim.
1928 mi 1930
I Pre-1924 Debt (revalued) 61 61 64
II Long Term Debt - Aggregate 666 813 812
a) Issued Abroad (379) (376) (371)
b) Issued at Home (287) (437) (451)
III Medium and Short Debt - Aggregate 571 849 1087
a) Issued Abroad (133) (106) (162)
b) Issued at Home (438) (743) (925)
TOTAL - New Debt (II -+ III) 1237 1662 1909
Annual Increase - New Debt (II + III) 425 3^7
SOURCE: (Tables 12 and 13): Konj.Stat.Hdb. (1936/ p 172
(ultimate: Stat.Reichsamt Public Debt Surveys^
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Turning to the Reich, it is generally agreed that the already-described
process of tax rate reduction and expenditure increase after 192*+
eroded the surplus which had been generated in that year, and by
1926-27 began to necessitate recourse to the capital market *90.
All the estimates of the budget of the Reich are consistent with this
account *91• Already in 1926, Dr Reinhold, the Reich Finance Minister
had a large long term capital issue in view, as a major means of
financing the Work Creation Programme of that period *92. The
history of this loan (issued feb. 1927' has already been described
(p yj ): the Reich had to spend c.100 mill.Rm. during this period
in supporting it, and in August had to convert it to a 6% basis *93*
The Finance Minister had taisjudged the market'.
In 1928 the financial deficit of the Reich widened alarmingly *9*+#
*90 For this account see IjdW 25/* /29 PP 6*+1-3» 'Erschtitterung der
Reichsfinanzen'; Wk 8(1929/ PP 157ff» 'Etats- und Kassenlage
des Reichs'.
*91 The estimates of the Agent-General are consolidated in R E Ltike
Von der Stabilisierung zur Krise p 81. The ofiicial estimates
are in Konj.Stat.Hdb(1936) P 162, and can be made comparable
with the former by subtracting Fondsentnahme, Schuldenaufnahme,
and sonstige Einnahmen from revenues. Also Baumgarten op.cit.
PP 3*+» 92, 93-**, 156, 166.
*92 See (vorl&ufiger) Reichswirtschaftsrat, Bericht ... (as cited in
*30) p5. G Upmeier (in K H Hansmeyer (ed. op.cit. p120)
detected proto-Keynesian analysis in Reinhold's plan. Wk 6
(1927) PP 36,*+0,151; Wd 12/1(1927/ PPl21,2*+9. Counting the
Dawes external loan, this was only the second post-stabilisation
flotation of the Reich.
♦93 See Wd 12/2(1927) P1252; Wk 8(1929) pp157ff; P Hertz, 'Reich
und Reichsbetriebe* pp521ff. The ultimate proceeds were c.*+30
mill.Rm. (Wk 7(828) pl86> but of this at least 150mill. was held
by other government bodies. In the view of some this was intended
as a kind of open-market operation on the cash balances of
disparate government agencies.
*9*+ A succinct account occurs in P Hertz loc.cit.
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This was, to a minor extent, because of over-optimistic forecasts
about the development of tax revenues *95; to a much greater
extent probably because of underestimation of expenditure, especially
of subsidies to the new Reich Institute for Employment and Unemploy¬
ment Insurance. As a result, the Reich was forced, for the first
time, to take advantage of its right to issue Treasury Bills
rediscountable at the Reichsbank *96. By the end of 1928 a current
cash deficit (Kassendeficit; of c.1 mrd. Rm. had opened up, a deficit
which the allowable lines of credit from the Reichsbank, and other
direct credits from the Rentenbank could in no way cover *97• In
May 1929« Hilferding, then linance Minister, attempted to float another
500 mill.km* long term loan on the home market on extremely favourable
terms (including extensive tax concessions on this interest/. It
failed miserably, had to be reduced to 300 millRm., and ultimately
only 180 mill.Rm. was taken up *98. The Reich got behind with its
*95 Overestimate of revenue is often blamed. See *97; but the
actual shortfall was only c.40 mill.Rm. Wi.u.Stat. 1929
p 38O.
*96 M B Northrop op.cit. pp 56, 147; BA R43 1/635* Bericht ...
of 13/4/28 p 4. From mid-1927 the Reich had repeatedly to
take up its permitted 100 mill.Rm. overdraft with the Reichtebank.
*97 Stat.Reichsamt Einzelschr ... no. 14 p 66. See HdW article
cited in *90; also W Lotz op.cit. pp 491-2, and Table 12,
p above. Wd 13/2(1928) pp 1751I"f» 'Die Finanzlage des
Reichs'. J Popitz, 'Finanzpolitische Betrachtungen zur neuen
Reichsanleihe', Bankarchiv XXVIII(1928/9) pp 287ff. The state
of the financial markets also affected Reich short term borrow¬
ing: DV II 4/5/28 pp 1036-7.
*98 The news of the intention to float such an issue depressed the
market: DV III IO/5/29 p 1073» 'Die Konjunktur'. On its
failure: DV III 14/6/29 P 1244; Wd 14/1(1929) P 803; 15/1
(1930) PP 959-60, 'Die Reichsfinanzen nach dera Abschluss fur
1929'• E Welter, Stockung ... pp 13-4.
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tax transfers to the states and did not know from month to month
whether it could pay salaries *99. Hilferding was compelled to go
cap in hand to the private credit banks at home and abroad for accom¬
modation *100; his successors were forced to negotiate, along with
the external 'Young' loan of 1930, the 'Kreuger' loan, from the
Swedish match magnate, in return for a match monopoly in Germany *101.
Such expedients are reminiscent of early modern monarchs. And even
so, the Reich had to negotiate, with difficulty, advances on these
loans from American banking houses *102. The weakness of the govern¬
ment was manifest when in December 1929 the Keichsbank Fresident
was able to compel the resignation of Hilferding and his chief
secretary (Popitz; *103. After Schacht's own succession by Luther
relations were rather better, but it does not seem that the Reich's
access to Reichsbank credit actually improved.
4.4. Analysis of the Borrowing Problems of Governments
The difficulty with which local authorities on the one hand, and the
Reich on the other floated domestic bond issues, requires some common
* 99 DV III 23/8/29 P 1583.
*100 Wd 14/1(1929) P 1110, 14/2(1929) PP 2216, 2260: DV III
22/2/29 P 653, 26/4/29 PP 988-9.
*101 Eg E Wandel op.cit. p 177; Wd 14/2(1929) P 1858. The Young
Loan was also a flop: R E Luke op.cit. p 254-6.
*102 E Wandel op.cit. pp 137, 177. R E Luke op.cit. pp 248ff;
G Hardach, Weltmarktorientierung ... pp 110ff.
*103 E Wandel op.cit. pp 137ff; H Muller, Die Zentralbank ...
pp 96-8.
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explanation *104. From the discussion in Chapter 3 it appears
that the major reason was the incomplete recovery of the domestic
capital market, especially the bond market, after 1924. Since the
long term issues of governments must be bonds, they were badly
affected.
I wish, however, in this subsection, to advance and test the hypo¬
thesis that domestic public authority bonds were especially disad¬
vantaged after 1924, owing to a deterioration in the 'credit rating'
of public households, relative to other classes of bond issue. Many
contemporaries noted this deterioration, compared with pre-war.
Some attributed it to the political reverses of the state - military
defeat, lack of status of the republic, the weakness of parliamentary
government and the like *105. A more specific view blamed the fact
that the statutory revaluation of the pre-stabilisation debt of public
authorities (finalised in 1925) was much meaner than that of private
sector debt *106. Broadly speaking, public authorities revalued
their own debt at 2%% of its real value; they revalued mortgages at
c.25%» mortgage bonds rather similarly, and industrial/commercial
*104 G Hardach's attribution (Weltmarktorientierung ... p 110)
of the failure of the Hilferding loan solely to the con¬
temporaneous crisis in the Reparations negotiations fails
to account for the failure of the only other post-stabilisation
domestic loan of the Reich (Feb. 1927) and of numerous state
and local authority flotations.
*105 Centralverband ... Materialien ... pp 52ff. E Wolfgang,
Der Neuaufbau ...' p 8?«
*106 See Centralverband ... Materialien ... loc.cit.; W Lotz
op.cit. p 491; the annual report of the Prussian State Bank
noticed in DV III 15/2/29 p 616, 'Die Konjunktur'.
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bonds at 15% *107*
This hypothesis can be tested by examination of the changes in the
relative yields of bonds of different classes, since 1913- Before
doing so, we must note changes in the relative stocks of the different
classes (which will affect relative yields if there is imperfect
substitutability between classes;.
From Table 14 we see that the importance of mortgage bonds, and the
bonds of communal mortgage banks, on the domestic market was much
greater in the later 1920s than it had been before 1913; at the
other extreme the relative importance of industrial/commercial bonds
was greatly diminished. This related to the very small proportion
*107 Wd 10/2(1925) p 1124, 'Aufwertung und Anleiheablflsung',
p 1161, 'Das Aufwertungsgesetz'; E Wolfgang, 'Der
Neuaufbau ..." p 89.
The pre-1924 debts of the Reich could (with certain except¬
ions, be exchanged for a holding in the 'Redemption Debt
('AnleiheablSsungsschuld') which was worth (in km./ not
more than 2-J% of the nominal value of pre-1920 debt, and
much less of post-1920 debt. This Redemption Debt was only
redeemable after 20-30 years (earlier for debt held con¬
tinuously since before July 1920/. There was no statutory
obligation to pay interest; in practice 4J% was to be paid
retrospectively at redemption. Similar arrangements
obtained for state and communal debt.
To obtain the Rm. value of specified private sector debts,
one must first calculate what might be termed the 'basic sum'
of the old debt held. This 'basic sum' consisted of the
nominal value of old debt held continuously since before
1/1/18, and the nominal value deflated by a simple price
index, of debt purchased thereafter. For mortgages the Rm.
value was to be 25% of the 'basic sum' repayable in full
only after 1/1/32, and bearing interest which rose from
1% at 1/1/25 to 5% at 1/1/32. Mortgage Bonds presumably
recovered in value as did the associated mortgages.
Industrial/commercial bonds were revalued at 15% of the
•basic sum'.
Bank current and deposit accounts were not revalued, but
savings bank accounts were, at a minimum of 12-J% of the
'basic sum'. Other private sector debts were to be revalued
on an equitable basis, to a maximum of 25%.
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Table 14 Distribution by Class of Bond, of New Domestic Issues of
Bonds ana Eouity 1901-31* Annual Averages
Total Issued - Mill.Em.
Distribution - %
Mortgage Bonds
Bonds of Communal Mortgage Banks
Public Authority Bonds









SOURCE: Centralverband ... Materialien ... p 45.






























1929 1.6 0.2 1.8
31.12.29 1.3 3.1 4.4
* excluding Hanse Cities. ** and local authority associations.
SOURCES: Lines 1) to 3): Kon.j.Stat.Hdb. (1936; pp 171-2.
Lines 4;and 5): Wd 15/1(1930) P 491.
Line 6): Wi.und.Stat. (1930P 386.
of mortgage bonds issued abroad (see Table 154 owing to a general
legislative prohibition, and to foreign unfamiliarity with this type
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of bond *108; conversely in the case of the very high proportion
of industrial/commercial bonds issued abroad# Public authorities
suffered an intermediate degree of restriction, and this fell mainly
on local authorities. Had demand preferences of domestic bond holders
been unaltered since pre-war, these differential restrictions on
freedom of access to foreign markets, producing such marked alter¬
ations from the supply side in the composition of the domestically
held bond stock, would surely have caused a marked deterioration in
the price of mortgage bonds, relative to industrial/commercial and
public authority (especially Reich and state/ bonds. But the statis¬
tics do not declare this. If we compute the current rate of return
(coupon value divided by priced on bonds of identical coupons
(assuming identical future price expectations/ we obtain the results
of Tables 16-18. The yield on mortgage bonds tended to fall relative
to that on public authority bonds; that on industrial and other bonds
remains the highest *109.
These observations seem to confirm a relative deterioration in the
status of public authority bonds. This view receives confirmation in
*108 E Wolfgang, 'Der Neuaufbau ...' p 85; P Speth op.cit.
pp 81-2. Only the Netherlands proved receptive to such
mortgage bonds as were permitted for overseas isaue: Wk 6
(1927/ P 252.
♦109 The average quality of mortgage bonds deteriorated after
the war because of the increase in the number of issuing
houses, the smaller average 'size' of issues, and the greater
variations in their market prices because of less successful
market management; lastly the bewildering variety of coupon
types. By contrast the number of separate local authority
issues fell: E Wolfgang, 'Der Neuaufbau ...' pp 86-7» 915
F Hartmann, 'Die Verh&ltnisse am Rentenmarkt' (in Central-
verband ... Materialien ... p 48.
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Table 16 Current Rate of Return* on Bonds (Arithmetic Averages
for Described Samples;
1913 3i% or b% Bonds
10 3%% Public Authority 4.12%
5 3!% Mortgage 4.13%
5 4% Industrial 4.25%
* Coupon Value Divided by Price.
NOTE: 1913 estimates calculated by E Wolfgang; 1929 from the
official Stat.Reichsamt indexes.
SOURCE: E Wolfgang, 'Der Neuaufbau ...', Wk 9(1930^ P
Table 17 Current Rate of Return* on 6% Bonds - %
vo ru00 1929 2229.
Public Authority 7.08 7.25 7.20
Mortgage 6.90 7.27 7.24
Bonds of Communal Mortgage Banks 6.98 7.1*0 7.15
Industrial 7.51 7.81 7.57
Average All Bonds 7.02 7.37 7.20
* Coupon Value Divided by Price
SOURCE: Kon.j.Stat.Hdb. (1936) p 113.
the contemporary comment that bonds of public enterprises in commercial
form sold better than the direct bonds of public authorities; so that,
according to some, the debt of the German Railway Co. was more sale¬
able than that of the Reich *110. Both Prussia and Berlin in 1929-30
*110 W Lotz op.cit. pp 496-7.





reorganised the commercial form of their enterprises - the latter
incorporating private shareholding - in order to improve the capital
market status of their debt; otherwise, it was said, the enterprises
could not raise new capital *111.
*t.5« Conclusion
In this chapter I have traced the emergence of a small but persistent
net deficit in the consolidated public household; a deficit which
did not diminish at the end of the decade. Fiscal policy did not
induce the depression. The ouantitative significance of the deficit
in respect of employment generation was however small. Its major
significance arises out of its uneven distribution, and the difficulty
with which those branches of government where it was concentrated
financed it. These difficulties had three roots:
i) the limited absorptive capacity of the domestic market for
government bonds. This was partly a result of the inadequate
general recovery of the domestic market after 192^, but it was aggra¬
vated by the deterioration of public credit as a result of defeat,
inflation, meagre revaluation of public authority debt, and management
of the public finances which, in the eyes of most contemporaries, was
poor.
*111 On Prussia: M Schulz-Briesen op.cit. vol. 2 pp 1^2-*f. A
similar point about the Recklinghausen AG is made by
E Lichtenberg, Hibernia ... pp li+6ff. On Berlin 0 Btisch
op.cit. pp 1§5ff.
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ii) the limited access to the foreign bond markets. This
applies especially to the states and the communes; the
Reich, in the period between the Dawes and the Young loans did not
wish to float foreign issues. Foreign absorptive capacity for German
public authority issues was limited aiyway, but the problem was aggra¬
vated especially after 1926, by the restrictiveness and intermittent
activity of the Advisory Council for Foreign Credits, by the six-
month suspension of the exemption of foreign issues from Capital
Yield Tax, and by the adverse criticism of the Agent-General for
Reparations.
iiiJ the Reich had very limited ability to borrow from the Central
Bank.
These conclusions have considerable relevance for the understanding of
the deflationary policies of the Brtining government during the
depression. Even had a government been in office which had wanted to
implement a deficit-financed anti-unemployment policy, such a policy
could effectively have been financed at best only by enlarging the
floating debt of the Reich, at worst by direct money creation by the
Central Bank (were its cooperation forthcoming,. The focus of the
discussion of work-creation projects during those years - on the
problem of financing - betrays this *112. The inflation which
*112 Eg W Grotkopp, Die Grosse Krise, pp 129-89'• G Kroll, Von der
Weltwirtschaftskrise zur Staatskon.junktur, pp 375-^+00 • Cf. con¬
temporary discussion of the (largely abortive) government Work
Creation Schemes in Wd 15/2(1930) P 1521, 'Das Arbeitsbes-
chaffungsprogramm'; 16/1(1931) P 837» 'Arbeitsbeschaffungdurch
Auslandsanleihen?' (The financing had to be completely inde¬
pendent of the Reich Treasury). Public Finance remained as
precarious throughout the depression as it had become in 1929:
E Wandel op.cit. Pt. Ill passim.
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generated a heritage of hysteria about unorthodox fiscal measures, so
weakened the capital market and the status of public debt as to have
forced the government, had it wished to finance a deficit, to that
extremity of unorthodoxy which would most outrage such sentiment.
This distinction between the framework within which German and Anglo-
Saxon deficit financing wcuLd have had to operate is frequently over¬
looked in discussions of Briining's pblicies *113» a»ay explain
why German fiscal policy at this time, not only ex ante, but also
ex post, was so deflationary.
*113 Eg H Sanmann, 'Daten und Alternativen
«1ih The Nazi recovery and re-armament involved heavy deficit
financing by short term debt. The continued saleability of
this at low rates seems to follow from a rapid increase in
the money supply (J J Klein, 'German Financial Policies
1932-M*') although this is not apparent in the currency
stock figures (Hoffmann ... p 815>>» Perhaps the distri¬
butional changes explain this (rise in profits share;
relative decline in consumption). Up to 1936 slack in the
economy seems to have prevented inflation; thereafter
physical controls. See too, K E Poole German Fiancial
Policies 1932-9 PP 36-80, 101-55 (especially Ikjff,;;
D Petzina, Die deutsche V/irtschaft in der Zwischenkriegszeit
pp 1l7ff.
After 19^8, public sector saving financed the bulk of public
sector investment. See below p> 160 •
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CHAPTER 5 A SIMPLE MACRO-ECONOMIC MODEL
5«1» In this chapter I extend and summarise the discussion up to
now, by developing a (mainly diagrammatic- model which is capable of
explaining the alterations in the behaviour of the key variables
listed on pp 8-9 above, over three periods: 1899-1913, 192^-29,
and 1950-55. The discussion will be launched with a consideration of
the comparative statics of the external balance, will proceed to
relate this to the comparative statics of the savings-investment
relationship, and thence (via the assumption of fixed domestic and
foreign prices) to the internal balance. This last assumption will
then be replaced by a verbal dynamic model of wage and price dhange.
Thus the model is a hybrid of static and dynamic elements; ine]qgant
but not, I think, inadmissible. Initially the model will be developed
with reference to the first two periods only. A penultimate section
will apply it to the period 1950-55* The final section briefly
summarises the findings of the chapter.
5.2. The Retardation of Foreign Exchange Earnings
In what respects can the German current account deficit in 192^-29
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(in contrast to the surpluses before 1913 *1» and after 195°) be
ascribed to an 'exogenous' retardation in the rate of growth of
export earnings *2 ?
I define:
(5/1) B = X - Im + X - Im + FI
C CSS
where B, X, Im, and FI denote the current account balance,
exports, imports, and net factor income from abroad respect¬
ively, and the subscripts c and s denote commodities
and services respectively,
I now tabulate each, in current prices, from Hoffmann's estimates:
Table 1 Components of the Balance of Payments (Current Account/
Annual Averages Current Mill. K/hm/Pm.
teriod X Im X - Im X - Im FI B
c c c c s s
1899/03 4588 5661 -1073 +1071 +4i6 +4i4
1904/08 6112 7584 -1672 +1627 +480 +435
1908/15 8246 9726 -1480 +1581 +540 +641
1925 9546 11990 -2444 +462 -6 -1988
1925/29 11520 12714 -1194 +607 -377 -964
1950/55 21524 18176 +3348 -746 -144 +3242
SOURCE: Hoffmann ... pp 817-21.
There is evidence that commodity exports suffered exogenous retardation
in the period 1924-29, in the fact that Germany's share of world exports
*1 According to E-A 1/6 Die deutsche Zahlungsbilanz pp 130-33»
the balance (current account; was negative before the war. This
is contradicted by the later estimates of Hoffmann ... p 826,
and may be partly accounted for by the exclusion of debt service
charges from the former's estimate.
*2 For writers who stress this aspect, see above p 4 •
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of finished manufactured goods dropped from 23% in 1913 to 15% in
19?5» rising again to 18% in 1929 *3• This was]'presumably caused by
the dislocation of foreign trading relations in the decade 1914-24.
Nevertheless there is no sign of deterioration in the commodity
balance. In the three pre-war quinquennia shown in Table 1, commodity
exports were 81%, 81%, and 85% of commodity imports respectively
(at current prices/. In 1925-29 the ratio improved to 91%; if we
take the peak employment years 1925» 1927* and 1928 alone, the ratio
was 83%. From these observations the view receives little support,
that after 1924 the Reichsmark was overvalued owing to the deterior¬
ation of German international competitivity *4.
*3 &-A i/5 vol. 20/2, Per Deutsche Aussenhanael ... Jj This
study also cites considerable evidence to show that the com-
modity distribution of German exports was weighted towards
growth products, but the geographical distribution (primarily
Europe; was weighted towards stagnant markets. Ibid, pp 157*
160, 162, 246, 261, 304.
The view frequently met, that the external balance on goods
and services was injured by the territorial losses (usually
on grounds of loss of raw material supplies) is less simple
than its advocates seem to suppose. One must distinguish
i; the difference before 1913 between the external balances
of the areas of pre- and post-Versailles Germany, and
ii) the effect of the war etc. on the external balance of post-
Versailles Germany.
*4 G Hardach, Weltmarktorientierung ... pp 35* 161. Compared
with 1899-1913 average, German net barter terms of trade were
little different in 1925-29 ( in contrast to the experience
of the UK). Moreover the Import price index fell less,
relative to the NNP/GNP deflator than it did in the UK, and,
at constant prices, imports failed to rise relative to NNP/GNP,
whereas they did in the UK. For data see Hoffmann ...
PP 548, 817-8, 826; C H Feinstein, National Income ...
pp T8, T14-16, T37-8, T132-3, T139. These observations seem
consistent with the view advanced in the text. From E H Phelps
Brown and M Browne, A Century of Pay* Appendix 3* we can see
that German prices and money wages were lower in 195-29 relative
to 1913 than they were in the UK or USA.
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The deterioration in export earnings was clearly worst in the
invisible balance and in factor incomes *5* The sharp change in
the latter's sign is doubtless initially attributable to the
expropriation of German foreign assets at Versailles. Note that
this category excludes reparations and was already negative in 1925*
before the great capital influx *5A. The deterioration of the
services balance may owe much to the expropriation of most of the
merchant fleet.
This evidence seems sufficient to establish an exogenous retardation
in foreign exchange earnings. But this is not sufficient to explain
the deterioration in the external balance. To do this we must first
examine the changes in savings and investment.
5»3» Savings. Investment, and the External Balance
Let us consider the alternative national income identities:
(5/2) Yf=C+I+G+B-Ti
(5/3) Y. + Tr = C + S + T.
f d
*5 Cf. E-A 1/6 Die deutsche Zahlungsbilanz ... pp 130-33*
This appear6 to manifest itself afresh in 1950-55$ in respect
of private transactions. See Table 1 above.
*5A It will be observed that Reparations per se play no part in
this analysis. This is because the model considers only net
flows on capital account, and, practically throughout the
period, the capital inflow exceeded the sum of reparations
plus the current account deficit.
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where = Net National Income at Factor Cost
C = Private Sector Consumption at Market Prices
I = Net Investment, of Public and Private Sectors at
Market Prices
B = The current account Balance of Payments as defined
above (5/1) p 131
Td' Ti = direct and Indirect Tax Revenues respectively
G = Government Current Expenditure at Market Prices
Tr = Transfer Payments by the Government
S = Private Sector Saving
By substituting (5/3) into (5/2) and rearranging, we obtain;
(5/k) B = PuS + S - 1
where PuS = T, + T. - Tr - G = Public Sector Savingd i
That is, as a matter of definition, the external balance is equal to
the difference between public plus private sector saving, and domestic
investment. Furthermore, denoting two periods by the superscripts
1 and 2, we can write:
(5/5) B2 - B1 = (PuS2 - PuS1) + (S2 - S1) - (I2 - I1)
If therefore the balance of payments deteriorates from one period to
another, then, as a matter of definition, either the rate of invest¬
ment must have increased, or the rate of public and private sector
saving have diminished.
I now tabulate the magnitudes in (5/k/ for the UK and Germany in
selected periods 1899-1959» at current prices. See Table 2.
In the case of the UK we can see that the vigorous growth of invest¬
ment in 1925/29 compared with pre-war was not completely matched by
the increase in private saving (public sector saving being small;,
and hence the external surplus on current account was reduced. But
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Table 2 National Accounting Magnitudes in the UK and Germany-
Annual Averages Current Prices
Period B I PuS S Y T
1) UK £mill.
1899/03 38 207 -40 285 2072 117
1904/08 117 167 8 276 2218 185
1909/13 195 168 n( 359 2496 195
1925/29 47 472 16 503 4846 439
1951/59 -37 2568 473 2058 16999 3394
2) Germany/Federal Republic of West Germany i-rd P/Dm/Dm.
1899/03 +0.4 4.6 0.3 4.7 32.5 2.4
1904/08 +0.6 6.3 0.1 6.9 40.2 2.9
1909/13 +0.6 7.2 0.6 7.3 48.5 4.3
1925/29 -1.0 8.4 1.2 6.3 75.3 12.9
(1925,7,8/ (-2.0, (10.6) (1.1) (7.6/ (77.3) (12.8)
1951/59- +4.1 24.9 11.7 17.3 134.7 33.1
METHODS: Estimates of B, I and PuS can be obtained from the sources
described below. S was then derived as a residual via
expression (5/4/•
SOURCES: UK: C H Feinstein, Rational Income, Expenditure «...
pp T8-11, T35, T37-8, T40-1. '
Germany: Hoffmann ... pp 763-4, 801, 803, 804-7, 817-9, 826.
To the estimates of public saving on pp 803, 807, had to be
added the net increase in the assets of the social insurance
institutions (for comparability with the UK,.
in the case of Germany we note that a sluggish increase of investment
between these two periods was matched by some increase in public sector
saving, but stagnation in the level of private saving *5B; so much
»5B A lower savings rate is asserted by K Borchardt, 'Wachstum und
Wechsellagen ...' p 690, and by D Petzina, Die Deutsche Wirt-
schaft ... p 95, and linked with low bond prices. See too
D H Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall St. pp 144-5.
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so that the sign of the external balance was reversed
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If we regard public sector savings and, for the moment, iraestment
as exogenous, then it is on the behaviour of private savings in the
two countries that we must concentrate.
The theory of savings is implicit in the theory of the consumption
function. Most modern theories *6 broadly agree (as far as concerns
this argument) in relating intended consumption to expected long-run
i
(or permanent) earned income, and to current net wealth. It would be
expected that, in the long run, for an entire society an increase
in disposable income would be matched by an absolute increase in
saving (though not necessarily in the same proportion). The UK data
in the above Table evidently conform to this expectation; the German
data do not.
A first explanation for the non-conformity of the German data could
be statistical. If the estimates of the external balance (By and
investment (I) are too low then savings too will be understated. The
investment data are the less exact, but I know of no general reason
for believing them to be underestimates *7.
If there was in fact no increase in the level of savings between
1909/13 and 1925/29* a second explanation might be that realised incomes
were below expected incomes throughout the latter period, and hence
*6 See eg H G Johnson, Macroeconomics and Monetary Theory pp 23ff;
M Lovell, Macroeconomics pp 105/7.
*7 For fuller discussion see p 238 below. Contemporary estimates
of B were rather low, but this was rectified in the data I use.
See E—A 1/6 Die deutsche Zahlungsbilanz ... pp 63-5-
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savings (in the short run a residual between intended consumption
and actual income) were 'temporarily' depressed. However, even in the
peak employment years 1925, 7 and 8, realised savings scarcely exceeded
those of the last pre-war quinquennium, when national income had been
about 50% lower. Moreover, if, as is usually presumed, long-run
income expectations are governed by past experience, what was there
in the experience of the decade 191^-24 to lead the public to regard
income levels in 192^-29 as temporarily depressed?
Thus, it seems to jne that 192^-29 ( or at least its peak years; must
be treated as representing a 'long-run' situation. In such a situation
the decline in savings relative to earned income would best be explained
by i, a rise in the value of assets relative to earned income. This
may possibly have occurred in the UK (increase in government debt net
of loss of foreign assets , but in Germany the near obliteration of
both types of 'outside' asset - government and foreign debt - suggests
that, on the contrary, asset values fell severely *8. ii; a
reduction in the rate of growth of population which would reduce
desired social savings rates, according to the 'life cycle' savings
hypothesis. But this pan-European phenomenon cannot explain a specifi¬
cally German observation *8a.
It appears therefore that in order to reconcile the observed behaviour
*8 Since the obliteration of 'inside' assets merely effects a
wealth redistribution, its effect on expenditure would pre¬
sumably be small. In some cases however (eg industrial bonds)
it may have stimulated investment at the expense of con¬
sumption.
*8A Borchardt, 'Wachstum ...' p 690, attributes it to changes in the
income distribution. There is too little empirical evidence
on this, to follow it up; furthermore the accepted theory of
the consumption function would not put much weight on this
factor.
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of savings with the accepted consumption function, we must postulate
a shift of the function: that at any given level of 'long-run*
income and of wealth, the desired rate of saving was less in 1925 than
it had been before the war *9-
Thus, given that imports are an increasing function of income, it
is possible to explain how that, despite retardation of export
earnings and, even more, of domestic investment, income levels rose
so strongly as to generate a level of imports which created an adverse
balance of payments *10.
5»*U Excursus: An Underpinning for the Savings Function
To validate the above account, the postulated shift in the savings
function must be substantiated. Suppose (to start with) that only
*9 A contemporary consensus held that the savings rate had fallen.
This was partly an inference from the theory by which they
explained the high interest rates (see p ^7 above), but was
also, if imperfectly, substantiated from statistics of growth
of savings deposits etc. See eg E Welter, 'Die deutsche
Kapitalbildung', in Wk 7(1928) pp JOlff. There he explains low
savings by reference to a backlog of consumer demand, and
taxation. The latter pant was researched, albeit inconclusively,
in a symposium: G Colm and H Neisser (eds), Kapitalbildung und
Steuersystem.
*10 A simple counterfactual exercise which applies the average pre-war
savings function: S = 0.17(Yf-T,) to the 1925-29 period, but
uses the observed 1925-29 import and tax functions: Im = 0.17Y^
and T^ = 0.12Y^ predicts that, given the 1925-29 observed average
values of X I and G, would have been 15% below its observed
levels, and B have been slightly positive. Thus, in this crude
model, an exogenous fall in exports cannot of itself account for
the external deficit. Were investment regarded as a function of
the level of income, the external balance would be even more active.
t
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households save, and that they do so only by accumulating assets of
fixed money value. In effect they choose between two types of
expenditure: current consumption, and future consumption. The
memory of the inflation would have the effect of reducing the
(certainty-equivalent, future consumption which households would
expect to gain by sacrificing a specific amount of current consumption.
The consequences of this altered trade-off can be analysed in the
familiar terms of its substitution and income effects. The former
effect will encourage households to consume more now at the expense
of less in the future; the latter will effect a reduction of both




Cf (vertical axis/ represents
future consumption measured in
certainty-equivalent units. Cc
horizontal axis.' shows current
consumption.
CY is income. YY' depicts the
initial trade-off between cur¬
rent and future consumption.
Under this, given the indif¬
ference curves, Cc1 is consumed,
and Cf' saved.
When increased uncertainty alters
the trade-off line to YY", point
2 shows the substitution effect;
point 3 (Cc1 ,Cf"/ the final
ecuilibrium, with saving falling
more than current consumption.
Diagram 9A
'11 If households were 'target' savers (as eg tue 'life-cycle'
hypothesis might imply , an increase in uncertainty would
redouble their saving efforts, and the above theory is inag>-
plicable. The observed fall in savings might be explained as
a 'lag' effect - owing to the persistence of inflation-bred
habits, but in this case, how woulo the reduction in. the desired
savings rate during the inflation be explained?
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The actual case is complicated by the fact that income increased
between the two periods (ie the intercept of the trade-off line with
the horizontal axis moved out). If the original line is read to
represent a 'blown-up' version of the pre-war trade-off on a post-war
scale, the diagram can be applied *12.
Perhaps a sufficient increase in interest rates would so have improved
the trade-off as to negate the substitution effect of increased uncer¬
tainty. The presence of foreign purchasers of German debt would
however prevent a sufficient rise *12A.
To what types of household saving may this hypothesis be applied?
Households save in four main ways:
i) by accumulating cash balances,
iio by lodging deposits with financial institutions,
iiiy by buying marketable debt, especially iii/1) bills and bonds
and iii/2) equity,
iv) by purchasing consumer durables.
The hypothesis seems applicable to all categories except the last,
(and complements the analysis of the effects of uncertainty on
financial markets, in Chapter Z>) subject to the following reser¬
vations: Firstly, equity purchase might be considered exempt.
*12 MB also that the 'family' of indifference curves in Diagram 5/1
is drawn on the assumption of unchanged net assets. Where
these diminish, the slope of the curves at the interception
with any vertical line becomes flatter; the perceived reduct¬
ion in certainty-equivalent future consumption must be so much
the more severe to offset this increased willingness to sacri¬
fice present for future consumption.
*12A Assuming that foreign aversion from German financial assets
increased less than did domestic. See p? 79-8&bove.
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However, in normal theories of portfolio selection, equity cannot
replace the (unobtainable; risk-free debt as a portfolio base. More¬
over the uncertainty bred by the decade 191^-2*+ was not confined to
iflation. Profits, dividends and share prices also fluctuated
wildly; bankruptcy crises and the fragility of the stock market
thereafter have already been mentioned; all these indicate the
potential illiquidity and the inadequacy of equity as a substitute
vehicle of saving.
Secondly, liquidity preference would encourage a maement into short
term debt, and cash. But a relative increase in liquid savings for
this reason will probably accompany a reduction in overall savings *13»
Thirdly, savers could have substituted foreign for domestic debt and,
to a degree, they did *1*+. In view of the recent expropriation of
the large part of German foreign assets, and continued vacillation
of the US authorities about the rights of German citizens to the rest
of their assets there, it is hardly to be expected that this would be
viewed as an adequate alternative method of saving.
We are left therefore with the fourth category of saving. From the
logic of the argument, I conclude that consumer purchases of durables
increased. This is hard to verify. In any case this form of saving
is statistically counted as consumption. Up to now I have assumed that
only households save. Saving by firms can be categorised in the same
fourfold way, except that under iv; the purchase of investment
*13 This may explain why statistics of growth of savings deposits
did not altogether display the retardation that contemporaries
expected. See *9 P 138 above.
*1h Especially in short term form. For references see *53
p 72 above.
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durables should be substituted. The first three are governed by the
same influences as in the case of households. Did direct investment
of retained earnings rise to compensate for the fall in the other
types of saving? Much was written in the 1920s about internal
financing (Selbstfinanzierung; and 'concealed investment' (stille
Investionen; *15* Nevertheless there are good grounds for believing
that this form of saving was under pressure in 1924-99, because of a
strong wages push. This will be examined in section 5-6. of this
chapter. Thus the internal savings of firms were probably little
greater than they had been pre-war *16. The literature on internal
financing was probably generated by awareness of the increasing dif¬
ficulty of market financing.
To summarise, the savings function I envisage involves a high demand
both for liquidity (doubtless aggravated by Reichsbank policy; and
for commodities. Both of these demands were satisfied by a large
scale sale of debt, which spilled over to abroad and
1; financed the import of money (the 'second Reichsbank' *17) thus
satisfying the in Teased demand for money;
2) financed the external deficit in goods and services, thus satis¬
fying the increased demand for commodities.
*15 See pp l49ff below.
*16 Hoffmann ... p 785 shows a higher rate of reserve-building
by Aktiengesellschaften in 1925-29 than before 1913* But
the importance of the AG as a form of enterprise had also
greatly increased, especially in the inflation. Borchardt,
Wachstum und Wechsellagen ... p 706 beloeves business savings
were smaller than before 1913*
*17 See p 50 above.
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111 A Static Macro-economic Model
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5«5»1« I now try to fuse the discussion of the external balance
and the savings function with the financial model described on
PP 76ff above, and a tentative investment function, to obtain
a simple diagrammatic explanation of the changes in macro-economic
structure between pre-1913 and 1925-29- The model here contains
three major simplifications.
Firstly the government sector is suppressed, on the hypothesis that
changes in the fiscal balance or in the absolute size of the sector
are immaterial to the problem in hand.
Secondly, the supply of interest-bearing debt (but not of money)
is assumed to be exogenous. An endogenous relation, while more
correct would complicate, but not, I think, materially alter the
argument.
Thirdly, domestic and foreign prices are assumed to be fixed. This
temporary assumption is relaxed in the next section.
A complete list of symbols is given on p viii . The following additional
symbols require definition:
E = net accumulation of gold and foreign exchange
U = an indicator of uncertainty of expectations
Y* = expected output (or income) level
K = extant capital stock
i = cost of finance to the investor in physical capital.
I now add savings/investment, foreign trade, and price relationships
to the model of the financial sector on pp 7£ff and to the identities
on pp i33ff above:
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(5/6/ I = I(i,Y*,K) I *(i , I'(K) < 0; I'(Y*)>0.
The rate of investment is a decreasing function of the cost
of finance, and of the size of the inherited capital stock,
and an increasing function of expected output.
(5/7) S = S(Y,U) S'(Y) > 0; S'(D/< 0.
The rate of savings is an increasing function of the level
of income, and a decreasing function of the degree of uncer¬
tainty of expectations.
(5/8) X = X Exports are exogenously determined.
(5/9' Iro = Im(Y / Im'(Y/>0.
Imports are an increasing function of the level of income.
(5/10) Pd = Fd , , . . . , , .The domestic and foreign price levels
(5/11J M.5? i are fixed.
(5/12) B . Bexp + F - E = 0
The net external surplus on current account (B/, minus the
net surplus on capital account, including reparations,
(Bexp - F/, minus the net increase in gold and foreign
exchange (E/ is identically eaual to zero.
(5/13) S - I = B This is (5/^) p 13^ « simplified by the
suppression of the government sector.
5»5»2« The six panels of Diagram 5/H (2 1^5 J seek to summarise the
model. Panel (i) depicts investment as a decreasing function of the
cost of finance. When income decreases (or inherited capital stock
increases., the entire function shifts vertically down. Savings are
ex hypothesi not a function of the cost of finance, but of income, as
depicted in Panel (ii . With an increase in uncertainty, less is
saved at each level of income: the function shifts rightwards.
In Panel (iii; imports are depicted as an increasing function of
income; exports exogenous. The difference between realised savings
DIAGRAM 5/111 : Superscript ^ (Dashed Functions) 1899-1913
2
Superscript (Continuous Functions) 1924-9
5/17
monetary policy. 1924-9*
Superscript (Continuous Functions) —, with con—
-sideration of 'autonomous' effect of
monetary policy 1924-9*
and investment in Panel (i) must, according to expression (5/13) above,
be equal to the gap between exports and imports in Panel (ill). This
is effectuated via Panel (ii/, by movements of income. Panels Civ)
to (vi) have already been explained in chapter 3 Cpp 78-9 ) *18.
The links between the real and the financial sectors are: Firstly,
as expressed in (5/12) above, the link between the capital inflow and
the current account external balance. Capital inflow is depicted in
Panel Civ. and, in a complex way, Panel (vi,; (see p above and
*18 Panels (iii and (iv, of Diagram 3/2L p 78 have been coalesced
into Panel (vi of 5/11 above-', for simplicity. Thus this
represents both the distribution of the holdings of existing
and of new bonds.
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*18 on the previous page/. To the extent that gold and foreign
exchange reserves do not alter, Reichsbank policy must adjust bill
rates to equate these. Secondly the link between bond yields and
the cost of finance. If businessmen are not risk averters, then, as
borrowers, they will discount the uncertainty component of high bond
yields. But they probably were risk averters to some degree. It
is upon this assumption that this part of the argument is predicated.
Diagram 5/H summarises the structure of the pre-1913 economy. Given
the savings function, the level of investment and exports created an
income level such as produced a balance of payments surplus on
current account. Demand and supply of money determined a bill rate
which produced a small inflow of short term credit. But the demand
for bonds was such that, given the domestic and foreign supply, Germans
steadily enlarged their net holdings of foreign bonds, not however
so vigorously as to exhaust the gold and foreign exchange made
available by the current transactions and the short term inflow *19.
The equilibrium bond price created a cost of finance which ratified
the level of investment hypothesised at the start of the paragraph.
In seeking to progress from this representation of the pre-1913
economy to the post-1924 economy, I have utilised an intermediate
mental concept - a scaled-up version of the pre-1913 economy, on a
post-1924 'scale'. Thus Diagram 5/H can now be viewed as represent¬
ing this intermediate concept, and we can speak of a reduction of
exports, rather than a retarded growth, and so on.
Diagram 5/IH reproduces (in dashed lines; the functions from 5/H»
*19 Germany was a persistent importer of gold and foreign exchange
in this period. See Hoffmann (... p 8l7»
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and superimposes the hypothesised function shifts of the 1924-29
period (in continuous lines;. Confining our attention to Panels
(i) to (iii/ it is clear that the reduction in exports plus the
rightward shift in the savings function suffice to explain the
external deficit, without reference to the financial sector, but not
the fall in investment (because income levels would not fall; *20.
But the theory is incomplete, because the effect of the deterioration
of the balance of payments on interest rates and hence on cost of
finance is ignored.
Widening our attention to include the financial sector, we must there¬
fore hypothesise that bill rates rose in response to the deteriorating
external balance (Panel (ivi), and that the domestic demand-for-bonds
function shifted upwards, both because of the rise in bill rates,
and especially because of the increase in uncertainty, analysed in
Chapter 3« Since the domestic demand for German bonds shifted further
than the foreign, foreigners became large holders of German bonds.
One point remains uncertain. Bid the rise in bond yields raise the
cost of finance (as depicted in 5/IH Panel (i,), thus throttling
back investment? Chapters 6 to 8 will substantiate the hypothesis
that the cost of finance did depress the long run level of investment
over the period 1924-29 as a whole (though changes in the cost of
finance had less immediate short run effect in the 1928-29 recession <.
*20 The sufficiency of a shift in the savings function plus export
reduction to explain the reverse of sign of the current account
balance can be exemplified in a linear model of the 'real'
economy, under most plausible assumptions. Cf *10
above. The downward shift of the investment function is
a secondary, feedback effect. The increase of the cost of
finance causes a downward shift along the investment
function. This induces a multiplier reduction in income
which, in turn, induces the downward shift of_ the investment
function.
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Diagram seems to me to provide a tolerable approximation of
the observed shifts in the macro-economics structure. A final
feature is added however in Diagram 5/IV. Here I assume that bill
rates rose not only sufficiently to attract the short term inflow
needed to offset the net deficit on other 'autonomous' components of
the balance of payments, but that Keichsbank policy raised them even
higher, thus raising both bond yields and (I hypothesise provision¬
ally; the cost of finance somewhat more. Investment is therefore
somewhat lower, hence also income and the external deficit are some¬
what reduced. But this does not feed back to reduce bill rates again,
because the effect of the 'initial' excessively high bill rates is
to induce a dependence on foreign short credits which causes the net
inflow of foreign credits at any given bill rate to fall through time-
expressed in the upward shift of F(r; in Panel (iv). The alterations
in functions and in values of variables, thus induced by Reichsbank
policy, are denoted by superscript in Diagram 5/IV.
5.6. Frice and Wage Determination
The patently arbitrary assumption of fixed domestic and foreign prices
must now be removed. I now allow that domestic prices vary relative
to foreign; ie eliminate (5/10) and substitute for (5/8) and (5/9;
(5/8*) X = a(7, Pd; X'(Pd) < 0
(5/9*) Im = Im(Y, Pd; Im'(Y)> 0; Im'(Pd)> 0
Exports and imports are also decreasing and increasing
functions respectively of the domestic price level, given
the foreign price level.
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What price determination function will substitute for (5/10) in such
a way as to preclude an adjustment of domestic, relative to foreign
prices, which would eliminate balance of payments disequilibria?
Those who have considered this question have generally rationalised
(5/10) - "prices are sticky in the short run" - and coupled this witia
the argument that the Reichsmark was overvalued, presumably fortuit¬
ously, at the currency stabilisation in November 1923* *21
This formulation seems to me to put tne cart before the horse. It
appears to be derived from the contemporary British 'return to gold',
whereby allegedly an overvalued dollar rate was superimposed upon a
system of 'sticky' prices and wages, thus necessitating a deflationary
policy, the miners' strike, and a gentle downward drift of prices
after 1925.
The German case is however not analogous. When the mark was stabilised,
the last thing that could be predicated of wages and prices was
stickinessi Thereafter, prices actually tumbled 15# (frankfurter
Zeitung index, or 20% (Stat, heichsamt index to the end of January
1924 *22. Then they rose a little (especially in manufactures; to
May - even though unemployment in the trade unions exceeded 25% in
February and 9% in Kay. When a stable price level emerged, the
external value of the currency was a datum, not vice versa, /aid if
prices could tumble so radically, why not a little more? Why did prices
*21 eg G Hardach Weltmarktorientierunfi ... pp 24, 3^5 also G
Hardach, 'Zur Politischen Okonomie p 25. W Fischer
op.eit. p 46 states that a devaluation would have eased the
problems of the external balance. Alterations in the level of
tariff protection (as against pre-war/ seem to have been slight.
These are discussed in C-D Krohn Stabilisierung ... pp 174-89.
*22 Wk 3(1924/ p 17.
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actually begin to rise when unemployment was still so severe?
It seems to me that an investigation of wage and price dynamics is
required. Table 3 below provides some raw materials for this.
It can be seen that, comparing Germany with the USA (where unemploy¬
ment was no greater), the NNP deflator and money (and real) wages rose
much faster in Germany, and that the wage/income ratio (ie roughly
wages share of income generated in industry and commerce/manufacturing.
rose in Germany, but fell in the USA. The pattern exhibited in the
UK (where unemployment was much worse than in Germany; resembles that
of the USA. So would the Swedish data (where unemployment never
exceeded 3?»» according to Kaddison *22A;, tad I reproduced Brown and
Browne's data on that country. Only in France, which had both an
inflationary history and very low unemployment, was the German price
and wage behaviour reduplicated. Thus, in that country where, to
judge by interest rates, monetary conditions were at their most
deflationary, we get the clearest indication of inflationary pressure
in the commodity and labour markets! Considering German data alone,
we note that the biggest wages explosion occurred in 1924-25» feee
Table 3f» col 1) when unemployment was probably 4-7# of the labour
force, and that wage increases mounted again as unemployment fell
in 1927-29* Finished goods prices failed to respond to the fall in
import prices *23; however the rise in prices, plus productivity,
failed to match that of money wages, so that, as noted above, wages
*22A Also E Lundberg, Instability and Economic ; Growth, p 32.
*23 The import price index fell from 139 in 1924 to 129 in 1929!
Hoffmann ... pp 613» 625» But export prices are believed
to have risen from 133 to 136 in the same period.
Ibid, p 607.
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Table J Unemployment, Prices, Wages, and Wage-Income Ratios
Germany, France, UK, and USA
(G = Germany; F = France/
a. Unemployment % b. Money Wages (1923-29=100>
G F UK USA G F 4K USA
1913 1.9 1.0 1.2 4.3 63 15 52 45
1925 3.0 6.4 3.8 89 82 101 99
1926 8.0 1.1 7.1 1.9 93 ' 96 99 100
1927 3.9 5.5 3.9 99 99 101 100
1928 3.8 — 6.1 4.3 106 104 99 101
1929 5.9 5.9 3.1 113 120 100 102
c. GKP/NNF Deflator
(1925-9 = 100/
d. Seal Wages (1925-9 = 100/
1913 72 17 60 58 91 85 82 77
1925 94 79 105 102 93 107 98 98
1926 89 102 102 102 96 96 96 98
1927 101 104 99 100 98 94 103 100
1928 108 104 98 99 103 99 101 102
1929 109 112 97 99 103 105 103 103
















































SOUPCES: a: A Maddison, Economic Growth ... p 220; cf discussion
p 8 above.
b-e: E H P Brown and M Browne, A Century of Pay pp 434-452
(Appendix 3>
_f Col 1: G Bry, Wages in Germany p 462; col 2: Kon.j.-




A 'wages push' formulaticnof the problem springs naturally to mind.
Certain proferred explanations - eg that the labour force sought to
re-establish its 1913 relative international real wage, or was subject
to the delayed action of the same forces which raised wages share of
manufacturing income during 191^-2h in other countries *25 - must be
rejected until some mechanism is specified to relate them to the
actual bargaining process. We must approach the specification of
wage determination more directly. What model fits best? Bilateral
monopoly? But rade union membership was less than 20$ of the total
labour force *26. A price leadership model? Certainly the big
salary increase of the civil service in 1927 *?7 is believed to
have had general repercussions. The widespread use (often legally
*25 eg E H Phelps Brown and M Browne op.cit. p 2h9; and
K Borchardt, 'Wachstum ...( p 69071
*26 Comparing T U membership data in Bry op.cit. p 52,
with labour force data in Hoffmann ... pp 205-6. Less
than L0% of the work-force in mining, manufacturing,
transport and communications was unionised. Even in
Iron and Steel, two-thirds of the labour force was
unorganised: H-H Hartwich, Arbeitsmarkt, VerbMnde und
Staat, p 196. Thus contemporary complaints about the
cartellisation of the labour market (eg Wk 7(1928) p 3i+3»
'Lohnniveau und Kapitalbildung') seem as myopic as like
complairbs about the commodity market.
*27 See abcve pp 95-6
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obligatory) of the state arbitration service *28 ? This was what
employers tended to blame *29.
None of these 'institutional' theories can explah the fact that the
wages push was at its strongest in 192h-25 when unions, collective
agreements and the arbitration service were at their weakest *29A.
Nor will they explain the international variations described above.
The new 'micro-economic theory of employment and inflation' seems to
me to provide a simpler and better resolution of this puzzle. In
this theory *30 every wage and price agreement is ar—in effect
*28 K H Hartwich op.cit. provides a detailed examination of
this hypothesis. See especially pp 30-^2. His conclusion
is a cautious acceptance of the view that the arbitration may
have reinforced wage demands, in the industrial sector only
(pp 193-220/. He also notes that in the period of greatest
wage rises (1924-25/♦ unions, collective agreements, and
hence arbitration were at their weakest. His main thesis
seems to be (summarised pp 385-8 that the arbitration
system gave workers a kind of socio-political guarantee in
the Weimar .Republic (of which labour unions were a pillar
which had otherwise so signally failed to achieve the high
worker aims of the 'revolution'. His 'counterfactual'
(p 388, also p 359;, appears to be that in the absence of
the arbitration system, labour and capital relations would
have erupted into severe social conflict: but the expected
net effect of this on wages is not specified.
The general view that the lack of a political consensus
affected social policy and labour relations runs through
the discussion in hommsen, Petzina, Weisbrod, (eds/
Industrielles System ... pp 352-60.
"29 The celebrated Ruhr lock-out of Nov.1928 was really an
expression of this. See U Hullbusch, 'Per Ruhreisenstreit',
passim; H H Hartwich op.cit. pp 2b^ffm
»29A See eg C S Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe pp ^tM+ff.
*3o E S Phelps, A A Alchian et al. Microecnnomic Foundations ...
(esp. introduction by Phelps); E S Phelps, Inflation Policy
and linemployraent Theory pp 3-80.
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a forward contract for an expected period, and bj concluded in the
context of perceived partial information (because both parties
believe that the opportunity cost of further search exceeds the
improvement in contract terms it is likely to yield)• b/ can be
expressed another way. In every contract negotiation participants
maintain a 'reservation price' above/below which they will not go;
they would rather renew their 'search'. Furthermore, given a/, the
reservation price on both sides will be higher, the higher the
expected rate of inflation.
However the realisation of buyers' and sellers' expectations depends
on the exogenous determinants of aggregate demand. If eg a deflation¬
ary policy is applied, buyers' demand (at unchanged reservation
prices, will recede. Sellers will experience what they take to be
random reductions in demand, and prefer, initially, to maintain
prices and let orders and inventories, then output, take the slack.
This last will induce a 'multiplier' reduction in aggregate output.
After some time, buyers' and sellers' reservation prices will fall,
as will the rates of inflation they expect, so that ultimately a new
equilibrium at a new level of output and price expectations will be
established.
In equilibrium, different rates of expected inflation are consistent
with roughly identical levels of normal full employment. Thus, in
the labour market, there exists a family of 'Phillips curves', each
attached to different expected rates of inflation, and each more or
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less vertical displacements of each other *51• Where experienced
inflation exceeds/is less than expected, unemployment will be less
than/exceed the 'normal' rate.
This model seems to be of direct application to the German case,
especially to the labour market. Rather than picturing the worker
as entertaining a definite probability distribution cf expected
inflation rates, it seems more appropriate to view him as acting
under 'Shackleian' uncertainty, but aware of the possibility that
inflation could break out again at any time, and hence taking vigorous
precautions to prevent his wages from again being caught in the ever-
widening adjustment lag that so depressed them in 1919-25# Hence
the very high wage increases (and strike activity ) of 192^« depicted
in Table 5* While these lessened in the 1925-2? recession period,
money wages continued to rise despite high unemployment. Following
the 192? upswing, wage increases and strike activity recovered in
1928-?9» though not to 1924 levels: an expression of the adjustment
of expectations *52.
Can price behaviour be similarly explained? The most relevant price
index seems to be that of industrial finished goods (Table 5f P 152 ).
This is less clearly consistent with the hypothesis. Three consider-
*51 E S Phelps, Inflation Policy ... pp 55-57 (the responsiveness
of the 'natural rate of unemployment to variations in the
equilibrium inflation rate which he discusses is, in this
context, minor;. See too R J Gordon, 'Recent Developments in
the Theory of Inflation and Unemployment' pp 48ff.
*52 For contemporary comment see eg Wk 6(1927) PP 157; 7(1928;
p 155ff; (articles 'Die LOhne'/. Wk carried regular quarterly
reviews of wage developments from 1924 - mid-1927» and these




i) A price in most markets is less clearly a forward contract
than is a wage - it is more readily revisable. Hence, under
uncertainty, price-setters may not have felt the same need as wage
earners to anticipate p®ible inflation,
ii; Business suffered a constraint on its ability to resist price
*
cuts not felt, in the short run, by labour: the threat of
bankruptcy, or, more generally, the disruption of markets by the
intrusion of bankrupts' stocks sold for what they will fetch *33.
The low levels of liquidity in the economy, and the consequent bank¬
ruptcy waves made this a material factor. See Table 4 below,
iii, Foreign competition was a constraint on price-raising in the
goods market, without counterpart in the labour market,
especially in periods of domestic demand recession (1925-26 and
1928-29).
Contemporaries were aware of severe inflationary pressure in the goods
markets in the immediate post-inflationary period *34.
Trices rose slowly through 1925; fell in the bankruptcy wave of
1925/26 *35; then recovered strongly in 1927-29,
*33 Reference to the Kon,j,Stat.Hdb. (19i 6 / pp104-7 and the St,Jb.f.d.
Dt.R.1926 p444, 1927 p4n, 1928 p460, 1929 P355, and 1950 p399i
shows that in periods of recession (esp. 1925-26/ price falls
and numbers of bankruptcies were severest in the consumer goods
and trade sectors. Regrettably, data on the industry-distribution
of bankruptcy by value of debt is unobtainable for the period.
*54 Cf. Wd 9/1(1924, p113, 'Freise und Ltihne seit der Etabilisier-
ung1. C-D Krohn op.cit. calls this 'profit psychosis' - pp 5&,68.
*35 But Wd 11/1(1926/ pl8l, 'Geldpolitik und Preisabbau' argues
that the inflation mentality had prevented prices from falling
hitherto. It continues "Es muss die Inflationsgewohnung
iiberwunden werden, die einen beginnenden Konjunkturanstieg
durch schnelle PreiserhBhungen wieder drosselt, anstatt ihn
durch Umsatzvergrdsserungen bei gleich bleibenden Preisen voll
ausreifen zu lassen."
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Table 4 Annual Bankruptcies: Number of Proceedings (000s;
~
Value of Debt (mill Em"
Proceedings V_ Value Proceedingi,s Value
1921-22 2.9 m 1927 7.9 242
1924 8.0 - 1928 10.6 398
1925 14.8 572 1929 13.2 597
1926 15.8 467 1930-32 16.3 655
SOURCES: St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1922 p 342ff; 1924/5 PP 385ff; 1926 FP 443ff.
Kon.j.Stat.Hdb. (1936; pp 157-8.
Table 5 Industrial finished Goods Price Index 1913 = 100
1924 1926 1927 1928 1929
1st q« 159 153 157 142 157 158
2nd q» 164 156 152 144 158 158
3rd q« 151 159 145 149 160 157
4th q* 151 159 143 154 160 156
q. = quarter
SOURCE: St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1927 p 301; Konj.Stat.Hdb.(1936) p 104.
Thus, to sum up, I hypothesise that expression (5/10; should be
replaced by a set of dynamic relations determining wage, and, to a
lesser extent price, change as an increasing function both of the
expected rate of inflation, and of the level of excess demana in the
relevant markets. In the absence of deflationary policies, it seems
to me that wage pressure would have been intense; a balance of pay¬
ments surplus transitorily achieved by a low initial exchange rate
would have been quickly eroded *36.
*36 This vew was expressed in 1924 by K Singer, Wd 9/1 (1924)
pp 221-3, 'Starres oder Elastisches System'; further 9/2(1924,
pp 909-13, 'Zur deutschen WMhrungspolitik'.
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The model requirements specified on pp 8-9 above have now been
met except in respect of the explanation of the severity of the
cycle. This seems capable of being linked with the greater illiquid-
ity of the 1924-29 economy than of that before 1915 °r after (as shall
be seen; 1950 - hence its proneness to bankruptcy waves, and sensiti¬
vity to credit squeezes. It is also linked with an inventory cycle.
This will be returned to in the following chapters.
9.7. Application of the Theory to the Tederal Kepublic 1950-55
Can the above theory explain why the inflation produced by the Second
World War was not followed by a state of the economy as unstable as
that of 1924-29?
Firstly we might note the differences in the styles of the inflations.
"^~Inthe open inflation of the 1920s, the continuity of the market
system was maintained; it remained legal. In the suppressed inflation
of the 1940s, the system as a whole was suspended; that is, it
remained as illegal as it had become with the evolution of the war
economy" *37. On -this basis I would expect the 'expectational after¬
math' of the second inflation, given the incoherence of its 'black'
and legal markets, and the general economic dislocation, to have been
less definite than that of the first. (In any case the memory of
the abrupt ending of the former inflation would colour expectations
*57 H henderhausen, Two Postwar Recoveries in Germany p 40.
(see section pp ^2-44;.
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of price increase after 19k8).
Secondly, after the Second World War, and even allowing for the
smaller area of the BHD, one can suppose that there was an exogenous
increase in foreign exchange receipts, relative to the capacity of
the domestic economy, both because of the general bupyancy of world
trade, and because of the unrequited inward transfers (Marshall Aid.}
the counterpart of the great cut in net invisible earnings decreed
at Versailles *38. The improvement in the external talance thus
induced would have been negated by the huge increase in the domestic
investment ratio *39* had it not been for the substantial increase
in the savings ratio, reported in Table 2 p 155 above, irom this
Table we note first of all the dramatic rise in public sector savings
a much noted feature of German recovery *k0. Still, private sector
■
savings also increased greatly. Commentators are agreed that this
was almost entirely a reflection of the massive increase of earnings
{
retained by firms *^+1, and only to a small extent the result of
saving by households; this habit having been impaired, it is alleged,
*58 Kendephausen op.cit. pp 11, 13, 92-109; A haddison, E onomic
Growth in the West pp l66ff.
*39 Menderh^usen op.cit. pp 48ff. The same can be inferred from
Hoffmania ... p 826.
*kO Kenderhkusen op.cit. pp 75ff; H Wallich, Lainsprings of the
German Revival pp 155ffj K W Roskamp, Capital Formation in
West Germany pp 138ff; haddison op.cit. p 239#
*41 Mendermusen op.cit. pp 75ff» Wallich op.cit. pp 156ff;
Roskampl op.cit. pp 82-7• D Keese, 'Die volkswirt-
schaftljiche GesamtgrBssen ... p 66; Hoffmann's estimates
of business reserves (pp 785-6, are consistent with this.
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by recent inflation experience *h2. This merely puts the question
one stage back. What was it that permitted the higher rate of
business saving in the 19.30s than in the later 1920s? Tax policy
was designed to encourage this (up to the mid-1950s/ But
surely a much more significant factor was the decline in labour's
share of income generated in industry and commerce, lart of the
reason for this was slower rise in German money wage rates, relative
to that abroad than in the 1920s. Gee Table 6a overleaf. This could
be ascribed to the confused inflation experience mentioned above;
or to the presence of a socio-political consensus whereby labour
determined not to 'rock the boat' Or lastly, to the higher
rate of unemployment in the 1950s, produced by the vast influx of
refugees *h5. As important however as the modest degree of wage
pressure was the rapid rise of productivity. This was a conjoint
result of high investment rates and low capital-output ratios 6.
Since capital-output ratios rose in the later 1950s, and product¬
ivity growth slackened (but not investment rates) the consensus
affirms that this rapid productivity growth reflects 'once-for-all'
aspects of the recovery from post-war chaos (without parallel during
*k2 Roskamp op.cit. pp 87-110; Wallich op.cit. pp 32-3;
Borchardt, 'Wachstum und Wechsellagen,' p 728. Uncertainty,
rather than definite inflation expectations, must be blamed
for the decline in individual savings.
*k3 Wallich, Roskamp, locis cit. *hl.
*kk Wallich op.cit. pp 12, ?91ff; lienderhausen op.cit. pp 62-7.
*k$ Wallich or. .cit. pp 288ff. For comparative unemployment data
see Maddison op.cit. p 220.
*k6 Wallich o7>.cit. pp 5^ff; Henderhausen op.cit. pp 76-7*
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Table 6 Wages Share, and Data relevant Thereto: 1950-55
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a. Money Wages: Various Countries 1952-59 = 100
G = Germany; F as France; S = Sweden
£ UK USA F S
1950 66 67 7b 49 59
1951 76 73 82 65 70
1952 82 79 86 76 82
1953 86 - 8b 91 78 85
195^ 89 89 92 8b 90
1955 95 98 97 92 98
b. Productivity Indices c. Wage-Income Patios in
1952-59 - 100 Serff' ''■anufacturinn
£ UK USA s £ UK USA s
1950 75 91 89 89 81 71 71 56
1951 82 92 89 91 76 76 71 50
1952 85 91 93 91 75 79 7b 61
1953 8Q 95 95 9b 75 79 75 60
195^ 95 99 95 9b 7b 79 75 60
1955 102 101 102 97 72 81 73 62
1959 115 108 109 70 80 75 58
SOURCE: E H F Brown and H Browne, A Century ... Appendix 3» pp bjlff.
192A—29, *^7.
The market in long term securities was $ badly injured by the second
as by the first inflation - or worse *b9» The much greater level
*b7 Wallich loc.cit.; Borchardt, 'Wachstum ...' p 732. The rela¬
tively fast growth of productivity adds an endogenous element
to the explanation of export growth.
*b<) Menderhausen op.cit. p77; Wallich or.cit. pp l8hff; Roskamp
op.cit. pp98ff, l32ff. Capital issues were very low, but this
is partly because of the legislative restriction of long terra
issuing rates to 6% - to help housing finance. Hence we can
infer the bond-bill gap which a free market would have exhibited.
Two inflations in 25 years would affect the bond market worse
than thje labour market.
/
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of business, and public sector saving however rendered investment
financing independent of the capital market; in marked contrast
to 1924-29.
Two final points:
i> Whereas in 1924-29 unemployment of labour was conjoined with
underutilisation of the capital stock *50, after 1950 unemploy¬
ment seems to have coexisted with more or less full utilisation of
the capital stock *51. This doubtless helps to explpin the high
investment rates of the later period.
ii Monetary policy was, on balance, restrictive. The discount rate
of the Rank Deutscher L&nder was 4% from July 1949 to October
1950. Thereafter 6% to April 1952, after which it dropped slowly to
by June-1^54. Quantitative controls were added to the standard
tools. *53 Since, unlike the later 1920s, the underlying Balance
of Payments structure did not (after 1950- compel a dear money policy,
the policy of the BdL can scarcely be judged less restrictive than
that of the Reichsbank *54 - at least up to later 1953« But the
inconvertibility of the currency enabled the BdL also to control short
*50 See below pp 253ff«
*51 A F Mester, 'Line Zeitreihe der Ausnutzung des Sachkapital-
bestandes' p 81 sets utilisation at capacity level for the
whole of 1950-59. This seems more realistic than the
utilisation levels reported by R Krengel (AnlagevermBgen,
Produktion und Besch&ftigung pp 86-9-, doubtless
produced by mechanical application of his method - and
inclusion of partially damaged stock.
*53 Wallich op.cit. pp 63-106, especially pp 89, 97, 103.
*54 The currency stock grew only slightly faster in the later
period. Hoffmann ... p 825.
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term capital inflows better than its predecessor could in the
1920s *55.
5.8. Summary
In this chapter the deviation of the macro-economic structure during
1924-29 from that obtaining before 1913 and after 1950 has been
explained chiefly in terms of 1; an exogenous reduction in foreign
exchange earnings; 2; a downward shift in the savings function
largely for endogenous reasons (household savings - owing to the
expectation of renewed inflation; business savings - to wages
pressure;; 5 a disruption of the capital market, owing to inflation¬
ary expectations which caused a; borrowers and lenders to prefer short
term transactions, and b) a large inflow of foreign funds; 4) continued
inflationary pressure, especially in wages; to a lesser extent in
the goods market; 5) excessively restrictive Reichsbank policy.
*55 Menderhausen op.cit. pp 82-91. Fiscal policy was also
restrictive: ibid; also Wallich op.cit. pp 6>-106;
Borchardt 'Wachstum und Wechsellagen ...' p 736.
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CHAPTER 6 INVESTMENT IN THE PUBLIC AND SEMI-PUBLIC SECTORS
6.1. Introduction
In the chapters up to this point 1 have been aiming to build up
.
. , ' '
descriptions of certain principal operating parts of a macro-economic
system, and finally (in Chapter 5: to assemble these parts and dis¬
play the system working. This was a comparative-statics system,
whose object was to account for leading features of the period
as a whole, not to account in detail for cyclical movements
within that period. However, it provides a general framework within
which this cyclical analysis can be conducted. To this I now turn.
The next four chapters are devoted to a short-term sector by sector
analysis of the investment function. In the end I hope, by this
analysis, to be able to ascertain more exactly the causes of the




In this chapter I seek to summarise the behaviour of investment in
the public and related sectors. These comprise:
- 1
ii The public household. Unlike all the other sectors here con¬
sidered, this class of investment is already included in the
aggregates of public household expenditure considered in the last
chapter. Investment under this head comprises buildings fop the use
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of government departments (at all levels), including educational,
recreational and welfare facilities (Hffentliche Gebflude/; secondly,
civil engineering works such as roads, canals, harbours, sewage and
drainage works (8ffentlicher Tiefbau;; finally, all investment by
public enterprises run as government/local government departments
('in eigener Regie').
ii; Transport and Communications. This comprises chiefly the invest¬
ment of the German Railway Co. ileutscle Reichsbahn Gesoll-
schaftthe Post Office Ifreutsclie Heichspost/, both of which after
192^ were operated as independent Reich-owned enterprises *1, and
also publicly owned local rail or tramway networks. These make up
80% of the statistical category. The other 20/ was made up by
related investments of the private sector, viz. private railways,
omnibuses and freight vehicles, all shipping (including fisheries.,
air traffic and radio *2.
iii; Public Utilities. These included a very large element of
publicly owned enterprise, as well as enterprises of mixed
public/private ownership, some of which were very large, eg the
*1 See above p 82 footnote ,
*2 See St.db.f.d.dt.R. 1938 p 56k. Hoffmann ... classifies
railways under a separate head. Where the latter places
the Post Office is hard to discern. Presumably omnibuses
etc. come under 'Gewerbe'.
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Rheinisch-Westffllische Elektrizitfltswerke *3» It should be noted
that data concerning this sector refer only to plants producing elec¬
tricity, gas and water for general consumption, outside of the
producing enterprise. In the case of electricity, such works will
be referred to as the public electricity supply; analogously for
gas and water. Where these things were produced for consumption
within the enterprise only, the investment in question is classified
according to the branch of the sale product of the firm,
iv/ Housebuilding. This important class of investment is related
to the public sector because in this period about half of its
finance was estimated to come from that source; also because of rent
control on pre-19?'* property. See below y 198 *3ft*
The Table following shows estimates of the aggregate annual invest¬
ment activity of each of these classes. Thereafter four sections
of the chapter consider each in turn. A final section briefly educes
tendencies common to all.
*3 According to one estimate in 193^» 57% of the public elec¬
tricity supply was generated in plants entirely owned by
the public sector. Of these, one half came from plants
owned by the Reich and States, and one half from plants
owned by the communes. Only 11% was sold from completely
privately owned works. Erich Rolling, Die Elektrizit£its-
werke in Deutschland ... p 18 (ultimate source: Reichs-
verband fiir LlektrizitMtswerkeSee too E-A III/2, Die
deutsche Llektri2itMtswirtschaft, p 68.
Of 1201 gasworks producing gas for public sale in 1928,
981 were communally owned, 78 'mixed', and 15° private:
E-A III/1, Die deutsche Kohlenwirtschaft p 38.
*3A Cf. D Petzina, Grundriss der deutschen Wirtschaftsgeschichte
1918-45 p 732.
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Table 1 Public and Semi-Public Sector Investment
A From Hoffmann: NET INVESTMENT
1 Public 2 Public
Railways
4 House¬ TOTAL
Buildings Civil Eng. buildings 1-4
1913 Prices Mill.Rm.
1924 220 900
1925 220 294 210 1000 1654
1926 250 378 260 1360 2108
1927 340 553 230 1530 2563
1928 360 483 210 1535 2483
1929 370 455 120 1395 2245'
1930 280 3^1 240 970 1741
Current xrices Mill*Em.
1925 380 450 300 1705 2750
1926 420 590 370 2165 3410
1927 570 890 340 2570 N 4220
1928 630 820 310 2680 4260
1929 660 800 190 2480 3960
1930 480 580 370 1655 2930
B From Statistische Jahrbticher: GROSS INVESTMENT
1 Fublic 2 Public 4 House¬ TOTAL.
Admin. Utilities 3 Transport* buildings 1 - 3
Current Prices Mill. Km.
1924 1407 432 1279 982 4100
1925 1859 757 1650 1712 5978
1926 2285 855 1709 1940 6789
1927 2690 727 2167 2622 8206
1928 2658 1023 1931 2825 8457
1929 2670 1083 1800 2877 8430
1930 2092 748 1512 2442 6794
* excl • undertakings 'in eigener Regie'. These are found under i
SOURCES AND METHODS: See overleaf.
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Notes to Table 1
SOURCES A: Hoffmann ... pp 258, 260; pp 236-7, col. 1 'GebHude'.
B: St.Jb.f.d.dt.R. 1938 p 565.
KLTHODS (references;: A_: Hoffmann ... pp 228-31, 2f+9 , 250ff.
B: G Keiser and B Benning, Kapitalbildung und
Investitionen in der deutschen Volkswirt-
schaft 192^-28, pp l8lff, 200-201, 20lff.
NOTES ON METHOD: In Hoffmann, public buildings investment is takenfrom
Stat.Reichsamt estimates of building activity (then
netted against seme depreciation scheme ; public civil engineering; from
analysis of consolidated public household accounts, on the assumption
that the caraeralist category of 'extraordinary expenditure' corresponds
to 'net investment' (against this assumption, see Keiser and Benning
op.cit. p 201j.
In the Statistische JphrbHcher estimates of public administrative
investment (inel. undertakings 'in eigener Regie'. were compiled by
detailed examination of ordinary and extraordinary accounts of public
households for items that satisfy the economic concept of 'gross
investment'.
Investment by the Geman Railway Co. derives in both cases from the
'Statistik der in Betrieb befindlichen Eisenbahnen Deutschlands',
modified, in the case of the St.Jb. estimates, by reference to the
Annual Reports and other data of the Company.
Local Railways, Public Utilities, Reichspost: in the Statistische
Jahrbticher estimates derive from balance sheet analysis (detailed
description below pp 21Off • Hoffmann subsumes public utilities
under 'Gewerbe', local railways under 'Railways'; I am not sure where
the Post Office appears. In the first two categories he follows the
methods of the St.Jb., applying his own depreciation scheme.
Housebuilding: Both sources use the Stsfc, Reichsamt housebuilding
statistics, based on the records of the building police (Baupolizeij.
Estimates of numbers, sizes and quality of dwellings completed, partly
built, and renovated in the year were converted to monetary estimates
by application of indexes of building costs.
NB to obtain Hoffmann's full estimates of housebuilding, half of
'agricultural building' must be added to 'non agricultural house¬
building'. Bee references above.
Periodisation: Columns A2 and B2 probably refer in reality to the
financial year; the rest probably to calendar years. See pp
above.
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6.2. Investment of the Public Household
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From Table 1 we observe that in aggregate this class of investment
(cols. a1, A2, b1) follows a pattern similar to that of total public
household expenditure (cf. Table 2 p 91 above}f but with an
earlier turning point: whereas total public expenditure in current
prices rose to 1928/29. and maintained a plateau during 1929/30,
public household investment levelled off from 1927/28. The earlier
end to the increase in investment probably reflects the greater
flexibility of tins type of expenditure in the face of financial
constraints
If Hoffmann's estimates (culled from different types of source/ are
valid, then public household investment in the years 1927-29 was
characterised by offsetting trends: an increase of investment in
buildings and a decrease in public civil engineering This seems
to be connected with the fact that public civil engineering investment
was mainly the responsibility of the communes, as Table 2 below shows
(if line 1 is assimilated to 'public buildings' and line 2 to
'public civil engineering'}.
It follows from the discussion in Chapter k *6, that already by
later 1927 communes as a class were in financial straits; the Boich
*k Annual estimates of net investment in, and repair and mainten¬
ance of highways (Landstrassen. tends to confirm this hypothesis:
Wi.u.St. 1937 pp 330-332.
*5 Stat.Reichsamt estimates of gross investment in road building-
confirm this latter. According to the St.Jb.f.d.dt.R. 193§
p 56^, it reached a peak of 629 mill.Rm. in 1927? 5^7 mill.Bm.
in 1928; 536 mill.Bm. in 1929* Also *k above.
*6 esp. pp lOlff Cf. K 1) Hansmeyer (ed-, Kommunale Finanzpolitik
P 137. "" '
171 6/7
not until 1928/29; hence perhaps the earlier decline in the net
investment pertinent to the former.
Table 2 Distribution of Public Household Net Investment between
Levels of Government 1923-27 Kill.Em.




2. Roads, Harbours etc,
Social, Sanitation
SOURCE: G Reiser and B Benning oy.cit. p 156.
h£ Different depreciation schemes vitiate comparison with Table 1A.
According to the Stat.Reichsamt data the issue of permits for the
construction of new urban public buildings levelled off in 1928 (see





Table 3 Publi Buildings: Permits and Completions in 90 Cities
(except as specified J
Permits Completions
1927* 1928* 1928 1927** 1928** 1928 22Z1
IQ 120 106 108 91 98 105 107 70
HQ 178 168 168 112 79 134 135 66
IIIQ 187 134 142 134 98 104 111 100
IVQ 154 148 144 84 130 132 134 147
MOTES: Permits may be viewed as proxies for intentions
* 89 cities ** 92 cities
SOURCE: Wi.u.St. 1929 P 86; 1930 p 129.
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public buildings were completed in 1929 than in 1928. Except on
implausible assumptions, this seems incompatible with the evidence
of Table 1 *7. It will be noted again below that the statistics
of urban building permits and completions seem to exaggerate the
contours of the cycle exhibited by more comprehensive data *8.
6.3. Investment in Communications
6.3.1. I shall consider firstly the German Railway Co.; secondly
the other publicly owned railways; and thirdly the Post Office.
Some more detailed estimates of investment follow in Table k.
6.3.2. Before discussing railway investment expenditure, attention
must be drawn to the fact that the cyclical pattern displayed by
Hoffmann's estimates (Table 1A col.3;» with its peaks in 1926 and
1928, runs counter to that of any other estimates I know (cf. Table k
above/ and to contemporary discussion. Perhaps this ia a consequence
of his depreciation scheme *9 (bo that his data gives a misleading
» ■
*7 A partial reconciliation may be 1) the delay between the com¬
pletion of buildings and the entering of the expenditure in
budget accounts; 2) the effect of the severity of the winter
of 1928/29 in delaying public building completions in to 1930«
Both points are speculative.
*8 See pp 193ff
*9 Is it significant that his rather brief discussion of his
depreciation schemes uses railway investment as an example?


































Tramways) Current Prices Mill.Rm.
1926 1927 1?28 1929 1930
1 Met ) Keichsbahn 346 459 285 201 196
2 Investment; Other 7 14 24 17 13
3 Replacement/ Reichsbahn 387 412 420 445 413
4 Investment Other 22 23 23 23 22
TOTAL 7S2 90S" 752 wz ^3
5 Mainten- ) Reichsbahn* 299 338 293 332 310
6 ance ) Other 14 15 15 15 14




St.Jb.f.d.dt.R. 1938 p 564,
Wi.u.St. 1937 PP 330-332.
indication of the pattern of gross investment/. It is justifiable, I
think, to follow the witness of the other sources in analysing railway
investment *9A.
*9A The contours of Tables 4a and 4b, with their 1927 peak, are con¬
firmed by current and constant price statistics of expenditure
on mpintenance, renewal and improvement of the Company's
physical assets, circulated to members of its finance Committee
in a memo dated 31*12.29. BA Machlass Silverberg 497*
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The consensus of contemporary *10 and subsequent *11 opinion
seems to hold that the physical assets which the German Railway Co.
inherited in 1924 were in large measure obsolete and otherwise
inadequate, as a result of low investment rates in the decade 1914-
1924. However, the only quantitative evidence I have does not
support this view. It relates to the locomotive stock, and implies
that renewal and expansion of the stock was very rapid in this
decade, so that by 1924 there was a considerable excess. See Table 5
below. If the locomotive stock in 192? was on average somewhat older
than in 1913, this was probably a result of low renewal rates in the
years 1924-26 *12. Some contemporaries doubted the urgency of
the Reichsbahn renewal programme in the later 1920s *12A.
The degree of obsolescence of the railway capital stock must therefore
remain an open question.
However, even in the absence of any net investment, the internal
financial stability of the Railway Co. was precarious. To analyse
*10 Letter from Director Jahn (of Railway Co.) to P Silverberg
on 24.2.28, in BA Nachlass Silverberg 481. See also Reichs-
bahngericht, Entscheidungsgrtinde ... p 17.
*11 RE LUke, Von aer Stabilisierung zur Krise, pp 102-107;
P Czada, Lie Berliner Ilektroindustrie ... p 153* According
to a footnote in the latter source _Reichsbahn investment
1920-2J was 585 mill.Gold K. as against 750 mill.M. p.a. in
1913-14. But how reliable is either?
*12 The locomotive stock may be exceptional: it is remarked on in
LV 25.5*28 p 1143. The Laves Commission however believed the
assets of the Co. to be highly modernised (R E Ltike PP
pp I02ff/: were they more biassed than those who had to pay
the Reparations?
There seems no good reason why the Railways could not have
financed an investment programme during the inflation. As a
dept. of the Reich they would have access to unlimited Reichs-
bank credits.
*12A IHZ 19.10.27, P 1, 'Braucht die Reichsbahn Kapital?'
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Table 5a Locomotive Stock (Reichsbahn;: Gross Changes and New
Orders 1910-2'-'* Numbers p.a. or Annual Averages
1910/15 1914/19 1920/22 1923 1924
Gross Additions 1280 1790 1990 1031 442
Numbers Scrapped 600 240 1550 1552 604
192^ 1926 mi 192s mi
Gross Additions 563 116 155 430
Numbers Scrapped 2520 1815 1156 900 •
New Orders - 196 310 101 23
Orders Outstanding
from Previous Year - - 176 376 45
at 1.1.
Table 5b Age Distribution of Locomotive Stock in 1913 and 1927
% of Stock of ... age (in years
J5 4-6 7-12 15 - 18 19 Average Age
1915 12% 15% 26% 21% 21% 12.8 years
1927 1% 14% 38% 24% 23% 13.5 years
SOURCE: Maschinenbau 8 (.18.4.29 pp W 85- W 88.
this, we must first recollect the place of the company in the economy
of Reparations. After 1924 the Company had to raise out of its
operating revenues the sums shown in Table 6a, line 6 below. It was
in order to ensure that the levy genuinely arose out of operating-
revenue that the Dawes Commission recommended that its management be
/
vested in an Aktien Gesellschaft owned by the Reich, and further
stipulated that the ratio of current operating expenditure (including
maintenance and renewal to qoerating revenue ought not to exceed
176 g/12
80% *13. From Table 6a, line 5 however we see that in fact this ratio
never fell below 81$. In good part this reflects the competition of
road transport, but there were other more accidental reasons *1
Out of the operating surplus (Betriebsttberschuss - Table 6a, line J>)
the company had to accumulate certain legally required reserves, meet
depreciation charges, pay dividends on the preference shares it issued
from time to time, and mast Reparations Charges *15* This is shown
in Table 6b. After 1925 this surplus, even before expenditure on
renewal of equipment etc, was barely adequate to this, let alone to
finance net investment expenditure.
Under these circumstances, the Company had two sources of outside
finance. Firstly, the Reich might buy preference shares or grant loans.
Secondly, the domestic capital market might do the same. The fact of
the primary of Reparations charges on the Company made foreign issuing
difficult. In practice, only short term foreign borrowing came into
question *16.
Up to the end of 1925 the impossibility of domestic loan flotation
confined investment expenditure to narrow limits. The opening of the
*13 RE Ltlke op.cit. pp 99ff. In practice the control of the Reich
extended to pricing and borrowing policies; the company's
independence was therefore limited.
*14 Wd 13/1(1928} pp 205ff, 'Die Finanzlage der Reichsbahn'.
Also Reichsbahngericht op.cit. pp 12-15- Among other reasons
was the heavy pensions burden, a consequence, it was alleged, of
the politically motivated overstaffing of the post-war years.
*15 Ibid, pp 3-11i 17-
*16 Letter of V Silverberg (member of the Verwaltungsrat - Admini¬
strative Board - of the Company} to 0 Wassermann (Deutsche
Bank) dated 7.1.28: BA Nachlass Silverberg 5^0» DV b.1.28
p A12 opines that Reparations charges impeded domestic borrowing
too.
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Table 6a German Railway Co. Operating Surplus and Charges
upon it. Current Prices Mill,Em.
192^ 1926 1927 1^28 1929 1930
1 Operating Revenues R669 5039 5159 535*+ *+570
2 Operating Expensesl 3452 323^ 3R38 36^6 383^ 3R96
3 Operating Surplusl 1217 1317 1601 1513 1520 10?E
k Renewal of Plant 523 *+59 721 6k8 660 59*+
5 Ratio of Expenditure to
Income ie (2 + R,:1 % 85 81 83 8k 8k 90
6 Reparations Charges 333 57'+ 591 658 659 660
Remainder of Surplus 362 286 290 207 201 -180
Table 6b German Railway Co. Operating Sur >lus and Charges
upon it. Current Prices Mill .Em.
1221 1926 1927 1928^
1 Operating Surplus 1217 1317 1587 1363
2 Renewal of Plant 523 *+57 656 (660/
3 Reparations Charges 333 57'+ 591 {Geo j
k To Statutory Reserves 93 91 100 (102/
5 Depreciation 115 1R0 157 -
6 Dividends on Preference Shares 3 ko 62 (90
7 Other Interest Payments 0 0 2 (?-'
1067 1302 1568 (1515/
8 Net Surplus 151 15 19 mm
9 Surplus brought forward from
Previous Years 3 153 167 (-152)
1
I'or my purposes I define 'operating surplus' net of renewal of plant.
2
These were provisional estimates made in first half of 19?8.
^ Forecast of Railway Tribunal.
SOURCES: Table 6a. Wi.u.St. 1932 p Ml
Ta&e 6b: Appendices to Reichsbahngericht, hhtscheidungs-
grtinde ... (1928 forecast from pp 9-10 of
text/.
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NOTE TO TABLE 6b re DEPRECIATION: The coverage of line 5 Table 6a
is patchy; it relates to only
certain new structures and sundry rights and other assets (eg the
company's operating rights in view of its obligation to return the
assets to Reich clear of debt in 1964 - see Wd 15/1(1930; PP 80lff;.
Because of its semi-cameralist bookkeeping, no comprehensive depre¬
ciation of balance sheet assets was calculated. Following the
Tribunal (Reichsbahngericht, I regard 'renewal of assets' as a proxy
for depreciation; its concyclicality (see Table) means however that
'net surplus' (line 8; is less concyclical than true profits would
be. Whether, on average, renewals reflect the correct level of
depreciation, is Hard to assess. It incorporates certain items that
have the character of net investment - and the Co. recognised this
by displaying these in its balance sheet under additions to assets;
on the other land many other items, if not currently being renewed,
are excluded. Contemporary assessments differ. The Tribunal defin¬
itely believed it understated depreciation - but understood depreciation
to cover technical improvements. See Reichsbahngericht, op.cit.
PP 3-7.
domestic capital market in 1926 permitted an expansion of investment
activity, and the 407 mill.Rm. capital expenditure of that year proved
fairly easy to finance *17. As a result of this no doubt, a six-year
investment programme was announced late in the year *18. But the
large scale placement of preference shares, by which it had been
hoped to finance the programme, had to be cancelled in the aftermath
of the Reich loan failure of February 1927 *19. The programme of 1927
*17 Letter from Railway Director Jahn to P Silverberg (cited in *10
above). Cf fieichsbahngericht, Entscheidungsgrtlnde ... Appendix,
part C, and DV 10.6.27 P 1149 145 mill.Rm. was raised by sale
of preference shares to Reich, 76 mill.Rm. by credits sold on
stock market, about 35 mill.Rm. generated internally. An added
stimulus was the work creation programme, in which the Co. was
expected to participate: Vorlfeufiger Reichswirtschaftsrat ...
PP 3»5-6,12. An expenditure of 120 mill.Rm. had been proposed
for it, to be financed by loans.
*18 V.jh.Kon.j. forsch. 1927 H1 pp 45-6.
*19 Wd 13/1(1928) pp 205ff (cit. *14).
See too the letter Jahn/Silverberg cited *10. On the Reich
loan failure see above P135-
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had to be financed out of the previous year's surplus (see Table 6b,
line 9 P 177/, out of c.130 mill.Rm. sundry credits, and 34 mill.Km.
out of current internal funds *20. In later 1927 the Company began
to feel the burden of the civil service salary increase in which it
was, willy nilly, involved *21; in addition, Separations charges
were to rise by 100 mill.Em. in 1928. In the absence of adequate
access to external finance the Company felt that these added burdens
compelled it to cut back its investment programme *22: in .ct in
early 1928 it did succeed in placing a further 200 raill.ijn. preference
shares, but as this was inadequate even for the restricted investment
prograaime now envisaged, the Company petitioned the Reich for a price
increase that would raise revenue by 250 mill.Em.p.a. *23- The
government entertained a rosier view of likely revenue development
and borrowing possibilities in the second half of 1928 than the Com,any
did, so refused the application *24, but a Railway Tribunal
(Reichsbahngericht, subsequently awarded the increase on grounds of
the already-described inadequacy of the internally generated surplus *25«
And in fact the surplus did not improve in 1928, despite the price
increase *26.
*20 Reichsbahngericht, Entscheidungsgrtinde ... Appendix C.
*21 Ibid, pp 8-9, and Appendix C. The full impact was expected
to raise costs c.300 mill.Rm.p.a.
*22 DV 7.12.27 P 260; Wd 13/1(1928) pp 205ff (cit. *14,
Letter Jahn/Silverberg cited *10.
*23 Reply of Reich Government to Application of German Railway
Co. concerning the Raising of Railway Tariffs. Sent to
Silverberg 8.8.28. BA Silverberg Nachlass 541.
*24 Ibid.
*25 Reichsbahngericht, EntscheidungsgrUncle ...
*26 Cf. estimates for 1928 in Tables £a and 6b p 177 .
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Further substantial external financing proved impossible after early
1928, until the Company received ite slice of the Young L>an (c.2^0
mill.Km. - received 1930-31); this however was required for consoli¬
dation of existing debt. In late 1929 the Reich launched a new Work
Creation Programme, in which the Railway Co. was to increase invest¬
ment spending by c.350 mill.Rm., to be financed, as the work
progressed, by a series of bond and bill issues. In addition, the
Reich undertook to cancel certain debts to itself, and to subsidise
the serviciig of the above issues *27. This programme doubtless
explains the high expenditure forecast for 1930.
W Frank, in Wirtschaftsdienst expressed himself sceptically about
these grandiose loan-financed schemes, and in fact they seem to have
come to naught, to judge by the actual ex post investment activity
of the Company in that year (except for the 'maverick' observation
of Hoffmann). We are told that in 1930 the operating deficit
could only be contained at 180 mill.Rm. by reduction of expenditure
on physical assets *28. The sharp and unexpected cutback in
railway capital expenditure at the end of 192? had serious conse¬
quences for the private sector *29.
6.3.3 Investment in local railways, tramways etc rose steeply
*27 Wd 1^/1(1929) P ^51, 'Zur Lage der Reichsbahnfinanzen'; 15/1
(1930) p 801, 'Der Abschluss der Reichsbahn ftlr 1920'; 15/2
(1930) pp I521ff, 'Das Arbeitsbeschaffungsprogramrae'•
*28 See Table 6a p 177. Wi.u.St. 1932 p Ml; Wd 16/1 (1931 >
p , 'Ergebnisse des Reichsbahnjahres'.
*29 See Ch. 8 p 292.
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between 1926-28, then fell agaik It is probable that this global
figure is dominated by the spending of a few major local transport
authorities, notably those of Berlin, which embarked on substantial
programmes that culminated in 1928/29 - programmes which landed
the city in the severe financial difficulties reported above. To
ease these difficulties, by facilitating overseas borrowing, the
Berlin transport undertakings merged into the iaerliner Verkehrs T-
in 1929 *30. The protocols of the advisory Council for e./.n
Credits reveal considerable investment by other large- 1 : <• ' authorities
in transport undertakings in 1928, and the illiouicity it caused *31.
6.3.^-. The last class of public sector investment in 'communications'
to be considered is that on the iost Office. This organisation
evidently planned heavy investment in telecommunications throughout
the decade *32. The internal financial structure of the Post Office
seems to have been healthier than that of the hail'-ay Co.; it
generated a net profit after all fixed charges throughout the
*30 See pp126-7 above; also 0 BUsch, Die Berliner Kommunalwirt-
schaft ... p 81} BA R2/2130, sitting of Advisory Council on
11.12.29.
*31 Eg of major towns: BA K2/2128, sitting of the Council of 15»3«28
- Munich, Dresden; 16.3.28 - Frankfurt/Kain; BA E2/2129,
30.^.28 - iiagdeburg; 3«5»28 - Stuttgart; 11.5.28 - Mainz;
12.6.28 - Duisburg; BA R2/2130 - 13.11.28 - Oberrheinische
Eisenbahngesellschaft. Transportation takes a decided second
place to public utilities; but the fact that it is mentioned
at all in support of an application indicates its urgency,
since such expenditure was. according to the 'guidelines',
very borderline. See p;1°° above.
*32 Cf P Czada op.cit. pp 158, 173-93. Tt seems that effective
orders were rather below those of the inflation years however
182 6/18
1920s *33« In 1926 it was able to float capital issues to the tune
of 300 mill.Km. with the aid of which it made a substantial contri¬
bution to the Work Creation Programme of that time *34.
The reduction of capital expenditure in 1927 (see Table 4a p 173
above; was therefore in part truly counter-cyclical - caused by the
conclusion of the Work Creation Programme. But it also expresses
a deterioration in the Post Office's internal liquidity because of
its inability to float an intended further 150 mill.km. bond in that
year. The Post Office therefore applied successfully for a considerable
increase in charges in July 1927* which increase, as well as the
general economic upswing, generated the dramatic recovery of profits
in 1927/28. Despite this, the capital expenditure of 1927 was not
completed without a deterioration of internal liquidity, which got
worse in 1928 when external financing still proved impossible, and the
Post Office was burdened by the salary increase and a 50 mill.Em.
increase in its cash transfer to the Reich (to 120 mill.Em.p.a.)•
The level of investment actually achieved involved borrowing from the
cash balances of the Postal banking services (Postscheckverkehr) in
*33 Wd 15/2(1930; pp 1521ff, 'Das Arbeitsbeschaffungsprogramm'.
The net profit of the Post Office was 185 mill.Em. in 1925/26
(year ending 31.3.), 125 mill.Em. in 1926/27 and 253 mill.Em.
in 1927/28. See Wd 12/2(1927) P 1126, 'Die Finanzlage der
Reichspost'; 13/2T1928) p 1675» 'Der Abschluss der Reichspost
fiir 1927'.
*34 Wd 12/1(1927) P 157. In February 1926 the Post Office applied
to the Advisory Council about a foreign issue of 130 mill.Em.
in view of the impossibility of domestic flotation. Presum¬
ably it withdrew its application in view of the subsequent
domestic improvement. No further substantial foreign issues
seem to have been contemplated: BA R2/2100.
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the hope that external financing would release this in 1929 ♦35.
Nevertheless the rather more favourable position of the Post Office
is seen in the fact that it alone of the authorities involved could
fulfil its obligations under the government's Work Creation Programme
of 1929/30' *36. Not till 1931 did the Post Office run into deficit,
as a consequence both of declining revenues and of vastly increased
cash demands of the Reich (227 mill.Rm. in 1931/* But even in that
year it could raise 150 mill.Rm. in long term and 20 mill.Rm. in short
term loans *37.
To conclude: the Post Office had little greater success in the 1920s
in raising external finance than the Railway Co.; its more satis¬
factory internal generation of funds gave it the freedom to follow
a policy that, from a macro-economic point of view *38, had real
elements of counter-cyclicality. In the long run, however, (ie after
1929/ its finances were subject to the same pressures as those of
other public bodies.
*35 Wd 13/2(1928) p 1675, (cited *3315 14/2(1929) P 1817,
'Der Abschluss der Reichspost fiir 1928'; cf. Stat.Reichsamt,
Einzelschrift No. 14, Die deutsche Finanzwirtschaft ... p 61.
They were not actually repaid until the capital issues of
1930: K Sautter, 'Der Kapital- und Zinsendienst der
deutschen Reichspost', p 321.
*36 Financed out of the 160 mill.Rm. Post Office share in the Young
Loan, 120 mill.Rm. Treasury Notes, (Schatzanweisungen; and out of
internally generated funds. The increased expenditure, we are
told, fell mainly in 1929. This is confirmed in Table 4a
p 173 above.
*37 Wi.u.St. 1932 P 678, 'Die Finanzen der deutschen Reichspost'.
Host of the loans had to be devoted to the payment of
existing debt.
*38 From the standpoint of supplying firms however this tended
merely to mean displaced alternation of high and low activity:
P Czada op.cit. pp 173-193*
184 6/20
6.4. Investment in Public Utilities
Of total fixed investment in public utilities during the period under
review over 80% was undertaken by the public electricity supply *39.
Accordingly, the discussion of this section will concentrate on
this branch.
Tables 7 and 8 give estimates of the rate of growth of capacity and
output, and provide a measure of capacity utilisation in the public
electricity supply.
From them we see a virtually uninterrupted growth of output and
capacity between 1900 and 1929. This was a new industry and from
the demand side the need for net capital formation was continuous *40.
Conditions were less favourable from the supply side. Because of
its extremely high capital-output ratio the industry was very depen¬
dent on external financing. Given contemporary German conditions
*39 G Keiser and B Benning, Kapitalbildung und Investitionen
in der deutschen Volkswirtschaft, p 88 (net investment
1924-28;; Wi.u.St. 1933 P 412 (gross investment of Aktien-
Gesellschaften quoted on stock market, or with share capital
exceeding 1 mill.Rm.) Of year-to-year change in gross invest¬
ment by public utilities, 66% of gross changes in 1928-29»
and 88% in 1929-30 were accounted for by the public electricity
supply.
*40 How far planned capital formation was impeded 1914-24 is hard
to judge. From Table 7 the absolute growth of capacity and
output accelerated steadily up to 1929 whereas the relative
growth rate decelerated. This is but as one would expect in
a 'new industry'. The improved utilisation 1911-24 probably
reflects the development of the 'grid' (1920 utilisation
clearly reflects the disturbances of that year;. Fossibly the
utilised plant in 1924 was less efficient than desired; hence
a rapid concentration of production thereafter. See pp I91ff
below.
*41 0 von der Gablentz, 'Kapitalstruktur und Kapitalertr&geder
deutschen Industrie, p 107; E-A III/2 op.cit. p 65; cf. the
debt-equity ratios that can be roughly inferred from Hoffmann ...
PP 774-5, 778-9.
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Table 7a Listalled Capacity (OOP Kilowatts; and Actual Output















Table 7b Bates of Increase* of Capacity and Output
1900/1" 1911/28 1915/2** 1924/28 1925/28
Capacity 147 146 106 44 35
Output 152 155 115 *+4 35
* absolute increase as % of initial and finishing values.
SOURCES: E-A III/2 Die deutsche ElektrizitStswirtschaft p 8,11.
Wi.u.St. 1938 pp 412-3; E Kolling, Die Elektrizitgtswerke
in Deutschland, p 35*
NB These sources all rely on the statistics of the Reichsverband der
bffentlichen Elektrizit&tswerke.
Table 8 Average Annual Capacity Utilisation in the Public
Electricity Supply
Utilisation Utilisation Utilisation
1900 1640 1924 2250 1928 2246
1911 1840 1925 2253 1929 2187
1913 2000 1926 197*+ 1930 2023
1920 1166 1927 2150 1931 1799
METHOD 01' CALCULATION: In Table 7a divide output by capacity. This was
a commonly used contemporary measure. It is
only valid in conjunction with information about the relationship
between peak utilisation at any point of time and average utilisation
over the year. Furthermore it conveys no information about the
efficiency of the plant being utilised.
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NOTE TO TABLES 7 AND 8: The definition of public electricity
supply is rather wider for 1900-2*+ than for
1925-1931* See E-A III/2 op.cit. pp 8,11.
this factor might have been expected to inhibit growth, but it should
also be noted that the electric power companies enjoyed favoured
status on the capital markets at home and abroad, relative to other
companies of similar size. This conclusion follows from a consider¬
ation of i) the relatively large amounts of debt issued; ii/ the
high proportion of this debt issued abroad; iii) the relatively low
interest rates at which it issued its debt despite i/ and iiJ, and
the fact that the bulk of it was floated later in the decade than
that of other industries (doubtless because of the long gestation
lag **+2) - ie when rates were rising again. See Tables 9 and 10
for verification.
So much for the long term growth possibilities and constraints. The
increase in the industry's gross investment expenditure was inter¬
rupted twice in the Weimar period, temporarily in 1925» and permanently
in 1929* Is this related to the peaks in the inflow of new domestic
orders to the Siemens Schuckert Werke (major manufacturer of electric
power equipment/ **+3» in mid 1925 (following a plateau of uncertain
length), and mid 1928 (filowing a plateau since late 1927) **+*+'?
**f2 It v/as the practice not to issue long term debt till the
projects to be financed were near completion. Lra
See Diagram 8/1 p 2*+8 below.
*hk Cf Table 1, col B2 p 168 with Diagram 8/1 below.
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Table 9a Issue of Fixed Interest (Long Term; Securities by Branch of









































Suppty excluding the German Railway Co.
Table 9b Average Nominal Rates of Interest at 31.12.29 on Out¬
standing Long Term Debt Issued since 1.1.25 %
Domestic Foreign
Coal, Iron, Steel 7.0 6.8
Other Manufacturing 7.3 6.7




* ie Railways and Tramways (excl. German Railway Co.) and Shipping.
SOURCE to Table 9a; Wi.u.St. 1930 p 386.
Table 9b: calculated from above source. Debt on which inter¬
est rates were variable was ignored. For simpli¬
city the rate appropriate to each class was assumed
to be the highest. This assumption will not affect
the internal rank order of the above average
rates, but biasses each of them c upward.
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The Siemens Schuckert Werke (SSW; would also supply equipment for
electricity generation outwith the public electricity supply. While
however in 1926 only 55% of total electricity output was generated by
the public supply, c.73% of the increase installed capacity between
1926-28 was undertaken by the public supply *45.
If the public electricity supply did dominate the SSW index *46, then
we discover a lag between the turning point of new orders and that of
the activation of new assets in balance sheets of one to two years.
A lag of this length was noted by contemporaries *47.
The downturn of domestic new orders in 1925 appears to coincide almost
exactly with the 'Stinne6 crisis' of July. Thus Czada appears to be
correct in attributing it to increased difficulties of foreign borrow¬
ing and increased tightness of the domestic financial markets *48.
*45 Inferred from the Tables in E-A III/2 op.cit. pp 8,14. Cf.
relative output cfevelopments 1925-29: E Kolling op.cit. p 35*
*46 Of course, had the industrial demand for generating plant for
private use been more variable than that of the public elec¬
tricity supply, then private demand may have dominated the
turning points. The fact that the SSW index lags the turning
point in the mechanical engineering industry's domestic new
orders index (below pp 247-8; may confirm that this former index
is dominated by the orders of the public electricity supply,
since firms buying generating plant for private use would also
dominate the latter index. But against this I note that the
separate new domestic orders index of heavy industry for the
products of the mech. engineering industry conforms more to the
SSW index than it does to the general mech.engineering domestic
index; and this branch was a very important purchaser of
generators for private use.
At any rate, it is unlikely that the turning point in orders of
the public electricity supply deviated much from that shown by
the SSW index, or it would not have shown that pattern.
*47 E Kolling op.cit. p 35» Cf. the methodological note on Public
Utilities to Table 1 p 169 above.
*48 P Czada op.cit. p 179» This timing does however suggest that
a fall in orders for heavy industry may have been important.
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But the conditions in foreign markets improved rapidly in the autumn
of 1925; yet new orders remained depressed till the summer of
1926 *^+8a. It seems therefore relevant also to point to the sub¬
stantial fall in capacity utilisation between 1925 and 1926, indicated
in Table 8 p 185 . In the later 1920s over 80% of the public elec¬
tricity supply was sold to industry *^9» and the available indexes
suggest that industrial production, and the production of electricity
were falling after the spring of 1925 *50.
The knowledge of the length of the gestation lag would presumably cause
firms in the public electricity supply to reduce their investment
promptly. The recovery of new orders in mid 1926 would then be
associated with cognizance of the recovery of industrial production
from the spring of that year.
Czada does not advance a specific explanation for the decline of new
orders in mid 1928 *51. But in this case borrowing problems were more
prolonged. The closure of foreign capital markets from December 1926
to June 1927* followed by their overloading for the following twelve
months, then finally signs of renewed deterioration of the US bond
market from c.June 1928, can be expected to have had a cumulative
effect on expectations. The depression of the domestic bond market
after February 1927 was less important to the industry, but would act
in the same direction. Nor is it irrelevant that the level of short
*48A Cf. the new foreign bond issues in 1925J Wk 5(1926) p M. In
fact the public electricity supply borrowed quite heavily
abroad: Wk M1925 P ^50$ 5(1926/ p kj.
E-A HI/2 op.cit. p 3-
*50 Konj.Stat.Hdb. pp 52-3? for monthly electricity production
(sample of 122 works) see Kon.j.Stat.Hdb. (1936) p 57*
*51 P Czada op.cit. p 191.
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term indebtedness in the industry was the subject of increasing
concern, especially from early 1928 *52. The prolonged plateau
of new domestic orders to the SSW may also reflect these problems.
True though it is that no other branch of the economy succeeded
in issuing so much long term debt abroad in later 1928 and 1929
(see Table 9a P187 ), nevertheless ttie largest firm in the industry,
the Rheinisch-WestfHlische Elektrizitcltswerke, could only float a
New York bond in late 1928 by according it conversion rights to
equity *53« Apart from borrowing problems, one might suppose that
publicly-owned electric power companies were under increasing pressure
by reason of the growing sums they were expected to transfer to their
governmental owners. Evidence of deteriorating communal finances
from the beginning of 1928 suggests that by mid 1928 this may have
been a significant factor *5^+.
Is there any relationship in 1928 between the development of capacity
utilisation, and the rate of investment in the industry? Capacity
utilisation reached a peak in 1928, but the decline in 1929 was very
mild (see Table 8 jp 185 )• The growth of the output of electricity
did not slacken in 1928-29, by contrast with 1925-26 (cf. Table 7 Pl85^»
*52 In 1928/29 an analysis of 80 leading Aktien-Gesellschaften in
the industry revealed that over half of their debt was short
term: E-A III/2 op.cit. pp 66ff. The Commission concluded that
the problem of unconsolidated debt became acute from mid 1928.
But it is clear from the protocols of the Advisory Council for
Foreign Credits that for many works owned by the public sector,
it was acute at least from late 1927 (BA R2/2128, 2129. See
pp 115ffabove).
*53 12.10.28 p 56. Cf. the discussion p;^0.
*5^ See Tables 10-Hp 117-7. Also E-A III/2 op.cit. pp 59, 79. The
report indicates that for this purpose prices were often
increased; if short run demand elasticity were low, then the
effect of this on net retained earnings may have been positive.
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just in the same way as industrial output as a whole only stagnated,
but did not decline in the later period *55. It is possible however
that capacity utilisation is related to the reduction in investment
intentions in another way. In 1928 average annual capacity utili¬
sation was no higher (2250 hours) than in 1924-25* Assuming that
i) the relationship between peak and average annual utilisation did
not alter over these years, and ii) that improvements in the function¬
ing of the 'grid' had increased the tfficiency with which peaks in
different parts of the country could offset each other *56, this
would appear to imply that even in 1928 utilisation was lower than
desirable *57*
It may be however that much of this capacity was obsolete, so that
annual average capacity utilisation does not adequately measure the
relationship between the actual and the desired stock. Certainly the
investment activity of 1924-29 involved substantia!. technical progress.
*55 Of. references cited *50.
*56 It seems likely that considerable progress was made in the
unification of the 'grid' during those years, at least within
large regions, despite the delays caused by local monopolies,
and the disagreements between the Reich/Prussian sponsored
A.G. ftlr ELektrizitgtswirtschaft, and private or mixed companies
like the Rehinisch-Westfglische Elektrizitgtswerke. On these
questions see H Btfggeln, Die Entwicklung der Elektrizitgtswirt-
schaft in Deutschland ... pp 137ff; T 2 Hughes, 'Technology as
a Force for Change in History', pp 153ff» E-A III/2 op.cit.
pp 33ff. The current comment can be followed through the pages
of DV: 4.11.27, P 135; 18.5.28, P 1107; 27.7.28, p 1466;
12.10.28, pp 36-7; 15.2.29, P 617; and esp. 22.2.29 p 655;
and 10.5.29 p 1059. See too 13.1.28 p 449.
*57 According to E-A III/2 op.cit. pp 24-8 the devdopknent of the
'grid' between 1913-28 permitted an increase of y% in average
annual capacity utilisation. The observed increase in Table 8
p 185 is only 13% however. This consideration seems to
reinforce the argument of the text.
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At the frontier of technology, the most advanced works in 1928/29
used c.-y less coal per unit of electricity produced than in 192^/25
(c.50% less than in 19D) *58, and there was very rapid concentration
of capacity in larger plant. See Table 10.
Table 10 Distribution of Generating Capacity by Size of Plant
Public Electricity Supply
Size of Plant (Kw) % of Total Capacity Number of Plants
1926 1928 1926 1928
1 - 1000 k.k 3.6 1079 1060
1001 - 10000 13.1 11.2 205 218
10001 - 100000 68.2 63.7 120 132
Above 1000001 H+.3 21.5 ^7
SOURCE: E-A III/2 Die deutsche Blektrizitgtswirtschaft p 1^.
Nevertheless it is unlikely that the degree of obsoleteness of the
extant capital stock was greater in 1928 than it had been in 1925;
and if it was argued that considerations of capacity utilisation must
enter the explanation of the reduction of new orders in 1925i it would
be inconsistent to exclude them from the explanation of the reduction
in 1928, though probably playing a role subsidiary to that of financial
factors.
The industry's financial difficulties intensified after mid 1928. By
the end of 1929 in many cases creditors would countenance no further
deterioration in the debt:equity ratio. In order to raise capital a
number of public enterprises in the industry had to seek private
*58 Ibid, p 12.
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shareholders *59« Co such difficulties explain why gross invest¬
ment in public utilities fell by two-thirds in Germany between
1929-33» whereas in the UK they increased *60 ?
6.5. Housebuilding
As in the case of railways, annual average net investment in housing
in the quinquennium 1925-29 was considerably less (in 1913 prices,)
than the decadal average for 1904 - 13 *61. Whereas there may be
some question as to the strength of the underlying demand in the case
of railways, basic physical demand for housing was very great, because
of low rates of construction in the decade 1914-24 *62. See Table 15*
A Reich housing census (Reichswohnungsz&hlung) conducted in fey 1927
fully confirmed the prior impressions of serious shortage. For
*59 Ibid, pp 8lff. Also 0 Btlsch op.cit. pp 163-4, 169-70.
*60 St.Jb.f.d.dt.R. 1938 p 565, and C H Feinstein, National
Expenditure ... p T92.
*61 See Hoffmann ... p 258, assumig the comparability of his
rather shaky (residual) series for before 1914 with his
post 1924 estimates. Lest Table 1"1 P194 appear to contra¬
dict this assertion, I note that housebuilding appears to
have been less in 1913 than in any year since 1900.
*62 A Table in Zement 1926 p 216, showing net increases in
housing per head of population in cities, clearly shows that
the rate in 1920-24 was generally one-fifth to one-half of
that in 1909/13 (ultimate source; Stat.Reichsamt).
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Table 11 Housebuilding in Germany 1913-30 Thousand Dwellings
1 Net Increase* in Dwellings 2 Gross Increase* in Dwellings
(Net of Demolitions, (Gross of Demolitions/
1913 200 1922 1V7
191^ 11L 1923 118
1915 52 192^ 107 192^ 115 1931 252
1916 15 1925 179 1925 192 1932 159
1917 6 1926 206 1926 221 1933 202
1918 3 1927 289 1927 307 193^ 319
1919 57 1928 310 1928 330
1920 103 1929 318 1929 339
1921 13^ 1930 311 1930 330
SOURCE: W Fey, Lei stunk'en und Aufgaben im deutschen Wohnungs- und
Siedlungsbau, pp 10,13; cf. Kon.j.Stat.Hdb. (1936; p 2L6.
* New dwellings and conversions. Each of the latter is estimated at
3 of a new dwelling. Cf. G Keiser and B Benning op.cit. p 201.
example, c.10% of families lacked their own dwelling *63.
But physical shortage is not identical to market demand, as contempo¬
raries remarked »6L. And in fact it was generally believed that
*63 The census is reported in Statistik des deutschen Reiches
V0I4 362. A summary appears in Wi.u.St. 1928 pp 82-3.
For general comment see Zement 1929 PP 206-7, Lehren aus der
ReichswohnungszNhlung'; DV 2.3.28 pp 690-6915 BBZ 23.1.27,
'Das deutsche Wohnungsproblem'; E-A III, Per Deutsche Wohn-
ungsbau, p k; Wk 8(1929/' p 3791 'Faterialien zur deutschen
Wohnungswirtschaft'. Overcrowding was however perhaps less
intense in cities than in 1910: Wi.u.St. 1929 p 2^5» 'Per
Wohndichte ...' But expectations had risen: Zement 1928
p 169, 'Ein Wohnungsbauprogramm der Gewerkschaften'.
*Sb E-A III, Per deutsche Wohnungsbau pp L-5; Zement 1928
pp 206-7. Indeed, given that controlled rents were well
below free market rents that operated on new dwellings,
(see below ,
. overcrowding is a rational response
to the housing policy. As a result of the rent control,
prices of pre-192L houses remained well below pre-war levels:
Wk M1925> p 16l, 6(1927; pp
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building costs had risen so steeply relative to other prices that
a free market determination of dwelling prices, hence rents, would
have choked demand for mew housebuilding back to a fraction of the
level actually achieved. This was for two reasons.
Firstly it was thought that costs of building materials and labour
had risen since 1913 more than prices in general *65# But a more
important reason was the much higher level of interest after 1924 *66.
Had the rents on new dwellings been entirely determined by 'free
market' forces, then, according to a memo published by the Reich
Labour ministry, they would have been three times their 1913 level
and twice the levels actually obtaining in the later 1920s *67.
The inequity of such a level of rents would have been aggravated by
the fact that the inflation had eradicated most of the debt burden
of owners of pre-stabilisation property. This was true even after
the re-evaluation of mortgages at c.25% in 1925 *68.
*65 The revised index of building costs reached 170 in 1928
(1913 = 100): Wi.u.St. 1933 P 424. Industrial producer
goocfe by contrast reached 137, consumer goods 174:
Kon.l.Stat.Hdb. (1936J pp 104, 106. The general consideration
that building was a labour-intensive industry, with a low
input of foreign raw materials may help to explain its
relatively high costs. For a detailed discussion see E-A
III Per deutsche Wohnungsbau pp 20ff, 595ff»
*66 German dwellings were seldom owner-occupied; hence could
often attract long mortgages: F Liitge, Die Wohnungswirt-
schaft, p 341. It was estimated that a mortgage rate
reduction from 8% to 7% would have reduced rents on a 10,000
Rm. house by 100 Rm p.a. To achieve such a reduction by
building economies would require a saving of 1200 Rm. in
construction: E-A III, Per deutsche Wohnungsbau, p 9»
*67 As reported in Aement 1928 p 121, 'Wohnungsbau und Bauwirt-
schaft'. Confirmatory calculations appear in Wk 8(1929;
pp 3^4-5 (article cited in *63).
*68 See p 123 above and references thereto.
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In fact a free market in housing had not existed since 1917 when
rent control was instituted, codified in the Reich Rent Law (Reich-
mietsgeset z , of 2*f.3«22 *69. In 192*+ a new tax (Gebgudentschuld-
ungssteuer; in Frussia, Hauszinssteuer) was instituted, whose
purpose was to expropriate part of the windfall gains to owners of
pre-l92i+ property *70. Rent control was retained on this property,
but not on dwellings built thereafter *71. Instead, large amounts
of public money were channelled toward housebuilding.
Before 1913 the pattern of housing finance was as follows. The
construction of the house was financed by 'interim credits' (Zwischen-
kredite, coupled with the capital of the prospective owner Oder
Bauherr'J. Cn completion, this financing was usually consolidated
by the incurring of two mortgages: a 'first' (erststellige) mortgage
(at a rate of c.4%, which usually covered 6C$ of the price, and a
'second' (zweitstellige> at c.5% which added another 15-25&. The
remainder was met by the owner's own capital. Even before 1913 the
procuring of all but the first mortgage had been an uncertain business.
After 192^ it seldom proved possible to obtain first mortgages
*69 Zement 1926 p 855ff» 'Wohnungspolitik und Bauwirtschaft';
F Liitge op.cit. pp 397ff.
*70 F Liitge opjcit. pp 352ff; V Fey, Leist-ungen und Aufgaben
im deutschen Wohnungs- und Siedlungsbau, pp 12ff; E-A III
Per deutsche Wohnungsbau pp lOff. The tax was levied by
the states, and part of it transferred to the communes: Stat.
Reichsamt, Einzelschr ... No. 14 op.cit. p 5^. The rate of
tax was between j ? of1913 rents. See the comprehensive
table in Zement 1928 p 1027.
*71 For an index of controlled rents on pre-192^ dwellings, see
W Fey op.cit. p 1 • Uncontrolled rents on new dwellings were
twice as high as on controlled stock: see Zement article
cited *67« P 122.
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covering more than A0$ of the price (and that at 8% - 10$ interest);
second mortgages were practically unobtainable from private sources.
The Reich therefore stipulated that a proportion of the revenue from
the Gebgudeentschuldungssteuer be devoted to the financing of house¬
building - usually to the provision of moderately priced second
mortgages, or, less often, of 'additional' first mortgages (Zusatz-
hypotheken,, or mortgages guarantees, or interest subsidies *72.
This was not the limit of public assistance for housebuilding. Other
methods included *73:
i) Housebuilding directly undertaken by the public sector (chiefly
by communes, by the Reich/Prussia in connection with east German
resettlement schemes, and by public enterprise employers;. Between
1927-29 c.10$ of new dwellings was constructed by public authorities.
A related 'aid' to housebuilding was the cheap mortgages available
to government employees *7^.
ii) Aid to 'non-profit-making' building trusts (gemeinntttzige
Wohnungsbauvereinigungen), chief among which were building
cooperatives (Baugenossenschafteny. These bodies became highly
dependent on public subsidies, interest subsidies, guarantees, and
*72 F Ltttge op.cit. pp 3^0-352; Zement 1928 p 167, 'Wohnungsbau
und Bauwirtschaft'; in practice c.50$ of Hauszinssteuer
revenue was devoted to the financing of housebuilding 192A-30:
W Fey op.cit. p 59.
*73 For state intervention in housebuilding see in general:
A Stegerwald, 'Der deutsche Baukapitalbedarf ...' pp lA8ff;
Karl HochdHrffer, Die staatliche Subventionen, pp 3'+-57» 92-8.
*7k F Ltftge op.cit. pp 231, 286-291, 352; 'Direct' housebuilding-
was considerably greater in the inflation, according to Ltitge
loc.cit. For loans to civil servants, see A Stegerwald
op.cit. pp 16A-5, Tables 1a, 1b.
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participation in their capital, in the financially difficult times
after 192*+. They built between 25% and 33% of all dwellings
1927-29 *75.
iii) Interim finance. Most notable in this respect was the 200
mill.Rm. credit extended by the Reich 1926-27 in connection
with the Work Creation Programme *76. Pore permanent was the work
of the Deutsche Bau- und Boden Bank AG set up in 1923. Its capital
was supplied by the Reich, but its finance was raised in the domestic,
and to a lesser extent, the foreign capital markets *77.
Table 13 presents estimates of the financing of housebuilding. These
show that c.MDJt to 60% was provided by public authorities. In 1927-29
about 80% of houses was constructed with some aid from public
moneys *78. It is plain therefore that from the supply side house¬
building was jb significantly determined by the availability of public
as of private finance. Hence its inclusion in this chapter.
*75 F Ltftge op.cit. pp 231, 270ff.
*76 F Lfitge op.cit. p 3^0; Wd 11/2(1926) p 137^, 'Arbeits-
beschaffung'; Zement 1927 P 175» A Stegerwald op.cit.
p 153? IHZ 1.3.27, 'Die Beschaffung der Zwischenkredite
flir den Wohnungsbau' .
*77 F LtJtge op.cit. pp 3**0, 352. See the reports of the Bank
in Zement 1928 p hl8, 1929 PP 313-^5 IHZ article cit. *76.
A Stegerwald op.cit. p 169. In 1929 its outstanding credits
were valued at ^50 mill.Rm. More institutional, but doubtless
a potent form'of state aid may be discerned in the fact that
c.80% of all finance for housebuilding was mediated through
public sector financial institutions: E Kleiner, 'Die
Ausbreitung der Hffentlichen Unternehmung in der deutschen
Bankwirtschaft*, p 419.
*78 F Ltitge op.cit. pp 35^-5.
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Table 12 Urban Quarterly Housebuilding Statistics (Thousands of
Residential Buildings or Dwellings*)
KEY: Permits = Applications for permission to commence building.
Net Additions = Completions of Buildings/Dwellings net of
Demolitions.
IQ26; IIQ26 etc = 1st quarter of 1926, second quarter of 1926 etc.












B Permits Net Additions
Buildings Dwellings Buildings Dwellings
No. of Cities 90/91 83/85 92/93 92/93
IQ26 3.6 9.0 4.6 15.2
IIQ26 6.2 15.9 4.4 16.2
IIIQ26 6.6 16.7 4.8 17.7
IVQ26 6.2 16.7 7.3 26.3
IQ27 6.7 22. 4 5-5 20.6
IIQ27 9.3 33.8 5.4 21.4
IIIQ27 8.6 32.1 6.6 25.2
IVQ27 6.3 23.8 9.6 38.0
IQ28 5.7 20.0 6.6 27.9
IIQ28 7.7 27.1 6.2 25.5
IIIQ28 8.8 3^.8 7.7 28.3
IVQ28 7.5 32.9 9.6 39.4
C No. of Cities in Sample: 95/96
IQ28 5.8 21.9 6.7 28.0
IIQ28 7.8 30.0 6.3 25.7
IIIQ28 9.1 39.2 7.8 29.4
IVQ28 7.6 35.0 9.7 39.8
IQ29 6.0 25.9 4.9 20.8
IIQ29 10.7 47.0 4.8 22.4
IIIQ29 11.4 53.8 8.0 36.6
IVQ29 7.2 32.7 13.0 57.3
* Residential Buildings = Buildings containing oneor more dwellings
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D Permits for Residential Buildings* Deseasonalised
(Thousand Buildings
1925 1926 1927 1?28 mi
IQ 5.^ k.7 8.8 7.5 7.9
HQ 5.0 5.3 8.1 6.7 9.3
IIIQ 4.2 5.5 7.3 7.7 9.8
IVQ 5.0 6.6 6.9 8.1 7.7
* ie buildings containing one or more dwelling.
SOURCES: Table 12A: Wi.u.St. 1926 p 363; 1927 p 228.
12B & C: Wi.u.St. 1929 P 86, 1930 p 129.
12D: The described series ^irrespective of sample
variations was deseasonalised on the basis
of the average relationship between quarterly
permit issue for the entire period 1925-29.
Table 13 The financing of Investment in Kousebuilding
Current Frices Kill.Rm.
mi
1 Cross Investment 1700
Financing*
2 From Public Sector* 935
3 Of which 'Hauszins- rL.Q
steuer' m'gages
4 From Banking Sector* 765
Of Which
5 Mortgage Banks 100
6 Insurance** 25
7 Savings Banks 130
8 Social Insurance 35
9 Other *+75
1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
1900 2600 2800 2900 2400
mo 13*+O 13^0 1230 1010
670 780 775 765 695
790 1260 1460 1670 1390
225 365 670 555 620
45 75 80 100 120
250 450 455 455 325
40 55 170 130 170
230 315 135 430 155
* excluding interim finance
** excluding Social Insurance (shown in column 9
SOURCE: W Fey, Leistungen und Aufgaben ... p 14.
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Ultimate Sources to Table 15: Line 1: Stat.Keichsamt; cf Table 1b
col. k p 168 above. Lines 2 and 3' hade up of Hauszinssteuer mort¬
gages and other public funds. The former (covering all states of
the Reich; were directly obtained from government accounts; so also
other applications of the revenue of this tax to housebuilding. For
the other forms of state aid, (excl. interim financing; estimates
for cities were extrapolated. Lines 3-8: These are based on estimates
of the stock of housing mortgages owed to each class of institution
listed, checked against estimates of increases of total urban mort¬
gages, with certain adjustments. These varbus data enable an estimate
of the proportion of the total mortgage increase which was lent on new
houses; it was assumed that for all classes of institution this pro¬
portion rose slowly from 192H. Line 9; This is a residual, and
includes the owner's own capital, privately arranged mortgages, interim
financing outstanding at the end of the year, payment delays, errors
due to delay in recording mortgages, other errors and omissions
(including those in line 1;.
Having described the general structure of the housing market in the
period, I turn to its short run cyclical aspects. It will bemoted
that in Table 1J> col. 3 (p 168 - housebuilding, according to Hoffmann's
estimates, reached a peak (ii.current prices; in 1927, whereas according
to the Stat.Kcichsamt estimates in Table 1B col.3 (p 168 > it reached
a plateau in 1928-29* Both these may be compared with the Stat.keich-
samt estimates of numbers of houses completed annually (Table V p19^»
Setting 1928 = 100 for ease of comparison we find:
Table 1*» Annual Housebuilding Estimates 1928 = 100
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
1a Number of com-




59 67 93 100 103
61 69 93 100 102 86
65 81 96 100 93 62
SOURCES: Line 1a: Table 11 pi9^ above.
Line 1b: See text following and footnotes.
Line 2 & 3: Table 1A col.3, 1B col.3 pl68 .
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The relationship in this Table between numbers of completed houses
(line 1a; and the Stat.keichsamt estimates of gross investment
(line 2, can be demonstrated quite easily. The difference arises
out of a> change in housebuilding costs, and b, adjustment for the
work done on houses still incomplete at the year-end. Data are
available for both calculations *79. In line 1b I show a rather crude
adjustment of 1a to allow for both sources of difference. Since
Hoffmann uses data and methods different in principle from the fore¬
going *80, I cannot account for the eccentricity of his estimates,
especially the 7% drop between 1928 and 1929. It seems likely that
the annual rate of housebuilding maintained a plateau during 1928-29
*79 For a. 192^-28 see Keiser and Benning op.cit. pp lK8ff, 200-1.
These data adjust an index of building costs for change in
average size and appointment of dwellings. I assume that costs
per dwelling were constant 1928-29. Building costs still rose,
though more slowly (Wi.u.St. 1933 P ^2^;. But the number of
dwellings per building was rising, which presumably offset the
rise in costs: W ley op.cit. p 16.
For b/ see W Fey op.cit. p 13* incorporating incomplete houses
at year-end by the method of Keiser and Benning loc.cit.
*80 ie Stat.Keichsamt data published before 193&* See Hoffmann ...
pp 228ff. As can be inferred from Table 11 p 19^ the rate of
demolition cannot explain the discrepancy.
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in current prices, perhaps falling a little in constant prices *81.
The steady increase of the annual rate of housebuilding from 192^
to 1928-29, in contrast to the variability of industrial/commercial
fixed investment, conforms to the pre-war pattern *81. Nevertheless,
the advance was not unimpeded, L-emand was strong, as measured by the
low percentage of empty dwellings, right up to 1930, when , doubtless
as a result of the general depression, landlords first began to
experience letting difficulties. Nor is there any evidence that firms
were unable to cope because of lack of materials or labour, in 1929«
even though the severity of the winter 1928/29 compelled a greater
than usual concentration of activity in the summer and autumn ♦S1*.
*81 i i Cortemporary opinions are usually based on available Stat.
Reichsamt data, so seldom constitute independent evidence. In
iZ 6.1.30, 'las deutsche Baujahr 1929' it was opined that
housebuilding was 12% less than in 1928; in FX 12.3.30, 'Der
Wohnungsbau 1929 und 1930' this opinion was revised to indicate
no change (money value) or increase (no. of dwellings;.
ii) F Liftge op.cit. pp 35^-5 indicates a fall in housebuilding
investment 192c-29» but hie data patently rely on Stat.Reichsamt
estimates of an earlier vintage than that reproduced here (or by
Hoffmann). The same data is shown in A Stegerwald op.cit. p 165.
But reference to Stegerwald shows that Llltge registers the
decline in 1929 by ignoring all estimates of interim financing
outstanding at the end of the year. In other respects LUtge's
data do not agree well with those of Hoffmann.
iii) The fact that according to Table 12 p 199 above, urban com¬
pletions in 1929 were c.12% higher than in 1928 may be reconciled
with Table 15 by the observation that rural housebuilding in 1929
was much less buoyant that urban. See *97 below.
*82 See the relevant Tables in Hoffmann ... pp 257ff.
*8^ According to a table in Hement 1929 P 1^27 (ultimate source;
IfK) peak employment of building workers during summer 1929
(as % of membership of relevant trade unions, was less than
in 1928; cf. St.Jb.f.d.dt.h. 1929 P 279; 1930 p 321. The
recession in industrial/commercial building doubtless explains
this.
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What about the supply of finance? The increase in financing from
public authorities appears to have levelled off, ex post in 1928-29
(see Table 13 P 200 . Doubtless this is related to the contemporary
plateau in public expenditure as a whole, having its origins in the
already described difficulties of the public finances. It is true
that in 1928 greater care than heretofore was taken to ensure that
second mortgages and interim finance would be provided from public
funds only when first mortgages were assured, and also that the
200 mill.km. credit for interim financing, made available by the .Reich
during 1926-27, was replaced by guarantees of privately obtained
finance; and yet the reports on housebuilding in 1928-29 do not cite
public authority financing as the problem *85. Not until the 'economy
measures' (Sparaktion of the German cities in late autumn 1929 were
public expenditure cuts expected to affect the rate of housebuilding *86.
The remarks of this paragraph would also apply to the financing
afforded by Savings Banks *87.
*85 Eg IHZ 1.3.29, p 2, 'Lie Finanzierung des Wohnungsbaues 1928'
(Report of Deutsche Bau- und Bodenbank ; Zemont 1929 P 23, 'An
der Schwelle des Baujahres 1929'; P 3&2, 'Lie Bautfitigkeit im
Jahre 1928'; p 358$ 'Wohnungsmarkt und iinanzierung ...'
(Report of Preuss.Landespfandbriefanstalt ; also pp 589-90, 765,
1146; 1930, p 253, 'Die BautMtigkeit im Jahre 1929'; P 204,
'Die Schwierigkeiten der Baufinanzierung im Jahre 1929' (Report
of Preuss.Landespfandbriefanstalt ; FZ articles cit. *81;
C Ziegler, 'Die Wirtschaftslage des rheinisch-westfMlischen
Baugewerbes im Jahre 1927'; ibid, for 1928 and 1929*
*86 Zement 1930 P 3^1, 'Konjunkturforschung des Baumarktes'; 1929
P 1501, 'Die Baustoffindustrien zur EinschrSnkung cier kommunalen
Bautgtigkeit'; V.ih.Kon.i.forsch. 1929 H3B p 28; G Ziegler, 1929
(article cit. *85 • Even in autumn 1929 current financing
problems were ascribed above all to the deteriorating position
of the private sector institutions; Zement 1929 P 1268, 'Die
Schwierigkeiten der WohnungsbaufinaEierung'.
*87 As the finances of the communes deteriorated they increasingly
turned to the savings banks (which they commonly owned/ for
credit. See Zement 1929 P 1501, 'Die Baustoffindustrien ...'
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To judge from contemporary comment, it was variations in the availa¬
bility of private mortgages that dominated the housebuilding financial
market in the short run. This in turn depended on the state of the
domestic market for mortgage and related bonds *88. It never proved
possible to attract significant foreign capital to this use *89. The
major institutions in the market were the private, the 'public status*
and the communal mortgage banks *90. Good short run statistics on the
net sales of mortgage and related bonds are not available. But from
the annual data, the development of their prices (see Tables 2a, 3b,
and pp 21, 22 above and contemporary comment, it is evident that the
sale of mortgage bonds was buoyant in 1926 until the general faltering
of the domestic bond market in early 1927. I1s absorbtive capacity
♦88 A comparison of the rate of return on mortgage bonds (Table p62 )
with the interest rates charged on first mortgages (W Fey
op.cit. p 12j shows that the tv/o moved in very close parallel;
the latter 1^-2% above the former.
*89 The need for foreign capital was urgently discussed especially
after the relapse of the domestic bond market in February 1927*
but sums raised were small, and fairly constant 1928-29. Accord¬
ing to the Stat.Reichsamt survey of 31.3.28, c.100 mill.km. of
outstanding foreign credits were for housebuilding (proximate
source: Bericht des Kommissars bei der Reichsbank 1.7»29» p^O;.
In 1928 the Reichstag approved a maximum foreign housebuilding
credit of 100 mill.Rm. (Zement 1928 p 610, 'Die neuen 100 mill.
Auslandskredite'; p 1062, 'Lie Quotenverteilung ...'/• In 1929
practically no foreign placement was achieved (C Ziegler, 1929»
article cit. *85 • See too BA Eh3 I/656 (re activities of the
Advisory Council for Foreign Credits.; 1HZ 3.^.28 p 1, 'Lie
Auslandsemissionen fllr den Wohnungsbau'; also 19.6.28, p 1;
Zement 1928 p 36, 'Ler Baumarkt im Jahre 1927'; P 1195.
*90 Ie frypotheken-Aktienbanken. Bffentlich-rechtliche Ffandbriefan-
stalten. and stgdtische Kypothekenbanken. respectively.
Cf H Oesterlink, 'Lie Kapitalbeschaffung ... des deutschen
Immobiliarkredits', or W Prion, 'Organisation des deutschen
Kapitalmarktes', both in B Harms (ed Kapital .,. vol. 1,
pp 329ff, *+00ff.
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remained limited till the end of 1927; and this had significant
consequences for housebuilding finance, and was believed to have
affected the actual rate of housebuilding *91• The deseasonalised
building permits series (Table 12D p 200 >% imperfect though it
certainly is, may reflect this. The jump in the value of 'other'
financing in 1927 (Table 13 line 9) may reflect the increased amount
of unconsolidated interim finance at the end of year *92. In 19?8
early forecasts about the problem of housing finance were gloomy, but
in the event it proved less problematic than expected, and at the
end of the year there was no repetition of the mass of unconsolidated
credit with which it had begun *93»
In early 1929 financing prospects were thought favourable. But from
the second quarter of the year sales of mortgage bonds fell heavily *94.
Yet the actual rate of housebuilding was no less than in 1928. The
result was a heavy burden of unconsolidated interim finance at the end
*91 Confirmation is found in the rough index (subsequently discon¬
tinued/ of gross monthly sales of mortgage bonds: Wc 6(1927^
p 454 and 7(1928/ p 102, 'Pfandbriefzulassungen'. See too
Zement 1928 p 36, 'Baumarkt und Baustoffindustrien'; p 1061,
'Ler Wohnungsbau als Zinsproblem *; V.jh.Kon.j. forsch. 1927 H3
PP 53-4; IHZ 21.3.27, p 4, 'Industriebauten und Wohnungs-
bauten'; 9.7.27» P 4, 'Stillstand am Immobiliarkreditmarkt';
C Ziegler, 1927 (article cit. *85., P l64ff.
*92 A Stegerwald op.cit. p 166 supports this inference in his Table
1b, as do the articles cited in *91.
*93 See the article in IHZ. and those in Zement 1928 and 1929 cited
in *8.5. further V.jh.Kon.i.forsch. 1927 H4 p 64; 1928 H2B
p 29? H3B p 24ff; C Ziegler, 1928 (article cited *85>,
pp l86ff.
*94 Zement 1929 PP 5&9-90, 'Der Bausaison 1929'; 1930 P 253, 'Die
BautHtigkeit im Jahre 1929'; V.jh.Kon.i.forsch. 1929 H1B p 27.
Cf net sales of mortgage bonds and the ldk.e 1925-29 in Wd 15/1
(1930' P 491; gross sales: Wk 8(1929 PP 321, 432 ; 9Tl930/
p 104.
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of the year *95«
The fact that applications for housebuilding permits remained high till
the end of 1929$ at least in cities *96, may indicate short-run
inscnsitivity to financing problems. The resultant build-up of
'frozen in' interim financing added to the liquidity problems of the
economy both at the end of 192? and of 1929, especially of the communes
and savings banks which were so prominent in housebuilding finance.
But this insensitivity was short run only. It is likely that already
in 1929 housebuilding was declining in the countryside *97 where the
degree of private sector mortgage finance was probably much higher *98.
From 1930, when public funds dried up, housebuilding fell in the cities
also.
This lag of about one year between the peak of general investment
activity and housebuilding seems, contrary to the analysis of the
*95 Table 13 P 200 (line 9 and notes thereto;. Cf A Stegerwald
op.cit. p 166 Table 1b. Further C Ziegler, 1929 (article cit.
*85/ pp l82ff; Zement 1929 P 1268, 'Die Schwierigkeiten ...';
1930 F 206ff, 'Die Schwierigkeiten ...'; V.lh.Kon.j.forsch.
1929 H3B p 28. "" ""
*96 Cf Table 12 p 199 • Zement 1930 pp 253ff» 'Die BautHtigkeit •••'
(where prior securing of mortgage finance is offered in
explanation. This seems inadequate;.
*97 Zement 1930 p 3^1, 'Konjunkturforschung ...'; p 206 (cit. *95)*
*98 According to a table in Zement 1930 P 622 (ultimate source:
Stat.Eeichsamt , in cities of above 100,000 population, D0%
of prospective owners (Bauherren; of houses under construction
were priv^e, 60% were public or cooperative. For communes of
5-10,000 the proportions were reversed. For communes of less
than 2000 private owners accounted for 8k%. In general,
public sector finance went more readily to public/cooperative
owners. See above P197 •
■k1 Zement 1930 P ?06 (cit. *95', slackening final demand for
dwellings (urban drift; is also offered as a reason.
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*99, to have been character-
6.6 Conclusion
In each of the types of investment activity considered in this chapter,
with the possible exception of that of the Post Office, the problems
connected with the raising of external finance (in this context, esp¬
ecially the floating of bonds) have dominated the discussion. In the
case of the public electricity supply, and to a small extent housebuild¬
ing, the degree of utilisation of the extant stock may also have had
some bearing on the reduction of investment activity observed after
1929* But the major common constraint was finance.
And yet in each of these sectors, apart from the German Railway Co.,
observed gross fixed investment did not decline until some time in
1929 *100. And even in the case of the public electricity supply where
a long gestation lag obtained, a decided downturn in investment inten¬
tions did not occur till mid 1928. Thus the financial problems of
these classes of investment cannot explain the turning point of the cycle,
though they undoubtedly reveal much about the basic structure of the
economy which made the recession, once under weigh, such a severe one.
* 99 The IfK analysis disceijfed an inverse relationship before the war
between housebuilding and general investment; rejSaced after the
war by a direct relationship. Thus they explained the gretter
violence of the post war cycle. From Hofftaann's data (pp 257-
260) the contrast they draw seems exaggerated. But see *61
above. W Fey op.cit. pp 7-1*+; V.ih.Kon.j.forsch. H1 pp 8-9♦
adopted by Zement 1930 p 3*+1» 'Konjunkturforschung ...*
*100 Ignoring Hoffmann's 'eccentric' housebuilding series. (See
p 202 abSve).
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CHAPTER 7 INVENTORY INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY AND TRADE
7»1» Introduction
Inventory investment is the most volatile component of aggregate invest¬
ment, and never more so than in the period under review. But the
investigation of this vital determinant of short run macro-economic
fluctuations has its perils:
"By the nature of the basic data it is virtually impossible
to obtain estimates of a high degree of reliability in
this field, and estimates of the value of physical change
in stocks ... should be regarded as subject to a wide
margin of error" *1.
Nevertheless, Temin has advanced the hypothesis that inventory invest¬
ment dominated the trade cycle in Germany in this period *2; the
subject cannot be ignored.
What theoretical magnitude do we wish to examine? Temin clearly has
an inventory cycle in mind; a cycle where the development of actual,
relative to desired levels of inventories provokes behavioural reactions
on the part of producers (notably, changes in rates of output and/or
purchases of raw materials . Such a model is characteristic of
*1 Central Statistical Office, National Accounts otatictics. Sources
and Methods, p ^07. Cf. C H Feinstein, Domestic Capital
Formation ... pp 32-3*
*2 P Temin, 'The Beginning of the Depression in Germany'. See p 7
above, for note on theoretical literature.
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industry and trade, not in the same form, of agriculture. I therefore
confine discussion in this chapter (as Temin does/ to what Germans
term Gewerbe. here specifically defined to include the following
sectors: raining, manufacturing, the artisan sector, wholesale and
retain trade, commerce, plus, for this chapter only, public utilities,
and transport and communications.
Secondly, the behavioural reaction we wish to capture is a real one;
so we require deflated estimates of inventory investment. However,
especially insofar as monetary constraints may be relevant, current
cost of inventory investment (net of the inventory valuation adjustment/
will be relevant.
7.2. The Data and its Deflation
The most elaborate available estimates are those pioneered by G Keiser
and B Benning and continued in the publications of the Statistisches
heichsamt *3« For mining, manufacturing, public utilities, and
transport and communications they derived their estimates by analysis
of the balance sheets of stock-exchange quoted companies and 'of non-
quoted companies whose capital exceeded 1 mill.fan. adjustments had
to be made to allow for (i) special write-offs (eg in connection of
merger or bankruptcy/; (ii/ the fact that not all firms balance on
*3 G Keiser and B Benning, Kapitalbildung und Investitionen in
der deutschen Volkswirtschaft 192^-28. That the Stat. Ke'ichsarat
continued this series: see article by B Benning in F Burgdorfer
(ed , Die Statistik in I-eutschland nach ihrem heutigen Stand,
PP 755-E*
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31 December, in which cases they apportioned net changes in stocks
between the relevant calendar years on the basis of extraneous
information. The estimates thus obtained for the investigated sample
were extrapolated over all firms in the industry with the aid of
various relevant statistics - eg proportion of output/assets/employ-
ment of the industry accounted for by the sample.
ior the artisan sector and retail trade, they based their estimates on
small-sample questionnaires, from which inventory - to-employment ratios
could be calculated, and extrapolated the results over the relevant
branches by aggregate employment data. Inventory investment in whole¬
sale trade was 'guesstimated' by an informal amalgamation of 'balance
sheet analysis' and 'questionnaire' methods, and other information *J>h,
The estimates in the cited sources do not distinguish 'true' change in
size of stocks (at current prices from inventory valuation adjustment.
Hence to obtain estimates of inventory investment at constant prices,
one must obtain estimates of inventory levels at the end of each year,
deflate these by appropriate price indexes, then take first differ¬
ences *4.
Which price index? Hoffmann deflated inventories in 'Gewerbe' in
aggregate by the annual average value of the wholesale price index *5*
*3A For their methodology, see Keiser and Benning op.cit. pp 1?^ff.
From Keiser and Benning one can derive estimates of the level of
inventories at 1.1.24. These can be cumulated with their succes¬
sive annual estimates of inventory investment to get levels at
the end of each year. See Appendix II pp 399 ff»
*5 Hoffmann ... pp 24-1-3. His method has the oddity that, to get
inventory ]©?el estimates, he seems to adopt Keiser and Benning's
sample estimates as they stand, rather than seek to derive
industry-wide estimates on the basis of them.
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This seems inappropriate. Firstly because this inde^c was designed to
measure the 'purchasing power of the entire eoonomy' *6, and therefore
assigns much too high a weight to the volatile prices of"agricultural
produce *7. I therefore use the many component indexes of the whole¬
sale price index (plus a few specially derived) to obtain more suitable
deflators of stocks in each branch of trade and industry; then aggregate
these to get estimates for Gewerbe as a whole *8.
A second criticism of Hoffmann's methods: why use annual average
prices? The question of the correct 'intertemporal weighting' of the
index decomposes into three related auestions:
(i> What is the distribution over the year of the balancing dates
of the investigated samples of firms?
(ii) What methods of inventory valuation were commonly used?
(iii/ What was the average rate of turnover of stocks?
Appendix I pp 373 ff investigates these questions and reaches the con¬
clusion that the probable range of 'true' deflators would be encompassed
by the following three simple intertemporal weightings:
*6 Wi.und.Stat. 1926 p 875.
*7 In the official wholesale price index agricultural prices have a
weight of 35&; in the deflator of stocks at 1.1.28, implicit in
my estimates, they have a weighting of less than 18%, which seems
more appropriate. A further, minor point is that the official
wholesale price index is designed to measure flows, not stocks.
Wi.und.Stat. 1926 p 876.






PHD The lover of the December price, and
the average July-December Price
The lower of the December price, and
the average October-December price
The resultant estimates are reproduced in Table 1 overleaf. I do not
derive separate estimates of the physical change in inventories at
current prices. The deflated estimates are better indicators of this
than the 'raw' current price estimates (which fail to separate out
the inventory valuation adjustment).
These estimates presuppose accuracy in the current value data and in
the deflators. Such errors as are inherent in the method of estimating
the current value data do not seem in aggregate to be characterised
by identifiable bias. However, it appears from statistical testing
that the deflators used in the derivation of Table 1 are too variable *9«
One possible reason for this could be an inadequate incorporation of
labour and overhead costs in the deflators of stocks of work in pro¬
gress and finished goods held by the mining and manufacturing sector.
Abramovitz concluded that in the USA (immediately post-war) these
costs should have a weight of at least 18$ for this sector *10.
*9 An attempt to use pooled cross section and time series data to
regress the deflated stocks on indexes of output, price change,
monetary variables, and the corresponding deflators was
unsuccessful, except that the deflators regularly displayed
significant negative partial regression coefficients. Theor¬
etically, there should have been no relationship.
*10 M Abramovitz, Inventories ana Business Cycles ... p 91*
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Table 1 Inventory Investment: Current Value (not excluding
Inventory Valuation Adjustment/ and Deflated Value
(1928 prices; Mill.Rm.
n f-i j. Stocks at Inventory Investment in
1.1.24 1924 1925 192%" 1927 1928 1929
a. Mining, I-'anufacturing; Artisan Trades
CV 8319 2425 1398 -1029 1717 1316 -548
AA 8008* 2482 1258 -92 1429 1062 110
2HD 8008* 2664 1474 -374 1152 1369 175
4QD 8008* 2458 1677 -475 1202 1422 169
b. Public Utilities, Transport and communications
CV 828 136 -12 -10? 9 -50 17
AA 717* 186 73 -105 2 -67 -5
2HD 717* 276 1 -117 -9 -72 1
4QD 717* 288 -12 -123 -2 -77 3
c. Wholesale and Retail Trade
CV 6606 3721 879 -598 1649 694 -427
AA 6591* 3471 631 14 1448 356 -36
2HL 6591* 4045 646 601 804 471 246
4QD 6591* 3856 826 615 567 754 206
d. Total: •Gewerbe'
CV 15753 6282 2265 -1734 3375 1960 -958
AA 15316* 6462 2157 -93 3107 939 -87
2HD 15316* 6985 2116 112 1947 1768 428
4QD 15516* 6602 2491 17 1767 2099 378
NOTES: CV = Current Value;
AA = Deflated by Annual Average Prices;
2HD = Deflated by the Tower of the December price and the
average July-December price;
4QD = Deflated by the lower of the December price and the
jiveiiage October-December price.
* In all cases stocks at 1.1.24 were deflated by the average
price ruling between January and July 1924.
SOURCES: See Appendix II pp ^>51 ff.
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My deflators take no explicit account of these costs; yet the use of
final goods prices as components of the deflators of stocks of many
industries *10A introduces them implicitly. It is not likely that
contemporary German accounting practice paid much attention to labour
and overhead costs *11. I do not think that my deflator is seriously
deficient in this respect *11&.
Table 2 Inventory Investment in 'Gewerbe' at Constant Prices. 1927-29;
with an Adjustment for the Use of 'Base Stock'
Valuation Methods. Mill.(1928; Km.
1927 1928 1922
AA 3265 1305 -376
2HD 2^92 1892 -35
^QL 2372 2115 -97
METHOD: Luring the period 1.1.2b to 31-12.26 there were no pronounced
and sustained increases in prices; it is unlikely that
failure to adjust for 'base stock' methods materially invali¬
dates the estimates in Table 1 for these years.
To effectuate the postulate that afrer 31.12.26 35% of all
stocks in 'liajerbe' were valued at invariant 31.12.26 prices,
I first calculated the deflators implicit in Table 1 for
stocks on and after that date; then combined these deflators
with the 31.12.26 deflator in the ratio 2>1, and finally
redeflated the cunent value stock level estimates with these
new deflators.
*10/ See the description of the deflation procedure in Appendix II
pp k02 ff below.
*11 The manuals of accounting practice which I read were vague. E
Schmalenbach, Dynamic Accounting ... p137 seems to imply that such
costs were seldom included. T Ascher, Die Steuerbilanz pp 192-3,
226-8 gives no direct guidance. Cf. the article 'Bilanz' in the
Handwbrterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften (1956; Vol.2. In inter-
war Britain, these costs tended to be ignored (private conver¬
sation with Prof. G Whittington.. I note that C H Peinstein,
Domestic Capital Formation p 32-3 omits these costs from his
deflator.
*11A In any case, my objective is to define the relative rates of
inventory investment in 1927 and 1928. From Table 1 it can be
seen that the major variations in estimates of this relation¬
ship arise in wholesale and retail trade, for which this
question is irrelevant, not in mining and manufacturing.
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A more serious deficiency may perhaps have been introduced by a
failure to allow for the possibility that the 'base stock' (eisemer
Bestand) method of valuation may have been quite widely used *12.
In this case, while prices are rising, a proportion of stocks should
be deflated at rather invariant prices.
I have tried to remedy this possible source of error by assuming that
after J1.12.26 (between 1.1.24 and 31.12.26 prices never rose signifi¬
cantly over twelvemonthly intervals) one third of the stock was
permanently valued at J>1»*2.26 prices. The results of a rough
aggregative exercise conducted on this postulate are shown in Table 2
above. It seems unlikely that the proportion exceeded one third. Efy
no means all firms used this method, and those that did valued only a
part of their stocks at the invariant price *12A.
7.3. Evaluation of the Estimates
As can be seen from Table 1, the three estimates of 'real' inventory
investment agree well with each other for all years except 1927 and
1928 *13. Thus, the Temin hypothesis about the origins of the
*12 See Appendix I pp 376ff.
*12A Feinstein loc.cit. seems to ignore the possible effect of this
valuation method on his deflators.
*13 Briefly, this is because prices were falling in later 1926,
rising in later 1927, and falling slightly in later 1928.
The 'AA' method thus maximises real stocks growth in 1927
by employing the highest deflator 'at' 31-12.26, but the
lowest 'at' 31-12.27; conversely for 1928.
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depression rests on narrow statistical assumptions *14. Can we go
further than this, to decide which of the specifications is the most
accurate?
To what extent does other information provide a check?
Firstly, we might consider the development of imports, or the import
surplus. See Table 3*
Table 3 Imports (Constant Prices 1913 = 100
Import Surplus (Gurnet Pricesj i-.ill.jaii.
Industrial Haw Semimanu- Finished Aggregate
Katerials factures Goods (Commodities;
3. IS I IS I I IS
1923 75 3453 96 *+98 82 -4653 82 3145
1926 66 2034 75 -698 57 -5121 73 -416
1927 99 3754 137 360 105 -5096 105 3313
1928 94 3769 126 -477 115 -5756 102 1876
1929 94 3320 11** -472 105 -6743 97 -36
SOURCE: Hoffmann ... pp 520, 52*+ , 538.
I = Imports; IS = Import Surplus.
This data indicates that imports and the import surplus were less in
1928 than in 1927. Does this mean that deflators yielding such a fall
in inventory investment are to be preferred? If for all firms, the
geographical distribution of sources of commodity purchases, and of
the location of the buyers of their products could be described by
identical, continuously declining fuctions of the distance from the
location of the firm in question, invariant through time, then the
*14 The deflator applied by Hoffmann (whose estimates were adopted
by Temin; corresponds best with the 'AA' variant developed here,
except that the former gives agricultural prices a much larger
weighting.
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import surplus would mirror the opposing flows by which inventories
are ac- and de-cumulated. But, of course, the relative importance of
domestic and foreign trade fluctuated from branch to branch and period
to period. Inspection of foreign trade statistics reveals the over¬
whelming importance of textiles, of iron and non-ferrous ores and semi¬
manufactures, and of foodstuffs, in imports (62% in 1928,; and of
textiles, iron and steel, machinery and chemicals in exports (57% in
1928 *15* Including the whole of the relevant sections of wholesale
trade *16, all of the stocks of specialist foreign trade merchants
(whether particular to the specified branches or not *16AJ, and (in
the case of imports/ the stocks of the relevant retail sections,
these groups of branches accounted for only and 36% respectively
of inventories in 'Gewerbe' *17. furthermore, to the extent that
(as seems likely the rise in net exports of finished goods in 1928
offsets a fall in domestic finished goods sales, above all in these
branches *18, then the data in Table 3 will exaggerate the decline in
inventory investment. And, moreover, the relationship between deflated
inventory investment in 1927 and 1928 (using the Keiser-Benning/Stat.
Reichsamt data is invariant to the deflator used, precisely in the cases
of chemicals and engineering (where a higher rate in 1928 is shown by
all methods/. Only for foodstuffs and textiles is the relationship
*15 Hoffmann ... pp 520, 522, 52^, 526.
*16 On the argument that an unknown proportion of these stocks was
involved in foreign trade.
*16A The proportion of these merchants' stocks pertaining to the
branches in question cannot be distinguished.
*17 Calculated from data in Reiser and Benning op.cit. cited on p 399
*18 for the decline in domestic real textile sales see Hoffmann ...
p 662; Kon.j.Stat.Hdb.(1956^ p 283. for iron/steel and
machinery see below p 2.32-b .
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sensitive to the deflator used; in the former case the sensitivity is
opposite to that of the aggregate estimates for all industry *19.
Thus, though imports and the import surplus did fall 1927-28, the
relevance of this to the choice of a correct deflator for inventories
is dubious *20.
A second check might be provided by the 'inventory scissors' diagram
reproduced and described in Diagram 7/1 overleaf. If the area between
the 'increase' and 'decrease' curves represents real inventory invest¬
ment (a dubious assumption, given the derivation of these curves,
then it drops from the equivalent, of c.3^! 'squares' in 1927 to c.2
'squares' in 1928. But, on this basis, disinvestment in 1926 (at
5 'squares'/ exceeded positive investment in 1925 and 1927. Thus the
diagram seems to exaggerate declines in inventory investment *21.
Lastly, the Deutsche Bank published a survey of inventory levels in
trade and industry *22. Its object seems to have been to ascertain
the extent of 'irrational' or excessive inventory holding, which was
tying up scarce capital. It is based on the usable rdurns to a
questionnaire, received from about 800 firms. Branches of industry
*19 Lack of space prevents my reproducing the detailed disaggre¬
gated estimates which sum to the series in Table 2. The bulk
of the fall in inventory investment in 1928 is, from that Table,
clearly in domestic trade.
*20 In 192^-25 the commodity import surplus increased somewhat
(St.Jb.f.d.Dt.k. 1930 pp 192-3/ whereas the rate on inventory
investment fell drasticallyi
*21 It is criticised in DV III 15.3.29.
*22 My source for this index in FZ 26.6.29, article 'Unrationelle
Lagerhaltung'. Its preparation was supervised by Dr Belchior
Falyi.
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were excluded where stocks were very dependent on the harvest, or
consisted largely of work in progress. Where possible, price changes
were eliminated. The aggregated results are reproduced in Table 4.
See too p 410 of Appendix III. They appear to indicate a severe drop
inuinventory investment in 1928. But they too indicate a much severer
drop in 19?6 than any of the deflated variants in Table 1 (ie relative
to inventory levels). Furthermore, the survey indicates a drop in
turnover rates in 1928 by comparison with 1927, whereas the more compre¬
hensive Hoffmann data indicate a rise. Thus, as more fully explained
in Appendix III, the survey probably exaggerates the reduction in
inventory investment between these two years.
To conclude: although on the surface these three 'checks' all support
the proposition that 'real' inventory investment was significantly
less in 1928 than in 1927, on closer inspection they prove rather
little.
We must therefore enquire directly: which of the deflators is like¬
liest to be correct? Given the rate of turnover of stocks, and the
concentration of the balancing date scatter at 31*12 (deduced, admit¬
tedly from a very small sample *23), the *AA' deflator seems to
Although Table I/lp 375 ('ppendix j. does not record such a
case, the most plausible amendment to the postulated concen¬
tration of balancing dates at 31*12 seems to me that a signifi¬
cant number of firms balanced at the end of the public fiscal
year - 31*3* I experimented with the hypothesis that 50% of
stocks in mining and manufacturing pertained to a 31*3 balancing
date, and 50% to 31*12 (this matter is irrelevant to most other
sectors, for which estimates of stock levels at 31*12 were
directly elicited by questionnaire/. When I applied this hypo¬
thesis to the data via the model developed in Appendix I
(pp 385 ff., I found results not significantly different from
those in Table 1 P214 above.
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incorporate much too wide a range of months. '4QB' probably errs in
the other direction. The '2HD' deflator, as adjusted after 1926 to
allow for the influence of the 'base stock' valuation method, seems
to me the most probable *2km But the estimates are demonstrably very
sensitive even to small errors.
7.^. The Relationship between Desired and Actual Inventory Levels
This question is obviously at the heart of the dynamics of the inventory
investment cycle. In this section, I wish to substantiate the view
that in early I92*t desired inventories were greatly above actual
levels; that by mid 1925 the reverse relationship had emerged, and
required a serious 'liquidation crisis' to eliminate it. The dis¬
crepancies between desired and actual stocks were less acute in 1927-29»
but excess stocks do seem to have emerged again during 1928.
These assertions can be substantiated in two ways. Firstly from con¬
temporary comment; and secondly, indirectly, by examination of the
inventory-to-turnover ration, and of price behaviour.
firstly, the evidence of contemporary comment.
Aggregative evidence, that inventories in Gewerbe were in disequilibrium,
is most clear-cut for early 192^ - when stocks were said to be exhausted
Thereby I include in my deflator more months of the year than
Feinstein or Abramovitz (operibus citatis/, or than the current
practice of the UK National Accounts (Central Statistical Office
loc.cit. . See too *12A p 216 above.
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as a result of the inflation - and for 1925/26, when the liquidation
of excess stocks was widely reported *25. Aggregative evidence of
stocks disequilibrium during 1927-29 is not so plentiful. However
the Inst.fttr Kon.junkturforschung did keep a watch on aggregate stock
levels.
It attributed the 1927-29 upswing to a restocking boom *26, but at no
time in 1927-29 did it regard stocks as seriously excessive. It
thought that stocks reached a peak in late 1927» and in part attributed
the recession of 1928-29 to a slow reduction of stocks *27» and
blamed the very slowness of the decline for the prolongation of the
recession *28.
A more detailed survey was made of comments on the levels of stocks in
individual industries particularly with reference to 1927-29* Such
comments are usually confined to industries producing "to stock" for
obvious reasons. Textiles are the obvious place to 3ook. An inventory
cycle model is implied in much of the treatment of this sector by
the Institut fiir Konjunkturforschung *29. In November 1926 we read
of continuing liquidation of stocks, and restocking characterised the
first half of 1927 *30* Hy February 1928 raw cotton stocks were
•25 Rather than listing the many possible references in trade
journals and contemporary newspapers, I note merely G Reiser
and B Benning op.cit. p 19? G Clausing, Die wirtschafiliche
Vtechsellagen ... pp 50-59; Agent-General for Reparations,
Report for 192^/25, p 17.
*26 V.jh.Kon.i-f orsch 1926 H3 p 39; 1927 H3 p 5.
♦27 Ibid. 1927 H4 p 7; 1928 H2A p 3; H3A P 7.
♦28 Ibid. 1929 H4A p 8.
*29 Ibid. 19?6 K2 pp 33-7; H*+ p 62, and many other places.
*30 Ibid, 1926 H3 p 55; 1927 H2 p if8.
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regarded as dangerously high, though textile stocks in general were
near equilibrium *31. Prices did not break, as in 1925/26, but by
mid-year the Institut did blame an "inventory cycle" for the current
decline in textile output *32. By February 1929 the Institut held
that current stock position could justify an increase in output
despite constant sales - ie that stocks were marginally deficient *33*
The trade journals of the textile industry are as pre-occupied with
stocks as the Institut. Spinner und Weber speaks of ©vejvoptimistic
purchasing by the trade in early 1925» leading to excess stocks in
wholesale and retail, whose liquidation in 1926 was seen as the basis
for the next upswing *34. In mid-1927 it was thought that "stocks
in the trade are none too plentiful, as a consecuence of protracted
cautious buying, and thus the inclination to obtain a more adequate
supply is every .-here very lively" *35i but the danger that this
inclination might produce excessive stocks and ultimately reduce
purchasing was also noted. By the autumn the journal noted a slacken¬
ing of demand, partly attributed to monetary factors, and was warning
manufacturers of the dangers of entering into long-term contracts
(presumably for supplies; *36. While in November 1927 the trade was
still thought to be expanding its stocks *37» in October 1928 we read
* 31 V.lh.Kon.i-Forsch 1927 H4 pp 56, 58.
*32 Ibid. 1928 H2B pp 20-21.
*33 Ibid. 1928 H4B pp 19-20.
*34 Spinner und Weber 1926 No 3 PP 16-20; No 15 P 22; No 33 P 21.
*35 Ibid. 1927 No 27 P 24.
*36 Ibid. 1927 No 46 pp 30-315 4ee also Textil-Woehe 9»9*27 P 12.
*37 As for *36.
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that the recession in textile manufacturing is due to the extremely
cautious buying, and the reduction of stocks by the trade over the
past year; however stocks were now low enough to warrant optimism
for 1929 It would be tedious to repeat the similar line of
analysis developed by the textile retailers' journal *39, except to
note a tendency to characterise the other chap's stocks as excess¬
ive **+0, and to repudiate allegations of excess stocks amongst their
own clientele *41* The journal insists that in 1928 cautious buying
will enable the trade to prevent the price collapse of 1925/26 *42,
but articles such as "Measures against Lumping" (Schleuderkampf; in
early 1929 betray uneasiness *43.
Comments on stock levels may be most frequent in the textile sector;
they are also numerous for most other branches of industry and trade
outside of the heavy and engineering branches. Even within heavy
industry, coal stocks at the pit head are subjected to continuous
scrutiny by the Institut fiir Konjunkturforschung *44. The Ihglish
strike was instrumental in clearing excess stocks in 1926 *45, but
*38 Spiner und Weber 1928 No 43 p 19; 1929 No 1 p 27.
*39 See flextil-Voche 18.3.27 P 12; 12.8.27 P 12.
*40 Ibid. 2.12.27 P 32 (with ref. to manufacturers' stocks,.
*41 Ibid. 9.3.?8 p 9.
*42 Ibid. 10.8.28 p 8.
*43 Ibid. 1.3.29 P 13; see also 19.4.29 P 7.
*44 See almost every issue of Vjh.Konj-I''orsch. in the section on
Steinkohle. The actual levels can be checked in Konj-Stat.Rdb.
(1936 p 208.
*45 V.jh.Konj-Eorsch. 1926 H3 p 50-51.
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from mid-1927 they began to rise again *46, though not to dangerous
levels until late 1928 *47. The extra cold winter of 1929 and
improved demand in the following summer helped to trim them again *48.
Other industries are listed at random. Stock levels were scrutinised
in the furniture industry *49, and the industry itself complained
of excess stocks at the end of 1928 *90. In the paper-making industry
a definite inventory cycle was observed *51, and in 1928 saw mills
showed tendencies to develop excess stocks *52. The IfK believed in
1928 that stocks in the glass and ceramics industry were excessive
(this could be a consequence of the rapid mechanisation of the industry)
and notes attempts to trim stocks in 1929 *53* The trade journal of
this branch also describes the elements of an inventory cycle in the
glass and ceramics trade stocks in 1927, with its repercussions on
industrial output *54. An inventory cycle is detected in the leather
and leather goods industries; a trough in late 1926 rising to a peak
in autumn 1927, and swinging down thereafter until mid-1929, when some
*46 Vjh.Konj-Forsch. 1927 H1 pp 41-5; H4 p 48.
*47 Ibid. 1928 H4B p 11.
*48 Ibid. 1929 H2B p 12.
*49 Ibid. 1926 H4 pp 67-8; 1927 H4 pp 67-8.
*50 Jahresbericht der Industrie - und Handelskammern des Buhr-
bezirks: Das Wirtschafts.jahr 1928 pp 237-8.
*51 Vjh.Kon.l-Forsch. 1927 H4 p 70 (low stocks;; 1928 H4B p JO
(high stocks;'. See data in Kon.j-Stat.Hdb. (1936/ p 270.
*52 Keiser und Benning op.cit. p 55*
*53 V.jh.Kon.i-Forsch. 1928 H3B p 23; H4B p 24.
54 Sprechsaal 1929 P 196; 338-9*
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tendency for demand for hides to increase was observed *55. Other
industries for which signs of excess stocks are mentioned are Building
Materials (1926/, where excess stocks in late 1928 were considerably
reduced by mid-1929 *56, industrial vehicle oils (excess stocks pre¬
dicated of 1926) *57, small iron and steel goods (1928; *58, small-
scale clothing manufacture (1926/ *59, and a number of wholesale and
retail branches *60. (In connection with retail, however, both
Benning und Nieschlag, and the Deutsche Bank survey, indicate that the
stock-to-turnover ratio fell in 1928 and 1929 *61).
There is thus fairly general direct evidence of the development of
some degree of excess stocks during 1928, but the evidence also conveys
the impression that this excess was not perceived as nearly so severe
as in 1925/26. Jt is what the decision-makers perceive that counts
in the determination of output.
The indirect evidence of the stock-to-turnover ratio broadly confirms
the findings from the direct evidence.
Estimates of this are provided in Table 5 below. The first, designated
"DB" is reproduced from Table 4 above (p 220 . 'phe second, designated
*55 V.jh.Kon.i-Forsch. 1927 H2 p 52; 1928 H1B pp 22-5; H^-B p 23;
1929 H2B p 26.
♦56 Ibid. 1928 H3B p 26; 1929 H2B p 30.
*57 Keiser und Benning op.cit. p 51*
*58 Ibid, p ?k.
*59 Ibid, p 133.
*60 Ibid, p 138-1^3. See too V.ih.Kon.i-Forsch. 1929 H2B p 35.
*61 Benning und Nieschlag op.cit. p ?6.
228 7/20
"£t.Ra/H" is calculated by averaging two successive estimates of 'end
of year' inventories and dividing the averages by estimates of annual
output in 'Gewerbe'.
Table 5 Stocks-to-Turnover Ratios in 'Gewerbe'
Constant Trices. 1925 = 100
1?2? 1926 1927 1928 1929
100 107 102 107 n.a.
100 116 96 103 103
DOURCES: 'BB' = Deutsche Bank Survey - see Table k p 220 above.
St.Ra/H: Inventory levels: Table 1 p 21kabove (cumulated
totals.
Output: Appendix 11} Table H/2column (5/, p ^12
and explanation attached thereto.
If desired inventory levels are a fixed proportion of real output,
then probably both series display the development of excess stocks
in 1926, and again in 1928-29. The current price ratio is probably
more relevant to business decisions, but good current price output
data are not to be had.
The lower line of Table 5 (based on the more comprehensive data > also
supports the belief that the degree to which stocks were excessive was
more serious in 1926 than in 1928 or even 1929.
Some confirmation of the hypothesis about the relations between desired
and actual inventory levels is provided by examination of the price
indices. *62. When stocks are perceived to be excessive, prices should
*62 References to sources where price indexes are to be found are
given in Appendix II p 399 .
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(abstracting from monopoly influences) be perceived to fall (ie
relative to the otherwise predictable trend). The fall should be the
severer, the more serious the excess was perceived to be.
The aggregate price index for industrial raw materials and semi¬
manufactures confirms these expectations. In important respects the
temporal pattern of price fall of its component indexes mirrors con¬
temporary comment about the timing of the development of excess stocks
in 1928-29s textile raw material and semi-manufactures prices broke
before those of timber (saw-mills) and of building materials, for which
evidence of excess stocks postdates that for textiles. In no case
was the price fall in 1928-29 as severe as that in 1925-26.
The aggregate finished goods price index does not follow this pattern.
The index rose till the first quarter of 1930« The difference between
this index aid that for industrial raw materials and semi-manufactures
lies chiefly in the importance of labour and overhead costs. Labour
costs were rising steeply in this period as the fifth chapter showed.
The fact that, despite this, the rate of increase of finished goods
prices appears to have moderated after late 1928 could itself be
indicative of a tendency for excess stocks to develop; in textiles,
where stocks of finished goods are important, prices fell from early
1929.
None of this evidence of the development of prices is conclusive, but
it is consistent with the postulated evolution of the relationship
between desired and actual stocks.
V/ithin this broad picture, can the point in 1928 at which excess stocks
began to develop be more closely defined?
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The direct evidence of contemporary comment reveals different timing
for different industries, as just noted. Different sources do not
always agree about the timing for individual industries. The stock-
to-turnover ratio does not help, being annual only. Evidence from the
price data could be adduced only if the lag structure of the response
were well established in other research: in any case this evidence
also differs f<r different industries. If, however, a guess is
necessary about the turning point in aggregate inventory investment,
the 'inventory scissors' diagram on p 220above provides a clue,
which is broadly consistent with all the other evidence I have cited
(including the ex post statistical data . In general, it seems to me
that excess stocks did not begin to develop until the second quarter,
or middle of 1928 *63* The evidence cited below *6^+, which relates
the growing trade tension in trade credit during later 1927 and 1928
to oontinued inventory investment, seems to confirm this view.
7«5« Inventory Investment and the Trade Cycle
It is clear that in quantitative terms inventory investment, having
sustained the upswing from early 192*+ to mid 1925» dominated the
subsequent collapse in 1925-26, in the sense that the absolute change
*63 Thus this turning point probably postdates other evidence of
the onset of recession - notably that of the domestic new
machinery orders index. See below pp 2*+6ff . The textile
sector is however an exception: inventory investment here
probably turned down from later 1927*
*6k See pp 233 below.
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in this quantity was far greater than the change in all other com¬
ponents of the National Ac counts *65- Inventory investment dominated
the gross movementeof components of the Accounts in 1928, only on
the evidence of those estimates which result from the deflation of
the current value data by annual average prices. If we use the more
plausible July-Decernber/Lecember price spread to deflate the data,
then the absolute change in the rate of real inventory investment
between 1927 and 1928 is no greater than that of a number of other
components - exports or government expenditure, for example *65A.
/nd changes in other types of investment are equally important. It
becomes implausible to attribute the beginning of the depression in
Germany solely to an inventory cycle, in the manner of Temin.
7.6. Determinants of Inventory Investment
The Temin - Falkus controversy *66 hinges on the role of monetary
factors in the inventory cycle. The following points are relevant,
but do not, to my mind, point to a clear conclusion.
*65 Inventory investment in 'Gewerbe' was 64 mrd.Rm. in 1924;
2 mrd.Rm. in 1925, and nearly nil in 1926. See Table 1 p2l4
above, line '2HD'. In these years, gross fixed investment
at current prices in the entire economy was 7.1, 10.3, and
10.7 mrd.km. respectively. See Table 2 p 11 above,
ana St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1938 P 565.
*65A See Table 2 p 91 above.
*66 P Temin op.cit.; M E Falkus, 'The German Business Cycle of
the 1920s'. See too the comments of Temin/Falkus/Balderston
in the Bc.H.R. XXX(1977) PP 159ff«
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i} Whether or not isolated modern researchers obtain significant
coefficients for interest rates in inventory investment
regressions, Temin is surely right that the consensus finds no such
relationship. But can these findhgs, obtained in the relatively
liquid environment of the postwar world be applied to the 'freak'
monetary environment of post-stabilisation Germany?
ii) Fundamental to the Temin - Falkus controversy is the question
of whether monetary factors were decisive in the turning point
\
of mid 19?5« Temin denies their influence *6? - though on unsatis¬
factory grounds; Falkus asserts it *68. I myself find it hard to
detect a link between the cessation of the foreign capital inflow, and
the 'open market' action of the Reichsbank *69 in early 1925» and the
turning point in inventory investment. Interest rates, pace Falkus,
hardly rose *?0. Only if businessmen's desired levels of inventories
had been predicated on expectations of continued future falls in rates,
would the cessation of this decline have precipitated such a reversal
of stockbuilding. While, in the long run, businessmen evidently did
expect such a 'normalisation' of interest rates, it seems unlikely that
they were so certain of immediate reductions that they based their
short run inventory policy upon it.
iii; Nevertheless, it is hard to deny all relationship. Unless all
contemporary comment, and the bankruptcy statistics are to be
*6? Temin op.cit. p 244. his proof rests largely on examination of
the ex post Balance of Paymerte annual data, and seems to involve
the misconception that the crisis began in 1926.
*68 Falkus op.cit. pp 459ff•
*69 See Chapter 2 pp 28 ff above.
*70 Falkus op.cit. p 460; "... interest rates began to rise appre¬
ciably ..." Data on interest rates is given in Table 1 p2D above.
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discounted, the 1925/26 recession was greatly aggravated by lack of
liquidity. This factor will not explain the origin of this recession:
illiauidity had been an enduring fact of life since November 1923»
If, however, for some other reason inventory investment slackened,
firms may have lacked the reserves to sustain this illiquidisation of
stocks, and thus a bankruptcy crisis have ensued which in turn
accentuated the price collapse and the decumulation of stocks. That
some such mechanism operated in 1925-26 seems most plausible *71•
In 1927 the reverse seems to be discernible. The increasing problems
of securing prompt payment, referred to earlier *72, are most naturally
associated with continuing inventory investment:
"Continued increases in output, at the same rate as in the
recent past, would rather bring the tension to a head,
firstly, through malinvestment ... and also through increased
inventory accumulation, which according to various opinions
has already reached significant levels, especially in the
textile industry; and which brings with it increased
illiquidity. Both these factors could mean that the already
very perceptible tension between the demand for and the
supply of capital could increase further, and the payments
of debts would suffer. More cautious inventory investment
would prevent serious dislocation of the system " *73»
This reflects a possible two-way relationship. The stubborn persistence
of inventory investment increased the scarcity of liquid capital. But
to what degree did this latter scarcity react to inhibit inventory
investment? There is much contemporary comment, especially in the
textile trades, which advocated and commented on 'hand to mouth' buy¬
ing, in view of the financial conditions. This seems to indicate some
*71 See the comment in Spinner una Weber 1926 No 3 p 17.
*72 See above pp k2, kk .
*73 Wk 7(1928; p 6.
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reaction of monetary variables upon inventory investment, though the
importance is hard to quantify *7*+.
Monetary determinants, then, will not explain the turning points satis¬
factorily, either in 1925 or in 1928. What will?
A satisfactory hypothesis lies to hand in the form of a heavily damped
'inventory cycle' of the hetzler variety. Accepting that in December
1923 stocks were exhausted, due to the last frenetic months of the
inflation *75, the investment of 192^-25 represents a vigorous 'restock¬
ing boom', which, as spelt out in the 'multiplier-accelerator' dynamics,
overshot, and generated the cessation of inventory investment during
1925-26. This, in turn, generated a renewed upswing from early 1927.
But the low values of the short-run multiplier, and the flexible orders
and production lags substantiated by modern research *76 imply that the
'echo effects' of the original inventory cycle would die away quite
quickly; thus the 1927 inventory accumulation was more moderate than
that of 192^-25; and the subsequent inventory recession was milder
than that of 1925-26 *77.
This 'real' model seems to me to capture the essence of the inventory
behaviour of this period. But equally, it seems to me that the pattern
was intensified by the liquidity crisis which dominated the German
economy in this period.
*7^ See references *35 - *^3 above and Vic 13(193^ P 25,
' Lageraufftil lung im Konjunkturanstieg', where considerable
importance is attached to credit conditions.
*75 See *"5 P 223 above.
*76 See p 7 above.
*77 These 'echo effects' are probably best viewed as having been super¬
imposed on a secular growth trend in the economy. Thus real stocks
hardly ever fall absolutely; only their rate of growth does.
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CHAPTER 8 rl, EL- INVESTMENT IN MIRING, RANliPACTLEING, TRALE ANE COMMERCE
8.1. Introduction
The German umbrella term Gewerbe will again be used in this chapter,
roughly as in the last; it will denote mining, manufacturing, trade
and commerce, but here will exclude public utilities and transport
and communications, whose fixed investment was considered in Chapter 6.
Of the immediate reduction in aggregate fixed investment between 1928
and 1929, two-thirds occurred in 'Gewerbe' *1. Thus the analysis
of this chapter is central to my subject.
Contemporaries offered the following explanations of this investment
recession:
i/ the 'natural conclusion' of a rationalisation wave *2.
ii / the emergence of excess capacity *3»
iii; the increasing difficulty of external financing, at home and
abroad **+.
*1 See Table -j p 239 •
*2 E Welter Stockung ... p 29; MuW (1928 pp lA79ff» 'Abklingende
Konjunktur'.
*3 E Welter loc.cit.; A Beithinger, Stand und Ursachen der Arbeit-
slosigkeit ... p 21.
*h E Welter loc.cit.; G Clausing, Lie wirtschaftliche Wechsellagon...
pp 63ff,12^ff; E Varga, as quoted in J Kuczynski Studien zur
zyklischen Uberproduktionskrisen ... pp 78, 83.
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iv} wage increases, rising social insurance contributions and taxes,
which constricted the internal cash flow *5*
There could hardly be a more comprehensive range of explanation than
this.
In this chapter I set the analysis in the general framework of a
'capital stock adjustment' model *6; the desired rate of net fixed
capital formation is a function of the difference between the desired
and the actual fixed capital stock, and of the speed at which this
difference is eliminated. The desired stock will be governed, given
the state of the technology, by the expected level of output *7, and
long run expected factor costs. The relationship between the desired
and the actual stock will also, in industries of rapid technical change,
depend on the obsolescence of the actual stock. The desired speed of
transition toward the desired stock wall be governed by the fact that
the cost of capital goods is probably an increasing function of capacity
utilisation in the capital goods industries; also by the possibility
*5 G Clausing op.ext. ]!>p 64-5? see too below pp 311 ff.
*6 A good general discussion is to be found in Michael Evans,
Macro-Economic Activity pp 73 (especially 82,ff.
*7 In strictly cartellised industries the plant capacity per se
is a counter in the bargaining for quotas; hence excess
capacity may not be so salutary a deterrent to investment.
Cf. (on the coke cartel/ E-A III/1 Cie ueutsche Kohlenwirt-
sehaft pp 31TT; (tube cartel - competition between Krupp,
Mannesmann and Vereinigte Stahlwerke.- Wd 14/1 (1929; PP 2217,
2261, also E-A II1/3 Lie deutsche Eisenerzeugende Industrie,
pp 23ff. Moreover, in new industries, or those whose tech¬
nology is undergoing rapid change, and hence market shares
are uncertain, a similar process may obtain. See below with
respect to glass and rayon, pp 257,268.
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that the time structure of investment activity may affect the cost of
finance. If the cost of finance, for example, is believed to be
temporarily high, investment projects may be delayed *8.
The observed reduction in fixed investment activity may therefore have
broadly three causes. Firstly, a decline in capacity utilisation
(actual, or expected, once currently constructed plant becomes oper¬
ational-. Secondly, an improvement in the technical characteristics
of the current stock, relative to the desirable. Thirdly, an increase
in the cost or reduction in the avails bility of external/internal
finance. (/ fourth possibility - lack of capacity in the capital goods
industries - is irrelevant here-.
■
Before proceeding to the analysis, the characteristics of the available
data require evaluation; this is done in section P. In section 3 the
question of the capacity utilisation of the existing stock, in section k
the rate of its technical improvement are examined. In section 5» I
,.V; •'
review 'exogenous' causes of a reduction of sales by Gewerbe during
1927-29. In sections 6 and 7, I consider the degree to which external
and internal financial conditions imposed constraints. The whole
argument is brought together in the eighth and final section.
*8 Or the maturity of the current financing arrangements shortened,
but this process has its limits. The normal method was to
finance work in progress by bank credits, consolidating these
by capital issues at gestation. F B Whale, Joint Stock
Banking in Germany, pp 3^ff*
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8.2. Investment /ctivity and Intentions
8.2.1. Statistics of Investment Activity
The rate of fixed investment activity can be measured either from the
ownership side (ie from an examination of owners' records of changes
in the value of their real fixed assets , or from the supply side
(ie from estimates of net domestic sales - production plus net
imports - of capital goods *9« Since, in this period, the output
statistics are poor for many capital goods industries, the 'ownership'
estimates are generally considered to be the better, furthermore,
they alone offer estimates of the capital stock as well.
8.2.1.1. Ownership Estimates. A collection of these is reproduced in
Table 1 overleaf. In practice, all such statistics derive from the
findings of Keiser and Benning, subsequently continued by the Stat.
Reichsamt *10. Their^neral methodology has already been described *11,
but some features particular to fixed investment remain to be noted.
a) Keiser and Benning present 'net' estimates of fixed investment
activity; but this is defined according to contemporary
accounting concepts, except that such special 'write offs' as seem to
reflect only accumulated obsolescence, or loss of value perceived in
*9 Cf. the discussion in C H Feinstein, Bomestic Capital formation...
pp 11ff, 57ff. 'Supply Side' estimation is also termed
'Commodity Flow'.
*10 G Keiser and B Benning, Kapitalbildung und Investitionen in der
deutschsn Volkswirtschaft 1924.28.
*11 pp 210 ff above.
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Table 1 Fixed Investment "Ownership Estimates"
8/5
A. Statistisches Reichsamt Aggregated Estimates
Gross investment Mrd.Rm. Current Prices
(i; (ii) (iii, (iv;
Manufacturing
Other Sectors
fi 0 Tr>nHf> janri Public Entire
Mining Commerce
Utilities Economy
1924 1.4 1.0 0.4 7.2
1925 2.2 1.4 0.8 10.3
1926 1.8 1.3 0.9 10.7
1927 2.2 1.7 0.7 13.0
1928 2.6 1.7 1.0 13.7
1929 2.0 1.4 1.1 12.8
1930 1.6 1.1 0.7 10.4
B. Hoffmann "Net Investment" Hoffmann "Net Investment"
"Gewerbe" Current Prices Prd Km. "Gewerbe" 1913 Prices Krd Em.
(i. (ii, (iii / (iv , (v. (vi)
Total Buildings Equipment Total Buildings Equipment
1924 1.7 1.1 0.6 1 0.8 0.5
1925 2.8 1.2 1.6 1.9 0.7 1.2
1926 2.3 1.1 1.2 1.6 0.7 0.9
1927 3.1 1.5 1.7 2.1 0.9 1.3
1928 3.5 1.4 2.1 2.2 0.8 1.6
1929 2.7 1.5 1.2 1.7 0.8 0.9
1930 1.6 1.2 0.4 1.0 0.7 0.3
C. Gehrig Gross Investment D. Krengel Pining and Panifa
iiitire E onomy Current Prices uring West Germany only
Mrd.Rm. Prd Em. 1950 Prices
(i) (ii-) (iii J (i) (ii)
Total Buildings Equipment Gross Net
1924 7.2 2.7 4.5 1.4 0.1
1.-925 10.3 5.2 5.1 2.0 0.7
1926 10.7 5.1 5.6 1.7 0.3
1927 13.0 6.3 6.7 2.1 0.8
1928 13.7 6.8 6.9 2.3 0.9
1929 12.8 6.0 6.8 1.8 0.3
SOURCES: A. Stat. Ob.f.d .Dt.E. 1938 p 565.
B. Hoffmann pp ,2^6-7.
C. C Gehrig, 'Eine Zeitreihe ' pp ;35-49.
D. Krengel, Das Anlap;everm6f.;en .. . P 113.
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connection with financial reconstruction, and merger, have been written
back in (as not representing 'economic* reality, *12. Whether, in
spite of this, their estimates reflect an economically relevant defi¬
nition of 'net' investment, is dubious, especially in a period when the
bulk of investment seems to have been undertaken with a view to modern¬
isation/rationalisation. The Statist!sches heichsarat's published
estimates of gross investment probably reflect even net investment
more accurately *13»
bj The regulations governing the form of commercial balance sheets
(Handelsbilanzen permitted the immediate writing off of large
expenditures on machinery and tools *14. Keiser and Benning believed
that no adjustment could be made for this. It will not matter, unless
the firms which adopted this practice were thereby concealing an
atypical pattern of investment behaviour; it may however distort the
apparent distribution of investment between branches of industry: eg
apparently depress that in engineering.
c) New capital stock is presumably activated in the first balance
sheet published after it has come into operation. Thus, if the
lag between the peak of investment activity and its conclusion exceeds
c.six months, the series under review may lag behind activity somewhat *{?.
*12 Keiser and Benning op.cit. p 174.
*13 Gross investment is, in any case, the relevant concept from
the standpoint of employment generation.
*"*4 Thus a number of firms (eg Siemens/ habitually entered the
value of their entire machinery stock at 1 km. Tax allowances
were also generous, if not quite so: Handwflrterbuch der
Sozialwissenschaften (1956; Vol II p 2.48, 'Bilanz'.
*15 Lags in the investment process are discussed below pp249 LL»
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Keiser and Benning make this point explicitly with reference to heavy
industry and chemicals:
"For chemicals, coal mining and iron and steel the rate of
investment for 1928 is far above the 192^-28 average.
This bunching of investment activity is to be explained
by the fact that, as a consequence of the great extent of
the new construction programmes - in many cases complete
new works complexes were built - the investment process
did not reach a conclusion, and hence appear in the
balance sheets, till relatively late in the upswing". *16.
d; In 1924-25 the bulk of firms revalued their balance sheets in
Reichs (= Gold,- mark *17. The estimates of the capital stock
in 'Gewerbe' obtained by Keiser and Benning and the Stat.Reichsamt depend
on these revaluations. From the discussion in Appendix IV pp 4-19 ff
it seems that the initial balance sheet valuations were probably
excessively conservative, relative to the valuations at which subsequent
investments were activated, perhaps more particularly in the case of
smaller firms.
Subsequent researchers adopt the Stat.Reichsamt estimates to a greater
or lesser degree. Krengel *18 adopts its gross fixed investment
estimates for mining and manufacturing directly, employing his own
straight-line depreciation scheme to derive net estimates. He constructs
his own capital stock estimates in such a way as to be consistent with
*16 Keiser and Benning op.cit. p 79. In V.jh.Kon.i.Forsch. 1930
H3A p 73 the same point is made, with reference to the whole
of industry.
*17 Cf. P Mueller, Die Goldbilangumstellunf, ...
*18 R Krengel, ..nlagevermdren, Frouuktion ... (1958'' PP 73ff«
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certain relevant criteria *19*
Gehrig *20 likewise adopts the Stat.Reichsamt gross fixed investment
estimates, this time for the whole economy, and builds up a capital
stock series by cumulating these with independently derived estimates
of scrapping.
The derivation of Hoffmann's estimates *21 is something of a puzzle.
He cites only Keiser and Benning and the Stat.Reichsamt as his sources,
stating that he adopted their estimates of net fixed investment in
Gewerbe directly; but 1 am unable to effect a reconciliation between
his estimates and those of his sources *22. However it would be more
consistent with his general approach *23 to suppose that he applied
to the Stat.Reichsamt gross data his own declining balance depreciation
scheme, to derive new net investment estimates. As he does not ever
publish his precise depreciation schemes, his methods cannot be recon¬
structed. His capital stock estimate for 192^ seems to have been
'guesstimated', probably with some respect to Keiser and Benning:'s
estimate. Since it indicates a 20# reduction in the constant-price
fixed capital stock in 'Gewerbe' between 1913 and 192^, it seems to me,
even allowing for territorial loss, to be on the low side *2k.
*19 Described in more detail on pp 277 ff below.
*20 G Gehrig, Bine Zeitreihe ftlr den Sachkapitalbestand pp 1Jff.
*21 Hoffmann ... pp 2*Hff.
•22 There are problems owing to differences in the categorisation
of the data, but these would not explain the discrepancies.
*23 Hoffmann ... pp 215-7*
*2k Ibid, p 2^5* Capital stock in 1913 = 85.2 mrd.M; in 1925 =
67.6 1913 mrd.M#
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P.2.1.?. 'Supply side' estimates. Both Hoffmann and Gehrig subdivide
their fixed capital formation series into investment in buildings on
the one hand, and in machinery and equipment on the other. They then
estimate one of these by 'supply side' infrmation, and the other as a
residual, given the aggregate 'ownership' estimate.
Gehrig built up 'supply side' estimates of investment in machinery and
equipment from estimates of the sum of the output plus net imports of
mechanical and electrical engineering, precision engineering
(ieinmechanik and optical, vehicles, ana shipbuilding Reasonably
good output data are available only for vehicles and shipbuilding;
for the rest estimates had to be cobbled together out of a variety of
disparate bits of information, interpolations, and assumed proportion¬
alities between one series and another. No allowance is made for
changing proportions of consumer sales in the output mix of any of the
relevant branches.
Hoffmann built up supply side estimates of investment in buildings from
the comprehensive data of the Stat.Reichsamt *26. However the sub¬
division of this data between Gewerbe and the Public Hector is somewhat
less secure than is the aggregate. It depends on the splicing of
results derived from records of large cities during 192h-29» to the
results of surveys of the entire Reich from 1929 on. The rather strange
'dip' in his estimates of buildings investment in Gewerbe in 1928, not
paralleled in any other information, makes one wonder wlHther any
'slippage' occurred at the pdint of splicing.
Gehrig then derived his estimate of investment in buildings as a
*?5 G Gehrig op.cit. pp ihff, R0-R5* See Table ?h(iv p 2kk .
♦26 Hoffmann ... pp 2?8ff. See Table lB(ii and (v p 239 .
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Table 2 "Supply-side" Indicators of Fixed Investment
SOLACES:
A. Domestic Purchases of Steele Cement, Capital Equipment
Mill Tonnes (CoLi'v is MrdRm. ?1912 Prices;
Domestic Purchases
of Crude Steel Domestic Purchases Domestic Purchases
unadjusted adjusted of (Jement of Capital Equipment
for indirect trade
(i - (ii) (iii; (iv;
1924 10.4 9.2 3.2 3.5
1925 10.4 8.8 2.9 3-7
1926 9.1 7.2 3.5 4.2
1927 14.7 12.8 3.2 5.1
1928 12.1 10.0 3.7 5.0
1929 14.4 11.8 5.7 4.8
1930 9.1 6.5 5.2 3.6
Quarterly Estimates of Domestic "Consumption" of Iron and .
Mill Tonnes Crude Steel Ec-uivalent
192^ 1926 1^27 1?28 1729
1st Quarter 3.4 1.6 3.3 3.9 3.5
2nd Quarter 3.2 1.8 3.8 3.2 3.0
3rd Quarter 2.5 2.3 4.0 3.0 3.0
4th Quarter 2.0 2.9 4.1 2.3 2.9
Annual 11.1 8.6 15.? 12.4 12.4













SOLACES; A. (i;, (ii , (iii;: Svennilson, Growth ... pp 276-9,234-5.
(iv,: Gehrig, Eine Eeitreihe ... p 35» deflated with
price index therein.
B. IfK, Ronj.Stat.Hdb. (1936. p 217.
C. Gehrig, p 4b; see text p 13.
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residual, Hoffmann, his estimates of investment in machinery and
equipment as a residual *27.
'Supply side' indicators of investment activity are also published by
Svennilson *28 and by the .Iistitut ftir Konjunkturforschung *29.
Both are reproduced in Table 2 p zbb • Both of these construct
estimates of output plus net imports of iron and steel, adjusted for
indirect trade (ie in goods embodying iron and steel ; the former
also offers a similarly-constructed index of domestic cement consumption.
The two iron/steel series agree quite well with each other, except that
that of Svennilson suggests a recovery in 1929 not evident in the
Inst.f.Konj.forsch. series. But even allowing for the lag in the
activation of assets in balance sheets, both indicators seem to suggest
an earlier 'turning point' in investment activity during 1928 than do
the 'ownership' estimates.
Svennilson's series of domestic cement purchases would be harder to
*27 Since both Gehrig and Hoffmann implicitly accept the superiority
of 'ownership' estimates, the validity of their respective
'supply side' series can be gaiaged by assessing the plausibility
of the residual component estimates which their data imply.
On this count, Gehrig's series is patently inferior. His
residual estimate of investment in buildings, reproduced in
Table TC p 239 , declines before his 'supply side' estimates
of investment in machinery. Given relative lag structures,
this seems unlikely, horeover, to fit his residual estimates
to available estimates of the rate of building construction,
he has to assume an altogether implausible 'jump' in buildings
repairs in 1929. See Table 2C above . By contrast, Hoffmann's
residual estimates of investment in machinery show a sharper
fall in 1929 than do his 'supply side' estimates of buildings
investment, and can plausibly be related to data on domestic
new machinery orders. See below p 2^7 .
*28 lngvar Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy
pp 211-3, 227-30, 276-85.
*29 Konj.Stat.Hdb. (1936; p 217.
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relate to any estimate of investment in buildings, or of the level of
activity in the construction industry.
'Ownership' estimates are clearly superior to 'supply side' estimates.
This view is confirmed by the practice of Hoffmann and Gehrig, both
of whom rely on the former type for their aggregate estimates.
Postscript: current and constant prices. Only Hoffmann offers estimates
of (net; fixed investment in 'Gewerbe' at constant (1913> prices. He
deflates his estimates of the stock of machinery and equipment at
purchase prices by the Stat.heichsamt index of producer goods prices,
his estimates of the stock of buildings at construction prices by the
Stat.Reichsamt index of buildings costs *JO. In view of the already
mentioned uncertainty surrounding the capital stock estimates, and the
considerable alteration in the price structure since 1913« so aggre¬
gative a method seems likely to introduce as many errors as it eliminates.
In fact, the relevait prices changed only slowly during 1926-29* The
index of producer goods prices was rather stable 1926-27» but rose fairly
fast 1927-28, more slowly 1928-29. It is probable therefore that the
current value estimates exaggerate fixed investment during 1928 relative
to that of 1927; ie that they are biassed against the hypothesis of
an early reduction in fixed investment activity in Gewerbe, which I
wish to sustain. It seems pointless therefore to submit the data to
elaborate deflation techniques.
8.2.2. Statistics of investment Intentions
Happily, there are good data on investment intentions. For machinery,
we have the index of new orders to the mechanical engineering industry,
♦JO Hoffmann ... pp 231, 2^5.
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Table 3 Investment Intentions
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B.(i) Number of New Permits issued for Building: Private Sector (excl.
Housing). c.90 cities for 1926-28; 96 cities 1929 Thousands
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SOURCES: A: Kon.j.Stat.Hdb. (1956/ p 2?8. (last line: Table iB(vi) p 239-








































published by the German Machine Builders Association (VDHA). It
distinguishes domestic from export orders, and also combines both
into an aggregate index; it was based on reports from about 600
firms *31• Probably it refers to number of orders *32. On some
simple assumptions, this index (reproduced on Table 3 overleaf) appears
to reflect short term change in investment intentions rather well.
This can be checked by lagging the index, and comparing it then with
realised investment in machinery. Machinery orders evidently took on
average between four and six months to complete *33. If one lags
the quarterly estimates in Table J>A by three, four, and six months
respectively, one gets rough estimates of gross machinery realisations.
These are • ompared, on an annual basis, with Hoffmann's residual
estimates of (albeit net / machinery investment in Ce-werbe *3^» See
the same Table. It can be seen that the new orders data lagged six
months agree remarkably closely with Hoffmann's, except in 1930* when
the fact that the former is gross, the latter net, may be relevant.
*31 G Oberwinter, Kon.junktur und Bilanz in der deutschen
Maschinenindustrie p l^Off.
*32 Ibid, p 1h2, I infer that by 'volume ('Mengen-J index'
he means 'numbers of orders'. He refers to a 'value'
index, but I cannot trace it.
*33 Maschinenbau i(l929) January p W22, 'Ende des Jahres 1928'.
From M Evans or.cit. pp 95-105, it seems that in the USA
today current investment activity reflects decisions originally
taken (on average) c.one year ago, subject to programme
modifications decided three to six months ago. These lags
represent an average for both buildings and machinery
investment; hence the information probably corroborates
that from Kaschinenbau. Note too that pressure on the
capacity of the investment goods industries was less in
"Germany.
The major discrepancies of conerage are that the intentions
data includes orders to agriculture, railv/ays, the post
office; Hoffmann excludes these.
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Czada published a diagram of the inflow of foreign and domestic
orders respectively to the Siemens-Schuckert Werke, reproduced in
Diagram 8/1 above. The decline in new domestic orders in this diagram
appears about the middle of 1928, that is, a little later than the
VDMA index. This doubtless reflects the fact that this company's
primary domestic clients were the public electricity supply
Lastly, estimates of investment intentions and realisations with regard
to industrial and commercial buildings can be read from the Stft.
Seichsamt data on building plans (BauvorhabenJ, permits issued
(Bauerlaubnisse;, construction starts (Baubet,inne,, and net increase
(keinzugang/ in ninety cities *35* The series on permits issued,
and net increase are reproduced in Table 3B p 2k7 . Hoffmann's estimates
of buildings investment in Oewerbe depend on the latter series up to
1928 (spliced thereafter to an entire-Eeich survey;. Nevertheless, no
clear parallelism is obvious between the series in Table lB(ii; and
(v/ and 3B(i;» The permits data represents a reduction in intentions
from early 1928, but Hoffmann's realisation series is already lower
for the year 1928 than for 1927. As already noted, Hoffmann's figure
for 1928 is hard to account for.
8.2.3. Contemporary Perceptions of the Investment Recession
Much contemporary discussion is in fact comment upon the statistics
just presented, but though not independent, it can cast light on the
contemporary interpretation of them.
♦3LA
*35
See the discussion above pp 186 ff.
Each of these series is denominated in numbers of buildings.
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In general, earlier articles tend to rank the decline of textile output
as more important than the decline in domestic sales of investment
goods, though viewing the signs of this latter decline as a disquieting
'further stage' in the general recession *36. By the end of 1928 the
investment recession is being assigned a much more prominent place *37.
The evidence in Maschinenbau, the organ of the VDKA, relates to this
body's new orders index, and notes the decline in domestic orders as
early as the turn of 1927-28 *38, remarking the fact with increasing
conviction as time progressed *39. The V.jh.Kon.i.forsch. repeats this
analysis *^G, and notes in addition evidence of a decline in domestic
sales of iron and steel, which it attributes to the decline in railway
investment *'+1, the decline in investment activity in iron/steel
itself *k2 and the general decline in industrial and commercial
building *^3*
The Deutsche Bergwerks Zeitun; , usually regarded as the organ of
Rhenish-Westphalian heavy industry, notes the decline of domestic iron
and steel sales from February 1928 *kk,
*36 Eg' C Kr&mer, 'Die deutsche Vdrtschaft urn die Jahresmitte,' in
Wd 13/2(1928) p 1218; Wk 7(1928) p 117, 'Decrescendo'.
*37 MdW 1928 pp 1979ff, 'Abklingende Konjunktur'.
*38 Kaschinenbau 9(1928) p 128, 'Die Jahreswende 1927/8'.
*39 Kaschinenbau 9 (1928) p 688, 983 (Monthly reports June/Sept.)
*k0 V.ih.Kon.i.forsch. 1927 HD p 53; 1928 IiTB p 1'+; 1928 H3B p 15.
*'<1 V.jh.Kon.l. forsch. 1928 H1B p 13.
*b2 V.jh.K-n.i.fcrsch. 1928 H3B p 12.
*K3 V.jh.Kon.j.forsch. 1929 H2B p 14.
*bk DBZ 29.2.28 p 1, 'Nachlassen der Bisenkonjunktur'.
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The reports of companies in investment goods industries also furnish
confirmatory evidence of decline in domestic sales to the private
sector in 1928, most noticeable in electrical engineering *45, but also
in iron and steel firms dependent on the construction industry *46,
and a large mechanical engineering firm *47.
Evidence of domestic investment recession is of course much more
plentiful in 1929* but that is not relevant here.
Finally, Keiser and Benning's comment on their own work may be cited.
They explain the fact that the level of fixed investment was higher
in 1928 than in 1927 by the fact of the 'spilling over' of activity
on projects begun later in 1927 ♦ and by the lag in the activation of
assets in balance sheets already noted *48. Clearly they felt that
the fact that their work revealed that fixed investment reached a peak
as late as 192c required explanation; it was not possible to explain
it by reference to a surge of new projects in 1928.
8.2.4. Conclusion; the Fattern of Fixed Investment Activity in 'Gewerbe'
In the period under review, there were two upper turning points in
fixed investment activity (1925 and 1928) and one lower (1926J. The
1925 upper turning point can probably be dated, as far as intentions
are concerned, in the first quarter of the year (Table 3A p 247 )|
*45 Siemens und Halske, Annual Report 1927/8; Accumulator-en
Fabrik, Report 1928; Felten und Cuilleaume, Report 1928.
•46 Buderus Eisenwerke, Annual Report 1928.
•47 Lemag AG, Annual Report 1928.
•48 ¥jh.Konj.forsch. 1930 H3A pp 73ff* I infer from verbal
similarities to Kapitalbildmu, und investitionen (loc.cit.
•16 above) that this was written by Keiser and Banning.
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as far as output of investment goods is concerned, just before mid-year
(Table 2B p 2kk ); hence as far as realisations are concerned, probably
in the third or fourth quarters of 1925* By a similar process, the
lower turning point of 19?6 seems to span the middle of that year.
As far as intentions are concerned, the second upper turning point in
Gewerbe seems to have occurred in the fourth quarter of 1927, as far
as output of investment roods is concerned, early in 1928; in respect
of realisations, possibly at mid-year for machinery, somewhat later
for buildings. Thus the upper turning point either precedes or at
latest, coincides with the turning point in inventory investment, and
clearly precedes the 'closure' of the U.S. bond market at mid-year,
usually associated with the share speculation there *i+9» Why?
8.3. The Fixed Capital Stock in 'Gewerbe': its Utilisation
8.3.1. The capital stock adjustment model directs our attention first
of all to questions of utilisation of the actual stock. This question
has two aspects. Firstly, the relationship betv/een the capacity
output of the actual stock, and its expected actual output. This
question is treated of in this section. Secondly, the technical
efficiency of the actual stock; obsolescence may induce 'net' invest¬
ment even in the presence of substantial excess capacity. This question
is considered in section S,k,
C P Kindleberger, The World in Depression, pp 70ff.
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8.3.2. Statistical Measures of the Utilisation of the Capital Stock
Two measures of the degree of utilisation of the fixed capital stock
have been published *50. Both are reviewed in Appendix V p L+23 ff.
Krengel's methodology is unsatisfactory, since it depends on the
assumption of a constant long term capital-output ratio. Hester's
index could be adopted directly from 1938, on certain assumptions about
the capital-labour ratio; it is based on Inst.f.Kon.j.forsch. reporting
of actual employment as a percentage of capacity employment in the
several industries (Arbeiterberichterstattungi *50A. His method
of extrapolating this series through 1924-2? is unsatisfactory however.
A revision is proposed in Appendix V. Since the ratio of the utilised
fixed capital stock to the employed labour force is ex hypothesi
unknown for 1924-271 1 propose three alternative backward extrapolations
of the 1928 ratio:
A. that the capital-labour ratio was constant 1924-28,
B. that the capital-labour ratio increased at 3>% p.a. 1924-28,
C. that the capital-labour ratio increased at 5% P»a. 1924-28.
The estimates thus derived are reproduced in Table 4 overleaf, in two
forms, using two different capital stock series: the 'net' series of
Hoffmann, covering 'Gewerbe'; and the '.gross' series of Krengel,
covering only mining and manufacturing. It should be noted that both
*50 A F Hester, 'Eine Zeitreihe der Ausnutzung des Sachkapital-
bestandes', and E Krengel, Anlagevermiigen ... pp 86-89.
*50A See description in Vjh.Kon.j.forsch. 1930 H1A» pp 44-6.
3500 firms, and c.3 million workers were covered.
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Table k Revised Estimates of the Utilisation of the
Fixed Capital Stock
1. "Gewerbe": Hoffmann Fixed Capital Stock Estimates
(Buildings and Equipment) %
A B £
192*+ 85.5 8^.3 76.5
1925 90.2 88.8 82.5
1926 81.4 80.6 76.6




2. Manufacturing and Mining: Krengel Fixed Capital Stock Estimates
A B £
1925 91.'+ 89.9 83.6
1926 79.8 79.1 75.2






SOURCES: 1. Appendix V Table C(i,', F (p 937)
2. Appendix1 V Table C(iij, F (p (9-37)
KEY: A The capital-labour ratio for 1928 applied throughout
192^-28.
B The capital-labour ratio rose at 3?% p.a. 192^-28.
£ The capital-labour• ratio rose at 1% p.a. 192^-28.
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sets of estimates as presented here, probably conceal an upward
bias *51• Good grounds exist for supposing ttet the capital-stock
ratio did rise in 192h-28 *52. But even if it v/ere constant, then
the fact of chronic excess capacity on average, is evident. This would
be consistent with evidence of endemically low levels of fixed investment
activity in 'Gewerbe'. Nevertheless, there is little sign of a
reduction in utilisation rates between 1927 and 1929 in aggregate,
such as might explain the investment recession.
8.3»5» Other Evidence about Capital. Stock Utilisation
I consider first the specific evidence for individual industries *53»
It is doubtless true to say, that for most of 1924-29 the capital stock
in the so-called 'new industries' would be fully utilised, ie in leading
firms in electrical engineering, chemicals, rayon, and vehicles. I
specify the leading firms, because most of these industries also con¬
tained a number of firms on the wane *54. Some examples of excess
plant may be cited:
*51 The 1928-50 estimates are derived directly from the Inst.f.Kon.j.
forsch. 'jobs reporting'. But they assume that a reported actual
employment rate of 80% represents in fact 'normal' full capacity
employment. Every figure in the Table is therefore the original
reported percentage multiplied by 5/4. The extrapolated 1924-27
figures derive their 'level' from this assumption.
*52 See Appendix V pp 431-5 •
*53 Substantiation that there was general excess capacity in the period
under review can be found in eg J Hirsch, 'Wandlungen ...'
pp 20lff. C Warriner, Combines and Nationalisation in Germany,
pp 64ff.
*54 W Hagemann op.cit. pp 102-7.
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Electrical Engineering: Accumulatoren Fabrik *55; the firms in the
cable industry syndicate *56. (Bergmann's annual reports 1924-29
hardly convey the impression of high pressure of activity either *57).
Chemicals: Anglo-Continentale Guano. This company reports a shut-down
of plant even in 1927. A.G. ft!r Chemische Produkte. The reports of
neither J.D. Riedel-E. de Hfign nor of Rtltgerswerke A.G. convey the
impression of a high level of activity *58. The Enquete Ausschuss
reports excess capacity in the nitrogen fertilisers branch *59# There
seems no evidence for either electrical engineering or chemicals that
the degree of utilisation deteriorated 1927-29#
Fayon: Up to 1928 there is no evidence of excess capacity for any firm.
From 1928 reports of excess capacity multiply, doubtless due to over¬
extension of plant in an, industry where gestation periods are long *60.
Vehicles: Before 1927» excess capacity could perhaps be inferred for
one or two ailing firms *61, and also perhaps for the entire
industry *62. However after 1927 evidence multiplies of serious excess
*55 Annual Reports 1926-29#
*56 KHlnische Zeitung l8/2/29» "Fersplitterung in der Kabelindustrie".
Beri.manns Elektrizitgts a.G. Annual Reports 1926-29#
*58 See the annual reports of these firms 1925-29#
*59 E.A. 111/6 Die deutsche Chemische Industrie, p 103.
*60 V.1h.Kon,j. forsch. 1927 H4 p 58; 19?9 H?B pp 24-5; Spinner und
Ueber 1929, 5% p 3^» 'Die Konkurrenz in der Weltkunstseidenmarkt•;
DBF 26/2/29 P 1 "Die Konsolidation der deutschen Kunstseiden-
industrie".
♦61 National Automobil Gesellschaft (NAG/, Annual Reports 1924-29#
*62 Wd 15/2 (1928;, p 1576, "Die deutsche Kraftfahrzeugindustrie".
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capacity, attributable to the completion of several conversions to
mass production *63# These scraps of evidence are not intended to
prove general excess capacity in the "new industries" but only that
the pressure of demand cannot have been all that high (except in rayon)
el£e even the weaker firms would have probably been fully employed.
Outside of the "new industries" ttie evidence of excess capacity can be
roughly summarised as follows.
Hard Coal: The major coalfields were strictly syndicated, so that normal
market processes were distorted. In any case coalfields are always
shutting down old workings and opening new ones; the level of demand
only affects the margin of operation. The Kuhr field did have an
endemic tendency to excess production as measured by coal stocks at
the pit head *64, and the general conclusion of both the majority and
minority reports of a famous commission into the profitability of the
industry (the "Schroalenbach Gutachten"; was that it was barely if at
all profitable *65. In a free market these factors would depress
investment intentions; however it must be recalled that the motivation
for investment in this industry lay in the complexities of the
Syndicate organisation and of its relationship with the iron and steel
industry. Due to increasing competition from British coal in the later
1920s, the average price (received by all members) grew increasingly
*63 Wd 14/1(1Q29) P 1016, "Die deutscbe Kraftfahrzeuginaustrie im
Jahre 192o"; DbZ 12/2/29 P , "Uberfremdung der Opelwerke".
*64 See the data on coal stocks at the pithead (IialdenbestSnde) in
IFK, Kon.1-Stat.Hdb. (1936; p 208.
*65 (Schmalenbach) Gutachten fiber die gegenw&rtige Lage ...
E.A. 111/1 Die Deutsche Kohlenwirtschaft p 139ff«
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unfavourable *66. In the Coking industry cartel arrangements brought
about greatly excessive capacity in the opinions of contemporaries *67«
The fact that the industry was also in the throes of radical technical
transformation (from scattered, to central coking plants) is an
additional explanation. It seems plausible that some level of excess
capacity was bound to deter further investment.
Lignite was rather a new industry; reserves were being increasingly
exploited by the chemical industry and the power stations. Excess
capacity seems unlikely here *68.
Iron and Steel. The degree of capacity utilisation in this industry
in the late 1920s was the subject of lively controversy, unleashed by
the (oblique) allegation in the relevant "Lnouete-Ausschuss" report,
of over-extension of plant *69- This was vigorously repudiated by
representatives of the industry *70, and combatted on both sides in
the press *71. The controversy generated more heat than light,
mainly because of failure to define an adequate concept of "capacity".
*66 Vjh.Konj.forsch 1927 H2 p 38; 19?8 H1B p 10: The sevece winter
of 1928/9 temporarily reversed this; cf ibid 1929 p 12; See
a-^° Jahresberichte der ... Industrie unci liandelskammern des
Ruhrbezirks 1928 pp 107-9* 1929 p6lff.
E-A 111/1 Lie deutsche Kohlenwirtschaft p 28ff; E Welter,
Wachstum ... p 25«
cf. the output statistics in Hoffmann ... p 3^2, Col 2.
E-A 111/3, Die deutsche Eisenerzeugende Industrie, pp 18-19
cf. R.A. Erad.y, The Rationalisation ■ Overrent in German Industry
p 125ff.
The industry's record of its response is to be found in BA R13/I
Vols 356, 337; See also Stahl und Eisen 1930 p 17^7, "Die
LeistungsfMhigkeit der deutschen Stahlindustrie" (article by J W
Reichert).
cf the controversy in Wd 16/1 (1951)s articles by P Berkenkopf,







Hovrever I have discovered one notable thesis which emerged from the
controversy - by J Strohe *72.
Strohe judges that in the period under consideration, crude steel or
rolling mill capacity defines capacity for the industry as a whole *73
Since blast furnace capacity was always excessive, this seems plaus¬
ible *7*+. He estimates peak capacity output by aggregating the
highest single monthly output of crude steel in four separate regions
during (iJ 1925-28 and (ii; 1929-30 *75* This task is complicated by
quality differences etc, but he notes that his methods are comparable
to those of the controversialists after removal of biasses in their
methods.
He then expresses actual annual outputs of crude steel 1925-28 as a
percentage of estimated capacity output 1925-28; likewise for actual
annual output 1929-30- His results are shown in Table 5 below.
Table 5 Degree of Utilisation of Crude Steel Capacity
Estimated Capacity Actual Annual % btilisation
Output. Mill tonnes Output. Kill tonnes of Capacity
1925 19 12.2 69
1926 19 12.3 69
1927 19 16.3 92
1928 19 14.5 82
1929 23 16.2 81
1930 23 13.5 57
SOURCE: J Strohe op.cit. p 53-
*72 J Strohe, Per Streit inn den Enquetebericht ttber die Eisenschaf fende
Industrie.
*73 Ibid, p 44.
*74 See St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1924/5, P 96; 1928 p 114; 1931 p 99.
*75 Ibid, p 54.
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These estimates might be expected to understate the true degree of
utilisation, since peak monthly output could be well in excess of
optimal long-term output *76. Comparison of Strohe's data with the
unadjusted IfK "jobs capacity index" for 1928-29 tends to confirm this
point *77.
Moreover the method of calculation of the 1925-29 estimates means that
the earlier estimates ape biassed downwards relative to the later.
However the degree of bias would have to be truly great for there
actually to have been full utilisation in the crude steel section in any
year but 1927*
Supplementary evidence is provided by evidence available in the records
of the Crude Steel Cartel and in contemporary newspapers as to the
length of deliveries delays, or length of period of employment guaranteed
by the existing: backlog of orders in different branches of iron and
steel *78. There are practically no periods when delivery delays
exceeded three months in any branch of the industry outside of the
summer or autumn of 19?7» except in the case of Railway structuial
material. These figures can be related to a statement by J W Reichert
in his 1927 report to the iron and steel industrialists' association
(VDESI;, of which he was executive director *79* The U.S. iron and
*76 cf. A Phillips op.cit. pp 282, 290.
*77 IfK, Kon.i .stat.Hdb. (1956; p 19»
*78 This information, gleaned from the Cartel's "Reports on the
State of the Market" (BA R15 1/45; and from the files of the
Deutsche Bergwerks Eeitung and the Industrie- und Kanuelszeitung,
has not been reproduced for reasons of space.
*79 Verein heutscher Eisen und 3ahl Industrieller (VDESIj Bericht
■fiber die Kitgliederversammlung 1927 P 26.
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steel industry, he said, regarded as normal an order book securing
employment for the next two months. Such a state of affairs with us
for a few months of 1927 has been regarded as boom conditions (Hoch-
kon.junktur). This was a statement for private circulation only. It
hardly suggests ''overheating" in the industry even in the latter half
of 1927.
Thus it may be ooncluded about the iron and deel industry, that except
in the last half of 1927 not even optimal capacity utilisation was
achieved, secondly that there was significant decline in the degree of
utilisation 1927-28 *80.
Despite this excess capacity, individual firms may have wished to
increase their capacity even apart from the question of technical
progress.
Thus Krupps built a blast furnace complex adjacent to their foundry in
Essen, to improve its efficiency *81. liannesmann also built a blast
furnace complex to free itself from dependence on external supplies *82.
Berkenkopf alleges these did not significantly increase total (pig
iron) capacity, but his v/itness is biassed *83. In this industry too,
there must have come a point where excess capacity inhibited further
investment.
Dechanical Engineering . The industry's association (VDMA) kept its
*80 cf. also Berliner Bbrsen Zeitung 5/2/29 P , "Die Wirtschaft-
sziele der Stahlindustrie".
*81 BA RPf/l Vol 656; cf F Krupp AG Annual Report 1928/9 (as
abstracted in Stahl und Eisen 1929 P 93
*82 Stahi und Eisen 1930 P 753» "Die Neuanlagen der Mannesmann-
rtlhrenwerke ..." In retaliation, Krupp threatened to enlarge
its tubes capacity: DV III 17/5/29 P 1098.
*83 Berkenkopf in tod 16 (19511 p 93« Article cited *71.
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own "jobs reporting index" similar to that subsequently adopted by
the IfK. (For definition, see above p 2$^
Table 6 Mechanical Engineering Jobs Capacity Index
1913 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
Annual 100 58 51 6k 72 7k
1st Quarter 75 61 62 78
2nd Quarter 77 58 69 79
3rd Quarter 75 58 73 79
kth Quarter 68 59 7k 73
SOIHCBS: Annual: Maschinenbau (1928/, pp 60h-5; (1.8.291 ppWI?0-172.
Quarterly: Albert Hesse: Die wirtschaftliche Lage ...
p 15 (ultimate:VDHA)
Why Hesse's quarterly data is systematically higher than the Kasclinen-
bau annual data is not clear; both are allegedly VDKA statistics. For
my purposes however both yield the same conclusions.
a) The general level of utilisation of the capital stock appears to
have been extraordinarily low. This is true even if we allow that
this index expresses a percentage of maximum rather than optimum utili¬
sation, and that the capital-labour ratio of the stock in use exceeds
that of the idle stock. The fact that the VDMA themselves "guess" the
1913 level at 100% shows that they thought the post-stabilisation level
of utilisation low.
That the average level of utilisation in an investment goods industry is
low perhaps is not surprising; that peak utilisation is also low, is.
There is plenty evidence that contemporaries regarded the continuous
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excess capacity as a serous problem *84.
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b) According to this data the degree of utilisation actually
increased over the period, doubtless owing to the export boom
of the last years of the decade. Particular sections of mechanical
engineering had differing experiences. Locomotive and waggon building
were appallingly under-utilised *85. The level of employment in the
large textile machinery industry was only fair during 1927-29 *86,
though individual sections of it, like machinery for the knitted goods
industries did very well *8?. The paper-making machinery section was
also fully employed *88, as was that supplying equipment to iron,
steel and coal-mining during 1927/8, but sales from this section seem
to have fallen steeply by mid-1928 *89. It is clear that the level
of utilisation in shipbuilding was disastrously low *90. An index of
post-war output itself makes that clear.
*84 eg Kaschinenbau 8 (18.7*29) P W157t "Las Missverh&ltnis zwischen
Produktion und ProduktionskapazitSt in der Maschinenindustrie";
G Oberwinter, Kon.junktur und Bilanz in der deutschen Maschinen¬
industrie p 46.
*85 V.jh.Kon.l.forsch. 1927 H4 pp 66-7; 1928 H4B p 28; Commerce Reports
13*5*29 P 430, "Problems of the German locomotive Industry;
Maschinenbau 8(l8.4.29) pp W85ff, "Der Lokomotivebedarf der
deutschen Reichsbahngesellschaft".
*86 kaschinenbau 9 (18.12.30) pp W272ff, "Die deutsche Textilmaschinen-
industrie"; Spinner und Leber 1928 Nr1, p 3^» "Aus der Wupper-
taler Textilmaschinenindustrie".
*87 i Grunbaum, ;,ie Welttextilkri.se pp 47-9*
*88 Inferred from Maschinenbau 9 (3*4*30) p W83, "Die Lage der Papier-
industrie"; cf. L-A 1/5/10, .i- deutsche lellstoff ... Industrie
P 292.
"89 V.jh.Kon.j.forsch. 1927 H3 p 44; 1928 K1B p 14.
*90 DBZ 11/12/27 P 111 "Lage und Aussichten im Schiffbau";
Wd 13/2 (1928) p 1502. Die Krisis im deutschen&hiffbau.
W Hagemann op.cit. p 129*
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SOURCE: St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1928 p 171» 1930 p 17^ s sea-going ships
completed during year, and under construction at end of
year.
But at least the degree of utilisation was not falling 1927-29* To
sum up therefore for the engineering trades in general. The level
of utilisation of the capital stock was very low throughout the period
for all but a few firms in electrical engineering and vehicles. Never¬
theless, outside of vehicles and certain sections of machine building,
the situation does not appear to have deteriorated during 1927-29*
Textiles. The evidence about the utilisation of the capital stock is
not so plentiful for this sector. Statistics can be assembled however
for cotton-spinning and weaving.
The following tables indicate full utilisation of the stock in 1927
and under-utilisation at other times. They confirm the view that the
1928/9 recession was severer in weaving than spinning *91*
The situation in sections of the wool industry seems to have been some¬
what better, as a rule, notably in the rapidly developing knitted
goods section *92, and in the "Kammgarn" branch *93*
*91 Wd lV2 (1929) P 1719* "Die deutsche Baumwollwebereien ira Jahre
1928".
*92 E Kupczyk, "Die deutsche Wirkerei und Strickerei seit 1927"t
in Wd 1V2 (1929) P 1767.
*93 G Plum, "Die deutsche Kammgarnspinnereien", in Wd 1V1 (1989)
p 139i cf V.jh.Kon.j.forsch. 1927 p 58; 1929 U2B p 23.
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Table 8 Cotton; Utilisation of the Capital Stock
(i) Spinning; % of available Spindles in Operation
Selected Months 1926-29*




October 85 97 91 -
SOURCE: V.jh.Kon.l.forsch. Various issues 1926-29*
(ii) Weaving: % of available looms in Operation
Quarterly Data 1925-29
2321 1926 1927 1928 1929
1st Quarter 85 86 89 93 71
2nd Quarter 86 76 93 90 65
3rd Quarter 89 74 94 87 66
4th Quarter 89 85 93 86 72
Year Average 87 80 92 89 69
SOURCE: Ifk: Kon.i.Stat.Hdb. (1936) p 289.
In Linen and coarse fibres excess capacity had reached crisis pro¬
portions *94. When contemporaries viewed the textile sector as a
whole, they perceived an endemic excess capacity problem *95*
(Rayon is of course an exception (up to 1928) as shown above p 257 • )
In 1928 the fortunes of all sections of the textile industry deteriorated
*94 V.ih.Kon.1.forsch. 1928 H2B p 19? Wd 13/2 (1928), "Die Ubergangs-
krise der Textilindustrie" especially p 1300*
*95 H Frankfurther, "Die Bbergangskrise der deutschen Textilindustrie"
in Wd.13/2 (1928)p 1299* Spinner und Weber 1926 Nr. 17 p 25»
"Die Textilarbeiter g.egen die Textilindustrie"; J W Angell,
The Recovery of Germany ... pp 168-70.
267 8/33
even of the most successful, like knitted goods and rayon *96.
Other Manufacturing Industries. For the rest of manufacturing,
information is much scantier.
Many of the remaining branches are populated by small firms with a
relatively small proportion of fixed capital assets: for example,
building, saw-milling and wood-working, iron and deel wares, chocolate
manufacture *97. In such branches "excess capacity" is hardly an
applicable concept: a potential excess of supply over demand would
manifest itself in unprofitable competitive conditions, bankruptcy, etc.
Conditions differed greatly between these small-scale branches.
Building appears to have been at least reasonably prosperous throughout
the period, doubtless as a consequence of the sustained housebuilding
boom *98. Saw-milling and wood-working, prosperous 1926/7, but
depressed 1928/9 *99. The relevant "I&ouete Ausschuss" reports
assets that the inflation had left the snail iron and steel wires branches
with endemic excess capacity which manifested itself in a compulsion to
export at unprofitable prices *100.
*96 £ Kupczyk, article cited *92 p 1768.
*97 "Die Krise in der Schokoladenindustrie" kd 13/2 (1928; p 1419.
*98 eg V.jh.Kon.i.forsch. 1927 H2 p 54; 1928 H3B p 24-5; 1929 H3B
p 27. Zement XIX (1930) p 253ff, "Die Bautfitigkeit im Jahre 1929";
XVIII (1929) P 362, "Die Bautatigkeit im Jahre 1928".
*99 V.jh.Kon.1. forsch. 1926 H4 pp 65-7; 1927 H3 pp 55-6; 1928 H2B
pp 29-30, 1929 H2B pp 30-31; Jahresberichte der Arbeitsgemein-
schaft der Industrie und Handelskammern des Ruhrbezirks, pas
Wirtschaftsjahr 1926 pp 284-5, 1927 PP 198-9, 1929 P 151-2
(articles: "Die MBbelindustrie").
*100 E-A 1/5/11 Die Deutsche Eisen- und Stahlwaren Industrie, p 350.
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Excess capacity per se was a much noted feature of the cement industry *101
attributable in large measure to cartel conditions. These meant that
the largest firms were still extending capacity somewhat in 1928
despite (allegedly) the fact that on average only 6C$ of the available
plant was in use *102. I lack information on other branches of
building materials.
Paper-making. The evidence is not quite clear-cut, but in general this
branch seems to have been relatively little troubled by excess capacity
in these years. If there was some, it was probably obsolete plant *103.
The degree of utilisation evidently did not fall until late 1929 *104.
Glass and Ceramics. The state of the glass industry was dominated by
the technological transformation of the plate glass section. The
evidence suggests that this resulted in considerable excess capacity
in 1928/9, evidently much greater than any previously experienced, since
it broke up the cartel *105. Excess capacity is said to have character¬
ised the porcelain industry since the stabilisation (and evidently this
was still so in 1929)? this prompted mergers in the industry *106.
*101 I Svennilson op.cit.pp 159-60, R Liefmann op.cit. p 71.
*102 G Plum, "Die deutsche Zeraentindustrie im Jahre 1928" in
Wd 14/1 (1929) P 850.
*103 DBZ 16/12/27 p 8, "Die deutsche Papierindustrie im Jahre 1926/7";
Kaschinenbau 9 (3.4.30) p W83, "Die Lage der Papierindustrie"
E-A 1/5/10 op.cit. p 135ff» 292.
*104 Der Papier Fabrikant XXVII (1930) P 902, "Die deutsche Papier¬
industrie."
*105 Sprechsaal 1927 PP 634-6, "Die deutsche Glasindustrie im Jahre
1926", 1928 pp 647ff, "Die deutsche Glasindustrie im Jahre 1927";
1929 P 549» "Pie deutsche Glasindustrie im Jahre 1928"; 1930 p 9»
"Die deutsche Glasindustrie im Jahre 1929"«
*106 Sprechsaal 1928 pp 12-13, "Die Lage der Porzellanindustrie im
Jahre 1927; 1929 PP 98-100, "Die Porzellanindustrie nach dem
Konzentration; 1929 P 277, "Probleme der Porzellanindustrie".
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I have no information about other branches of ceramics.
Leather. Activity in this industry was very cyclical. If comments on
the level of employment can be used as a rough guide, at least in 1927,
actual output was near capacity levels. By 193B considerable unemploy¬
ment had emerged, and there was some attempt to restrict output *107.
Shoes: This industry suffered throughout the period from low price
Czechoslovakian competition. In September 1928 capacity utilisation
was said to be just over 50# *108. By 1929 however technical progress
was enabling the industry to compete more successfully *109.
Food, Drink, Tobacco. Probably excess capacity was not as prevalent in
this branch. Brewing, for example, seems to have been fairly prosperous
throughout the period *110. However flour-milling seems to have been
beset by excess capacity and lack of profitability *111.
Trade, Commerce, etc. I have no information on capital stock utili¬
sation in this section. Presumably it was higher and more uniform than
in mining and manufacturing.
8.3.*+. Utilisation of the Fixed Capital Stock: Conclusion
Statistical measures and contemporary comment combine to testify to
significant excess capacity in German industry throughout 1924-29.
Aggregate statistical measures indicate no deterioration of this in
*107 V.jh.Kon.i.forsch. 1927 H2 p 52; H4 p 60: 1929 H1B p 24; H2b p 25.
♦108 V.jh.Kon.i.forsch. 1927 H2 pp 53-4; 1928 H3B p 22.
*109 V.ih.Kon.1. forsch. 1929 H3B pp 25-6.
♦110 DBZ 22/2/28, "Das Braujahr 1926/7"; 27/1/29 P 11, "Das
Braujahr 1927/8".
*111 Wd 13/2 (1928) p 1508, "Bilanzanspannung in der MOhlenindustrie"
Wk 7(1928) p 199» "Pie Konzentration in der Ntihlenindustrie".
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1927-29; comment and particular statistics suggest deterioration in
certain sectors, notably heavy industry, vehicles, textiles, shoes
and glass. The aggregate index is not necessarily the most relevant.
About 40% of the decline of industrial fixed investment between 1928
and 1929 occurred in heavy industry; a further 20% in textiles *112.
By contrast, in certain branches where utilisation improved in 1928-29,
eg mechanical engineering, the absolute level of utilisation remained
so low as to render any investment-inducing effects of that improvement
very snail.
8.4. The Fixed Capital Stock: its 'Quality'
8.4.1. If, for example, the capital stock at the start of the upswing
in 1926 was perceived to be, on average, obsolete, a 'modernisation1
boom could have been the propulsive force of the upswing. The investi¬
gation of this hypothesis is necessarily less precise than that of the
relationship between capacity output and actual output. Two methods
will be employed:
i) What was the rate of fixed investment in 1919-25? The faster
this rate, the 'newer' on average the 1926 capital stock, hence the
less the likelihood of its being obsolete. But this statement is
subject to the qualification: many contemporaries believed that the
investment activity of the inflation period was of inferior quality.
*112 Moreover, the investment activity of the former branch was
disproportionately large, relative to its share of industrial
net value added. See Table 14 p 298 below.
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ii) What was the observed rate of technical change during the
fixed investment boom of 1926-8?
8.L.2. To deal with the former question first. That contrary views
have been expressed about the rate and the quality of investment
activity during the inflation is well known *113» Evidence is, and
probably will remain, inconclusive. A number of 'supply-side' indi¬
cators of gross investment activity in the economy as a whole are
assembled in Table 9 below. There is some evidence that investment
in agriculture was at quite a high level *11*u Capital expenditure
by central government and related agencies seems to have been fairly
high *15, but that by local authorities (which normally undertook the
bulk of governmental investment) appears to have been somewhat
restricted by lack of finance *116. Housebuilding was at a lower level
than after the stabilisation *117*
Thus, if we suppose that in aggregate, public sector gross capital
formation was about as great a proportion of total fixed capital for¬
mation before the stabilisation as after, and that a higher proportion
*113 C Bresciani-Turroni, The Economics of Inflation, pp 201ff,
4llff, argues the paucity, and especially the poor quality
of the investment. So too G Clausing op.cit. p ^9?
C T Schmidt, German Business Cycles, p 93* K. Laursen and
J Pedersen, The German Inflation pp 9^-7 present the 'optimistic'
view.
*11^ FZ as quoted in Bresciani Turroni op.cit. p 202.
*115 Laursen and Pedersen op.cit. p 9^; cf on railways pp ff above.
*1^6 See pp I02ff above.




















Some "Supply Side" Indicators of Fixed Investment in the
Inflation Mill,Tonnes (unless otherwise specified;
A. Apparent Consumption B. Apparent Consumption











C. Estimate of Domestic Purchases of Machinery
C1 C2 C3 Ck
Domestic Sales Number of Estimate of Value of
per Snployee Employees Domestic Purchases Domestic Purchases
Weight (Index) 000s (Volume) Em mill Rm mill
0.75 1^62 27kO
0.75 165^ 3050 mm
0.6k lVl1 •» 2310
0.79 - • 2600
2080
32 *+0
D. Subsidiary Table to A.
D1 D2
_ . . _ - . , Polling Mill ProductsOutput of Output of Rolling „ . ^i, T ,
_ ~ e D3 Exports Ob ImportsCrude Steel Mill Products ^ 1 *
8.5 7.0 1.1 0.1
10.0 8.5 1.5 O.b
11.7 10.3 1.5 1.2
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SOURCES for Table
A + B I Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation ... pp 276-9, 284-5
except col.AI yrars 1920/21: see note A(ii) below.
C1 Kaschinenbau, 5 (1926) p 858.
C2 Stat.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1923 P 74 (Order VII)
C3 See note C below.
C4 G Gehrig, Eine Zeitreihe ... p 38; Cols. 3+4+6-5»
D1 I Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation ... p 262.
D2 Stat.Jb.f.d.DtR. 1924/5 p 98: "Walzwerkerzeugnisse".
D3 + D4 Stat.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1923 PP 165—9; the following categories:
Walzen aus nicht schmiedbarem Gusse; TrSger aus schmiedbarem
Eisen; Formeisen, Stabeisen, Bandeisen etc; all tubes
(Rtfhren); all sheets (Bleche); all wire (Draht); Sipsnbahn-
schienen, - schwellen, - laschen und -unterlagen, -achsen etc.
NOTES to Table
A(i) 1913 refers to inter-war territory.
A(ii) The estimate in col. A2 £>r years 1920/21 was obtained thus.
I could not find data on foreign trade in crude steel, so
used production and foreign trade in rolling mill products as
a proxy (the former standardised to 1922 area, the latter
current area). A comparison of D1 and D2 indicates the
adequacy of the proxy. By the sum D2+D4-D3 I formed estimates
of domestic consumption of rolling mill products and spliced
these to Svennilson's estimates of domestic consumption of
crude steel (col.At) at 1922. This gave the desired estimates
for 1920/21 which were averaged, to avoid a spurious impression
of accuracy.
B See note A(i)
C To obtain the estimates of domestic purchases of machinery in
col.C3, col.CI was multiplied by col.C2 and the result spliced
to cdL C4 at 1924. This procedure ignores (i) imports of
machinery. But even after 1924 these never exceed 5/^ of
domestic output (cf Gehrig loc.cit.); (ii) price change 1924-
29. Prices were, in fact, approximately constant. The 1923
estimate is omitted for lack of employment data.
According to Gehrig, the ratio of domestic output in 1924 to
domestic output 1925-29 is 72%. His data source is VDKA/IfK.
According to other VDMA sources the ratio is 65$. If this
other data were more accurate, col.C3 would be a slight over¬
estimate relative to col.C4. I assume however that Gehrig's
revealed preference indicates the more accurate estimate.
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of fixed capital formation in agriculture offsets a lower proportion
in housebuilding, we may not be wide of the mark in assuming that gross
capital expenditure in 'Gewerbe' formed a similar proportion of the
total in both periods. Cfci this assumption the estimates in Table 9
provide a benchmark on which to relate the fixed investment in Gewerbe
during the inflation period, to that of 1924-29.
According to columns A1 ad A2, domestic output of iron and steel in
1920-22 was, on average, probably a little less than that of 1924-26;
of cement (column B) appreciably less; but domestic machinery orders
(column C) appreciably above those of 1924-26 *118. Bemembering the
low levels of activity in 1919 and 192J, it appears from Table 10 that
Table 10 Gross Fixed Capital Formation in the USA and UK 1919-29
Constant Prices (USA = Hrd.1941?# ; UK = Mill. 1938 3C )
1919 1?20 mi mi 1923 1924-6♦ 1927-9
2.1 2.7 1.3 3.6 2.1 2.0 2.4
172 284 326 300 308 389 447






NOTES: Macro: Estimates fcr entire economy.
Mfg.: Manufacturing.
SOURCES: USA: Historical Statistics of the USA p 410.
UK: C H Feinstsin, National Expenditure ... pp T89» T94-5.
*1i8 In 1921-22 the boom in mech.engineering caused an acute crias
in iron/steel supplies: Wd 7(1922) p 58, 'Die Eisenindustrie
in der Weltwirtschaft'.
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the rate of fixed investment in this sector in 1919-23 as a whole was
less, relative to that in 192*4—29 than it was in the UK, and very
probably less relatively than in the USA as well.
Contemporary comment is disappointingly vague. 'Flight into real values'
(Flucht in die Sachwerte) probably reflects intentions rather than
realisations; raw materials shortages, political and labour disputes
seem to have constrained the actual output in the investment goods
industries severely *120. For one industry, however, there is evidence
of a relatively high rate of investment: iron and steel.
Table 12 Average Output of Furnace in Blast
Germany USA UK France
1913 59 271 31 ^7
192*f n.a. 333 n.a. n.a.
1925 97 359 h2 57
1926 112 375 36 61
MEASURES: USA: Capacity (tonnes) per day.
All others: Average Output (000 tonnes)
SOURCES: USA: Stahl und Eisen 1929 P 9*+5-
All others: I Svennilson op.cit. p 265.
Average output per furnace in blast rose faster between 1913 and 1925 in
Germany than anywhere else; doubtless this partly reflects the fact
that marginal (small) furnaces were standing idle, but 1925 was quite
*120 Eg Wd 6(1921) pp 609, 709, 'Zur Lage'; further the letters in
BA R13 1/70 (records of VDESI); cf. the contemporary company
reports of Siemens-Schuckert Werke and AEG. The 'myth' of an
extraordinarily high level of inflation period investment may
well originate in the desire to explain the excess capacity
of the later 1920s solely from the supply side.
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a boom year in Germany. The historiography of the political leverage
of this industry would lead us to expect that its investment rate at
this time exceeded that of other industries *121. The only other
industry for which I possess quantitative evidence is cotton spinning,
which exhibits no net increase in spindle stock at all *123.
In general, therefore, it seems that, except for iron and steel, the
quantity of investment undertaken in 'Gewerbe' during the inflation was
low, relative to that in other countries. What about its quality?
The 'malinvestment' (Fehlinvestitioneri), alleged by many writers *124,
may in part imply that investment in the investment goods industries
was excessive, relative to that in the consumer goods industries.
This construction of the term should entail therefore that, after the
stabilisation, the rate of growth of the capital stock in the consumer
goods industries exceeded that in the investment goods industries, by
way of 'catching up'. Fischer, using Krengel's data, believes that
this is so *125. But given Krengel's methods, this observation is of
*121 See recently G B Feldman, Iron and Steel in the German
Inflation, passim. The argument is reinforced by the inform¬
ation that, during the inflation the 'centre of gravity' of
the industry's investment was in steel making plant, not
blast furnaces: E-A 1II/3 op.cit. pp 15ff.
*123 H Grunbaum, Die Welttextilkrise, p A. Of course, cotton
was especially disadvantaged by the inflation, being depend¬
ent on an imported raw material.
*124 Eg P Bresciani-Turroni op.cit. pp 197ff.
*125 Wolfram Fischer, 'Bergbau, Industrie und Handwerk 1914-70',
citing R Krengel, Anlagevermflgen ... pp 20, 84.
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doubtful validity *126.
If Keiser and Benning's estimates of net investment undertaken by the
investigated sample during 1924-28 are divided by their estimates of
the net fixed capital stock of the same at 1.1.24 *127» then the rate
of growth of the stock in the investment goods industries (heavy
industry, metallurgy, engineering *128) and in the producer goods
industries (chemicals, building, building materials etc *129) is on
average not dissimilar (22% and 43% respectively) from that of the
consumer goods industries (26%) *130. Clearly the significant dif¬
ference is between 'new' and 'old' industries, not between 'investment'
*126 R Krengel (Anlagevermflgen ... pp 15ff; Das Anlagevermflgen
der westdeutschen Industrie ... pp 96ff) constructed his
capital stock estimates for 1924 for each of five sectors
(mining, investment goods, producer goods, consumer goods
and fodd and drink) arbitrarily to satisfy the following
conditions: a) that when cumulated with net investment to
1929 they have generated a level of depreciation allowances
sufficient to yield negative net investment 1930-3^* Bub
the net investment and depreciation allowances in qestion
were artificially constructed by writing of the capital stock
over 20-33 years on a straight-line basis. This seems an
implausible scheme, b) that the relative sizes of the fixed
capital stock in different sectors remains constant. Thus
Fischer uses a series constrained to yield constant long-run
proportionality, to prove the opposite on the short run I
*127 As they provide estimates for both the sample and the entire
industry only in respect of investment, not capital stock,
this was the only sensible procedure.
*128 Orders I and IV in Table 14 p 298 below.
*129 Orders II and III in Table 14 p 298 below.
*130 Orders V, VI and VII in Table 14 p 298 below.
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and 'consumer' goods industries *131*
So much for the intersectoral distribution of investment activity. The
quality of the fixed investment during the inflation might be open to
question on the following grounds *132.
1 The inflation period investments utilised inferior technologies.
2 The inflation period investments were so badly constructed, or
constructed out of such inferior materials, that subsequent main¬
tenance expenditure was extraordinarily high *133*
1 could be (and/or lias been; supported with the following arguments:
1a. The war and inflation cut Germany off from international
advance *13^» The war may have (though of course in certain
fields Germany led the world). But it is difficult to see how that the
inflation could have had this effect, at least in industries where large
firms predominated. Industries where the typical firm is small are
usually industries of slow technical change anyway.
1b. It was not possible to import the best foreign machinery. This
seems to be partly true according to some observations of German
mechanical engineering 135« However, even after stabilisation, the
*131 Cf Table jp in Keiser and Benning op.cit. p 86. Hayon, petroleum
and vehicles head the list; leather, margarine and shipbuilding
are at the tail. Other generalisations about the growth of
industrial economies might view as abnormal a growth of invest¬
ment goods capacity which only equalled that of consumer goods;
but the fact remains that variation of growth rates within
each category is so great as to render insecure any general¬
isation about the relationship between them.
*132 cf the discussion in Bresciani-Turroni, pp 388ff; J W Angell
op.cit. pp 46ff.
*133 C Brtickner op.cit. p 193*
*13^ cf G Stolper op.cit. p 97.
*135 Iron Age 111/1 (I923)p1259* "Machine-Tool Situation in Germany".
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values of machinery imports never exceeded % of domestic output *136,
so this can only have been of minor significance.
1c. The distorted factor cost ratios encouraged the use of tech¬
niques which were inefficient under conditions of stable prices.
It is not altogether clear in what way the factor cost ratios were
distorted. Labour was very cheap, but on the other hand capital (in
the sense of finance) was more or less free for those entrepreneurs
that had access to it. However, delays in the delivery of capital
goods may have imposed their own costs.
In certain industries acute shortages of raw materials could have com¬
pelled an adjustment of technique.
As far as capital-labour ratios are concerned, it is usually held that
the choice of optimal technology of "core" manufacturing processes is
insensitive to a wide range of different relative costs, but that
ancillary activities may be more sensitive, for example, the handling
of materials, packaging etc *137«
There is some interesting evidence on both these points. Aggregate
annual capital-labour ratios or estimates of output per capita tend
to be nisleading, because of the high incidence of labour disputes and
other interruptions. However Die Wirtschaftskurve published a series
of articles which summarise the responses to direct questionnaires
about the development of labour productivity *138» The responses
assume therefore the Essence of interruptions to the working week. They
are unfortunately too multifarious to be conveniently reproduced here.
*136 See eg G Gehrig op.cit. p 38.
*137 A S Milward and S B Saul, The Economic Development ... Vol 1,
pp I7i+ff«
*138 Wk 1(1922) H2 p5/+, H3 p58, Kb p5*t; 2(1923) P70, "Die Arbeitsleis-
tung".
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In general the data are concerned only with the output of directly
productive workers (eg shop-floor workers in a factory, workers below
ground in a mine). Thus the evidence relates well to my concept of
"core" manufacturing processes. Examples are cited from engineering
shops, coal mines, a steel-rolling mill, a cigarette factory, a shoe
factory, shipyards, clothing factories, a brickyard. The sample of
workers studied in each case is usually small. But the results are
surprisingly uniform. In general, real output per worker fell below
pre-war levels 1919/20; in 1921/22 it reocvered so that by 1922 it
was either at, or in some cases substantially above 1913 levels. The
investigated firms cited various reasons; among which the introduction
of piece work, of new machinery, rationalisation of method figured
largely. These conclusions may he confirmed by inspection of column C1
in Table 9- above p 272 . This index was obtained by dividing weight
of machinery produced by entire labour force. By this measure, labour
productivity 1921/2 was little less than in 1925*
Thus the view that there was a great fall in productivity during the
inflation is modified *139* Apart from the immediate post-war
recovery, it is valid only as a description of the effects of disordered
social conditions, not as a consequence of any deterioration in the
quality of the capital stock. The belief that "rationalisation" was
purely a post-stabilisation objective is also called in question. As
already stated, the above evidence relates chiefly to "core" manufacturing
processes. As regards "ancillary" activities, Die Wirtschaftskurve
also supplies interesting information *1*+0. There does appear to
*139 Bresciani-Turroni op.cit. pp 215-9*
*1^0 Wk 3(192*0 P165, "Die Zunahme unproduktiver Arbeitskr&fte; for a
parallel case in elec.eng. see P Czada op.cit. ppl67ff;
J W Angell op.cit. pp *+6ff.
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have been an increase in the proportion of ancillary workers (handling,
packing, clerical), to shop-floor workers, and the mechanisation and
streamlining of these activities were among the major features of the
post-stabilisation "rationalisation" *141.
As far as the relative costs of raw materials are concerned, there is
evidence that in iron and steel at least, this factor prompted a shift
in techniques. In steel making, the costs of foreign ores, hence pig
iron prompted a shift towards techniques which utilised a greater
proportion of scrap, ie from "Bessemer converters" towards "Siemens-
Martin" ovens *142. After stabilisation, a reversion to the Bessemer
process can be discerned. But despite the fuss made about this, the
distortion seems very small in toto.
1d. By shielding the German economy from foreign competetion, the
inflation blunted the incentive to utilise optimal technologies.
Some cite this to explain the failure of the vehicle industry to adopt
mass production techniques till after stabilisation *l4j, but without
a theory of the constraints on domestic competetion, this explanation
is clearly incomplete. To this we turn.
1e, Acording to Bresciani-Turroni, profits and losses were entirely
arbitrary during the inflation, and bankruptcy abolished *144.
This may mean that in certain industries, notably the consumer goods',
♦ 1^1 See *171 below.
*142 E-A III/3, Die deutsche Eisenerzaag;ende Industrie p 15*
*143 See ref *61.
*144 Bresciani-Turroni, p 219« Statistical confirmation is found in
Wk3 (1924) p 212.
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where the market was probably restricted anyway small obsolete
plant could compete successfully with modern plant of large capacity.
These conditions, and the general politico-economic climate, doubtless
also inhibited foreign direct investment. These various factors listed
under 1d. and 1e. may explain the timing of the transformation of the
vehicle and glass industries (see below p 287 )•
2. The allegation that workmanship and materials in capital goods
were inferior could be sustained with the following arguments:
2a. The political/social climate may have caused a deterioration in
the diligence of the labour force. The evidence as to this is
conflicting. The articles about labour productivity cited above *1^6
contain only a small minority of criticism on these lines. Some of
the reports of U.S. observers do stress a deterioration on this
score *1^7, but the tone of others conveys a happier picture ♦l^.
2b. The difficulty of importing may have caused inferior domestic
materials to be used. The relative scarcity of steel may - .
have caused excessive economising in its use in machinery etc. For such
conjecture however I have found no specific support in the literature.
*1^5 cf the "Haushaltsrechungen" in Wk 1(1922; H2 p23 and in all
subsequent issues 1922-23# These dem nstrate clearly the
expense reduction of "luxury" expenditure by the average household.
*1^6 See ref *1^6.
*1^7 Maschinenbau 2(1923)P 3&7» "Amerikanischer Urteil fiber den
deutschen Kaschinenbau". Iron Age 111/1(1923) p33» "Changed
Machine Tool Shop in Germany; 112/1(1923) p 258, "Germany's
Machinery Trade".
*1^8 Iron Age 111/1(1923) P 758, "Today's Products of the Krupp Works"
111/1(1923) p886, "Famous German Forging and Machine Plants".
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2c. Delays in delivery associated with the extraordinarily high
pressure of economic activity may have encouraged the builders
of capital goods to "cut corners". Again this is sheer conjecture.
On the other hand, in the later 1920s Americans were still criticising
Germans for building blast furnaces and other equipment too solidly,
for failing to "plan obsolescence and the like" *150; a. little less
solidity in capital goods construction here and there could do no harm.
In other ways shortages could stimulate technical progress; eg in
stimulating the search for heat economics in iron and steel *151
(though the reasons for the gains actually registered are a complex
matter *152).
The conclusion of this subsection is therefore, that the rate of fixed
investment in 'Gewerbe' in the period 1919-23 was probably lower,
relative to 'normal' than it was in the UK and the USA, but that the
allegations tlit its interindustrial distribution subsequently proved
inefficient, or that its quality was inferior, cannot be satisfactorily
substantiated.
8.4,3. Contemporary Impression of the Quality of the Fixed Capital
Stock c.1926
I now turn to the second question on p 271 above. What was the observed
rate of technical change during 1926-29? I preface this with remarks
*150 Iron Age 121(1928) p10ll, "German High Tonnage Furnaces".
111/1(1923) P1259, "Machine Tool Situation in Germany".
J W Angell p 115-
*151 Bresciani-Turroni op.cit. p 198.
*152 E-A 111/3, Die deutsche Eisenerzeugende Industrie p 26.
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on contemporary impressions of the technical state of the stock in
about 1926 - at the start of the fixed investment boom.
About this time foreigners made interesting comments about the quality
of the capital stock of a number of industries. Firstly, a favourable
impression from 1924: "There is no doubt of the excellent physical
condition of Germany's industrial plant" *153* American observers of
German heavy industry at the end of the inflation expressed general
admiration of the quality of the technology *154; the criticisms
voiced refer rather to the socio-economic environment than to the plant
itself *155« After the stabilisation, Americans found German practice
to lag their own in certain respects - notably the handling of
materials *156 - but overall, the impression conveyed throughout the
1920s is that German practice is every bit as competent as the American
American correspondents in Iron Age also commented on the state of the
mechanical engineering industry. Naturally their observations are
confined to the largest, most renowned workshops. There are for example
two reports of visits to Krupps. The first observer was "impressed with
the organisation and efficiency of the works" *158- The second however
*153 Iron Age 113/2(1924; p 1219, 'Germany's High Costs Hamper
Industry'• Cf a similar comment by J W Angell op.cit. p 238.
*154 Iron Age 111/2(1923) P 1725,'Changes in German Steel Practice'.
*155 Iron Age 113/1( ) p230» 'Year of Collapse in German Industry'
*156 Iron Age 115(1925) P1571, 'How Germany can learn from the US'.
*157 Iron Age (1927) p15^5» 'German Industry nearing pre-war Status';
123(1929) P 939, 'German Rolling Kill Practice'.
*158 Iron Age 111/1(1923)pp756-60, 'Today's Products of the Krupp
Works *•
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found that "its equipment had distinctly more of old types than
desirable" *159* Reports on other famous works were however generally
favourable *160, with the reservation that Germans did not 'plan the
obsolescence' of their equipment sufficiently fast, nor specialise
enough *161. Even at the end of the 1920s it was observed that the
labour productivity of German mechanical engineering was much below
that of the U.S. industry *162. This may have been justified of
course by relative factor costs.
A review of the German shipbuilding industry at the end of the inflation
criticised it for its obsoleteness *163 - a surprising observation in
view of the great expansion of the industry's capacity during and after
the war.
Similar evidence about electrical engineering is scarce. A U.S. visitor
to AEG was apparently impressed by the plant. "Wherever applicable
with profit, western appliance and methods were adopted" *16^. This
is no more than one would expect.
Textiles. Here my evidence relates to the end of the 1920s. Angell and
Brady thought that the German textile industry employed a technology
inferior to that of the UK and the US *165. German opinion varied. A
*159 Iron Age 1l8(l926)pp1066-7,'German Industry striding Forward',
ct JiascEThenbau 2(1923) p367,'Amerikischer Urteil ...'.
•16O Iron Age 111/1(1923) p886-8,'Famous German Forging and Machine
Plant'.
*161 Iron ge 111/2(1923) p1259»'Machine Tool Situation in Germany'.
*162 Cf the statistics in Maschinenbau 7(1928) pp 38^-5*
*163 Iron Age 111/1(1923/* p^72,'Present Plight of German Shipbuilding'.
*16^ See reference in *159.
*165 J W Angell op.cit. pp 168-70; R A Brady, The Rationalisation
Movement in German Industry, pp 263ff.
286 8/52
study-group which toured England broadly concurred with Angell, though
not failing to mention examples where Ehglish technology lagged Wiind
German *166. A trade-union spokesman in 1930 believed that, as a
consequence of the 'Rationalisation', German practice was second to
none, but he was trying to persuade his colhagues to take a more
positive view of technical change *167. It seems doubtful whether the
relative backwardness of German textiles had diminished in the period
191>23.
8.*+.*+. Technical Change 1926-29
I now look directly at the importance of technical modernisation in
the investment boom of 1926-29.
Before trying to summarise the details, a few general remarks on
'rationalisation' - the vogue word of the later 1920s, used to character¬
ise the investment activity of the time - are desirable. Many cf the
first and foremost processes represented by this word have only minimal
implications for real investment activity. For example, reorganisation
of the ownership structure, cartellisation, the shutting down of
obsolete plant and concentration of production in the most efficient.
These headed the list in an authoritative review of 'rationalisation'
in heavy industry *168. In industries such as engineering, standard-
*166 Spinner und Weber(1929) Mr 9» P 69» 'Studienreise in die
englische Textilindustrie'5 see also ibid. Nr JO p 20, 'Die
L hnkosten in der europgischen Baumwollindustrie'.
♦167 Spinner und Weber (1930 S Nr 28 p 17, 'Rationalisierung in der
Textilindustrie'.
*168 J W Reichert (Executive Head of VIESI), 'Kationalisierungsarbeiten
ira Kohlenbergbau sowie in der Eisen- und Stahlindustrie', Stahl
una Eisen *+8(1928) pp *+1-2. Cf J W Angell op.cit.pp l87ff« Also
the statement of F Deutsch (AEG) in Wd 10/1 (1925) P *+*+0.
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isation was one of the first things implied by the word *169. Other
aspects are only slightly more pertinent to real investment - eg
specialisation of output between plants *170. Only after clearing
these meanings out of the way do we come on the investment (technical
change) associations of the word *171*
Thus, contemporary witness to the magnitude of the 'rationalisation
movement' is consistent with other evidence of an only moderate rate
of fixed investment.
Contemporary comment on the rate of technical change throughout industry
does not suggest an abnormal rate. The techniques of a few industries
were radically transformed in those years. Notable among these are
vehicles *172, and plate glass. In both cases the innovation of
American methods by subsidiaries of US firms forced German competitors
to follow suit *173*
Given the foreign influence, it is possible that both processes were
delayed by the socio-economic conditions of 1920-25*
In other industries, technical progress was rapid though falling short
*169 B Warriner op.cit. pp 29ff; *+0ff.
*170 See reference *168; Verein deutscher Maschinenbau .nstalten,
Die deutsche Maschinenindustrie 1927-28, pp 26-9.
*171 In confirmation of this argument see E A Brady op.cit. passim;
F Meyenburg, 'Eationalisierung der technischen Betriebsorgan-
isation'; also Clausing's distinction between expenditure
on rationalisation and on innovation: op.cit. p 123« Modern
writers follow this view: D Petzina, Die deutsche Wirtschaft ...
p 57; K Borchardt, 'Wachstum ..." p 688.
*172 Probably true only of leading firms. Cf R J Overy, Cars,
Roads ... pp h66-7; the Wd articles cited in *62, *63; the
Annual Reports of Adlerwerke, NAG, Daimler-Benz, Opel, etc.
*173 See references in *105.
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of "transformation". The whole range of heavy industry exemplifies
this. In hard-coal mining there was both an actension of the mechani¬
sation of extraction and change in the mechanical techniques used; in
addition there was increased electrification and use of bechanical
rather than animal transport underground. Above ground there was con¬
siderable improvement of coal handling, sorting and cleaning equip¬
ment *1?4, often accompanying a concentration of these processes in
fewer larger establishments. The replacement of colliery coking plants
with fewer large "central coking plants" was a notable example of a
similar process *175*
In iron and steel, in addition to the moderate reversion to the Bessemer
process mentioned above (p 281 ) there was a steady drift towards larger
plant - blast furnaces, steel furnaces/ovens, and rolling mills,
associated with a parallel emphasis on improved power sources and
handling equipment *176. Much emphasis was put on the increased speed
of processing (Durchsatz-geschwindigkeit) which these and other improve¬
ments produced as also on the gains in heat economies - a constant
objective for which a special research institute was set up
*174 Stahl und Eisen, article cited in *168; Gltickauf (1928) p732ff;
"Grtind6; ftfr die Zu-oder Abnahme der verschiedenen Gewinnungs-
maschinen"; Keiser und Benning op.cit. p 42. See also relevant
company reports eg Harpener Bergbau, for 1926-29; DBZ 13/3/28,
p 1, "Das Ergebnis der Rationalisierung im Ruhrbergbau."
♦175 KB p 42; R A Brady op.cit. p 82ff; DBZ 12/4/27 P 1, "Grund-
sHtzliches zur Preispolitik der Eisenschaffenden Industrie."
*176 Stahl und Eisen, article cited *168; Iron Age 120(1927) p 440,
"Large German Units put to work"; Ibid, p 50, "Germany Modern¬
ising Blast Furnaces"; 121 (1928) p 1011, "German High Tonnage
iurnaces" 123 (1929) P 939» "German Rolling Mill Practice",
also the DBZ article cited in *175*
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(Wgrmewirtschaftstelle) *177.
Rationalisation in iron and steel had a definite effect on employment.
While output increased 1925-29 employment fell *178. It would be
interesting to analyse how many of these were "core" and how many
"ancillary" production workers but unfortunately I do not have the
data.
There is a good deal of evidence of fairly rapid technical progress in
the paper-making industry *179. This was mainly to increase precision
of control of processes; but furthermore considerable sums were spent
on improvement of efficiency of heat utilisation, and of the transport
and handling of materials. Paper-making was an industry where despite
the expenditure, even in 1930 some believed it still to lag the
practice of foreigners *180. A related branch also undergoing con¬
siderable technical advance was printing *181.
Most industries however, seem to have been characterised by a rather
moderate rate of progress. Almost every branch, for example, was
engaged in electrification and some improvements in the handling of
materials *182. In cotton, there was a slow spread in ring-spinning
and the number of automatic looms *183. This seems rather typical of
*177 E-A III/3 "Pie deutsche Eisenerzengende Industrie", pp
Stahl und Eisen article cited *168; J Strohe op.cit. p
26ff;
25.
*178 See the statistics in E-A III/3 op.cit. p 8f.
*179 See the refs. in *1o^; also Keiser and Benning op.cit. PP 51-2.
*180 E-A 1/5/10, Die deutsche £ellstoff...industrie, pp 80ff.
*181 Keiser and Benning op.cit. p 7^.
*182 E-A 1/5/11, Pie deutsche Eisen und Stahlwarenindustrie
Keiser and Benning op.cit. pp 39-?*+ passim.
PP 221 ff
*183 E Welter Stockung p 30.
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many industries. In a number of industries there is a considerable
evidence of a rise in output per employee, even though no specific
technical advances can be pinpointed - for example electrical engin¬
eering *l8h. Since these gains tend to be concentrated on 1925/6
(this is true also for iron and steel) they appear to be once-over
improvements after the stabilisation - perhaps also a confirmation of
the distinction made above between the effects of the inflation:-on
"core" and on "ancillary" technologies (p 279 ).
By adopting a branch-by-branch approach I have been ignoring the
"aggregative" technical change represented by the advance of new
industries, the decline of old ones - eg of rayon at the expense of
cotton, the rise new consumer goods' industries - eg cosmetics,
pharmaceuticals, photography, and the stagnation of older ones, eg
wood-working *185.
This kind of change is even more difficult to appraise. Given the
German hegemony of the world chemical and electrical industries however,
I find it difficult to believe that in 1926 Germany had any especial
backwardness in the development of these branches to make good.
Finally, this section gives occasion to mention the much neglected
sectors; Retail and Wholesale trade. In retail trade the continued
spread of multiple stores such as Woolworths, and department stores,
and the assumption of wholesale functions by large retail concerns, at
the expense of "traditional" wholesale, amounts to quite agnificant
*l8h
*185
Czada op.cit. p l82ff.
Keiser and Benning op.cit. p 71.
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8.4.5* Conclusion: The Nature of Investment Activity in 'Gewerbe'
The evidence assembled in this section and the preceding one seems to
indicate that the bulk of investment activity was probably directed
toward quality improvement; far from quantitative extension having
been prominent, the term 'rationalisation' implies rather a reduction
in capacity by the scrapping of obsolete plant. This finding may help
to reconcile the tension between the failure of the aggregate statis¬
tical estimates of capital stock utilisation to decline after 1927
(Table 4 p 255^ % anc* the subsequently described impression, gleaned
from the writings of contemporaries, that such a deterioration did
occur: the modern (ie non-obsolete) capital stock may have been
expanding more rapidly than output in 1926-29# The perception that
excess capacity thus defined was developing in 1928 may perhaps help
to account for the observed reduction in investment then.
Nevertheless, it was also no£ed that the term 'rationalisation' does
not imply an exceptional rate of real innovatory investment, nor a
wealth of long-gestation capital programmes. I have assembled a large
number of cases where it is stated that the rate of investment is being-
reduced in 1928/9 b?cause the planned programme "has reached some kind
of a conclusion" ("ist zu einem f ev/issen Abschluss gekommen"). At
first I tended to discount such statements as concealing the true
*186 Wd 15/2(1928) p 1501, "Die Ausdehnung der Warenhatiser".
Wk 6(1927) P 290, "Die kationalisierung in Textileinzelhandel,"
cf K A Brady op.cit. pp 263ff.
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causes of the decline. The sheer amount of repetition of them, in
widely differing industrial contexts, made this policy seem over-
subtle; maybe they do point to a real reason for the investment
decline. As the references are too numerous for a footnote, I have
set them out in Appendix VII.
8.5« The Determinants of Output in 'Gewerbe'
Capacity utilisation is a joint function of the growth of the capital
stock, and of the growth of output. Having considered the former,
I now turn to the latter.
Output in 'Gewerbe' is partly determined by investment within the sector,
and its multiplier effects. In the short run, the most significant
component of this is inventory investment. I have already shown that
an 'inventory cycle' in 'Gewerbe', aggravated by the tight liquidity
conditions, dominated short-run macro-economic change between 1924
and 1927. Hence, the reduction in the utilisation of the capital stock
in 1926. But the reduction in the rate of inventory investment from
early/mid 1928 was milder and, anyway, postdates the origins of the
decline in domestic new machinery orders.
In a complex modern economy, the demand from other sectors v/ill be
as, or more, important a determinant of output in 'Gewerbe'. The
decline in fixed investment in sections of the public and semi-public
sectors, already noted in 1928, has been described in Chapter 6. In
particular, the abrupt curtailment of the German kailway Co.'s investment
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programme at the end of 1927 *187 had acute repercussions on iron
and steel *188, on locomotive and waggon building, small iron and
steel wares and building *189.
The reduction in the rate of agricultural fixed investment in 1928 will
likewise be noticed below *190.
On the other hand, exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures rose
strongly at the end of the decade.
Table Exports of Manufactures and Semi-Manufactures:
Output of Mining and Manufacturing





Current 1913 Current 1913 Current 1913
Prices Index Prices Index Prices Index
1925 5.6 74 1.7 60 33.9* 101
1926 5.8 79 2.3 83 32.4* 93
1927 6.4 86 2.3 78 42.5* 116
1928 7.2 94 2.5 88 46.1* 116
1929 8.1 107 2.8 101 48.4* 119




See pp 179ff above.
In 'normal' (? pre-war) times c.17% of the entire output of .
rolled products was railway material: V.jh.Kon.j»forsch. 1927 H2
p *+6, H3 p 42. The relevant sections of iron/steel had order
books assuring six months employment in the first half of 1927 -
far longer 1han any other sections. By April 1928 this had fallen
to 4-5 weeks; cf *78 p 26labove.
Commerce Reports 13/5/29 P 4-30, 'The German Loco Building
Industry'; E-A 1/5/11, Die deutsche Eisen- und Stahlwaren-
industrie, pp 268ff; Dement 1928 p 1023, 'Betrachtungen zur
Reichsbahnbau- und Beschaffungspolotik'.
*190 See pp 355ff and references thereto
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To some extent, this reflects the international upswing of these years,
and the recovery of Germany's position on international markets. It
also, however, partly represents the remedy traditionally resorted to
by German manufacturers in time of domestic recession *191.
The domestic investment recession in branches of the economy other than
'Gewerbe' can feirly be ascribed to credit difficulties, according to
the discussion in the relevant chapters. These are both long term
difficulties, associated with the speed with which debts were recon¬
structed after the stabilisation - and their maturity structure; and
short term difficulties, associated above all with the collapse of the
domestic capital market in 1927* The credit difficulties of these
sectors may have mediately affected investment in 'Gewerbe1, by reducing
demand for its products (especially those of the iron and steel industry -
the most heavily investing branch of 'Gewerbe' at the time) and hence
its capital stock utilisation.
8.6. External Financing
From Table 9a pl87 it is apparent that c.70% of bonds issued by
Gewerbe in the period under review were issued abroad. Naturally, only
larger companies could float bonds abroad, above all heavy industry and
electrical engineering *192. Shares were almost never issued abroad,
*191 'Exportventil'. See further pp 31jff below.
*192 See also Table 9a p 187 .
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but this form of financing was open only to appropriately organised
(and usually larger) companies. Thus there was a clear distinction
between the long term financing opportunities open to larger and those
open to smaller firms. Contemporaries were vividly aware of this *193*
Three specialised institutions were set up in the period to raise
finance abroad for smaller businesses: the Sflchsische Landespfand-
briefanstalt, the Pfglzische Wirtschaftsbank and the Centralbank
deutscher Industrieller *19*+. In later 1927 the Deutsche Bank took the
unprecedented step of raising a Ofej mill.loan in the U.S. in order to
consolidate the short term debts of its medium sized clients *195*
Very probably, smaller firms had poorer access to short term credits
also. On the one hand, they, above all, were often caught in a pincers
between the strict payments conditions imposed by their large suppliers,
and the tardy receipts of payments due to them from their customers *196.
In addition, their links with the great commercial banks were poorer
*193 A Lansburgh, 'Die Finanzierung des Kapitalbedarfs der Kittells«d-
Kleinindustrie ...'; J Hirsch, 'Wandlungen im £ufbau der
deutschen Industrie'; cf. P Czada op.cit. pp 174, 188. The
Reich Federation of German Industry had a committee (on bank
and credit problems) which concerned itself (with anall success)
with this matter: B A Nachlass Silverberg JO.
*194 For general discussion: W Hagemann, Das Vcrhgltnis der Gross-
banken zur Industrie pp 37ff. On specific institutions:
Maschinenbau 6(1927) p 818, 'Die Beschaffung langfristiger
Kredite fur die Industrie'; Verein deutscher Maschinenbau
Anstalten, Die duutsche Kaschinenindustrie 1927/8 p 58ff;
HdW 9/8/28 p 1241-3, 'Industrielle Realkredit'; IHZ 15/2/27,
'Die auslSndische Kreditquellen der mittleren Industrie*;
P Schulz-Kiesar, 'Das langfristige Kreditproblem der mittleren
Industrie'.
*195 IHZ 10/9/27, 'Die merika-Anleihe der Deutschen Bank';
KdW 1/8/28, 'Die Deutsche Bank Sammelanleihe'.
*196 Eg E-A 1/5/11 op.cit. p 158.
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than those of the large firms *19?. Savings banks partly, but only
partly, remedied the deficiency »198. The distinction just drawn
between the availability of external finance to large and small firms
is of little relevance to the earlier downturn in fixed investment -
in 1925. Domestic long term capital issuing was not yet possible till
early 1926; foreign issuing was still relatively small *200. The
'liquidation crisis' whrh commenced in July 1925 spread to all sections
of industry, irrespective of firm size.
If change in the availability of external finance was a material cause
of the 1928 recession however, there should be an observable distinction
between the investment behaviour of large- and small-firm industries.
Since, broadly speaking, the deterioration of domestic capital market
conditions (FebruaryA-ay 1927) antedates the definitive deterioration
of foreign capital market conditions by at least a year, the investment
activity of domestic-dependent (ie snail-firm) industries should be
observed to decline before that of large-firm industries.
*197 Throughout this period, but especially during 1927-29, credit
banks lent foreign currency credits to big business at up to
2% cheaper than they extended Em.credits to 'average' customers;
M J Bonn, 'Die Wirkung des hohen Zinsfusses auf Handel und
Bankwesen', pp 375-7; G Bernhard, 'Die LiquiditatsstHrungen
und die Krise des deutschen Eankensystems' pp 332ff. It seems
very liely that the banks'demand for security on advances
discriminated against smaller clients. Cf above pp ff.
*198 W Prion, 'Die Sparkassen als Kreditgeber des Mittelstandes';
J Hoffmann, 'Der Aufstieg der Sparkassen', in Wk 6(1927)
pp 305ff.
*200 The high degree of short term financing by firms, as a con¬
sequence of the unavailability of long term finance, excited
contemporary comment: kk ?(l925-> pp ?3Hf» kurzfristige
Verbindlichkeiten der deutschen Industrie'. This, of course,
may have exacerbated the crisis.
297 8/63
Already the analysis of 1927 balance sheets in Wirtschaftsdienst
expresses concern about the apparent level of short term financing of
fixed investment in the following branches: paper *201, glass *202,
flour-milling *203, leather *204, linen *205, and chocolate *206.
All these industries tended to be dominated by smaller firms. Reference
to Table 14 overleaf shows that gross fixed invedtoent was less in 1928
than in 1927 in all these branches except glass *207 and leather (where
it failed to rise). Apart from these industries, gross fixed investment
fell (between 1927-28) in vehicles, shipbuilding, building, brandy/
yeast, muacal instruments, and woodworking (consumer goods). Except
for the first two (both of which suffered from serious problems of
excess capacity and foreign competition *208.), all of these were small-
firm industries. Of firms experiencing definite increases in fixed
investment, only clothing and iron/steel and metal goods seem to me to
qualify as 'small-firm' industries; and in neither was the increase
above that for industry as a whole.
Were idiosyncratic sales developments responsible for the investment
*201 Wd_ 13/2(1928) p 1851, 'Die deutsche Papierindustrie'.
*202 Wd_ 13/2(1928) p 1152, 'Die deutsche Glasindustrie im Jahre 1927'*
*203 Wd 13/2(1928) p 1508, 'Bilanzanspannung in der KtfcJenindustrie'.
*204 Wd 13/2(1928) p 1719, 'Die deutsche Lederindustrie'.
*205 Wd 14/1(1929) p 449, 'Die deutsche Leinenindustrie'.
*206 Wd 13/2(1928) p 1419, 'Die Krise in der Schokoladenindustrie'.
*207 But the glass industry was in the midst of radical technical
transformation. See p 287ff above.
*208 See pp257,265 above.
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Table 14 Gross Investment in Industry and Mining by Branches 1925-29;
Mill R.M.
BRANCH 2221 2221 1927 1928 1929
I Mining and Smelting
Heavy Industry 381 320 500 570 330
Lignite 56 44 72 74 65
Non-ferrous Mining and Smelt 53 38 37 47 42
Total 490 402 609 691 437
II Chemical, Petrol, Potash
Chemical Industry 191 190 207 333 250
Petroleum Industry 27 54 72 85 96
Potash (incl. Rock Salt; 95 52 35 38 46
Total 313 296 314 456 392
III Misc. Producer Goods Industries
Paper Industry (Paper Making) 69 51 85 70 69
Building Industry 70 40 72 63 54
Building Materials Industry 82 69 86 108 90
Rubber and Asbestos 17 15 13 13 13
Saw-Milling 10 9 8 8 8
Leather and Leather Goods 14 7 11 11 10
Total 262 191 275 273 244
IV Engineering and Related Industries
Electrical liigineering 6© 61 78 84 83
Mechanical Engineering 154 90 112 128 96
Vehicles, Motor-Cycles, Cycles 64 47. 65 60 46
Locomotive, Waggon Building 9 7 10 16 12
Shipbuilding 6 9 13 9 10
Total 301 214 278 297 247
V Textile ana Clothing Industries
Spinning and Weaving 170 137 154 177 141
of which: Wool (60) (48) (41) (54) (63)
Cotton (55) (54) (72) (79) (44)
Coarse Fibres (19) (11) (13) (12) (15)
Silk, Combined
Firms (36) (24) (28) (32) (19)
Other Textile Industry * 94 69 63 93 53
Rayon 30 23 56 67 22
Clotbhg Industry 20 9 13 17 15
Shoe Industry 6 5 11 11 6




VI Food, Drink, Tobacco
Brewing and Malting 107
Chocolate and Confectionery 25
(Flour; Milling 2b
Brandy and Yeast 16
Sugar Industry 2b
Margarine and Other Fats 1L
Other Foodstuffs, Tobacco 72
Total 280
VII Misc. Consumer Goods Industries
Printing and Publishing 65
Fine Ceramics and Glass 25
Musical 'instruments and Toys 12
Iron, Steel, and Metetl Goods 60
Clocks, Optical, Precision Big. 17
Woodworking (excl. Saw-Mills; 20
Linoleum 8
Paper Processing Industries 10
Total 217
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRY 2185
I - IV Producer Goods Inds. 1366
V - VII Consumer Goods Inds. 817
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2221 1927 2221 2221
112 120 138 118
12 20 15 15
16 22 16 15
8 13 10 10
17 15 18 10
9 12 15 19
L9 51 65 70
223 253 277 257
81 70 85 58
36 30 *+i 23
10 1^ 11 8
b9 59 72 63
9 12 13 10
12 21 18 20
b b b 5
8 12 12 12
209 222 256 199
1778 22^8 2221 2015
1103 1V?6 1717 1320
675 772 898 693
* ie Knitted Goods and the like.
SOURCE; Stat.Jb.f.d.dt.R. 1958, p 566.
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SOURCE: Ifk, Kon.i-stat.Hdb. (1936)
1222 1928 1929 193c
102 100 108 95
113 100 112 79
91 100 105 88
103 100 95 72
89 100 107 96
95 100 106 102
9k 100 99 95
92 100 98 82
97 100 93 73
106 100 91 72
105 100 86 67
113 100 91 82
100 119 10.7
80 100 101 83
8k 100 89 72
80 100 121 72
93 100 120 104
113 100 86 82
104 100 92 92
115 100 97 104
105 100 96 94
109 100 85 86
110 100 99 81
163 100 88 83
150 100 93 76
120 100 96 92
85 100 91 87
104 100 78 70
110 100 93 89
90 100 103 93
97 100 108 87
93 100 102 100
101 100 99 96
7k 100 110 92
90 100 197 132
95 100 106 108
117 100 80 46
PP 49-50.
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patterns in these industries between 1927 and 1928? See Table 15
p 300. Output fell definitely in linen and leather; increased
clearly in building and chocolate *209« There was also a pronounced
output fall in iron/steel; yet investment in this branch rose. Output
does not seem to correlate as well with the reduction in gross fixed
investment as does the evidence of external financial constraints.
The domestic financial collapse, affecting most acutely industries
populated by smaller firms, seems therefore to be the factor most
closely related to the reduction of gross fixed investment in 1928 *210.
Of the industries listed whose 1927 balance sheets excited the dis¬
quiet of Wirtschaftsdienst analysts, only paper *211, and glass *212
were analysed again for 1928; in both cases the same disquiet was
again expressed. Additional branches whose balance sheets excited
*209 Output data are not available for glass.
*210 One notable feature of the domestic stock market after May
1927» even during its v;aak recovery in 1928, was the total
absence of issues of medium sized firms, who had participated
quite strongly in the stock market boom: V.jh.Kon.j.forsch.
1928 H1A p 11.
*211 Wd 15/1(1930) p 539, 'hntwicklung und Lage in der Papier-
industrie'.
*212 Wd 14/1(1929) p 1065, 'Die deutsche Glasindustrie im Jahre
1928*.
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concern on this score as regards 1928 were hard-coal *213»
vehicles *214, linoleum *215» jute and hemp *216, and knitted
goods *217. Other industries did not exhibit these symptoms.
Wirtschaftsdienst analysts found nothing to warrant unfavourable comment
in the 1928 debt patterns of cotton-weaving *218, textile
machinery *219» electrical engineering *220, cement *221, and
rubber *222. For iron and steel I found conflicting views *223.
*213 Wfi 14/2(1929), 'Die Lage des westfHlischen Steinkohlenbergbaues'.
Illustrative, or, possibly, determinative of this observation is
the direct evidence of cancellation by Harpener Bergbau AG (the
largest Ruhr 'pure coal' concern J in November 1928, of 45% of
the capital expenditure programme ratified at the board meeting
of July 1928o BA Silverberg Nachlass 204 pp 169,218. Since
Harpener was one of the few large firms to mention illiquidity
in its Annual Report for that year, and the only German private
co. to float a foreign loan in early 1929 (Wk 8(1929) PP 25»140,
'Deutsche Anleihen im Ausland'), its case may however be extreme.
*214 Wd 1VK1929) P1018, 'Die deutsche Kraftfahrzeugenindustrie im
Jahre 1928'.
*215 Wd 14/2(1929) p 2124, 'Die deutsche Linoleumindustrie'.
216 Wd 1^/1(1929) P 275» 'Die deutsche Jite- und Hanfindustrie'.*
'217 Wd 14/2(1929) P1770,'Die deutsche Wirkereien und Strickereien
seit 19?7'•
♦218 Wd 14/2(1929) P 1719, 'Die deutsche Baumwollwebereien'.
*219 Wd 14/2(1929) P 1366, 'Die deutsche Textilmaschfenindustrie'.
*220 Wd 14/1(1929) P 360, 'Zur Lage der deutschen Elektrotech-
nischen Industrie'.
*221 Wd 14/1(1929) p851,'Die deutsche Zementindustrie im Jahre 1928'.
*222 Wd 14/2(1929) p2254,'Die deutsche Gummi-industrie im Jahre 1928/9'.
*223 Wd 14/1(1929) p1053»'Zur Lage der deutschen Eisenindustrie'
ascertains no over-extension of short term debt. Kon.j.berichte
'Westen' 1932 H2 pp 21-6,'Zur Bilanz der rheinisch-westfHlischen
Grosseisenindustrie', and J Strohe op.cit. pp 31-39 reach the
opposite conclusion, but both with hindsight. W Treue found
evidence of growing illiquidity at this time in his history of
Ilseder Htitte (tie Geschichte ... pp 319-20;.
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In trying to relate this information to the data on gross fixed invest¬
ment between 1928 and 1929 (Table 1*+), textile machinery and cement
have to be equated with mechanical engineering and building materials
respectively. This done, comparison of the above remarks with Table 14
will show that there is less relationship between the pattern of invest¬
ment change and reports of excessive short term cfebt, than was the case
in 1927.
On the other hand, there is better evidence to relate the investment
decline between 1928-29 to real factors, than there was in 1927-28.
This can be shown by comparing; the investment data in Table 14 with
the output data in Table 15.
The sector in which, on average, gross investment fell least 1928-29
is food, drink and tobacco, that is, the branch whose output was the
most stable, both in the long run, and 1927-29 in particular.
The sector which displayed the greatest fall is textiles. This seems
clearly related in aggregate to the fact that output fell more 1927-28
in textiles than in any other sector. This has already been attributed
to the operation of a textile inventory cycle. Nevertheless, within
textiles, the steepest fall in investment occurs in rayon, a branch
for which output rose 1927-29 at a fast rate. In this case however
there is clear evidence of the gsiergence of serious excess capacity in
1928 (p 257 above), perhaps in accordance with the "model" of an industry
where technical change is rapid and gestation periods long.
Evidently the relative rates of decline of gross investment in other
branches of the textile sector are not solely connected with the relative
prior rates of fall of output. For example, compare output and invest¬
ment figures for cotton and wool-spinning and weaving. Investment
fell in ootton, rose in wool, despite similar output development.
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This however fits in with evidence cited earlier, that in 1928, the
cotton branch was less prosperous than the "Kammgarn" branch *223A.
The knitted goods branch registers a severe decline in investment; also
output 1928-29; and there is non-quantitative evidence of the emergence
of excess capacity *223B.
Other branches for which gross investment fell dramatically 1928-29
are:
(1, Heavy Industry. As the chapter has shown, this decline has an
abundance of explanation, without introducing external financial
factors. Firstly capacity was excessive in this branch throughout the
period 1924-29 except part of 1927; nor was the productive plant
obsolete. The inference that therefore the investment boom was
relatively weak and may itself have been beginning to come to a natural
conclusion is abundantly supported in contemporary comment (Appendix VI),
The degree of utilisation fell away after 1927 as already stated;
finally the internal cash flow was caught to an unusual degree between
the pressures of rising wage costs and falling average prices due to
the increasing proportion of iron and steel directly and indirectly
exported. This industry registered one of the sharpest falls in profits
1927-28 *224.
(2) Shoes. This industry was severely afflicted by foreign compe¬
tition (p269-'• In 1929 domestic sales increased somewhat;
accordingly gross investment expenditure rose in 1950 to Km 8 mill.
(3) Sugar. I have no evidence at all about this branch.
*223A See Footnotes *91 and *93 of this chapter.
*223B See Footnote *92 of this chapter.
*224 M Sweezy, 'German Corporate Profits 1926-38', p 390. This is
discussed further in the next sections of this chapter.
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(4) Glass and Ceramics. The technical transformation of the plate-
glass (Flachglas; section of the glass industry was substantially
complete by 1929 (p 287and refs thereto; also Appendix VI;. As a
consequence, considerable excess capacity emerged in glass in 1928-29;
excess capacity was also evident in porcelain.
(5) Publishing, Printing. There was considerable technical progress
in this branch (p289 ). We may therefore have to do here with
the 'natural conclusion' of investment programmes.
Two branches which might have been expected to appear in this list, do
not. The first is vehicles. But in this case there is evidence that
even in 1929 the technical transformation was not yet complete (p 287).
The second is flour milling. But from Table 14 it can be seen that
already by 1928 gross investment had fallen appreciably in this branch.
This is consistent with the fact that for this branch my information
of excess capacity refers to 1927 (p 269).
Did the exceptions prove the rule? What about branches where gross
investment in 1929 was as high as, or higher than in 1928?
1) Petroleum. The output statistics confirm that this was a growth
industry.
2) Potash. Output of potash and rock salt increased 1927-29.
3) Paper-making. Output rose 1927-28; fell 1928-29. This is the only
branch for v/hich I have evidence that 'intrinsic' demand for modern¬
isation remained strong into 1930 (p 289 )•
4) Rubber. Output increased 1927-29.
5) Electrical Engineering. Output increased 1927-29 *225. The annual
*225 cf also the estimates in G Gehrig op.cit. p 38.
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reports of AEG and the Siemens concern indicate that not until 1929
did the investment programme begin to reach a conclusion
(Appendix VI).
6) Shipbuilding.. Output increased appreciably 1927.
7) Wool. This is hard to explain in terms of my theory.
8) Coarse Fibres. As for wool. It is interesting however that invest¬
ment declines in wool and coarse fibres were greater than for any
other textile branch in 1930. Tims it looks like some sort of
delayed reaction.
9) Brandy. Output rose appreciably 1927-29.
10) Margarine. Output rose 1927-29.
11) Wood working. I lack the statistics to explain this case. The
evidence of the relevant sections of the V.ih.Kon.i-forsch. suggests
that output ii 1928 was less than in 1927i but recovered somewhat in
1929 due to improved orders from railway waggon building, shipbuilding
and for furniture *226. This does however pre-suppose a shorter
lag between output and investment than I have usually worked with.
12) Linoleum. Output increased considerably 1927-28; it fell in 1929«
and gross investment slumped in 1930.
13) Paper Processing. Perhaps as for paper-making.
The only branch not already mentioned, for which output increased
appreciably 1927-28, but gross investment fell 1928-29, is mechanical
engineering. Here, as already remarked, presumably the pervasive excess
capacity obscured any real link betw een investment and output.




In Table 16 below data are presented on (a) capital income, (b) profit
rates, (C) the wage-income ratio and its components: ie (D) the price
of manufactured goods, and (E) unit wage costs, which in turn decomposes
into (F) money wages, ad (G) labour productivity.
The availability of internal finance has been obliquely considered by
a number of German historians *227, who recognise the relevance of wage
increases in the late 1920s to this issue, but not exactly in the
analytical context of this chapter.
This subsection asserts that firms' internal cash flow was reduced in
the period 1927-29 by two developments.
(i) A 'wages explosion' which increased real wage costs, and
reduced profits' share.
(ii) An increase in the proportion of output exported, in virtue
of the fact that in many significant branches export prices
were below domestic.
I consider first, as a general indicator of the development of the
internal cash flow, the behaviour of capital income and profits. All
series in Table 16a and 16B agree that these magnitudes fell in 1928.
However, as the notes to that Table ecplain, columns (1;, (2) and (k)
are not independent, so it is the agreement between these and (3) that
is of interest. This of itself refutes two possible criticisms of
the statistics.
*227 See p153ff above; also K E Born, Die deutsche Bankenkrise,
PP 35-6.
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Table 16 Internal Financing 1924-29 (Gewerbe, unless dherwise stated)
A Capital Income
Krd Em
B Profit Hate %
(i) 'Gewerbe' (ii) Industry Trade (iii) Whole
Commerce Economy
1925 2.6 (3.1) 6.8
1926 2.5 2.1 4.1 5.9
1927 5.9 6.4 5.5 10.2
1928 5.3 5.5 4.9 9.6
1929 5.5 5.5 3.6 9.8
C The Wage Income D Price Indices E Unit Wage




1909/13 65 - - -
1925 58 141 157 96
1926 60 150 150 98
1927 59 132 147 97
1928 65 13^ 159 102
1929 62 132 157 108
F honey Earnings G Output per Occupied H Real Earnings
Person
(i) (ii) (1913 Prices Index,*
1913 63 100 91
1924 — 115 •
1925 89 145 1.64 93
1926 93 148 1.63 96
1927 99 160 1.78 98
1928 107 173 1.73 103
1929 113 184 1.75 108







Hoffmann pp 205-6, 471, 508.
M Sweezy op.cit. p 591. Bottom line.
E H Pbelps Brown & M Brov.ne, op»cit.
App. 2 p 585 .^able 114 Col 2;
App. 5 p 458 Cols 1, 5* 8, 9» 10.
IfK, Kon.j.stat Hdb (1936) pp 101, 104.
See Appendix V p 438 Table J(iJ.
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NOTE to Table A : Capital Income. Hoffmann obtained this by multi¬
plying the profit rate (Table B(i), 1926ff) into
the capital stock at original purchase prices
(Hoffmann p 505)» plus an estimate for the value of
land used by "Gewerbe", of -J of value of building
stock. He does not state how he got his 1925 estimate.
NOTE to Table B : (i; Hoffmann: H. derived estimates of absolute
profits from official statistics of balance
sheets of Aktien Gesellschaften in Gewerbe. He
divided these by corrected estimates of net assets
from the same sources. The purpose of the correction
was to eliminate changes in concealed investment. He
did this by recalculating the official estimates on the
basis of the assumption of a fixed depreciation rate
(Vid» Hoffmann pp 780ff).
To obtain a 1925 estimate I divided Hoffmann's esti¬
mate of capital income (see Note to Section A) into
the capital stock estimate for 192^ (Original purchase
prices;.
(ii) Sweezy: These estimates refer to net profit rate
after deduction of estimated Corporation Taxes.
They cover the class of .'iktien-gesellschaften, and
Gesellschaften mit beschrHnkter Haflung whose nominal
capital exceeded 1 mill.Rnu, or which were listed on
German stock exchanges. The profit rate gross of cor-
poratinn tax was calculated by dividing net income by
net worth, on the basis of St.Heichsamt statistics.
She does not state how she obtained a net (after tax)
rate from the gross rate; presumably the St.fia data
also provides the necessary information, cf Sweezy
op.cit. p 385-6.
(iii; Phelps Brown & Browne: This is inferred on the
basis of the estimates of the share of wages in
total output in 'Gewerbe' (see Section C).
Let % be an estimate of the share of wages in total
output in 'Gewerbe', where W = total wages in 'Gewerbe'
G = total value added in 'Gewerbe'.
p
Let /0 be an estimate of capital's share in total out¬
put in 'Gewerbe', where P = capital income,
and fyo be the capital output ratio in 'Gewerbe' where
K = the capital stock.
Thai define % + fo = 1
Then (1 - )^0) ie is Phelps Brown & Browne's
estimate of the profit rate.
Phelps Brown & Browne's estimate of j^G is subject to
bias, but one that is a function of long term structu¬
ral change only and unlikely to affect year-to-year
comparability.
(Vid. EHPB + KB pp 60-66, 253-7, 38l+-6.)
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(a) The estimates in columns (1), (£) and (4) are based on the
balance sheets of Aktien-Gesellschaften - ie of larger firms. Since
Sweezy's data tend to show a bigger decline for smaller-firm industries,
•228, this is rather a point in favour of the hypothesis of an overall
reduction in internal cash generation, except under unlikely suppo¬
sitions.
(b) The degree of undervaluation of assets increased 1927-28. This
objection seems unfounded; I can think of no reason why firm's desire
to conceal their profits should have systematically increased in this
way.
Thus, 1 conclude that the sources of internal finance did fall. I now
turn to the relationship between this, and the 'wages explosion'.
Table 16 shows that over 1926-27, money wage earnings rose (on average
at roughly the same rate as output per worker) so that unit wage costs
fell slightly. Prices were stable (on average.1 though raw material
prices showed some tendency to rise. However, aggregate output rose
strongly (see Table 13 P 293); the net effect of all these forces was
that capital income and the profit rate rose; the v;age-income ratio fell.
In 1927-28 real output per worker apparently fell. This is doubtless
a result of approaching the top of a cyclical upswing. Finished goods
prices rose c.9% and semi-manufactured and raw materials prices rose
c.2%, but the rate of wage increase accelerated from about 11% in 1926-27
to about 1*+%. /s a result of this, and stagnating productivity, unit
wage costs increased about After paying the increased raw materials
prices, evidently more of the net product went to labour than to capital,
*228 M Sweezy op.cit. pp 390-1.
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as a result of wage pressure, for the wage-income ratio rose sharply,
and capital income and the profit rate declined. There was little
further change in 1929* according to all sources except Sweezy.
A hypothesis to account for this wages pressure has already been
presented *229.
Indirect evidence that wage rises were eroding the internal cash
generation by firms is provided by the upsurge of strikes and lockouts
in 1928 *230. The 1927-28 increase in man-days lost through these is
far greater than can be explained by the modest ex post acceleration of
wage increases. Employers' resistance must have hardened. The celebrated
Ruhr lockout in November 1928 by the North-Western group of employers
in heavy industry and engineering *231 had many complex political
and legal roots *232, but it hardly seems too far-fetched to regard
the erosion of the internal cash generation by wage pressure as a
fundamental provocation *233* According to Eweezy's calculations *23^»
profits in iron/steel slumped badly in 1928 (partly however as a conse¬
quence of the lockout and of increasing export dependence).
Contemporary complaints about the inexorable wages pressure (ie on the
part of employers) are at least as widespread as complaints about lack
of external financing. The annual report of practically any company for
*229 See ppl^9ff above.
*230 See Table 3 p152 above.
*231 U Htillbusch, 'Der Ruhreisenstreit und die Gewerkschaften'.
*232 E Fraenkel, 'Der Ruhreisenstreit •••'•
*233 See Deutsche Bank, Annual Report (GeschHftsbericht) for 1928;
also Wd 13/1(1928) p 88, 'Die Eisenpreiserhdhung und die
deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik'.
*23^ M Sweezy op.cit. p 390.
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the years 1927-29 will be found to express this grievance, from large
companies like Siemens "'235 to medium-sized firms like Christian
Dierig AG (textiles; or Vogtl&ndische Maschinenfabrik (engineering) *236.
At a more sophisticated level, wages pressure was widely regarded as
one of the chief causes of the general scarcity of capital, because it
redistributed income away from the saving classes *237* In response,
trade unions sometimes denied that profits were being eroded *238, but
more often they seemed to accept this as a fact, but deny the conse¬
quences, either by elaborating a purchasing power theory of the trade
cycle, or by asserting that workers saved as much as capitalists *239•
It was argued that the rationalisation was compelled by rising wages *240;
on the other hand that rising wages ate up all the fruits of rational¬
isation *2k1.
The object here is not to survey the validity of these theories, but to
show that m est participants from both sides of the controversy agreed
that capital's share was falling; secondly to infer from the intensity
of the attack by the 'capitalists' that they were unusually disquieted
*235 P Czada op.cit. p 185.
*236 C Dierig AG, Annual Report for 1929; Vogtl&ndische Maschinen¬
fabrik, Annual Report for 1927-28.
*237 for a succinct account of the controversy: Wk 7(1928) pp 392ff,
'Lohnniveau und Kapitalbildung'.
*238 Eg Vorw'frts 16/8/27 p , 'Die Textilindustrie verdient'.
*239 Kaschinenbau (1930) P W16, 'Lohnhbhe und Kapitalbildung'•
*2^0 Spinner und Weber (1930) Nr 28 p 17, 'Rationalisierung in
Textilindustrie: Standpunkt der Textilarbeiter'; at a more
sophisticated level, A Reithinger, Stand und Ursachen der
Arbeitslosigkeit ... pp 22ff.
*2M Jahresbericht der ... Industrie- und Handelskaromero des Ruhr-
bezirks, 1928 pp 107ff (about hard coal).
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by the advance of wages, and sought to generalise from their own
problem to an explanation of what was wrong with the entire economy.
Concurrent with this attack on wages was a tremendous attack on the
social insurance contributions required from employers, and on taxes,
also on the grounds that it reduced the sources of savings *242.
Businessmen doubtless always complain of these things, but seldom with
the intensity apparent in these years. Surely this is further evidence
of the perceived acute inadequacy of internal cash generation. Tax
rates did not increase after 1924 nor, except for the institution of
the Keich Institute for Employment and Unemployment Insurance, did
social insurance contributions *2^+3» insofar as taxes dh materially
affect cash generation, it would be the long-term transition from a
period of no taxes and high demand, to a period of high taxes, and lower
demand, that created the problem, not a short term deterioration during
1924-29 *244.
The second cause of corgtriction of internal cash generation was the
rising proportion of goods exported. This can be verified from Table
13 P 293 above.
Exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures were about 2.2% of the
total output of 'Gewerbe'; higher for mining and manufacturing alone *245,
*242 Eg P Kempner, 'Private Kapitalbildung und Steuersystem
or Darmst&dter und Nationalbank, Annual Report 1927•
*24j See pp 92 ff above.
*244 A conference convened to discuss this topic concluded that no
feasible reduction in tax rates would have had much effect on
savings: see _kd 15/1(1930) P 569t 'Kum Thema Kapitalbildung
und Besteuerung'; the full report is G Colm und H Neisser,
(eds; Kapitalbildung und Steuersystem.
*245 Hoffmann ... pp 508, 520.
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so that the export price level was a significant factor. The evidence
that export prices were lower than domestic is almost entirely quali¬
tative *246. It is at its best for the iron and steel industry.
When iron and steel tariffs were reintroduced in 1925 the industry was
forced again to negotiate an ageeement with the iron/steel using
indus ries, that it would reimburse the difference between home and
export iron and steel prices for the metal embodied in any product
that could be shown to have been exported. This so-called 'Avi-
Abkommen' is clear proof of the price gap *247. A graph of the average
prices ('Erlflse') received by members of the crude steel syndicate *248
shows a steady decline in 1928 *249, because of the increasing
proportion of direct and indirect exports. Support for this evidence
is found in a letter from Peiner Walzwerk (a mid-German firm supplying
the home market exclusively/ to the central office of the crude steel
cartel, complaining bitterly at its being forced to subsidise the
export drive of the western works *250.
However, the iron and steel was in an especially bad position, in
*246 Comparison of prices is inconclusive because of quality
differences, even in iron and steel; see the endless argument,
eg in MdW 2(1928) pp 725ff» 'Die Eisenpreise in Deutschland
und Ehgland'; ibid, pp 1127ff, 'Nochmals ... Eisenpreise';
E-A III/3 op.cit. pp 97ff; J Strohe op.cit. pp l48ff. For
other manufacturing, such comparison would be impossible.
*247 U Nocken, 'Interindustrial Conflicts and Alliances, as exem¬
plified in the Avi Agreement'; E-A III/3 op.cit. pp I05ff.
*248 D Warriner op.cit. pp 86ff.
*249 VDESI, Bericht Hber die Mitgliederversammlung 1928 (by
J W Reichert). Regretably, I failed to note the page on which
this graph appeared in the pamphlet.
*250 BA R13 1/45. letter dated 28/8/28; cf W Schulz zur Wiesch,
Her ZusammenschAussbeweerun ... pp 80-1.
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virtue of its own heavy export dependence, and that of its principal
domestic customers. But there is also considerable evidence that
mechanical and electrical engineering, as well as the smaller iron
and steel goods branches found ecport prices below domestic on their
own account; also the paper industry *251• Authoritative commentators
regarded lower prices as characteristic of exports as a whole *252.
Having reviewed the evidence of a reduction of the internal cash flow,
and its causes, two comments should be added.
Firstly, neither of the causes is completely independent of factors
discussed elsewhere in the chapter. Specifically, both are in measure
consequences of the failure of the domestic market to expand in 1928.
But both contain 'autonomous' elements as well; the dynamics of post-
inflationary wage pressure, and the world trade boom of 1927-29*
Secondly, the timing. From the statistics of Table 16, and the date
of the levelling off of domestic sales, it seems to me that it would be
possible to place the beginnings of the reduction of the internal cash
generation quite early in 1928. Thus it v/oud coincide with the reduction
of investment intentions, but not lead it. The short-run evolution of
the export ratio can only be inferred; probably it also rose from the
beginning of 1928 "*256. Thus, both of these influences on the internal
cash flow can be regarded as having intensified, but not initiated the
downturn.
*251 Haschronbau 9(1930) pWl70,'Die deutsche kaschinenindustrie im
Jahre 1929'; V.lh.Kon.j.forsch.1929 K2B p1 ; P Czada op.cit. p191»
Bergmann ElektrizitMtswerke AG, Annual Report 1929; F-A 1/5/11
op.cit. p ^57; F-A 1/5/1O op.cit. pp 135ff*
*252 E-A 1/5/20/2 Per deutsche Aussenhandel ... p^*+2 (also diagram;;
cf K Wagenfuhr, Die Bedeutung des Aussenhandels ... pp 28ff.




To organise this summary of the argument of this chapter, I refer to
the four causes of fixed investment recession, listed at the outset,
on p 235 I also recollect that, of the observed reduction of fixed
investment activity in industry between 1928 and 1929, ^0% occurred
in heavy industry, and 21% in textiles (cf Table 14 p 298). The
proferred explanation must therefore be congruent with the importance
of these branches.
Firstly, I consider the role of external financing. That this played
a part in initiating the investment recession in this sector, during
1927-28, seems likely, from the discussion in section 8.6. But it
seems to have faded into the background as the recession became serious
in 1928-29. Doubtless heavy industry experienced financial stringency,
but of all branches of industry, given the acceptability of its debt
abroad, and the closeness of its relationship with the great banks,
surely it was best placed to minimise the effects of such stringency *257•
It seems unliltely that the textile indstry was worse placed in respect
of external finance, than any other branch.
Both these branches were however united by evidence of a marked decline
*257 One might argue that the relatively high rate of investment
by this branch (measured by the fact that its share of
industrial investment greatly exceeded its share of
industrial net value added) precipitated a severer debt
burden, hence dependence on capital market conditions, than
In other branches. But this argument would apply also to
elec. engineering, and the public electricity supply,
also heavily dependent on foreign bond issuing. Yet
investment in these branches did not fall in 1929«
Cf Table 9a p 187 above.
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of capacity utilisation *258. In the case of iron and steel (also
cement) this partly reflects constraints on buying by the public sector
and agriculture; hence the constraints of the domestic financial
markets, and domestic constraints on access to foreign financial
markets. In the case of textiles it seems to be a reflection of an
inventory cycle; also international over-building (rayonJ. By con¬
trast, it seems likely that in certain export-orientated branches
(eg mechanical engineering), where capacity utilisation rose at the
end of 1920s, the absolute level of utilisation remained so low as to
inhibit any general effect on investment plans.
In the case of heavy industry, and of many other industries where
technical change was appreciable, a further explanation would complement
this: that 1928-29 witnessed the endogenous end of a 'rationalisation
boom' *259. But why did this boom peter out after only about three
years, when apparently a considerable backlog of opportunities for
improvement had been created by the war, and by the low investment
rates of the inflation? One answer could be that 'rationalisation'
increased the proportion of 'technically advanced' capital stock that
was underutilised; hence (given low endemic utilisation rates)
inhibited further innovatory inestment.
*258 See pp25>ff above. There is a remarkably close parallelism
between the aggregate index of textile output, and the
index of domestic new orders for textile machinery.
See Kon.j.Stat.Brib. (1936) pp 281, 282.
*259 Cf Appendix VI.
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A further, cogent, possible answer is provided by Hardach.
"The high credit costs depressed investment activity and
influenced its time structure; in the 1920s it was
mainly short-term investments that were undertaken,
with a view to rationalising and rounding out existing
plant" 260.
Coupled with the conclusion of Chapter 3 of this thesis, that investors
expected the capital market rather definitely to return to normal,
it seems plausible that only short-gestation and quick pay-back
projects were, in the main, embarked on immediately in the 1920s;
longer gestation and payback projects were deferred till such times
as the cost of finance had fallen.
Finally, the deterioration of the internal cash flow, owing to wages
pressure, which built up from later 192? as a result of the renewed
high employment, and owing to the increasing dependence (especially
in the case of heavy industry) on lower-price foreign markets,
further aggravated liquidity problems.
The roots of the decline of fixed investment in 'Gewerbe' at the end
of the 1920s cannot therefore be simply ascribed to exogenous factors
such as the cessation of the inflow of foreign capital; they lie
embedded in the structure of the post-stabilisation economy - the
long-term dynamics of its capital and labour markets.
*260 G Hardach, Weltparktorientierung ... pp 1^8-9, " ... in den
zwanziger Jahren wurden hauptsMchlich kurzfristige Kational-
isierungs- und Erg&nzungsinvestitionen durchgeftihrt".
It seems likely that in addition, in 1929 & sharp deterioration
in business expectations occurred. This is separately commented
on in KdW 28/2/29» PP 3°7ff» 'Unternehmermtidigkeit', and
E Welter, Stocking ... p 27.
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AGRICULTURE AND THE 1928 RECESSION
9/1
1 INTRODUCTION
The object of this chapter is to assess the part placed by agriculture
in the German economy 1924-29# The general coverage of the term
'agriculture' is obvious. It is usually subdivided into two main
sections - (i; arable, being the part concerned with the production
of grains, root crops, market garden produce etc, and (ii) livestock,
comprehending the production of meat ana poultry, and other animal
products such as wool, hides, dairy produce, eggs etc. Kost agricultural
enterprises operated of course in both sections.
Very often the relevant statistics lump agriculture together with forestry
and fishing, to make a larger 'primary' sector. This 'primary' sector
is however dominated by agriculture both in respect of Quantity of
output and of year-to-year change in output. The discussion in the
chapter therefore ignores forestry ana fishing.
In this chapter I concentrate on the 'behavioural' or 'economic' relation¬
ship between agriculture and the rest of the economy. The discussion of
these in section 2 forms the bulk of the chapter. In a piecemeal study
like this the complex mutual causation of change between the sector or
variable under discussion and the rest of the economic system has somehow
to be simplified. As far as investment in the private sector is concerned,
veil accepted simple models of this interrelationship were available - the
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so-called 'inventory investment* and 'fixed capital formation'
functions. In the case of public sector investment we can assume sub¬
stantial exogeneity: public sector investment affects short-run
activity in the rest of the economy, but, in a simple behavioural sense,
is not significantly affected by it.
In agriculture, no such simple ready-made solution is available. The
piiicipal direct effect of agriculture on the level of activity in
other sectors obviously operates through the demand exercised by agri¬
culture for the output of these sectors. 1b this demand however merely
the reflex of the converse, viz. of the demand exercised by the non-
agricultural sectors for agricultural output? The agricultural sector
was, after all rather smaller than the sum total of the rest of the
economy. If agricultural demand is merely a reflex, then it would not
seem worth devoting much attention to it, any more than for example to
the behaviour of consumer expenditure in a simple 'textbook* Keynesian
model.
However there do seem to be adequate grounds for believing that the
demand exercised by arable was determined 'exogenously' to a significant
extent, because of its relations!#) with the international market.
Agriculture can be expected to affect the level of activity in the rest
of the economy in indirect ways also. The first such way is by the
effect of the price level of agricultural commodities on the real income
of consumers of these commodities (by comparison with a counterfactual
alternative price level); hence (given the income inelasticity of demand
for agricultural products) the effect of this price level on non-
agricultural demand for non-agricultural output and imports.
A second of these indirect effects is that of agricultural net borrowing
on the 'general' interest rate and hence on the level of investment- in
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other sectors.
These two 'feedback effects' are considered in section 3*
It should finally be noted that, despite its inaccuracy in certain
respects, 'farm' has been used to translate landwirtschaftlicher
Betrieb, although this translation may seem to connote a homogeneity of
type of enterprise foreign to German conditions. The responsible
decision-maker within the 'farm' will be termed 'farm operator'.
9.2. Economic Relationships between Agriculture and the Rest of the
Economy
Table 1 Agricultural Production Mill. 1913 m. *2
1 Production* 2 Production* 3 Production*
b Production'
in Agriculture in Arable in Livestock
in L'stock
Products
1925 9198 2677 3916 2605
1926 8619 1928 '+036 2658
1927 9559 2297 ^372 2890
1928 10975 303^ ^897 JObk
1929 10872 2931 ^823 3118
1930 1063'f 2607 ^81k 3213
*Production is defined as Crop Yields, Animal Slaughterings etc. minus
(seed grain + feedstuff + loss).
SOURCE; Hoffmann ... p 310.
*2 Hoffmann's cunent value data on production (see sources to Table 1
above) closely match that of the Kon.junktur-Statistisches Handbuch
(1936) pp 175-6.
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9.2.1. The economic interrelationships between the agricultural sector
and the rest of the economy will be analysed with the aid of a simple
demand and supply model. How did the development of demand within the
agricultural sector affect activity in all other sectors?
Before proceeding, we must note that Hoffmann's estinates of net value
added in the arable section are not adequate as they stand for a close
study of the relationship between current income in the sector and
current effective demand. This is because, in his compilation of data
on production and net value added he indiscriminately combines data for
calendar years with data for the harvest year (July - June) which com¬
menced during the given calendar year. The error is not material in
respect of the production and net value added data in themselves;
crops harvested in year 1925/6 are substantially those harvested in late
summer 1925, I suppose. But the income derived from this crop does not
conirain expenditure in calendar year 1925, but rather in 1925/6, or even
later. A rough adjustment procedure which tries to reduce this problem
of periodisation is outlined in Appendix VII pp M-t4f£ From now on,
the revised data obtained there will be used in place of Hoffmann's;
only where an estimate for 1925 is desired will Hoffmann's 'raw' data
be used, since the method of revision eliminates this observation.
In the introduction to the chapter it was stated that the significance
of agricultural demand for the behaviour of the economy as a whole
largely depended on its being, to a significant degree, exogenously
determined. The effective demand of the sector is a function on the one
hand of its expectations, but on the other, of the coititraints imposed by
the income it earns and by the credit opportunities open to it. In the
subsection which follows the pattern and the determination of agricultural
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income flows over the quinquennium are considered; in the next sub¬
section the distribution of this income between labour and capital,
and the determinants thereof; thereafter the rate of borrowing by
farm operators, and its determinants; and in the final subsection the
determinants of short-term change in investment expenditure are
examined.
9.2.2. Income Flows in Agriculture: the Trend 1923-29
According to Hoffmann's data, both revised and unrevised (to retain an
estimate for 1925 >> the development of net value added in agriculture and
in all other sectors at constant and current prices is as shown in
Table 2.











































































SOURCES: Hoffmann ... op.cit. pp 319, 323» 455» 509.
Hoffmann (revised): Appendix VII p i+l+j •
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For the examination of the behaviour of sectoral income as a constraint
on effective demand, it is the development of net value added at current
prices that is immediately relevant. From Table 2 we see that the quin¬
quennial growth of this quantity was slower in agriculture than in all
other sectors together *3» But, as the constant price part of the
table indicates, this was not because of the slower growth of 'physical'
output, but because of the slower increase in the returns per unit of
output received by factors of production in agriculture than in other
sectors. This difference is not at first sight expressed in the price
indices (see Table J).






1925-26 131 136 142 15*+
1928-29 132 131 130 158
Selected National Income Price Deflators (Two Year Averages)
Foodstuffs
Domestic Education, Public Sector
Services Recreatton Current Expenditure
1925-26 142 136 136 136
1928-29 1^5 147 147 150
* R.K.+S.K. = Raw Materials and Semi-manufactures
SOURCES: Wholesale: Kon.j.stat.Hdb. (1936; pp 99-104.
Nat.Inc.Deflators: Hoffmann ... pp 600-601.
*3 Due almost entirely to the slow growth of the arable section:
see Table 1 p 321 above.
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The quinquennial change in wholesale prices of agricultural commodities
is not appreciably different from that for industrial finished goods.
But is is much less than that for labour-intensive services such as
domestic services, public sector current expenditure, education,
recreation. It maybe that the increase in the implicit deflator of net
value added by the entire non-agricultural sector originates mainly in
these service sectors. However, even though the price rise in industrial
finished goods is slight, it seems possible to argue that the deflator
of net value added by this sector also increased *kt especially when
we remember that the above mentioned services were not only labour-
intensive, but also sparing in the use of raw materials.
The price stability displayed by industrial finished goods is probably
the result of offsetting trends: decline in the price of raw materials
and semi-manufactures (especially those which are internationally
determined; and rising productivity, matched by an increase in wage and
salary costs. Agriculture, by contrast, was relatively light in the use
of those (especially overseas) raw materials whose price collapsed in
the later 1920s.
Similar price trends in agriculture and industry conceal therefore
differing trends in factor returns. But was the slower growth of factor
incomes in agriculture exogeneusly determined, or was it merely the
reflex of the income inelasticity of domestic demand for the products
of the sector?
Change in factor incomes is the result of change in quantity produced,
change in price, and change in necessary costs such as materials,
*k Cf. Hoffmann's data on volume of production in 'Gewerbe' (p *+55
cols. 2-5) with hat on income generated in 'Gewerbe' at current
prices (p 508).
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depreciation etc. I assume that in arable this last item can be ignored,
but not in the livestock section. In the following I shall try to show
that, over a quinquennium at least, quantity produced can be regarded
as exogenously determined, thereafter that the determination of arable
price contains at least significant elements of exogeneity; finally
that the price determination of the major input of the livestock section -
feedstuffs - is largely exogenous.
It seems a fairly well established theorem of agricultural economics
that the supply of agricultural commodities is price inelastic in the
short run *5. And in this context the 'short run' would, it seems,
reasonably span a quinquennium "6. The inelasticity of supply can be
illustrated in the case of selected arable crops by reference to the
development of sown area and yield per hectare (see Table 4).
Table 4 Sown Area (Mill.ha.) and Yield per Hectare (Tonnes/ha.)
Selected Crops
Wheat Rye Potatoes Sugar Beet
Area Yield Area Yield Area Yield Area Yield
1920-4 1.4 1.8 ^.3 1.4 2.7 12.9 0.39 23.9
1925 1.6 2.3 b.7 2.0 2.8 17.1 0.40 25.6
1926 1.6 1.8 b.7 1.6 2.8 12.5 0.40 26.1
1927 1.7 2.1 4.6 1.7 2.8 15.^ 0.43 25.0
1928 1.7 2.4 b.7 2.0 2.8 15.9 0.45 24.2
1929 1.6 2.2 b.7 1.9 2.9 15.6 0.45 24.4
1930-2 2.1 2.2 ^.5 1.8 2.7 18.0 O.38 30.0
SOURCE: Hoffmann ... pp 274, 281.
*5 D Gale Johnson,'The Nature of the Supply Function for Agricultural
Froducts. See also Mark Nerlove, The Dynamics of Supply ... Nerlove
finds considerable supply elasticity with respect to expected price,
which he proxies by a distributed lag regression on actual past
prices. The adjustment of supply within a quinquennium would there¬
fore be slow. Moreover he finds total arable output less price elas¬
tic than output of individual commodities. See his summary pp 82-6.
*6 For this reason I infer that changes in stocks of arable produce
have little effect on production decisions.
"in ita
In the second half of 1920s yields were on average above those obtained
in the first half, probably as a result of the progressive recuperation
of the soil under fertilisers; but within the period 1925-29 there is
no discernible trend in either sown acreage or yield. The latter is
clearly a function of the weather. Contemporary comment tells us that
the harvest in 1925 was exceedingly good *7, that in 1926 exceedingly
poor *8; 1927 was better than 1926 in quantity but poor in quality *9;
1928 was in general a very good harvest; 1929 also good, if in quality
not quite up to'1928 ♦10.




Pigs Cattle and Calves Meat All Otl
1924 1617 846 3770
1925 1661 889 3916 2605
1926 1740 904 4036 2658
1927 2086 882 4372 2890
1928 2270 994 4897 3044
1929 2076 1106 4823 3118
1930 2134 1067 4813 3213
SOURCE: Hoffmann ... pp 302, 310.
It seems plausible also to hypothesise that, within a quinquennium, the
supply of livestock and of livestock products was also inelastic with
»7 Wd 10/2(1925), P 1428, 'Die Getreidebilanz des Erntejahrs 1925/6'.
♦ 8 Wd 11/2(1926), p 1311, 'Die Getreideversorgung auf Grund der
neuen Ernte'•
♦9 Wd 12/2(1927), P 1484, 'Getreideversorgung auf Grund der neuen
Ernte'.
♦10 Wd 14/2(1929) P 1536, 'Das Emtejahr 1928/9 in Deutschland'.
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respect to selling price.
As Table 1 demonstrates, livestock output showed a more pronounced
tendency to increase than did arable: was it therefore simply related to
current domestic demand for livestock products? That this was not so can
be shown most clearly in the case of pigs, (the major type of livestock
in Germany). Contemporaries recognised a 'corn-hog' - or rather a
'barley-hog' cycle *12. The analysis is not hard to reproduce if we
chart the relationship between pig and barley (the main feedstuff) prices,
together with the development of the pig stock and the rate of slaughtering.
Table 6a Data for the German 'Barley-Hog' Cycle
Price Index, or Mill.Beasts
(l)Pig (2)Barley (3)Ratio ^ No# of
Price Price Col(l)/Col(2) a .* Slaughterings
previous year
1913 120 171 70 mm -
1924 164 204 80 mm 10.2
1925 179 239 75 16.9 12.1
1926 193 215 90 16.2 13.1
1927 157 253 62 19.4 17.3
1928 162 264 62 22.9 19.5
1929 202 237* 85 20.1 17.3
1930 167 206 81 19.9 18.0
* Assuming error in Hoffmann, which here reads 327. (The correction brings
this estimate in line with other evidence -eg that of St.Jb.f.ri.Dt.R.)
SOURCES: Cols (1) and (2): Hoffmann ... pp 554, 559.
Cols (4) and (5): St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1928 p 85, 1930 p 83,
1931 PP 71, 76.
*12 Esp. the Inst.f.Konj.forsch., following perhaps their American
mentors - the NBER. See eg V.jh.Kon.1. forsch. 1926 H4 p 72, and
many other place®.
This cycle can be viewed as an inventory cycle in livestock.
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Relative to 1913 the pig-barley price ratio was high in 192^-26. Pig
producers exploited this initially by increasing slaughterings, but
subsequently by increasing iock. As a result, supply of slaughtered
animals jumped up in 1927, and, at the same time the barley price shot
up. The disastrous price ratio of 1927-28 prompted a reduction in
stocks, which meant an excess of slaughtering in those years. % 1929
barley prices were falling in common with world grain prices; this
restored a favourable price relationship, and a cyclical upswing
recommenced (at 1.12.30 the size of the pig stock was 23.k mill.).
The average weight of slaughtered beasts corroborates this thesis:
Table 6b Average Weight of Slaughtered Pigs in Kg.
SOURCE: St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R.. as for Table 6a.
Average weight increased when stocks were being built up (fewer young
pigs slaughtered) and fell when stocks wfere being run down. Striking
confirmation that the supply of pig products was 'exogenously' deter¬
mined appeas to be provided by the corresponding data for the U.S.
'corn-hog* cycle.
In the U.S., as in Germany, pig stock seems to conform to the pig-corn
ratio after about a year's lag. The parallelism with the German data,
in respect of price movements, pig stock and pig production is unmistake-
able. To my knowledge the only common element was the barley price -




192^+ 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
90 91 92 90 88 90
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Table 7 Data for the U.S. 'Corn-Hog' Cycle
IndiceB of Price or Physical Quantity
Pig Barley Corn Pig/Corn Pig Pig







































* Harvest Year Price
SOURCE: Historical Statistics of the U.S. pp 289, 296-8.
In fine, pig slaughterings were a function of the current ratio between
the pig and the feedstuff price, and the size of the existing stock.
In the short run they are only mediately a function of the pig price per
se. The 'barley-pig* cycle dominated livestock production as a whole
by virtue of the importance of pig rearing; a similar cycle cannot be
shown to characterise other departments such as cattle rearing. However
contemporaries did hold in this case that the availability of hay was
as important a determinant of profitability as selling price. This
influence is by its nature statistically less demonstrable than the pig
cycle, but it was described in qualitative terms in the V.jh.Kon.j.
forsch. *13.
Having attempted to show that the main determinants of agricultural
supply were exogenous, I turn now to consider the determinants of
*13 This can be followed through the agricultural sections of
successive issues 1927-29.
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agricultural price. Firstly in the case of the arable section. If the
price of arable commodities is purely determined by the interaction of
domestic demand with the exogenously given supply, then arable receipts
are in principle endogenously determined within the German economic
system. And if input costs are negligible or rather constant then
income is endogenously determined too. But to a greater or lesser extent
arable prices were internationally determined. The extreme case is wheat,
the world market for which, up till 1929 was highly 'perfect'. Moreover,
since Germany supplied only c«3& of world output and a correspondingly
small proportion of internationally traded wheat, German influence on
the world price was negligible *15. It is easy to verify that German
and world wheat prices moved in close parallel *16.







BD is the domestic German
demand for wheat. CQ is
the exogenously determined
domestic supply. CP is the
internationally determined
price. is the import
of wheat required to clear
the domestic market at the
world price. The exogen¬
ously determined receipts
of German wheat producers











£ Malenbaura, The World Wheat Economy, pp 236-9.
cf Hoffmann...p55^» with B E Mitchell and P leane, Abstract.,»p^77.
In the following analyses of arable prices it is assumed that since
tariff levels were constant between summer 1925 and summer 1929»
these can be ignored.
In fact about half of German wheat consumption was imported during
these years. See Kcn.i.Stat.Hdb(l936 > p 178.
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Wheat is, however, an extreme case. But the analysis appears to hold
in a modified form for rye. Germany was a major supplier of rye on the
world market, especially since the absence of Russian supplies after
the war. But supply is in any case exogenous in the short run; the
critical assumption is that price in this case also is internationally
determined and that changes in international demand for rye are largely
independent of changes in domestic demand. Were Germany the only
supplier of internationally traded rye the analysis would be:
In this case DD is the dom¬
estic demand for rye. E.Mh
is the international demand
for rye. Price is inter¬
nationally set at GP and
this together with the exog-
enously given supply (CQ;
determines receipts at PAQO.
The export surplus Q.Q is
set by the displacement
between the international
and the domestic demand
schedules *19»
Diagram 9/lI
In this model the exogeneity of price determination is iarersely related
to the proportion of world demand accounted for by Germany itself.
This proportion was probably fairly high *20, so we cannot conclude
'19 Net export of rye was only a small fraction of domestic pro¬
duction ... But exports plus imports of rye was more than
10% of domestic rye production, so that internationally traded
rye had a significant impact on the domestic market. See
Kon.j . Stat»Bdb (1936) p 178.
*20 In the 1920s Germany imported ; - ] of all internationally
traded rye: Wei 1J/2(192o; pp 15^6-7, 'Die Lage des Welt-
marktes fttr Brott'.etreide' .
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more than that rye price was not wholly determined by the domestic
market.
Fig.9/H and the related conclusions about the determination of rye
price would also seem to apply to sugar beet, because at least 5% to
10% of beet output was exported. Potatoes were a crop in which Germany
had a marginal import surplus *21; given low value-to-weight ratio of
this crop it seems that the domestically determined price was much less
subject to the constraints of the international market than in the cases
previously mentioned.
Finally barley must be put in a class on its own. To some extent it
probably falls between the models illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2. Like
wheat, German and international barley prices moved in quite close
parallel Furthermore, inasmuch as barley was chiefly used as a
feedstuff, the domestic element in its price determination is a function
of the size of the livestock, which as we have seen is exogenous in 1be
short run.
It can therefore be concluded that the international market set, for
most crops, reasonably narrow limits to the range of domestically engin¬
eered price fluctuation. It is a widely accepted generalisation that
world prices of arable products were relatively low in the 1920s *23»
The failure of factor incomes in the German arable sector to rise is there¬
fore at least in part ascribable to adverse international market conditions.
This type of analysis does not seem to be applicable to the livestock
sector, where international markets were generally much less well
*21 Konj.Stat.Hdb.(1936) p 178.
*23 See the classic interpretation of W Arthur Lewis,
Economic Survey 1919-39 PP 38-65. The high inter-substitut-
ability of grains reinforces the argument.
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developed. Livestock prices were therefore more purely determined by
the interaction between the (in part exogenously set) domestic supply,
and domestic demand. Particularly in pig rearing, income was low for much
of the period under review; to the extent that this is related to an
international pig-feedstuff cycle, this too v/as exogenous *24.
9.2.3. The Distribution of Income in Agriculture 1925-29
So much for the aggregate development of income: what of its distri¬
bution between hired labour and farm operators? The sources I rely on
provide different approximations of this division.
Firstly, Hoffmann calculates aggregate labour income in the 'primary'
sector (in cash and kind) directly, and derives capital income as a
residual, given net value added. His labour income series for 1925-29
is the backward extrapolation of an estimate of aggregate labour income
in 1938, which was derived from census material.
The extrapolation factors are weighted averages of official agricultural
wage rates (Tariflohnsgtze). weighted according to information in the
said 1938 census. Whether wage rates do adequate duty for earnings in
this context is hard to tell. I have recalculated the capital income
*24 In a detailed article in Weltwirtschaftlich.es Archiv 29 (1929)
pp l6*ff, entitled 'Industrie und Landwirtschaft', K Lange
reaches a conclusion which appears to run counter to mine: viz.
that agricultural income is more dependent on industrial demand
for agricultural products than vice versa. He bases his con¬
clusion on the estimate that nearly 2/5 of agricultural produce
is sold to the industrial population, whereas only 1/6 of
industrial output is sold to agriculture. In my view his con¬
clusion does not follow from these facts, at least in the context
of short-run dependence within a quinquennium.
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series, using my revision of Hoffmann's net value added statistics.
Note that imputed labour income of farm operators and their families is
here included under labour income. This is shown in Table 8a; in
Table 8b I add Stat.Reichsamt estimates of cash earnings of farm
operators.


































* AFF = Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing.
SOURCES: Col (1): Appendix II p ¥+7t (plus Forestry, Fishing)
Cols (2a) and (3): Hoffmann ... p 508.
Col(2b): Difference between cols (1) and (3).
Table 8b Cash Incomes of Farm Operators, Gross and Net of
Interest Fayments Current Prices Mill.Rm.
Net
Gross
1924/5 1925/6 1926/7 1927/8 1928/9 1929/30
2252 2451 1774 2145 3115 2877
425 610 625 785 920 950
1827 1841 1149 1369 2195 1727
SOURCE: St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1936 p 509.
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Both the 'raw' and the 'revised' data in Table 8a concur that capital
income reached a peak in 1928; Table 8b however places the peak in
cash earnings slightly later - 1928/9. It is notable that labour
income increased by 30% between 1925-29» whereas net value added
increased by only c.22%. Thus, according to Hoffmann's data, profits
were being squeezed. This has a rational explanation if we consider
evidence of labour income per occupied person in different sectors:

















SOURCE: Hoffmann ... pp 205-6, 508-9.
METHOD: Total annual labour income was divided by annual average
employment in the same sector.
Bnployment in agriculture fell by c.2% between 192^-29? in mining,
manufacturing and services it increased by c.10%. Labour income was at
a lower level in agriculture than in other sectors, but rising faster.
Integration of the labour market due to cultural change and transport
development, perhaps also the halving of the agricultural labour immi¬
gration over the eastern frontiers compared with pre-war days *25 are
*25 W KUllmann, BevHlkerungsgeschichte, in Handbuch der deutschen
Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte (19?6), Bd.2, p 36.
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obvious reasons for this. The question of agricultural wages was a
touchy subject as a controversy in Wirtschaftsdienst in the mid 1920s
reveals *26.
The Stat.Reichsamt/Inst. f .Kon j . forBch provide estimates of the cash
earnings of farm operators, the cash wage bill of labourers, and of self-
consumption on farms *26a. Inference from this source aa to the
distribution of income depends crucially on how one elects to divide
self-consumption between labourers and operators. Suppose 50% to each.
Then beteen 1925-29 labour income grew by 15%, operators'income by
16%. If self-consumption is divided between the two more nearly in
accordance with the ratio of their aggregate cash incomes - ie in the ratio
labourer:operator = 1:3 - then labour income increased by 17%, operator
income by 12%. This source clearly does not yield definite conclusions.
9.2.*+. Profitability of Agriculture
Profitability<can be viewed from another angle. If my revised estimates
of capital income in agriculture (Table 8a) are expressed as a proportion
of the current value of the total capital stock (excluding land), an
estimate of the rate of profit can be obtained. For comparison the same
is done for mining, manufacturing, trade and commerce (Gewerbe), and the
calculations are repeated for two previous four-year periods - 1910-13$
I
and 1892-95.
♦26 Wd 11/1(1926) pp 529, 778; 11/2(1926; p 993.
*26A St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1936 p 509; Kon.i.Stat.Hdb.(1936) pp 175-7.
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Table 10 Bates of Profit in Agriculture and 'Gewerbe': Four Year
A■erage
Capital Income 1926-29 Mrd Mk
Capital Stock* 1926-29 Mrd Mk
Rate of Profit 1926-29
Kate of Profit 1910-13















SOURCES: Capital Income in Agriculture 1926-29J Table 8a p 335.
All else: Hoffmann ... pp 255-6$ 507-8.
If the degree of bias *27 ii the capital stock estimates is the same
in both sectors, the evidence of extremely low profitability in agri¬
culture compared with that in Gewerbe is unmistakeable. Moreover,
even allowing for considerable non-comparability between pre- and post¬
war capital stock estimates, the decline in the estimated profit rates
in the primary sector (both absolutely and relatively to that in
Gewerbe) is so extreme that it surely must reflect fact.
Evidence about the behaviour of profitability in agriculture can also
be derived from the Agricultural Bookkeeping Survey (Landwirtschaftliche
Buchftthrungsergebnisse) *28. Both the Stat.Reichsamt/Inst.f.Kon.j.forach.
and the sources used on by Hoffmann *29 rely to some extent on this
*27 See Appendix IV.
*28 Deutscher Landwirtschaftsrat, Ftinf.jghrige Buchftihrungsergebnisse...
This was conducted under the auspices of the 'Enquete-Auschuss'.
See Wd 13/1(1928) p 52.
*29 Eg D Grupe, Die ftMirungsmittelversorgung Deutschlands seit 1925.
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survey. Hence none of the evidence cited here is wholly independent
of any other. The Bookkeeping Survey comprehended only 0.3%-of all
agricultural enterprises, ie JOOO units *30, and was stratified as
follows. Firstly geographically - between east and west Germany.
Secondly by major type of crop - sugar beet, potatoes, bread grains
and feedstuffs (presumably the livestock section of agriculture is
subsumed under 'feedstuffs' and 'potatoes'). Thirdly by size of holding.
All results were published on a per hectare basis, to aid comparability.
Since the data is extensive, and I do not possess the weighting factors
that would enable me to combine the estimates of the several subsamples,
I have been unable to reproduce it.
From the Agricultural Bookkeeping Survey, n&t profitability can be
calculated as a percentage of gross proceeds from sales plus self-consumption.
Since circulating capital, broadly speaking, turns over once per year in
agriculture, this can be viewed as a rate of profit on circulating
capital; it therefore exaggerates the profit rate on the entire capital
stock.
Apart from the fact that Table 11 is a percentage of turnover only, the
following points should be borne in mind in interpreting it:
(1) The sample is small (0,3& of agricultural enterprises) and in many
cases the sample variance is large. The means reproduced are therefore
weakly attested *31.
*30 Max Sering et al., Die deutsche Landwirtschaft unter volks- und
weltwirtschaftliche Gesichtspunkten ... p 39* According to Wd,
loc.cit. in *28, the number was 3600.
*31 Fi Sering op.cit. p 39.
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Table 11 Average Profitability of Agriculture 192L/5 - 1928/9
% per Hectare
East Germany
Size of Holding (ha.) 5-50 50-200 above 200
Sugar Beet Producers 8 5 3
Potato Producers 8 1.5 0.5
Grain Producers 5 0.5 -2
Feedstuff (Livestock) Producers 1 -1 -6
West Germany
Size of Holding (ha.) 5-20 20-100 above 100
Sugar Beet Producers 15 9 8
Potato Producers 13 6 if
Grain Producers 7 6 3
Feedstuff (Livestock) Producers 1 2 -0.5
NOTE: Profit defined net of imputed labour earnings of operators, and
of land taxes, but gross of income taxes and interest charges.
SOURCE: Calculated as described from data in DeutscherLandwirtschaft-
srat ... op.cit. appendix.
(2) Insofar as bias can be detected, it operates in offsetting
direction. On the one hand it is usually believed that bookkeeping-
units in agriculture operated more efficiently than the average unit,
so, that profitability would be higher on such *33* On the other land,
it is plausible to suppose that bookkeeping enterprises would follow
'best' accounting practice and enter depreciation allowances in excess
of the economically justifiable, thus creating understatement of true
profitability.
Therefore Table 11 provides a broadly unbiassed, but inexact picture
of profit as a percent of turnover. We can infer that profitability as
a percent of total capital employed was very low (or negative), that
*33, Wd 13/1(1928) p 52
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larger units were less profitable than small. (The evidence that
profits were higher in the vest than the east would to some extent be
offset from the point of view of the individual operator by higher land
prices).
9.2.5. Debt Accumulation in Agriculture
Agriculture reacted to this 'profitability crisis' not by reducing the
margin of cultivation (see Table 4 p 326; but by borrowing.
Table 12 Agricultural Debt Statistics Mill.Mks. at 31.12,•
mi 1926 mi JIM mi 1930
1 Long Term (Mortgage/ 1011 2049 2814 3623 4117 ^373
2 Medium Term 26 102 304 318 360 330
3 Short Term, formal 2186 2127 2568 2890 2865 3088
4 Short Term, informal n a n a n a n a 800 n a
Aggregate Lines 1-3 3223 4277 5684 6831 7262 7761
n a = not available. Formal short term debt: Certain bank credits and
discounts.
Informal short term debt: other bank credits and
trade credit.
SOURCES: Lines 1-3, 1925-28: V.ih.Kon.i.Forsch. 1929, H4A, p 19.
1929-30: proximate, M Sering op.cit. p 51
ultimate, Inst.f.Kon.i.forsch.
Line 4: V.jh,Kon.i. forsch. 1929 H2A, p 21.
3^2 o/2b
Table 13 Agricultural Mortgage Credit Mrd.Kks. at 31.12.
Year 192k 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
Amount 1.05 1.55 2.51 3.19 3-98 ^.35 ^.55
SOURCE: St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1931, p 35*+.
At a rough guess, total icrease in agricultural debt owed to banking and
other institutions between 1925 and 1929 was c.5.6mrd.Rm.
But how does the accumulation of debt by the sector compare with the
savings generated within it? Was there a net transfer of resources from
other sectors into agriculture? To gain a rough indication of this I
compare the relationship between total capital income in agriculture and
aggregate net investment in the same sector, with the relationship between
the same two quantities in Gewerbe. The critical assumptions of this
comparison are that (ij saving out of labour income in both sectors is
exactly offset by consumer spending out of capital income, and (ii) that
all borrowing is for purposes of productive investment.
Table ih Capital Income and Net Investment Aggregated Estimates
Krd.Kks Current Prices 1925-9
Agriculture 'Geverbe'
Capital Income Net Investment Capital Income Net Investment
2.9 ^.1 21.6 19.3
SOURCE: Hoffmann ... pp P60, 508.
Whereas in Gewerbe net investment over the quinquennium is estimated to
have been rather less than capital income, in agriculture (incl.




The evidence of institutional pressures points in the same direction.
For most of German agriculture, an important source of finance was the
agricultural cooperative movement, which was organised up till 1928 in
two associations - the 'National Association' (Reichsverbandj and the
Raiffeisen Association. East Elbian Junkerdom found its long-term
finance through the official Prussian 'Landschaften' (ie agricultural
mortgage credit institutions). Finally, various other mortgage insti¬
tutions and rural savings banks also lent to agriculture *3^»
The National Association of Agric. Cooperatives (Heichsverband) and
the Prussian Landschaften had a common clearing house in the Prussian
Central Cooperative Clearing House (Preussenkasse for short) *35*
It was said that before the war this institution was self-financing, a
pure clearing-house within agriculture, and only borrowing in the
'general' money market in certain seasons (eg before harvest). After
the war the Preussenkasse became a heavy consistent borrower in the
'general' money market, as did the provincial (lower level) cooperative
clearing houses (Zentralgenossenschaftskassen) *56. Since the war
the Prussian State deposit in the Preussenkasse greatly exceeded the
aggregate cooperative deposit, in stark contrast to the pre-war days *37•
*3h See W Prion, 'Organisation des deutschen Kapitalmarktes',
E Grunfeld, 'Die Selbsthilfebanken'.
*35 Up to 1928 the 'Raiffeisen' association of cooperatives had a
separate clearing house; thereafter the same. M Sering op.cit.
PP 103, 105; Wd 15/2(1928) p 1587, 'Vereinheitlichung des
ltodlichen Genossenschaftwesens'.
*36 H Sering op.cit. pp 103-105, 615, 6l6-6l9*
*37 Ibid, pp 616-619*
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In 192^-25 only c.25%cf loans floated by the provincial central cooper¬
ative clearing houses (ie in Prussia/ were subscribed to by the cooper¬
atives themselves; in 1927 only 35%» Pre-war ratios had been much
higher •38.
Furthermore, after 1925 the Preussenkasse was supplemented in is function
by the Rentenbank Kreditanstalt (Credit Institution) - an offshoot of
the Rentenbank which was chiefly used to ease agricultural financing *39.
This brought considerable extra outside finance into the sector (see
also below pp 360ff>.
As final evidence in the same direction, we note that agriculture enjoyed
considerable and continued government subsidies. These were granted for
land improvement, to aid consolidation of holdings, and in connection with
with the work creation programme of 1926-27.
Table 15 Reich Subventions to Agriculture and Industry Rm.Kill.

















SOURCE; K. Hochddrffer, Die staatliche Subventionen in der
Nachkriegszeit in Deutschland, p 98.
Statistical and contemporary evidence therefore strongly suggest net
dissaving by agriculture. From the gap between capital formation and
*38 Ibid, p 112.
*39 Ibid, p 112; Vie 9(1930) p l60ff, 'Subventionen in der Land-
wirtschaft1.
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capital income, this net dissaving may have been perhaps 3-^# of
agricultural income - ie 1-2# of national income. In a Keynesian
framework this 1-2# would provide a stimulus to aggregate demand of
similar or somewhat greater magnitude.
:
9.2.6. Rationale of Ket dissaving
.... * ,
Assuming the conclusion of the last section, why did agriculture so
persistently dissave? We are concerned with dissaving by enterprises,
by farm operators, not by consumers. (It is to the former kind of
debt that our evidence refers *k2).
Which enterprises borrowed?
Clearly at all sizes of farm, debt burdens were lower relative to land
values in the west than in the east. Actually, absolute debt levels
in marks per hectare were comparable *^3» hut land values were higher
in the west.
The scatter of debt burdens ptrtrays the same picture. A much higher
proportion of enterprises in the east than in the west was 'over the ears'
in debt. Table 1? illustrates this for a selection of regions.
*k2 A criticism of agricultural debt statistics occurs in Wd--13/1
(1928 J pp I0l6ff, 'Statistik der landwirtschaftlichen Verschuldung'.
The article describes offsetting biasses however, with no indi¬
cation that the incidence of bias was systematically related to
region or size of enterprise. It may be well however to suppose
that these statistics contain generally a degree of over-statement.
For a discussion of agricultural debt in general, see F Beckmann,
'Landwirtschaftliche Kreditfragen'.
#i+3 M Sering op.cit. p 53*
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Table 16 Aggregate Debt as a % of Land Values at 1.7.29







100 88 88<\i-3- above400 ave¬rage
East Prussia 68 64 79 76 68 69
Silesia 37 37 52 56 57 61 45
Mid-east provinces 59 47 57 73 71 57 59
Central Germany 26 28 3k 39 48 - 31
North-West Germany 31 33 3k 42 43 - 33
Rhinel.-Westph. 28 31 35 k2 tm - 30
Bavaria 43 34 41 - - - 40
SOURCE: M Sering, op.cit. p 53•
Table 17 Distribution of Agricultural Enterprises by Size of Unit and








0 30 61 above







5- 50 17% 28% 29% 26% 39% 26% 17% 18%
50-200 13% 32% 30% 25% 23% 23% 25% 29%
above 200 10% 27% 38% 25% 15% 37% 29% 19%
NORTH-WEST GERMANY CENTRAL GERMANY
5-50 57% 23% 11% 9% 63% 21% 13% 3%
50-200 53% 30% 12% 5% 60% 27% 11% 5%





6195 20% 17% 2%
64% 19% 11% 6%
SOURCE: M Sering op.cit. p 5^.
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In the bulk of enterprises in west and central Germany, the debt burden
was less than half the value of the holding# £$y contrast in the east
the debt burden of the bulk of holdings exceeded 61% of the value of
the holding.
It is also broadly true in all regions that relative debt burdens were
higher, the larger the holding. Thus debt burdens were above all a
problem for large east German grain estates. This is the case, although
profitability was probably not much lower in the east than the west.
The geographical distribution of the debt may well provide the clue to
its rationale.
A number of purely 'economic' explanations seem unsatisfactory. For
example, a time-lag in adjusting from inflation-period prosperity
to post-stabilisation insolvency. The lag that this explanation would
require seems implausibly long, although it is true that in agriculture
random factors can obscure perception of the trend for longer than in
other sectors; moreover this explanation would not account for the
geographical and size distribution. Another 'economic' explanation
would be to say that debt levels were returning to 'normal' after their
abnormally low post-inflation level. This explanation is only rational
however if the new debt was expected to earn a return in excess of the
interest due; a condition which ex post was never met. Furthermore,
already by 1927 it is believed that interest levels exceeded the 1913
*kk For inflation period prosperity see F Aeroboe, Per Einfluss des
Krieges auf die landwirtschaftliche Eroduktion in Peutschland.
PP 113-^0. Debt and tax burdens were obliterated (the latter
because of the c.1 yr. lag between assessment and payment, in
the case of the sector), and the costs of lab air, raw materials
and equipment lagged well behind agricultural prices (though in
fact agric. wages did not fall as much as non-agric. wages -




The regional distribution of the debt suggests a more plausible
politico-economic explanation. Eastern grain estates should not be
viewed merely as capital assets, but also as consumer durables. Possession
of them was necessary to the 'way of life' and self-understanding of
the Junker or would-be Junker. This is typified by the 'Hindenburg
Spende' of 1927 in which the nation (by free subscription) bought back
for him the estate of his forbears *46. Thus an estate would be main¬
tained in being even under the expectation of several years' insolvency
for the same reasons as, according to the 'permanent income hypothesis',
a consumer adjusts his consumption according to his expected permanent
income, irrespective of current negative transitory income.
But on what grounds dii the East Elbian gentry regard the current insolv¬
ency as transitory? If we take at face value the prevalent interpretation
of the political role of the Junkers, a rationale can be found. The
Junker class traditionally exerted a lot of leverage on the Prussian
bureaucracy and the Prussian government; hance also on the bureaucracy
and government of the German empire *47. Political institutions had of
course changed radically - at least to outward appearances - since the
'revolution' of 1919/19. But much modern political historiography of
the 1920s aims to show that the realities of the power and the prestige
of the Junkers had not greatly diminished in the republic, despite their
\
*45 Bee Table 19 P 353 below.
*46 J Wheeler Bennet, Hindenburg, The Wooden Titan, pp 3l2ff.
*47 H Rosenberg, 'Die Pseudodemokratisierung der Rittergutsbesit-
zerklasse', pp ?87ff; W Carr, A history of Germany 1813-1943,
p 140. * "
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refusal to acknowledge its legitimacy *48. Havi. ng thus access to the
•corridors of power' the Junker reposed faith in the willingness of the
state to support his economy. His faith was not in vain. Agriculture
(ie chiefly eastern agriculture) received the bulk of economic subsidies
in the mid 1920s *49. Heavy industry was, significantly, the other
major recipient. Aid culminated in the notorious Osthilfe made available
by various legislative/administrative acts of 1929-31 *50. Aid also
came, if less clearly, in the form of tariffs. In 1925 the von BUlow
grain tariffs of 1902/06 were reimposed with little alteration. Import
certificates were reintroduced in October 1925 *51• What had been a
high tariff before the war was perhaps less adequate in 1925, when
prices were on average c.30% higher; and in addition livestock and
animal product tariffs were actually raised above their pre-war levels
in that year. Thus, the 1925 tariff was not specifically in the
interests of the east.
In 1929-30 grain tariffs were approximately doubled *52; by 1931 they
stood at about eight times their 1925 level (and their 1913 level;. By
1931 livestock tariffs stood at 5 to 4^ times their 1913 levels, animal
*48 H Rosenberg op.cit. pp 5°6ff. A Gerschenkron, Bread and
Democracy in Germany, pp 126ff; C-D Krohn, Stabilisierung und
flkonomische Interessen, passim.
*49 For a detailed description see 9(1930; pp 157ff, 'Subventionen
in der Landwirtschaft'. Aid in the form of easing of payment
terms on fertilisers, freight charges and other attempts to
improve agricultural liquidity began as early as the 1924 harvest:
See F Aereboe, ier Einfluss ... pp l86ff.
*50 See the Wk article cited in *49 pp l62ff.
*51 Wd_ 11/2(1926, p 955, 'Hie neue Getreidezollregelung'.
*52 M Sering op.cit. pp 853-855*
350 9/32
product tariffs at only if to 2f times those levels *53« In addition
Vermahlungszwang was introduced in flour-milling - ie millers were
oompelled to use a proportion of domestic grain *54. The state began
to purchase surplus rye, dye it, and sell it as a feedstuff at a loss
(eosinierte Roggen; *55* Finally, no sector received so much cheap
government credit as did agriculture. This is described on pp Hoff.
below *56. If therefore the theory of the political function of the
Junker class is correct - a theory which stresses the material self-
interest that governed their lobbying - then it seems that this debt
accumulation represents its projection on the economic plane.
Other sections of agriculture probably perceived their position and
self-interest in terms suggested by the propaganda of the Junker
agrarian organisations *57* The more modest dissaving of these other
sections would be consistent with this.
9.2.7. The Lynamics of Debt Accumulation
This section forms a transition from consideration of budget constraints
♦53 Ibid, pp 832, 840.
*54 Wd 14/2(1929J P 1141, 'Die Neuordnung der Getreidewirtschaft•.
*55 WJ 15/1(1930) p46,'Die Nacrdnung der deutschen Getreidewirtschaft'.
*56 Other minor aid included a 6 mill.mk interest rate subsidy on land
improvement credits. Wd 12/2(1926; p1328. Also, (according to
DV 11/1/29 p453<i 'the purchase of east German estates by Prussia
Cinder the aegis of resettlement schemes) to maintain prices.
♦57 H-J Puhle, Agrarische Interesr.gfinpoll.tik und preussischer
Konservatismus, pp l45ff.
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over the entire quinquennium, to the consideration of these constraints
in the short run.
As long as there is no change in government policy, and underlying
profitability shows little increase, borrowing must obviously increase
at an exponential rate if farm operators' cash disposable income, net
of interest payments, is to be sustained.
Available evidence suggests that already by 1927-28 agricultural debt
was creating sometliig of a crisis. This is clear from contemporary
comment *58, but also from the fact that the Reich and Prussia initiated
agricultural debt consolidation programmes in the summer of 1928, to
which they devoted 18.5 mill.Rm. of their own funds plus the proceeds
of a ,$?5 mill. U.S. loan floated by the Deutsche Landesbankzentrale;
a further 50 mill.Rm. was committed to this use in hay 1929 *59» Perhaps
the clearest evidence of growing crisis in agriculture was in the bank¬
ruptcy sales or land foreclosures, shown in Table 18.
In aggregate the table presents a picture of steep increase from financial
year (April-March,) 1924/5 to 1926/7. A plateau is then maintained till
late 1927/8. Between 1927/8 and 1928/9 bankruptcy of smaller estates
jumps up; not till 1928/9 - 1929/30 does bankruptcy in the largest
class rise notably again.
By way of comparison it can be roughly estimated that in 1913/4 less
*58 Wd 13/1(1928) p 253. '2ur Agrarkrise'; ibid, p 303» 'Das
Notprogramm der Reichsregierung'; ibid, p 471« 'Keichsbeteiligung
an der Agrarkredit'; especially ibid, p 1013» 'Zur Agrarkrise';
14/1(1929) p 544, 'Ein Programm gegen die Agrarkrise'.
*59 M Sering op.cit. pp 674, 676.
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Table 18 Bankruptcy Sales of Agricultural and Forestry Estates in most
of Germany (Estates under 2 ha, excluded/
Number of Estates/thousand hectares"^
. Estates Estates Estates
Aggregate 2 - 20 ha. 20-200 ha. above 200 ha.
No. Area No. Area No. Area No. Area
1924/5* 96 2 82 1 12 1 2 1
1925/6 308 9 248 2 51 3 9 5
1926/7 851 35 596 4 213 12 42 19
1927/8 913 37 658 4 207 13 48 20
1928/9. 1374 50 992 7 328 20 54 23
April/
8Sept 919 23 340 2 114 31 12
1928
April/
Sept 1329 48 478 4 229 15 58 29
1929
* The 'yea1"' is April-March.
SOURCE: V.jh.Kon.i. forsch. 1929 H4a p 19.
than 30000 ha, were foreclosed in the German empire *60. (1913 was
of course a prosperous year;. But by 1928/9 it is likely that the level
of foreclosures had shot well above pre-war levels.
As a further aspect of the dynamics of debt accumulation it is interesting
to compare aggregate income of farm operators (labour earnings and profit,
gross and net of interest payments *61. It is clear that operators'
incomes gross of interest payments tended to rise 1924/5 to 1928/9.
*60 V.jh.Kon.j.forsch. 1929 H4A p 19. Bankruptcy sales affected 26000ha.
in Prussia in July-Sept 1929; 29000 ha. in the entire Reich
during the same period. In the whole year 1913 bankruptcy sales
in Prussia affected 22000 ha. For similar data see Wd 13/1(1928)
p 253, '2ur Krise der Landwirtschaft'. Foreclosure had prac¬
tically ceased during the inflation.
*61 Deutscher Landwirtschaftsrat- loc.cit.
353 9/35
But net of interest there is no discernible trend. In 13 out of the 24
subsamples it remains roughly static, in 6 it rises and in 5 it falls.
Small-sized holdings dominate the 'rising' class, large-size holdings
the 'falling' class. However between 1927/8 and 1929/9 alone, there is
a rising tendency.
It seems justifiable to conclude that behind the increasing agricultural
difficulties of the later 1920s there was a basic problem of growing
indebtedness.
Finally, let us consider the evidence of aggregate interest payments,
shown in Table 19»



















SOUKCES: (i) K Sering op.cit. p 51 (ult. source - Inst«f.Kon.j.forsch).
(ii) St.Jb.f.d.dt.R. 1936 p 509.
The increasing interest burden therefore points in the same direction.
Contemporaries however stressed the liquidity problem as much as the
aggregate debt burden: the higher proportion of short term debt. Thus,
Sering wrote, for this reason the average ratio of debt to assets on
foreclosed estates after the stabilisation was actually lower than before
the war, although in the later period the number of foreclosures was
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much higher. The crisis developed from 1927/8, as the tolerance of
short-term bank and trade creditors diminished *62. Maybe this is
why bankruptcy increased earliest among smalles? holdings at this time.
Therefore to understand the foreclosure pattern we should perhaps
concentrate on the short-term debt pattern (Table 12 p34l). Dumg
1926 and early 1927 the easy capital market conditions allowed a
considerable consolidation of the short term debt incurred during
1924-25. In later 1927 this facility disappeared; agriculture was
thrown back on short-term debt which increased for the first time since
1925. But interest rates were rising, and other general evidence tells
us that trade credit was getting much tighter *63. The data underlying
Table 18 show that foreclosures were beginning to jump up from the
first quarter of 1928.i. Concern as to the liquidity problem obviously
underlay the Reich/Prussian debt consolidation programme of 1928 *64.
finally it is to be noted that the increase in foreclosures persisted
despite the record earnings from the 1928 harvest, and the improvement
in livestock conditions. Solvency in agriculture was dominated by the
debt burden to the exclusion of current change in income.
9.2.ft. Short Run Change in Agricultural Demand
This section will concentrate on year-to-year change in agricultural
t
*62 l«i Sering op.cit. pp 57-58. See also Wd 14/1(1929> p544,
'Die Zinsbelastung'.
*63 See p if2 ff above i
*64 A good {Ascription of the beginnings of this development is in
Wd 12/'(1927) p1Jl6, 'Vorsorge ftfr die Erntefinanzierung'.
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demand for producer goods. Demand for consumer goods can be assumed
to have been more stable, though, even here there are indications of a
'dullness' in rural textile sales in early 1928 *65.
Table 20 provides major data on sales of producer goods to agriculture.
Table 20 Agricultural Purchases of Producer Goods Mill.Kk.
Current Prices Harvest or Calendar Year
1924/5 1925/6 1926/7 1927/8 1928/9 1929/30
1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
1 New Buildings 231 325 351 405 384 366
2 New Equipment 272 204 241 303 281 242
3 New Buildings 90 170 270 300 360 340
4 New Equipment 180 210 210 250 260 240
5 Fertilisers 631 622 723 690 775 768
6 Fuels etc. 259 270 264 279 303 309
7 Feedstuffs 763 882 1495 1786 1726 1815
SOURCES: Lines 1,2,5,6,6: St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1936 p 509.
Lines 3«i+: Hoffmann ... p 257.
Hoffmann's data in lines 3 and 4 differ from the Stat.Jb. data probably
mainly because of adjustment to a calendar year basis, and because he
recalculated the depreciation allowances *66.
Lines 1 to 4 clearly identify a turning point in calendar year 1928 at
the latest. In line 5 (fertilisers) the change is not regular, but
1928/9 is a peak. Line 6 (fuelE etc.) show no turning point whereas
line 7 (feedstuffs) follows closely the size of the livestock.
*65 Textilwoche 23/3/28 p 40, 'Landwirtschaftliche Krise und Not
des Einzelhandels'; 7/9/28 p 7, 'Gebremster Konjunkturrtickgang*;
16/11/28 p 12, 'Gesch&ftslage'; 30/11/28 p 12, 'Keine Konjunk-
turrfickgang'.
*66 (See the chapter on fixed investment p 242).
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Therefore on major investment items a turning point contemporaneous
with that in the private non-agricultural sector (Gewerbe) is indicated.
New orders for agricultural machinery reached a peak in the third quarter
of 1927, at the same time as *67* or even earlier than *68 the
aggregate domestic new machinery orders index.
Investment activity could have peaked in 1928 because of technical
satiation of demand. Considering the low levels of equipment in German
agriculture at the time *69 it seems to me that this explanation can
be rejected. Bather I think we must consider the development of the
income and borrowing constraints on effective demand. But from Tables
8a and 8b it is not easy to relate this to the development of farm
operators' incomes. Rather it seems likely to have been a reflection of
their deteriorating capital position, witnessed to by the rising
bankruptcy statistics.
9.3. Feedbacks
The purpose of this section is to register a major qualification to the
argument of the previous section.
*67 Kon,1.Stat.Hdb.(1936; p 228 ) The source material used by these two
) references is the same; presumably
) the witness of the Kon.j.Stat.Hdb.
*68 Haschinenbau 10(5/3/31) pWfjO) is tc be preferred, as later.
*69 M Rolfes, in Hdb. der deutschen Wirtschafts- und Sozial-
Geschichte Vol 2, pp 757-8.
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9»3»1« It has been hypothesised above that both the state of the
international market for agricultural commodities and also, to some
extent the complex dynamics of the 'barley-pig' cycle conspired to
depress factor earnings in agriculture. Given that labour earnings in
the sector were sensitive to labour earnings in other sectors, the
pressure fell chiefly on capital earnings. This would tend to depress
the income constraint on the demand exercised by farm operators for the
output of the non-agricultural sector. For a period, farm operators
evaded this constraint by borrowing,but from 1928 this proved no longer
possible. This is only part of the story, because we need to consider
two types of feedback effects.
Firstly, what farm operators lost, the consumers of agricultural com¬
modities gained in lower prices. Hence the depression of agricultural
incomes is purely a transfer effect. This conclusion depends critically
on the assumption that agricultural supply is price-inelastic over the
period of a quinquennium. Had low prices caused a speedy reduction in
output and employment in agr culture, the multiplier effects of this
might have offset the transfer effects just outlined. But, as it is,
agricultural supply is not reduced (in the short run/' by low prices; is
there any reason to suppose that low agricultural prices will reduce
supply in the non-agricultural sectors? Given the income inelasticity
of demand for agricultural products, low prices will create increased
demand on the part of non-agricultural consumers for non-agricultural
output. And the argument of section 3 of the chapter is that the
reduction of demand on the part of farm operators, on whom the brunt of
the low prices fell, was mail, because they borrowed in order to maintain
customary standards of expenditure. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude
that the agricultural depression, far from reducing the aggregate supply
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of commodities, more probably increased it somewhat, by contrast with
a situation where, for example, agriculture enjoyed relatively higher
prices, because of higher tariffs or a lower exchange rate *70.
Three possible objections to this view are as follows :
i) To the extent that lower prices were being received on exports,
there was genuine loss to the entire economy. In fact however
Germany was a heavy net importer of agricultural commodities. So
terms of trade which favoured industrial goods in exchange with agri¬
cultural goods could only benefit the economy as a whole,
ii) The response of the disadvantaged in depressing incomes in
asymmetrically greater than the response of the beneficiaries
in raising their effective demand *71. As already argued however
in this case the opposite appears to be true.
iii) The dynamic adjustment to falling prices depresses expectations
of both losers and gainers so that the static transfer effects
are overwhelmed *72. However, up to 1929 farm incomes were low, but
not falling, so this argument is irrelevant.
I find therefore the paradoxical conclusion hard to avoid, that the -
to some extent exogenously determined - low level of farm incomes raised
rather than reduced aggregate demand in the economy because it must have
raised effective demand in other sections of the economy by more than
*70 As a matter of fact, poor harvests in 1926-27 coincided with
high and rising levels of activity in other sectors; whereas
a bumper harvest in 1928 coincided with declining incomes in
other sectors.
*71 C P Kindleberger, The World in Depression p 1^2.
*72 Ibid, loc.cit.
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it reduced it within agriculture. But this provisional conclusion
leads to the second feedback which must be considered.
9.3.2. The second major type of feedback is the tffect of net dissaving
by the agricultural sector on the general level of interest rates, and
hence on aggregate economic activity. It was suggested on p 3^5 above
that during 192H-29 net dissaving by agriculture may have equalled 1%
of national income, or 5% of net new financing *72A - not insignificant
sums. A theoretical consensus creates the expectation that such net
dissaving would cause higher interest rates, provided that the money
supply was not directly responsive to agricultural credit requirements.
The argument is as follows:
Let us assume that the credit is created within the banking sector, but
that the authorities controlling the issue of 'base money* do not alter
the money supply specifically in response to agricultural borrowing.
The credit thus created will cause an increase in the total money supply.
But this will mean a relative shrinkage of the cash base. Neglecting
the extreme position of eg. the 'Radcliffe Committee Report*, it can be
accepted that this will reduce the ultimate liquidity of Ithe banking
sector and cause interest rates to rise; this will tend to depress
investment, maybe personal and governmental consumption to a certain
extent. While therefore the readiness and ability of agriculture to
dssave does imply a net boost to aggregate demand (by contrast with the
situation where its income had been the same, but the sector had not
*72A For statistics of net new financing see Hoffmann ... pp 508, 8lJ.
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borrowed), this net boost will have a partial offset in the induced
reduction of investment spending etc in other sectors. Only in except¬
ional circumstances would the offset be total; though it must be
remembered that in this period money conditions were exceptionally tight,
for reasons unrelated to agricultural dissaving.
But one basic presupposition of the foregoing argument is shot through
with exceptions. The money supply did in fact expand specifically in
response to agricultural credit needs. To this extent, the 'negative
feedback' would be mitigated. The supply expanded in the following
ways:
i) The institution of the Rentenbank Kreditanstalt. This meant
a prolongation of the life of the Rentenbank, and, more
generally of its money-creetLng ability, beyond what was originally
envisaged. The decision to prolong it was more or less directly a result
of the experience of the agricultural credit crisis of 1924; during that
year the Rentenbank lent 600 mill Rentenmark (= Reichsmark) to agriculture
and its agencies (chiefly the Preussenltasse). When it became apparent
that this could not be repaid as speedily as the Dawes experts had
envisaged, the Rentenbank Kreditanstalt was set up to manage and in fact
supplement these credits, by lending to a range of agricultural credit
institutions *73»
ii) The Golddiskontbank. Originally this was set up to facilitate
foreign trade in the immediate post-stabilisation period,
before transition to a gold-exchange currency. Its life, too, was
prolonged, in this case to act as an unofficial agency of the Reichsbank,
*73 M Bering op.cit. pp 106-111
361 9A3
able to conduct business forbidden to the latter under its charter.
For example, in 1926 the Golddiskontbank bought 2*tO mill.Rm. of mortgage
certificates (Hypothekenschuldscheine) to aid harvest financing *7^.
iii) In the summer of 1926 also the Reichsbank relaxed its re-
discounting rules specifically in order to facilitate the
financing of the harvest *75»
iv) The Government programme of agricultural debt consolidation
1928-29 (see p 351 above) can be viewed as a species of money
creation, insofar as it was designed to improve the liquidity of the
agricultural banking sector *76. Under the same action the government
also sponsored an overseas loan by the Deutsche Landesbankzentrale, of
$25 mill. (ibid.) This followed an overseas loan flotation of similar
size and for a similar purpose by the Rentenbank Kreditanstalt *77•
v) New methods of agricultural short term credit - enjoying some
n measure of government guarantee - were introduced in 1928 on
the basis of fixed delivery contracts for com between farm operators
*?k To purchase these certificates the bank sold 'Solawechsel' to
various public authorities with large cash balances. To the
extent that these authorities themselves would not have been
willing to purchase such certificates, because of their strong
liquidity preference (see p 31 ff above/, this practice
reduced the sensitivity of the interest rate to agricultural
borrowing. See E-A V/1, Die Reichsbank pp 1l5ff (Schacht's
views on p 148); Centralverband ... Katerialien ... p 23.
*75 M Sering op.cit. p ^33* It was intended to rediscount the
bills of flour millers. This flurry of aid to harvest financ¬
ing in 1926 followed the extreme difficulty of financing the
1925 harvest. Under the easy monetary conditions of 1926
however it proved largely unnecessary.
•76 Ibid, pp 55, S?'u
*77 In 1927 the Golddiskontbank also borrowed 30 mill.Rm. discount
credit for agriculture: Wd 12/2(1927) P 1326.
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and cooperatives *78.
That the money supply was in some measure directly responsive to the
large credit demands of agriculture, is clear. What the net quanti¬
tative effect of this was on interest rates and hence on economic activity
could not be determined wibout a macro-econometric model. Perhaps this
much may be suggested however: the most significant acts of responsive
money creation came in the period 192*^-26 *79» Thus, maybe at the
very time when the inner dynamics of the agricultural sector were
generating a crisis, the monetary response of the authorities was
drying up, so that the feedbacks of net agricultural dssaving on the
rest of the economy (via higher interest rates) would be more pronounced.
But again, this is impossible to quantify.
9»*u Conclusion
Thus, in this chapter, I have tried to show that the lack of prosperity
in agriculture did not restrict agricultural spending; rather it induced
*78 M Bering op.cit. p ^32. Further less important measures of this
kind include: the fact that the Advisory Council for Foragn
Credits relaxed its rule that local circumstances were not a
relevant criterion of the admissibility of foreign, credits,
only in the case of a number of agricultural (specifically
eastern) and agricultural/border local authorities. This
follows from analysis of the applications in BA K2/2126-213Q»
*79 Harvest financing continued throughout the period, but on a
more modest scale: DV 2/8/29 P 1^96, 'Aus der Woche'.
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dissaving# Inasmuch as (i) within arable, the low incomes were exogen-
ously induced (from international influences) and (ii) because agri¬
cultural supply was inelastic, quantity of real product generated in
the sector did not fall, so that, (iii) the only direct effect of the
low agricultural prices was to transfer income to the rest of the
economy, this net dissaving represented a net Keynesian stimulus to
aggregate demand. This would be offset to the extent that the dis¬
saving was financed, from borrowing from the banking sector which
raised interest rates to the economy as a whole, hence causing reductions
in investment spending in other sectors. But even this feedback was
emasculated, especially in earlier years, by net money or credit
creation by the monetary authorities, specifically to meet agricultural
needs.
From 1927-28 a liquidity crisis began to engulf agriculture, especially
in the east, as a consequence of the rapid rate of prior debt accumu¬
lation, and of the general deterioration of financial markets; this
seems to be the most plausible explanation of the decline in the sector's




To conclude this thesis I return to the question proposed on the first
page. Was the depression in Germany produced by the impact of a strong
'exogenous' shock on a stable economic system, or of a more moderate
shock on an unstable system? The first five chapters, and the seventh,
have an especial bearing on this issue. I have lypothesised that the
inflation reduced economic stability, by comparison with the pre-war
period. Firstly, it had an effect on the overall savings ratio. The
experience of the inflation seems to have reduced households' propensity
to save *1. The momentum of inflationary wage claims seems to have
persisted after the stabilisation; given a fixed exchange rate, this
circumscribed business saving *2, For a number of socio-political
reasons, government saving was little greater than before the war *3*
Thus, overall, the propensity to save was less; hence, at given levels
of 'autonomous' (public sector, private investment) expenditure and
export demand, the external current account balance would be worsew This
deterioration in the external balance is, of course, observable in the
statistics of the period.
The weakness of the external balance, and the wagd/price drift prompted
a restrictive monetary policy right from 192^ on the part of the Reichsbank.
*1 Chapter 5 PP 135-142 •
*2 Chapter 5 PP i49ff 811(3 Chapter 8 pp 307ff •
*3 Chapter 5 PI 135 811(3 Chapter 4.
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The extensive, often compulsory wage negotiating and arbitrating
machinery may be viewed as having exercised a joint function with the
monetary policy, in preserving the stability of the currency, and
thereby, of the bourgeois state *k.
Contrary to what might have been expected, this deterioration in the
goods and services balance did not induce foreign exchange difficulties.
This can, following Hardach, be partly ascribed to the success of the
restrictive monetary policy in attracting short term funds, but a fuller
understanding of the process is gained from atconsideration of the
effects of the inflation on the capital market. Not unnaturally, it
seems to have weakened the domestic propensity to hold German bonds,
both as a direct consequence, and also because it seems to have reduced
turnover on the stock market, and made it more variable, thus increasing
the volatility of security prices and hence the risk of holding them.
Foreigners' propensity to hold German bonds did not deteriorate, by
comparison with pre-war, so severely as did the domestic propensity.
This is evident ex post from the fact that, in contrast to pre-war,
foreigners came to be considerable net holders of the German bond stock.
The process whereby they accumulated this portfolio substantially alle¬
viated the German Balance of Payments in the period under review. The
reason why foreign aversion to German bonds did not increase at the same
rate as domestic may be found firstly in the fact that short rates were
generally lower abroad (in virtue of generally easier monetary policies
abroad;. Secondly, in the fact that German bonds normally constituted
a smaller proportion of the total bond portfolios of foreigners than of
Germans; they could diversify their risks better *5.
Ch 2 and Ch 5 PH5if» This supports the conclusions of G Hardach,
H-H Hartwich and Helmut Miller (see citations in pages referred to).
*5 See Ch 3 esp pp 79 ff.
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Such a method of balancing her international accounts would not neces¬
sarily have posed a threat to the stability of the German economy, had
it not been for the excessively short maturity distribution of the debt
obligations Germans incurred. The rationale of this distribution from
the viewpoint of these who held the debt has often been noted: the
desire to minimise risk. But probably those incurring the debt were
equally eager that it be short debt, because they looked forward to the
rapid normalisation of interest rates and hence were unwilling to saddle
themselves for long future periods with debt bearing the high current
rates. Both these demand and supply side factors seem necessary to
account for the oft-noted avidity with which Germany built up a high
level of short term indebtedness in the 1920s, and which ended in the
debacle of 1931 *6.
This short maturity distribution c haracterised the domestic debt
structure also. Both in 1925» and again in 1928 there are signs that
it created grave illiquidity in the economy, in times when expectations
were deteriorating. The short maturity distribution seems to me a major
element in the short run instability of the economy.
Before closing this account of the features which 'set the scene' for
the domestic instability in Germany l92^-29» 1 must note one other,
little related to those already described: the inventory cycle. It seems
plausible that business stocks were emptied by the frenetic final months
of the inflation and that this exogenous stimulus, lie a hand pulling
a pendulum away from the neighbourhood of equilibrium, then releasing it,
set in motion a 'Ketzlerian' inventory cycle which dominated short run
macro-economic change (in the sense that movement of this variable
*6 Chapter 3 P.' ^9
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absolutely exceeded all others) up to early 1927# But, accepting the
findings of modern research as to the weakness of the short-run
'multiplier', and the comparative flexibility of orders and production
lags, it seems likely that this inventory cycle would be a highly damped
one; my revision of the constant price inventory investment data
indicates that in the period 1927-29 it no longer dominated macro-
economic change *8.
I now turn to an account of the actual recession from 1927/8. I find
it difficult not to accord a central role to the double collapse of
the domestic stock market in the first half of 19?7: of the bond market
from February (following the failure of the Reich bond issue) and of
the equity market from May (following the anti-speculation measures of
the credit banks - prompted by the Reichsbank.) '"9.
This collapse appears to have induced a temporary behavioural change on
the part of the credit banks: 1927 is the only year in the period
192^-31 in which their liquidity ratios improved, evidently as a safety
precaution. This seems to have repercussed on the private sector in the
form of severe tightening of trade credit conditions (voluntary, and,
more important, involuntary) *10. But the very intensity of the evidence
*8 Chapter 7.
*9 Definite signs of recession in the economy appeared in the autumn
and winter of 1927 - ie six months to one year after the stock
market collapse. This seems to accord well with the lag in the
effects of monetary policy noted for the post war world by A Ando,
E C Brown et al., 'Lags in Fiscal and Monetary Policy', p 6,
(for the USA); and (for the German Federal Republic) by Heinz
MUller, 'Die Bedeutung der time lags fUr die Wirksamkeit der
Geld- und Kreditpolitik in der BRD'. See too his Die Politik
der deutschen Zentralbank, pp 83ff.
*10 Chapter 2 pp *f2ff.
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of this deterioration in payments delays etc. also suggests that
businesses did not respond to the crisis by significant reduction in
the rate of inventory investment; not until early or mid 1928 are
there signs of this, followed, later in the year, by slight signs of
the easing of pressure on trade credit *11.
The domestic stock market collapse induced a significant reduction in the
liquidity of agriculture, and of the public sector. The former sector
had reconstructed its debt obligations with extreme rapidity in the
preceding years, hence was all the more exposed to deterioration in the
financial markets and institutions. In addition, it was poorly placed
to evade the constraints of the domestic market by borrov/ing abroad.
The latter sector found recourse to the foreign markets impaired after
mid 1927 by the 'overloading' of these markets with German issues at
this time *12, and secondly by the intervention of the Advisory Council
for Foreign Credits, and of the -gent-General for Separations.
Thus, in agriculture, whose net dissaving in the years up to 1928 had
probably provided an exogenous stimulus to economic activity, there are
definite signs of a decline in fixed investment realisations from mid
1928. There was a anilar decline in the fixed investment activity in
some of those sections of the public/semi-public sector most affected by
the collapse of the domestic market and by difficulties of access to
*11 In later 1928 complaints of payments delays etc. seem to have
been less frequent than they had been in later 1927, or were
to become again in 1929-
*12 As a result of the closure of German access to foreign capital
markets by the suspension of the exemption of foreign-issued
bonds from capital-yield tax between December 1926 and June 1927
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foreign markets (railways, communes). In other part6 of the public/
semi-public sector investment levels continues to rise slowly, but at
the cost of deterioration in Hcpidity *15. There is evidence too that
liquidity problems were responsible fcr some of the early decline of fixed
investment in industry and commerce *14.
Fixed investment in industry and commerce (Gewerbe) first fell notice¬
ably in 1928-29, being, along with inventory investment, the main
precipitant of economic recession at this time *15» This decline cannot
be closely related to capital market conditions. Forty percent of the
decline was registered in heavy industry, which had as good or better
access to external finance than any other branch of industry; and the
rate of investment on the only other two equally favoured branches -
electrical engineering and the public electricity supply - did not fall
in 1929. Rather, the decline can be attributed to the following factors.
Firstly, the weakness of the preceding investment boom. Because of the
high cost of capital and of expectations of its future reduction, it
seems likely that only a limited number of projects of rapid gestation
and payback would be undertaken (as the word 'rationalisation' implies);
the supply of such projects ran out toward the end of the decade. A
good deal of contemporary comment supports this view *16. Secondly,
capacity utilisation levels remained low throughout the quinquennium
1924-29» because, doubtless, of the constrained financial market
• 1
*13 Chapter 6 „ I _ ./ •* , rk
*14 Chapter 8 pp 296-301.
*15 For the following see Chapter 8.
*16 See Appendix VI.
*
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conditions, and the deflationary monetary policy. The quantitative
indicators display no overall deterioration of the rate of utilisation
during 1927-29, but contemporary descriptions of technical change
support the possibility that by then a significantly larger proportion
of this capacity had been modernised; perceived excess cajscity therefore
increased. There is also evidence that in those branches in which
utilisation increased 1927-29 (notably mechanical engineering;,
utilisation rates-remained so low, despite this, as to stifle any
impetus to increased investment that might have been produced; whereas
those branches where utilisation rates fell had experienced hitherto
reasonably full capacity operation, so that it was in these branches
above all that fixed investment fell. In iron/steel it is likely that
the reduction of public sector (above all, railway; investment was a
material factor in reducing utilisation levels; thus mediately did
the credit crisis affect investment in industry. In the case of textiles
(which accounted for twenty percent of the fall in fixed investment in
industry in 1928-29) the endogenous operation of the inventory cycle
seems to explain most of the reduction in utilisation. Finally, wages
pressure resumed during the years of fuller employment after 1927»
eroding the internal generation of funds. No branch experienced this
erosion as acutely as heavy industry: coal was under pressure from
resurgent British competition; iron/steel was exporting, directly and
indirectly, a rapidly rising proportion of its output at lower world
prices. The Ruhr lock-out of November 1928 seems to be, among other
things, the expression of the straits of that industry.
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Economic activity was sustained for a while, in the traditional manner,
by increasing exports. When exports collapsed at the end of I929t the
extent of the deficiency of domestic demand became manifest. The final
prop to domestic economic activity was knocked away by the deflationary
fiscal policy. Bound up as this was with the political aims and con¬
straints of the Brttning government, the relevance of the crisis of the
public finances, and in particular of the long term inability of the
government to float domestic loans (or borrow freely from the keichsbank)
cannot be ignored.
To try to relate this account to that of previous students wouH, given
the multiplicity of views and theoretical frameworks described in the
first chapter, demand a lengthy further investment of the reader's time.
I cannot claim to have introduced new factors into the explanation,
thought of neither by contemporaries nor by ether historians, though I
have brought new types of evidence to bear on them (eg trade journals).
I think I may also claim to have embedded these factors in a closer
analysis of the economic system than has hitherto been attempted, showing
how domestic economic structure and the 'exogenous' factors (hitherto
considered usually in an isolated, seriatim fashion.; interacted on each
other. Investment activity remains, here as in other studies, central
to the analysis of the 'real' side of the German recession. I have
tried to restore the analysis of the capital market to a place of
centrality consonant with the importance contemporaries dtached to it;
to bring the factor of the continuous wages pressure, rather neglected
by historians, into play in a manner which does justice to the attention
attached to it_ by contemporaries; and to have cast doubt on one or two
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views of modern historiography - above all the meaningfulness of the
view that the Reichsmark was overvalued *17. I also find myself
reassessing the emphasis placed by Hardach on the effects of Reichebank
policy *18. That he, rightly, drev; attention to the economic impli¬
cations of that policy, is not in question; but I believe I have
shown that it was a factor which aggravated, rather than determined,
the macro-economic instability, and have spelled out, more clearly
than hifcherto, the probably serious implications for currency stability,
had it not implemented such a policy.
Among the aspects of this thesis most in need of further research,
I think the analysis of the labour market stands out. The importance
of this market in post-inflationary Germany, and maybe in other post-
inflationary economies, deserves an attention it has not yet received.
*17 Chapter 5 PP 14-9
*18 Still the best reference is G Hardach, 'Reichsbankpolitik
und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung 1924-31'.
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APPENDIX I
INTER-TEMPORAL WEIGHTING GE THE DEFLATORS
This Appendix attempts to consider the following question:
When deflating, an estimate of current value inventories, nominally held
at the end of a particular year, what spread of months around that period
should be included in the deflator, and with what weighting?
The question is most directly relevant for data derived from balance
sheet analysis. It has however a relevance for data derived from
questionnaires also, since respondents probably prodded estimates of
these end-of-year stocks either directly from their balance sheets, or
valued in the same way as in their balance sheets.
The question boils down to three practical issues:
(1j What is the consequence of the fact that in reality certain
firms balanced at dates other than 31*12 and that Reiser and Benning
et al adjusted these balance sheets to provide aggregative "synthetic"
year-end estimates?
(P) What assumptions should we make about the method of valuation
of inventories in the balance sheets?
(3) What assumptions should we make about the average period of
turnover of inventories?
Various aspects of these three questions will be discussed in turn. Then
on the basis of this discussion, a "model" of the main features of the
structure of the Reiser and Benning "synthetic" estimates will be
developed. The sensitivity of estimates of deflators to alternative
assumptions about numerical values of the various sets of parameters of
the model will be explored and finally, on the basis of this, a simple
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scheme of alternative assumptions will be outlined, which is likely to
produce a set of alternative estimates of deflated inventory investment
that encompasses tie true value.
1.1.1. The Balancing Date Scatter
Keiser and Benning provide no clue about the prevalence of balancing
dates other than 31.12, and I possess no other aggregative evidence.
However, Table 1/1, p 375 has been produced from the small sample of
German firms for which I do have evidence.
The marked tendency of mining and ferrous metallurgy, and of electrical
engineering, not to balance at 31 December is manifest. The tendency
of all other branches, and in particular those dominated by a smaller
scale of firms, eg textiles and mechanical engineering (where not owned
by heavy industrial concerns) to balance on 31 Decotoer is equally
evident. This is a very small sample. But in sofar as it over-
represents large firms grossly, and it seems as if it is the large
firms that balance at other than 31 December, the above conclusions seem
justified.
What are the consequences of this observation for the deflation procedure?
Previous researchers either faced different problems or are not explicit
about how they solved them *1.
In my case, the estimates of inventory levels which I have built up
definitely refer to year-ends. They are derived by cumulating estimates
of calendar-year inventory investment at current prices. Keiser and
A Abramovitz op.clt. pp 50D-5. C H f'einstein op.cit. p 32.
Central Statistical Office; National Accounts Statistics;









































































































































































































































Benning et al incorporated inventory investment of firms not ba ancing
at the year-end into these estimates by apportioning this investment
between calendar years. How was this apportionment done? They did not
simply do it on a "straight-line" basis; rather they used extraneous
information to determine how to allocate the total *2.
Thus for each industry, to determine the inter-temporal weighting
appropriate to its deflator we need to consider :
(i; The teLancing-date scatter for that industry
(iij The probable apportionment between calendar years by
the original researchers, of investment of companies
not balancing at 31.12.
To do this exhaustively would require masses of information, some of
which (especially for (ii)J is doubtless irretrievably lost. It would
also require aeons of time. But the sensitivity of results to alternative
assumptions as to these two types of variables can at least be explored
on a sample basis.
1.1.2. Valuation of Inventories
It seems certain that German firms, like British, valued their inven¬
tories at "cost or current price whichever is lower." *3 Cost is
either purchase price or cost of manufacture; the question of the
inclusion of overheads is discussed in the text pp 213-5 *
*2 See Keiser and Benning op.cit. p 177.
*3 eg T Ascher op.cit. pp 192-3; 226-8. A F Schuster op.cit.
comment on Sections *t0, 2^1. Randv.tirterbuch der Sczial vvissen-
schaften Vol. 2 pp 2^8 (Art. on "Bilanz";.
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Current price for finished goods is apparently the price at which the
good could be sold: ie the market price of finished goods *'u When
prices sire falling there is therefore little difficulty about the
valuation of inventories (in principle;. What valuatin principle is
operative when prices are rising?
I know of no empirical research on the practice of firms in this respect,
so we must proceed on more general information particularly discussions
of the construction of commercial balance sheets and of the rules of
taxation authorities.
A prevalent method of valuation seems to have been the so-called "base-
stock" method *5» also prevalent in England before the Second World
War. Under this method, the "base-stock" need only be revalued at
longish, irregular intervals. Net additions to base-stock, insofar as
recorded in the balance sheet will be valued at very recent prices.
Thus in a crude way this method approximates to a so-called LIFO method,
and would argue for the incorporation in the deflator of a fairly long
span of months prior to the balancing date, greater than the period of
stock turnover.
The only other method allowed, as far as I can see, was the so-called
"age of specific lots method." I infer this from the fact that according
to one source the so-called FIFO and LIFO methods "have never been
recognised by the German authorities"; according to another they are
allowed "only when they correspond to the firm's actual stock-management
A F Schuster op.cit.; comment on Section 261.
E Schmalenbach op.cit. pp 178-188.
*5 Handwtlrterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften loc.cit.
E Schmalenbach op.cit. pp 178-190.
378 AI/6
pattern" *6. For different kinds of inventories, different patterns
are doubtless desirable, depending on perishability and the like, and
on the method of access permitted by the method of storage*
Perishable, obsolescent goods, etc, are likely to be utilised on a FIFO
basis. The number of months prior to the balancing date will be
approximately equal to the period of stock turnover.
If we assume that non-perishable goods (etc) valued on the "age of
specific lots" basis are subject to a random order of utilisation, we
can take over Abramovitz's findings on the sul^pct :
"Experiment with arithmetical examples based upon the
assumption that the goods used each month have an average
age eaual to the average of the supply available at the
beginning of the month indicates that, on the average,
actual cost of specific lots accounting will produce an
age distribution of inventory such that the percentage
bought in any given month decreases rapidly as one goes
backward from the reporting date. Hence the bulk of the
stock is likely to date from the last few months of the
year, although an infinitesimal fraction is indefinitely
old." "7
Where the assumptions for this type of valuation hold, the months prior
to balancing date should therefore (ideally) be accorded an exponentially
declining system of weights.
Other forms of inventory, eg fluids, will however be valued in yet
different ways.
We have now discussed a number of methods of inventory valuation probably
in operation in Germany in this period. To combine this information




H Abramovitz op.cit. p 335
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(ij The extent to which each method was used.
(ii; The gross rate of change of real inventories at all significant
balancing dates. This is because, within any one method the
"centre of gravity" of the set of valuation prices will shift
relative to the balancing dates in a manner dependent on how
stocks are changing around that time.
(iii) The average rate of turnover of inventories. In all methods
the number of months included in the set of valuation prices
will bear some direct relation to the rate of turnover.
Information under head (i) is not to hand. The pattern of gross change
of stocks could, within wide margins, prcbably be reconstructed for most
significant branches, but this information is of little use if the
relative prevalence of different methods of valuation is unknown.
With so much unknown the simplest procedure seems to be to experiment
with the average prices for different numbers of months prior to the
balancing dates and see how sensitive the results are to the different
lengths of time included. This corresponds to the methods of Fein-
stein *8, and Abramovitz. *9. Feinstein assumed that a FIFO valuation
scheme predominated in his sources. However, it appears that in fact
the base-stock method was very prevalent in the United Kingdom between
the wars *10; he does not explicitly consider this. Abramovitz
assumed that only FIFO or "age of specific lots scheme" underlay his
data; this assumption seems well grounded in United States practice.
*8 C H Feinstein cc.cit. p 32.
*9 M Abramovitz op.cit. pp 535-6.
*10 From a conversation with Prof. G Whittington.
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The British National Accounts also assume that a FIFO scheme underlies
all present-day balance sheets of industrial companies, and in general
they deflate by the average price for the number of months prior to
balancing date which corresponds to the average period of turnover of
stocks according to the most recent census of production. Separate
methods, employing a declining weight scheme, are used however for
industries with much work in progress *11.
Thus, for the valuation of stocks when prices are rising, the use of an
unweighted average of prices over a period of months prior to the
balancing date is a well-worn method. The errors implicit in so rigid a
scheme cannot be overlooked however, particularly since the pattern
of gross change of inventories at any one time is likely to be parallel
for most branches of industry and trade.
1.1.3. Average Period of Turnover of Inventories
It is convenient to follow the discussion of the valuation method with
the integrally connected question of the avereage period of turnover of
stocks.
I lacked access to German evidence on this question. So, as comparable
evidence I used the United Kingdom Censuses of Production of 1963 &&d
1968 (for manufacturing) and Censuses of Distribution of 1950 and 1961
(for wholesale and retail trade). The rough estimates of average period
of turnover derived fr va these are reproduced in Tables 1/2 and /3 below.
For manufacturing, according to Table 1/2, average period of turnover
*11 Central Statistical Office: Nat.Accounts Statistics '
pp 402-405.
381 AI/9
Table 1/2 Estimates of Average Turnover of Inventories in Manufacturing:
Estimate = Materials, fid., stores, work in progress and goods for sale,
all on hand at end of year, divided by sale and work done
during year.
Order Short Name 196? 1968
III Food, etc .14 .13
IV CoaL, Petrol .14 .12
V Chemicals, etc .16 .17
VI Metal Mfg. .18 .18
VII Mech.Engineering .35 .45
VIII Instrument Eng. .37
IX Elec. Engineering .32 .30
A Shipbuild. etc .39 .65
XI Vehicles .29 .25
XII Metal Goods n.e.s. .16 .19
XIII Textiles .23 .22
XIV Leather Etc .23 .21
XV Clothing etc .18 .18
XVI Bricks, Pottery etc .16 .14
XVII Timber, Furniture .18 .19
XVIII Paper, Printing .14 .14
XIX Other Mfg. .18 .18
Total: All Manufacturing .21 .23
II Mining etc .12 .28
xX Construction .05 .04
XXI Gas, Elec., Water .09 .08
Total: All Industry .18 .19
SOUKCE: Itept. of Trade and Industry, Business Statistics Office:
herort on the Census of Froduction 1968; Vol. 156:
Summary Tables: Industry Analyses pp 36-60.
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Table 1/3 Estimates of verage Turnover of Inventories in
Retail and Wholesale Trade
Estimate for Ketail ^ of iear 2tocke
Estimate for Wholesale =
Calendar Year Sales


































































Board of Trade, Census of Listribution 1950
Vol II (Retail and Service Trade; Table 2ht
pp 19W10.
Ditto for 1961, Part 1R, Table 6 pp 1k/j/S -
1V52.
Ditto for 1950, Vol III (Wholesale Trades;
Table 13 pp 125-130.
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is less than three months (0.25) for all Orders* except engineering.
(If, for accuracy, profits were eliminated from the divisor, the
conclusion would be little affected). For all branches of trade
(Table 1/3) average period of turnover seems to be less than three
months.
Abramovitz consider that, where FIFO or 'age of specific lots' valuations
underly the data, the deflator should incorporate a number of months
equal to 1-g times the average period of turnover *12. Where base
stock valuations are prominent, a longer period might be appropriate.
Feinstein uses four months uniformly *13* Current UK National Accounting
practice differs from branch to branch; the numerical example in the
handbook employs a two-month period *14.
In the formal model developed below the sensitivity of the results to
different periodisations of the deflator will be examined.
1.2.1. A Model of the Structure of Keiser and Benning's Estimates
In the model constructed in this section, I will attempt to lay bare the
structure of the 'synthetic' estimates of year-end stocks, and hence of




*1^ Central Statistical Office op.cit. pp 400-^+07.
38*v AI/12
Assumptions
Ass 1 There is only one kind of commodity.
Ass 2 Valuation of Inventories: the following three alternative
schemes are employed.
i) All inventories can be considered to have been valued
by the average purchase price during the twelve months pre¬
ceding the balancing date.
ii) All inventories can be considered to have been valued
by the lower of the average purchase price during the six
months preceding the balancing date, and that ruling in the
month in which the balancing date falls.
iii) All inventories can be considered to have been valued
by the lower of the average purchase price during the three
months preceding the balancing date, and that ruling in the
month in which the balancing date falls.
Ass 3 Distribution of Balancing Dates. It is assumed that firms
balance at the end of any of the four quarters of the year,
but not at other times. The following three concrete alter¬
natives were employed :
i) All firms balance at 31st December.
ii; Of the aggregate of stocks in Keiser and Benning's
'synthetic' year-end estimates, pertain to firms
balancing at 31st December, and 16,7% each to firms balancing
at the end of each of the other three quarters.
iii) Of the aggregate of stocks in Keiser and Benning's
'synthetic* year-end estimates, 25$> each pertain to firms
balancing at the end of each of the four quarters.
Ass 3(ii) and Ass 3(iii) require us to make further assumptions about
how the original researchers apportioned between the relevant calendar
years the inventory investment of firms not balancing at the year-end.
I employed the alternative assumptions :
Ass i) The original researchers apportioned the inventory invest¬
ment of firms between calendar years on a 'straight-line'
(pro-rata; basis (ie as if there was a constant net rate of
investment).
ii) The original researchers apportioned the inventory invest¬
ment flexibly, on the basis of extraneous information.
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The model developed is general enough to encompass all of these alter¬







represent the number of goods in all inventories
published in balance sheets, pertaining to dates
within the calendar year *t'.
represent the aggregate value of inventories appearing
in the balance sheets f firms balancing at 31-3-t*
as valued by the methods employed in those sheets.
analogously to V^p' ^ , but for 30.6.t .
analogously to V^p^ , but for 30.9.t .
analogously to V^p,^ , but for 31-12.t .
(1)
Let Vtpt = Vn * V2tp2t + Vjt +
ie denote the totality of stocks appearing in balance
sheets pertaining to year t, at the valuations used
therein.
Further, on analogy with (1),
(1a) (
Let V =V+V+V+V.
t 1t 2t 3t 4t
Let (est V^hB; represent Keiser and Benning's 'synthetic* estimate of
what inventory levels would have been at 31*12.t , if
all firms had balanced at that date.
Let (est CVIxt,= (estVtKB; - (est V^KB)
ie represent Keiser and Benning's estimate of current
value inventory investment in calendar year t .
To obtain this estimate they had to apportion between calendar years the
first differences in inventory levels reported in successive balance
sheets of all firms not balancing at 31st December.
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For firms balancing at 30.9 let
x, (V,.p,,. - V_, p,. ) be the proportion of the difference
J J 3 - 3 - between inventory levels at 30.9.t
and 30.9.t-1 (of firms balancing at
that date) assigned by Keiser and
Benning to year t •
(1 - x.)(V_.p_. - V p .) is therefore the proportion of the
Z jZ jZ l/Z—\ z>Z—l . , . , .
same assigned to year t-1 .
For firms balancing at 30*6 1 define analogously
yt^V2tP2t T V2t-1p2t-l' " yt^V2tP2t ~ V2t-1p2t-1^
For firms balancing at 31*3 1 define analogously
zt(V1tp1t ~ Vit-tp1t-1'' and (1 " zt'(V1tP1t " Vlt-1p1t-l"
Assume that at the start of year *1' stocks are nil. Then Keiser and
Benning's estimate of current value inventory investment in year *1'
may be represented by expression (2) on the following sheet. (3) on
the same sheet represents their 'synthetic' estimate of current value
inventory ivel at the end of year '1'. By repeating the process, general
expression for their estimates of current value inventory investment and
of year-end inventory 3e^els can be obtained, as shown in (k) and (j5;
respectively.
(5) - the general expression for inventory values at the year-end - is
what we wish to deflate. A satisfactory deflated equivalent would be :
(6; Pyy£\t + xt+1V3t + yt+1V2t + Zt+1V1t
+ (l~Xt+1/V3t+1 + (l"yt+1;V2t+1 + (1~Zt+1;V1t+1
Let (6) be represented by p, N^. where represents the expression in
square brackets. (5) can be converted to (6; by the following tautology:





















































































(eBt VtKB; . pfcNt
(est V KB) p^N^. , if we can ascertain the ratio:
(7) pbKt(est VtKB)








Thus we can rewrite ratio (7) :
PbNt(Q \ D w
(est V KB;
N.
i ♦ *t+ibtpjt *
* (i-zt+i/d;pit^i-7
cancels out, and the inverse of (8) is the desired deflator. To make
further progress, some heroic simplifications have to be introduced.
Ass 5 We assume that the levels of inventories are large relative to
changes in these levels.
Ass 6 We assume that the relative 'market shares' of sub-aggregates
of firms balancing at the end of each quarter do not change.
On the basis of these two assumptions we infer
(9) Vt^Vt+1 ' V1t^V1t+1 * VPt~ V2t+1 etC*
(10) bfc =£=b* ? c. c* dt
(11) N -x- V ---Vv i j «t — vt — »t+1
In estimating the deflator, we treat the approximations in (9)» (10) and
(11) as equalities. To do so in respect of the 'model' embodied in
expressions (5-- and (6) is strictly speaking illogical unless stocks are
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invariant. But only by this means can we obtain a deflator that can
be calculated with the meagre data to hand. We rewrite (8) in the light
of (9), (10) and (11), and invert it :
<12> Zvv ♦ V-iVjt + •—
+ V3t+1 + " (1"zt+i )dtpit-n -7
What sort of bias does this simplification introduce? Under the followhg
conditions:
that real stocks and prices rise and fall simultaneously and
at the same rate
- it can easily be demonstrated that (12) will always under¬
estimate the inverse of (8), because it will always assign relatively
too small a weight to the higher price components of the deflator. Other
conditions will modify this bias however, so that in fact it may not be
too serious.
1.2.2. Testing the Sensitivity of the Model to Alternative Specifications
of the Parameters
We now wish to test the consequences for the value of the price deflator
expressed in (12), of alternative formulations of the assumptions Ass 2,
Ass 5 and ss
To begin with, we assume Ass Mi;, in all cases: ie straight-line
apportionment by the original researchers of the investment of firms not
balancing at the year end. In the notation of the above model this
implies for (12)
(l3j Xt+1 = t' ^+1 = Vl = t = 0,1,2
k
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We also need to translate the alterative formulations of Ass 3 into
numerical values of a^. ... d^. It can be seen that
under Ass 3(i) a^ = 1; = c^ = = 0; t = 0,1,2 ...
under Ass 3(ii) = f5 = ct ~ dt = t = 0,1,2 ...
under Ass 3(iii) = b^ = c^ = t = 0,1,2 ...
With this information we can tabulate the weights which should be attached
to each of ... P^t+1 in expression (.12), under strdght-line apportion¬
ment. The results can be seen in Table 1/5 on page 393 below, firstly
for Ass 3(i)» (where all firms balance at the year-end), and secondly
for the other two balancing date scatter assumptions.
If we further complicate matters by assuming Ass Mii) (ie flexible
apportionment), then we can no longer assume that x, y, and z will have
the same value in every year. Instead we have to postulate how the
original researchers perceived the turning-points in inventory investment
from period to period, and then how, on the basis of this perception,
they apportioned investment in each period.
These assumptions will be exemplified below in the case of aggregate
inventories in manufacturing industry and mining. We postulate that
the original researchers perceived the turning-points in inventories in


























Even this postulated pattern of inventory investment does not give exact
guidance about apportionment procedure. Let us assume however that
their procedure was as represented in the following table. The subse¬
quent notes explain the less clear-cut decisions.
Table 1/h
Weights for deflator of
(est V^KB) at year-end Xt+1 yt+i Zt+1
t = 192L I * i
t m 1925 1b 1 14
t = 1926 I 1 '!4
t = 1927 I ab
t = 1928 X•r-*♦ 5 0
t = 1929 1b £
Rationale of above Table: (For brevity the "p." parts of the "V.p."
v t v
terms have been omitted below).
(a) 1925 yt+1 = 1 This is a consequence of the assumption that all
of (V2 2g - Vp 2^) should be assigned to 1926. As ex hypothesi
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an upper turning point occurred at 30.9.25, the gross increase in stocks
in the 3rd quarter of 1925 would be cancelled out by the gross decrease
in the ^th, and the net decrease would be confined to the first quarter
of 1926.
(b) 1925 i The implication is that (V^ ^ - v>j 25^ was
apportioned on a straight-line basis even despite the upper turning
point at 30.9.25. If (V^ ^5 - 25^ neSative, this decrease will
have occurred in the last quarter of 1925 and the first of 1926; under
this possibility \ .
But if (V^ is positive, all of the increase will have occurred
in 1925, so that z^.+^ = 0. We do not know which is true, so we take the
average: z^ = £.
(c) 1926 yt+1 = 1 See (a; above. 30.9.26 is a lower turning point.
(d) 1926 zt+1 = * See (b) above. 30.9.26 is a lower turning point.
(e) 1928 xt+1 = 1 See (b) above: the grounds here are analogous.
(f) 1928 yt+1 = { The implication is that (V? „c, - V? 2g) is positive,
but that the net increase largely occurred in 1928.
(g> 1928 zt+1 = 0 This is on the same grounds as in (f).
(h) 1929 zt+1 = * This is bee use 30*9.29 is assumed to be an upper
turning point.
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Table 1/5 Weighting Structure for the Set of Valuation Prices in the
Price Deflator represented in Expression (11)
P P P P P p p
1t 21 3t 4t 1t+1 2t+1 3t+1
Ass 3(i > 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Straight-Line Apportionment
Ass 3(ii). 4(i) .042 .083 .125 -500 .125 .083 .042
Ass 3(iii). 4(i; .063 .125 .188 .250 .188 .125 .063
Flexible Apportionment
Ass 3(ii)i 4(ii)
1924 .042 .083 .125 .500 .125 *000 .042
1925 .042 .167 .125 •500 .125 .000 .042
1926 .042 .167 .125 .500 .125 .000 .042
1927 .042 .083 .125 .500 .125 .083 .042
1928 .OCX) .042 .125 .500 .167 .125 .042
1929 .083 .083 .125 .500 .083 .083 .042
Ass 3(iii)« 4(ii)
1924 .063 .125 .188 .250 .188 .125 .063
1925 .063 .250 .188 .250 .188 .000 .063
1926 .063 .250 .188 .250 .188 .000 .063
1927 .063 .125 .188 .250 .188 .125 .063
1928 .000 .063 .188 .250 .250 .188 .063
1929 .125 .125 .188 .250 .125 .125 .063
Thus we have worked out a specific system of flexible apportionment whose
implications can be tested along with the other formulations of the
assumptions. It must be remembered that we are concerned with an example
only; the accuracy of the flexible apportionment system is not very
important. In the lower part of Table 1/5 the intertemporal weighting
for each year implicit in this flexible apportionment scheme is shown
under the two relevant assumptions about balancing date scatter.
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As yet we have said nothing about the alternatives of Ass 2, ie the
three alternatives about the content of "p" in our notation. Each of
the 5 different combinations of Ass 3 and Ass 4, set out in Table 1/4,
can be combined with any of the three formulations of Ass 2 to give 15
permutations of Ass 2, 5 ana 4 altogether.
For the purposes of our example, ie of deftting aggregate stocks in
manufacturing industry and mining, the official wholesale price index
was used. The appropriate deflators for inventories appearing at the end
of every quarter from 1.1.24 to 30.9.30 was calculated under each formu¬
lation of Ass 2, and the results substituted into expression (11) for
each of the 5 intertemporal weightings set out in Table 1/5. The
resultant deflators for the "synthetic" estimates of year-end stocks
are given below in Table 1/6.
Table 1/6 Price Deflators under Alternative Formulations of Assumptions
relevant to the Inter-Temporal Weighting
Deflator used : The Official Wholesale Price Index with 19?8 = 100
(a, Deflator for 1.1.24 : In all cases the average value of the index




















Deflator for year end J1.12,
1J224 2221 1926 1927 1928 mi
98.1 101.3 96.0 98.3 100.0 98.0
98.5 98.5 97.7 98.4 98.4 97.4
98.5 98.6 97.7 98.4 98.4 97.4
98.4 98.3 97.7 98.3 98.4 97.2
98.4 98.5 97.6 98.3 98.4 97.3
98.1 99.9 96.7 99.4 99.9 95.9
98.5 98.9 96.3 99.0 99.5 95.2
98.5 99.4 96.1 99.0 99.4 95.1
98.8 98.4 96.1 98.8 99.3 94.8
98.8 99.2 95.7 98.8 99.1 94.7
101.1 99.9 97.7 99.7 99.9 95.9
99.9 99.0 96.5 98.6 99.5 94.8
99.9 99.3 96.5 98.6 99.4 95.2
99.3 98.6 96.0 98.1 99.3 94.3
99.3 99.3 95.9 98.1 99.1 94.8
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The Official Wholesale Price Index :
Stat.Jahrbuch f.d.Dt.R., 1927 p 301; 1930 p 278.
Perhaps the first impression conveyed by Table 1/6 is that of the
insensitivity of the estimates to alternative intertemporal weighting
structures. This impression is somewhat misleading, and a consequence
of the relative stability of the aggregate wholesale price index. In
an earlier draft, alternative intertemporal weighting structures were
exemplified in the case of Spinning and Weaving; the deflator applied
(textile raw materials and semi-manufactures) was much more volatile,
and as a consequence, estimates of deflated inventory investment varied
quite considerably under different assumptions. However for other
reasons (namely that that price index showed marked secular decline) that
example was less suitable than this.
1.2.3. Which Range of Assumptions about Inter-Temporal Weighting of
Price Deflators should be adopted in Practice?
In order to deflate the entire range of inventory investment data we
shall wish to employ a scheme of assumptions as to inter-temporal weight¬
ing which is both simple to operate, and also likely to encompass the
Bnits within which the "true" constant price inventory investment lies.
We want to find out which set of assumptions is most critical to the
deflated values, and to operate a scheme which will vary in respect of
these, using for convenience' sake a constant set of formulations of
the other assumptions.
An "analysis of variance" was used to identify the critical assumption.
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Table 1/7 Analysis of Variance for Table 1/6
Note : For Comparability, the Variances are expressed as
percentages of the Means of deflators in the group.
A Variance within Groups %
Assumption
Common to Variance of Deflators for Inventories at Year-Ehd
Group

























































B Variance between Means of Groups of same "Set" %




1921+ 2221 2221 ly 1^28 2221
Ass 2 0.1+8 0.01 0.22 0.08 0.11 1.39
Ass 3 0.22 0.55 0.02 0.08 0.19 0.22
Ass k 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
The price deflators in Table 1/6 were grouped in various ways. Firstly
according to whether they incorporated Ass 2(i). (ii) or (iii) - ie
deflators using the same valuation assumption were grouped together.
Secondly they were grouped according to whether they iicorporated
Ass 3(i). (ii) or (iii); ie deflators using the same balancing date
scatter assumption were grouped together. Thirdly they were grouped
according to whether they incorporated Ass Mi) or (ii) - ie deflators
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using Straight-line apportionment grouped separately from those with
flexible apportionment. For all of these sets of groups variance within
each individual group was computed and also variance befeeen the means
of the groups of the same set. The results are seen in Table 1/7.
The "critical" type of assumption will be that for which variance within
groups is minimised and between groups is maximised.
Broadly speaking, it is clear that Ass.2 best fits this criterion. This
is not just a consequence of the specific example used. 'When, in the
previous draft, the model was exemplified on Spinning and Weaving data,
the result was much more unambiguous.
And in fact, this criterion is biassed against Ass.2 when prices are
falling; because in these cases the deflators (other assumptions con¬
stant) take on the same value under Ass 2(ii) and Ass 2(iii).
When prices are falling therefore, the variance between groups (which
we seek to maximise) is subject to a minimising constraint. No such
force operates in groups based on formulation of Ass 3 or Ass h.
In constructing deflators therefore for the entire data on inventory
investment we shall use a set which vary in respect of the formulations
of Ass 2, and hold all the others constant.
Which set of other variables should be employed and held constant?
Inspection of Table 1/6 shows that, for all its complexity, Ass Mii)
produces results little different from the simpler Ass Mi); this would
probably be true of most flexible apportionment schemes. Ass Mii) is
ruled out.
Ass 3(i), Ass 3(ii) or Ass 3(iii)? For most industries the balancing
date scatter probably lies between Ass g(i) and Ass 3(ii). In industries
where this is not true, eg Iron, Steel and Coal, experimentation showed
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that alternative assumptions, eg that all firms balanced at 30*9,
produced results little different from the results where it was assumed
all balanced at 31.12.
Therefore, for simplicity's sake, the other set of assumptions employed
was Ass 3(i)s that all firms balance at 31*12. The three formulations
of Ass 2 therefore become (with the simplified notation employed in the
text)
Assumption Precise Reference
■ * Notation " ■ 1
Ass 2 (i) AA Annual Average of appropriate price deflator
Ass 2 (ii; 2HD a*1® lower of the average July-December price^ 1
or the December price
. 1.,™ The lower of the average October-DecemberAss c. v 1X1) «QD • v .price or the December price.
It can be verified that in four out of six cases in Table 1/6 the three
combinations Ass 3(i). Ass 2(i), (ii) and (iii) do lie at the upper and
lower limits of the entire set (a fortiori if the true balancing date
scatter does lie between Ass 3(i) and (ii)).
Reference to p 380above, on average turnover, clearly indicates that
Ass 2(i) (annual average prices) is most unlikely to represent the truth
unless an extreme "base-stock" valuation method is prevalent. It is
incorporated mainly for comparability with Hoffmann's estimate.
In most cases except engineering a scheme incorporating three to four and
a half months would be adequate and conform with Abramovitz and Feinstein's
practice (see abDve p ^83 happens fortunately that the estimates for
engineering are very insensitive to the number of months included. There¬
fore for the aggregate estimates each formulation of Ass 2 will be used
in turn, across the board.
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APPENDIX II
DEFLATION OF INVENTORY INVESTMENT : SOURCES AND METHODS
All/1
II.1, Sources
a) Current Value Inventory Investment
a1) A set of detailed estimates for 1924-28, in G Keiser and B Benning,
Kapitalbildung und Investitionen ... pp 45, 50* 55, 60, 65, 69, 75,
93, 110, 134, 145, 139.
a2) A set of revised estimates for 1924-29, disaggregated only to the
industry group level, in Wi.u.Stat. 1938 p 33» and in
St.Jb.f.d.Dt.R. 1938, p 565.
b) Price Indexes
These are to be found in one or more of the following:
St.Jb.f.d.dt.R. 1926 p 259; 1927 pp 297-303; 1928 p 345; 1931 PP 259-263.
Kon.j.Stat.Hdb. (1936) pp 99-108, 288, 289, 318, except for the deflators
of the following two specially constructed indexes:
Lignite: in the St.Jb.f.d.dt.R.1930 P 104 there is data on the volume
and value of output: (i^ crude lignite and (ii) briketts etc. Thus
for each an implicit price per tonne can be found. The ratios of the
volumes (i):(ii) is constant at 0.3*1. Assuming that the composition
of stocks reflects that of output (though they are successive, not
parallel processes) the two indexes were joined in the ratio 3;1 to
provide the desired index.
Potash and Salt: in the St.Jb.f.d.dt.R. 1930 P 106 value and volume
series can be found for (i) crude potash output, (ii) crude common salt
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output, (iii) processed potash output, (iv) processed salt output,
and (v) potash and salt utilised in calcium chloride plant etc. The
most significant structural change over 1925-29 is the variation in the
output of salt (crude and processed) relative to that of potash. There¬
fore I constructed a combined index by ammalgamating the crude potash
and crude salt prices implicit in the above-mentioned tables in the
following ratio for each year:
Year 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
fiatio (potash.'salt) 6.8:1 4.8:1 4.9:1 5*2:1 5*2:1 4.9:1
To the extent that both for potash and salt implicit crude prices rose
faster than processed prices, this index may have an upward bias.
Below I provide a classification of the price indexes. Two-digit indexes
are components of one-digit indexes; three-digit indexes of two-digit
etc. A small roman numeral means a regrouping of certain elements of the
'parallel' arabic digit indexes; eg elements of 4.1.(i) are found in
4.1.1. and 4.1.2. The two specially constructed indexes just described
are denoted by the addition of a lower case letter.
The following classification can easily be matched with the lay-out of
indexes in the sources listed above.
Only the two specially constructed indexes are reproduced.
Classification of Prices Indexes








3. Aggregate Industrial Paw Materials and Semimanufactures.
3.1 Coal (Hard and Lignite)
3*1«a Lignite : Annual Average Values
1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1950
1TIT3 97IF 9ffto 99.0 100.0 101.7 102.9
3.2 Iron Paw Materials and Semi-manufactures
3.3 Non-Ferrous Metal6, Raw Materials and Semi-manufactures
3.4 Textile Raw Materials and Semi-Kanufactures
3.5 Hides and Leather
3.6 Chemicals
2
3.6.a Potash : Annual Average Values
1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
T^TT 73^0 HIT 91.5 100.0 97.2 97.2
3.7 Artificial Fertilisers
3.8 Energy Oils and Lubricants"^
3.9 Rubber
3.10 Paper Raw Materials and Paper
3.11 Building Materials
3.11.1 Building Wood
4. Aggregate Industrial Finished Goods











5.1 Cost of Living Index less Accommodation Costs
5.1.1 Retail Food Prices
5.1.2 Retail Clothing Prices
5.1.3 Retail Hesting and Lighting Costs




1924 price estimated by extrapolation of 1925 figure with aid of
index 3«1 •
p
1924 price estimates by extrapolation of 1925 figure with aid of
index 3 •
•z
This index replaced an earlier one ('technical oils and fats').
The 1924 data for this latter index were multiplied by 0.714 to
obtain 1924 values for 3«8 •
L
This is a simple average of the Stat.Reichsamt price indexes for
freight and for passenger vehicles.
1924 price estimated by extrapolation of figure for first quarter
of 1925 with the aid of index 4.2.1 •
II.? Methods of Deflation
As already stated in the citation of sources, the current value inventory
investment data come in two forms: the original estimates of Keiser and
Benning, and the revised estimates of the Stat.Reichsamt. I decided to
work with the former in the first instance, because these results are
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published in a finer industry classification than are the latter; also
because only the former publication also gives any indication of stock
levels.
Since the current value data includes inventory valuation adjustment,
the correct procedure is to cumulate the estimates of stock levels at
1.1.2'+ (the only date for which Reiser and Benning publish levels;
with successive estimates of current value investment, thus obtaining a
series of estimates of stock levels pertaining to every year-end. These
should then be deflated appropriately; and the first differences would
be the desired 'real' inventory investment estimates.
Unfortunately, Reiser and Benning, in the cases of mining and manufact¬
uring, and public utilities, only publish inventory level estimates
pertaining to the investigated sample. It can be shown that the correct
procedure is to gross these stock level estimates up to apply to the
entire industry group with the aid of some extrapolation factor, then
cumulate year-end inventory level estimates at the industry level as
just described. Reiser and Benning publish inventory investment estimates
both for the samples and for the entire industries; a representative
extrapolation factor could be assessed from the factors implicit in
these data.
Commodity Weighting of Deflators
I list below each of the industries into which Reiser and Benning dis¬
aggregate their data, together with
(i) the extrapolation factor just described, ('E' Factor; and
(ii) the combination of deflators I used in each case, togeher with
their weighting. The attached numbers refer to the classification
kok
of prices indexes on pp AOG-1 above.
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I Heavy Industry
I(i) Hard Coal,Iron) 1.17
Steel)
I(ii) Lignite 1.30
I(iii) Non Ferrous Metals 1.33II Chemicals
II(i:) Chemicals (Producer ^
Goods**) 1,bU





3.1 Coal ... 0.5
3.2 Iron ... 0.5
3.1.a. Lignite 1.0
3.3 Hon Ferrous 1.0
3.6 Chemicals 0.5
3.7 Fertilisers 0.5
3.8 Energy Oils 1.0
3.6.a. Potash 1.0




Paper 2.20 3.10 Paper ... 1.0
Ill(ii) Building 6.90 3.11 Building Materials 1.0
Ill(iii) Building Materials 3.50 3-11 Building Materials 1.0







III(v) Saw Mills 9.00 3-11.1 Building Wood 1.0
Ill(ii) Leather, Leather
Goods 3.^0
3.5 Hides and Leather 1.0
* Extrapolation Factor









IV(ii) Mechanical _ __
Engineering



























V(i) Cotton** 2.80 3.^ Textiles • • • 1.0
V(ii) Wool** 3.50 3.^ Textiles • • • 1.0
V(iii) Linen, Hemp etc** 1.90 3.*+ Textiles • • • 1.0
V(iv) Other Spinning and
Weaving 3.10
3.^ Textiles • • • 1.0








V(vi) Rayon 1.30 3.*+ Textiles 1.0





V(viii) Shoes 3*30 3*5 Hides and Leather O.67
4.2.2 Shoes 0.33
* Extrapolation Factor



























VIII Public Utilities 2.0 3.1 Goal ... 0.67
3.2 Iron ... 0.17
3.11 Building Materials 0.17
IX Transport and Com- _ „* ■ 1 — 1.0
munications
As for VIII
In the case of other sectors, Keiser and Benning did not investigate by
means of balance sheet analysis; so for the following their estimates
of inventory levels at 1.1.21+ refer to the entire sector.
Sector or Branch Deflators , Weight¬
ing














** This index was adjusted by replacing component index 3-1+ Textiles ..
by 3*11»1 Building Wood, with the same weighting.
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Food, Drink, Tobacco, Street
Trading, Hawking, etc
Clothing
Household and Luxury Goods
Miscellaneous Requisites
Coal
3.11 Building Materials 1.0

















4.l.(i).1 Agricultural Machinery 1.0
4.1.(ii) Vehicles 1.0
























4.2.1 Textile Goods 1.0
4.2.3 Household Goods 1.0
5.1.4 Misc. Household Requisites
and Transportation
1.0
3.1 Coal ... 1.0
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'Inter-temporal Weighting1 of the Deflators
AII/10
In all cases the inventory levels at 1.1.24 were deflated by the
unweighted average of the relevant prices in the first six months of
1924. Subsequent 'year-end' inventories were deflated each by the
three variants described above p 398^- -
Application of Results to the Revised Stat.Reichsamt Data
I wished the final results of the deflation exercise to pertain to the
later, more final Stat» Reichsamt current value data, and used the following
method to deflate these;
The estimates of inventory levels at 1.1.2k described aborehad to be
taken over directly, since the Stat.Reichsamt data provide no hints as
to their revision. These were aggregated to the industry group, or
sectoral level (ie the roman numeral level of pp4o4"f)» and cumulated
with the Stat.Reichsamt data on current value inventory investment to
derive current value year-end inventory levels series. These series
was delated by the implicit deflators of the corresponding Reiser/
Benning groups or sectors, over the period 1.1.24 to 31•12.28.
Reiser and Benning did not carry their estimates forward to 1929* To
obtain deflators for stocks at 31*12.29» the component deflators of the
corresponding groups or sectors were combined in the weighting implicit
therein at 31-12.28.
Taking first differences of the results produced the estimates reproduced




Relationship between Survey Estimates and those obtained here
(The argument of this section is largely in terms of rate of change
of stocks or of output. In all cases "rate of change" is defined as
the absolute change of the quantity in question, divided by the average
of the beginning-and end-of-period quantities.
Reference to Table III/1 below shows that according to the Deutsche
Bank survey, inventory levels increased 18% in the period 1926/7
and only 1.8% in 1927/8. By contrast, according to my estimates
deflating by July-December/December prices stocks rose by 7.6% in' 1927
and by a further 6.^% in 1928. Actually the coverage is not quite
identical; my estimates include handicrafts, public utilities and
transport and communication, as well as certain branches of manu¬
facturing industry, all of which are omitted by the Deutsche Bank Survey.
As it happens, differences of coverage only go a small way to closing
the gap.
One vital difference is in the timing. In the Deutsche Bank data the
inventory ]e/els are calculated as averages for the whole year.
Inventory investment can therefore only be inferred from this data as
differences between these year averages, whereas my data on inventory
investment refers to calendar years.
Without quarterly or monthly data on inventories however we can infer
no more than that this difference in timing will produce some dis¬
crepancy between the two series. The only monthly series which we can
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Table III/1 Deutsche Bank Survey
Stock Levels and Stock-to-Turnover Ratios 1925-28
NB: In all cases 1925=100. Therefore the 1925 column is omitted.
Industry or Trade Stocks Stocks-to-Turnover
Branch Ratio
1926 122Z 1928 1^26 1^27 1228
Stone and Earth 104 109 116 122 99 104
Iron and Steel 96 105 100 119 99 94
Non-Ferrous Metal 97 115 118 106 94 98
Mech. Engineering 88 105 101 117 100 102
Elec.Eng. and Optical 77 86 92 95 91 86
Chemical 98 124 125 104 97 95
Textiles 86 117 117 105 107 110
Clothing 82 108 112 100 105 116
Leather 92 114 107 111 107 119
Timber 104 152 126 103 98 99
Paper 104 108 108 119 98 98
Foods, etc 93 113 111 104 111 121
Wholesale 99 111 112 98 99 89
Retail 88 104 108 84 101 106
Distribution by Firm
Size (Equity Capital)
Below 1 mill.Rm 98 114 115 119 119 127
1-5 mill.Rm 97 119 89 116 116 128
5-10 mill.Rm 95 99 106 119 105 99
Above 10 mill.Rm 98 101 105 111 101 105
Aggregate 92 113 115 107 102 107
SOURCE; FZ 26.6.29, 'Unratioralle Lagerhaltung'.
(Ultimate: Deutsche Bank/
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use are those for stocks of textile raw materials, and of wood for
paper mills. (The third - coal stocks - is useless as a general
indicator since its behaviour is so heavily influenced by the English
Coal Strike). It is interesting to note that for both of these monthly
series the (negative) gap between average inventory levels in 1925
aid 1926 exceeds the year-end gap in inventory levels, December 1925
and December 1926. Conversely the (positive) gap between annual
average inventory levels 1926 and 1927 exceeds the year-end gap
December 1926 and December 1927. These are only straws in the wind,
but they indicate how the differences in timing could explain part
of the gap between the two series, up to the end of 1927.
For 1928 however this factor works in the opposite direction. Our
knowledge of the trade-cycle, plus the evidence of these two monthly
series indicates that the gap should be the converse of what the
figures shows an estimate of inventory investment in the calendar
year 1928 should be less than an estimate calculated as the difference
between the annual average 1927 and 1928. Instead, the former is
greater than the latter.
One hypothesis which may help to reconcile the two estimates for 1928
and 1927/8 will be outlined in aggregative terms first, then explored
at the industry level.
As well as providing estimates of inventory levels, the Deutsche
Bank Survey provides estimates of stock-to-turnover ratios. Thus
estimates of turnover can be inferred. Over a twelvemonth output and
turnover are roughly the same. So the inferred turnover figures can be
compared with Hoffmann's data on real output in industry and trade, after
adjustment to remove the element of commerce, insurance etc in the
letter's data. The results are as follows:
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Table II1/2
(1) (2) (3; (4) =(3) + (4;
Index of Output of Output of Industry
Output
Trade Trade, Trade etc
Output Commerce etc adjusted
1925 108.0 4634 4642 20579 25221
1926 100.7 A396 4328 18648 22976
1927 122.0 5244 5244 23644 28888
1928 121.1 5370 5197 23703 28899
1929 122.5 5409 5266 24161 29427
SOUKCE: Hoffmann ... pp 448, 455.
Column .(5; provides my adjustment of Hoffmann's data to provide a series
with nearly the same coverage as the Deutsche Bank survey. This estimate
can be reduced to index numbers and compared with the aggregate turnover
data inferred from 1he Deutsche Bank Survey.

















SOliHCE: Hoffmann: See previous table. Deutsche Bank. See footnote
to Table III/1.
It: can be seen that the two series do not coincide. In general the
Deutsche Bank (inferred." series is more volatile.
Suppose we make the arbitrary assumption that the stock-to-turnover
ratio in the Deutsche Bank estimates is more representative of all
413 MlI/5
industry and trade than are the inventory level estimates, and recalcu¬
late the aggregate inventory ]e/el estimates by multiplying the aggregate
stock-to-turnover ratio estimates by the Hoffmann output data, what is
the result?
Table III/4 Inventory levels: Manufacturing Industry and Trade
Original Recalculated ( Estimates
Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank " ec".
deflator; at 31.12
1925 86.9 87.3 85.2
1926 80.0 85.1 86.7
1927 98.2 102.0 93.1
1928 100.0 107.0 100.0
The recalculated "Deutsche Bank" results can be seen in the middle
ir
column. If we ignore the differences in timing, we can see the estimates
of inventory investment are brought closer together.



















If we could be sure that the stock-to-turnover ratios in the Deutsche
Bank survey were more representative than the inventory level estimates,
if-1 if AIII/6
we could use the above recalculation as an indication of how the
"perverse" gap between the Deutsche Bank 1927/8 estimate and my 1928
estimate might be closed. The differences in timing would reinforce
this to close the gap 1925/6 as against 1926, and, more partially for
1926/7 and 1927.
It was found, furthermore, that this hypothesis was broadly confirmed
by a branch-by-branch comparison of ray estimates of inventory investment
in 1928 with the "Leutsche Bank" estimates for 1927-28, in conjunction
with a comparison of rate of change of output 1927/8 according to the
best available sources with the rate of change of output as inferred
from the Deutsche Bank data. Table III/6 on the next sheet sets out
the relevant data. Of my estimates of inventory investment in manu¬
facturing industry and trade, all are reproduced except veiy minor
branches like lignite and potash.
The table may be considered as follows :
Firstly: Consider branches included in ray estimate but totally
excluded from the Deutsche Bank survey. Two of these show
an increase appreciably above the increase of my aggregate estimates
for industry and trade altogether - ie industrial oils, and especially
shipbuilding. The other two show an increase only a little below the
average: miscellaneous consumer goods, and vehicles.
Thus it appears that on balance the Deutsche Bank survey omitted (net)
above average stock building in 1928.
Secondly: We consider branches for which the Deutsche Bank coverage
is expressly incomplete - engineering, and food, drink and
tobacco. Food, drink and tobacco exhibits above average growth in my




Comparison of Bates of Change of Inventories and Output
Estimates of Different Sources
Rate of Change of
Inventories {%)













Retail +1.1 +3.8 -0.4 mm -1.1
Wholesale +6.1 +0.9 - - +11.6
Iron/Steel'' -3.9 —4.9 -10.56 -5.06 +0.3
Non Ferr.Metal +17.9 +2.6 +1.9 +5.3 -1.7




Paper _ +8.5 0.0 +^.3 +6.0 0.0
Timber +7.1 -4.7 +0.4 —2.6 -5.7
Leather +10.9 -6.3 -15.1£ -6.0q -17.1
Building , +0.2 - -4.5s +9.0^ -
Stone + Earth'' +20.5 +6.2 -2.8 -1.6 +1.3
Bee.Eng. +12.8 +3.4 - - +12.0
Mech.Eng. 3-5.7 -3.9 - +11.1 -5.9
Shipbuild. +25.2 - +13.1 +7.0 -
Vehicles, +6.2 - +20.0 +8.0 -
Textiles +7.4) 0.0 -2.9 "4.0) CO•<\)1
Other Textiles +16.0) - -1.7)
Clothing -0.2 +4.0 -4.0 -6.0
F .D.T. +9.0 -2.0 +6 +6.0 -10.0
Misc. +6.0 - - - -
Consum.Goods











In my estimates this includes coal mining
Corresponding category in my estimates




ie Food, Drink and Tobacco
In this case pig iron
" " " leather manufacture. Leather working statistic:
-18.9%
In this case stone and earth
" " " building materials
Inventories: My Estimates See Appendix II
Output:
Table III/1 above,
v G Hoffmann op.cit.pp 354,358,362,373,385,392-3
^31.
Kon.j-Stat.Hdb.(1936) pp 49-50, 251.
Deutsche Bank: inferred from Table III/1 above
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estimate is based, it appears that the sub-branches of food etc omitted
by the Deutsche Bank survey (brewing, tobacco, and grain-milling;
probably exhibited net above average stock accumulation in 1928. As
far as engineering is concerned, the Deutsche Bank estimates under-
represent branches working to order. I possess no data which distinguishes
between production to stock and to order: and a prior reasoning does
not give much help. The electrical engineering stock building in my
estimate is relatively as much above average as the Deutsche Bank elec¬
trical engineering figure is above its average; but my mechanical
engineering figure is relatively higher.
The explanation may be doubtful, but the fact is clear, that for branches
only partly represented in the Deutsche Bank data, taken together, my
estimates a~e relatively higher than the Deutsche Bank estimates. Further¬
more, for both mech.eng. and food etc, the Hoffmann and Konj-Stat.HdbUch
estimates of rate of change of output exceed those inferred from the
Deutsche Bank Survey.
Thirdly: Compare branches which in principle are covered by both
my estimates ana the Deutsche Bank survey.
Of these, only two series in my estimates exhibit a lower degree of
inventory investment than the corresponding Deutsche Bank series.
According to all available series the rate of output or sales fell in
these branches, and the rate of decline was as fast or faster acoording
to the Hoffmann series, as according to that inferred from the Deutsche
Bank survey.
For Iron and Steel both my estimates and the Deutsche Bank estimates
show roughly the same change in inventories. Output fell according to
the Hoffmann data: rose a little as inferred from the Deutsche Bank
survey.
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Tor all other branches represented in both series - eight in all - ray
estimates exhibit greater increase in inventories than does the cor¬
responding Deutsche estimate. One of the mcA outstanding of these -
Chemicals - is due to the atockbuilding policies of I.G. Farben - which
the Deutsche Bank survey clearly failed to capture *1. Of these
eight series, Hoffmann and the Kon.j-Stat-Hdb. provide output series for
all except wholesale trade. For the seven left, in four cases rate of
change of output is higher according to these sources than as inferred
from the Deutsche Bank survey - ie chemicals, non-ferrous metals, paper
and timber.
In 2 cases the rate of change of output is similar in all sources - ie
textiles and leather. In 1 case the inferred rate of change of output
from the Deutsche Bank survey is higher than that in other sources - ie
building materials / stone and earth.
To sum up the branch-by-branch analysis of the two estimates of inventory
investment and related estimates of output change for 1927/8 and 1928:
(i) Those branches totally omitted by the Deutsche Bank survey
display on balance in my estimates a rate of inventory investment which
is above average even in relation to the rest of my estimates.
(iij For branches for which Deutsche Bank estimates are explicitly
incomplete, my estimates exceed the Deutsche Bank estimates; furthermore
the directly obtained estimates of output change (Hoffmann and Kon;j-
Btat-Hdbuch/ exceed those inferred from the Deutsche Bank data.
(iii; For branches in which the coverage of my estimates and those
of the "Deutsche Bank" survey are in principle the same, the following
broad correlation is observable: where my estimates of inventory
*1 Keiser und Benning op.cit. p 50.
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investment exceed the Deutsche Bank estimates, directly ascertained
estimates of the rate of change of output exceed those inferred from
the Deutsche Bank survey. Where my estimates of inventory investment
are less than those of the Deutsche Bank survey, the converse is true.
While not perfect, the correlation seems closer than can be explained
as chance. This branch-by-branch correlation confirms the aggregative
hypothesis advanced above: viz that if we regard the stock-to-turnover
ratios as more representative than the inventory level estimates and
recalculate the levels on the basis of these ratios multiplied by the
best available output data, the gap between my estimates and those of
the Deutsche Bank survey is substantially reduced.
It seems possible that these three items could close the gap between
my estimates for 1928 and those of the Deutsche Bank survey for 1927/8
perhaps, even allowing for the gap-widening effect of the difference
in periodisation.
It may be said in conclusion that the rise in real inventory levels




WAS THERE A SYSTEMATIC BIAS IK THE INITIAL BALANCE-SHEET
VALUATION OF FILED ASSETS AETER THE STABILISATION ?
. -fyi • ••
Almost all firms reconstructed their balance sheets in terms of
Ooldmark/Reichsoark during the two years after Stabilisation *1.
According to the writer of one thesis on the subject, the relevant
legislation allowed considerable latitude in the determination of the
values of their assets *2. Do the balance-sheet values of fixed
assets (from which estimates of the fixed capital stock in Gewerbe
are derived) conceal a systematic bias?
What do we mean by "bias"? A reasonable definition seems to be as
follows: If the initial balance-sheet values of pre-1914 fixed assets
are less than the average 1924-29 replacement costs for identical
assets, after allowance for depreciation, undervaluation can be said to
have occurred. Vice-versa for overvaluation. How can this definition
be applied empirically? In practice all we have to go on are con¬
temporaries' impressions and common sense.
Contemporaries (and historians) who comment on this problem seem to work
with roughly this definition. Their method of approach usually seems to
be to compare actual declared profit rates, net of depreciation, of firms
and industries, with their own subjective assessment of "true" profit¬





were assets correctly valued, their definition is closely related to
mine; so that eg when contemporaries believe declared profits are
too high, this by my criterion indicates undervaluation.
However "true" profits sometimes also convey the sense of Marshallian
"normal" profits. Where this is so their evidence cannot be directly
aligned with my criterion.
There were other approaches to the problem as well of course.
Opinions among those who discuss the problem are fairly uniform.
Mueller, the writer of the above-mentioned thesis, concluded that the
"initial" revaluation of assets after Stabilisation inadequately
reflected the real net investment that had occurred bebween 1913/24;
secondly that on average initial values of assets were lower than would
have obtained in 1913 on identical assets (presumably after allowance
for price-level change) *3» Maybe, he thought, the less rosy post-
inflation economic outlook justified this. Thus Mueller's conclusion
seems clearly to imply undervaluation by my definition. This is also,
in the main, the view of Reiser and Benning, especially with respect to
industries predominantly populated by smaller firms *4, but also for
heavy industry *5; however in the case of mechanical engineering they
advance a hypothesis of overvaluation, in the light of the subsequent
severe and endemic excess capacity and low profitability of that branch *6.
Thus it does appear ttet Reiser and Benning's criterion of "true" profit-
•vV..s \ ?'* 4'
*3 Ibid, pp 73-4, 90ff.
*4 Reiser and Benning op.cit. p 1?6.
*5 Ibid, p 44.
V
*6 Ibid.p 51? Undervaluation is also supported by B Benning, 'Ber
schwarze Freitag ...' p 114.
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ability is Narshallian; hence we can probably adopt their evidence of
undervaluation directly, but their understanding of overvaluation in
mechanical engineering might for us imply accurate valuation. This
conclusion for mech.engineering is supported by A Ceser. who holds that
the industry valued its assets during 1924/5 at full production value,
a decision proved erroneous by subsequent excess capacity *7.
Other opinions diverge. A writer on German mechanical engineering in
"Commerce Reports" believed that assets were deliberately undervalued to
minimise the burden of the reparations bonds *8. Certainly it is true
that these obligations were being determ^d contemporaneously with the
balance sheet revaluation. On the other hand Treue holds that the steel
firm Ilseaer Htitte "undoubtedly valued its fixed assets vejry high" in
the initial balance sheet, in order subsequently to generate large
dspreciatton allowances. Other disadvantages of this policy were not
considered *9.
In a general scholarly survey, F Schmidt subscribed to a view of general
undervaluation during 1924/5 *10.
Thus the consensus of this small sample is: undervaluation; the sole
dissenter being Treue. I think we can view the consensus as evidence
of undervaluation by my criterion.
Common sense seems to support this view anyway.
*7 -■ Oeser, "Kapital und Ertrag im deutschen Maschinenbau", Wirt-
schaftliche Hefto der Frankfurter f'eitung, Feb.1928.
*8 Commerce Reports, 27/2/28,"German Machinery Industry and Trade".
*9 W Treue,op.cit.p 500; DBZ 15/ /2,.p5,"hie Lage im Ruhrkohlenbagbau".
*10 F Schmidt, 'Die Faktpren des industriellen Kapitalbedarfs', p129.
For other support 6f this view (excepting the case of the public
electricity supply,1 see E-A 111/2, Die deutsche Elektrizit&ts-
wirtschaft pp 65-4.
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i) Accounting practice uniformly advocates conservative valuation
of assets. Given a reasonably free hand, firms will seek to minimise
risk by so doing, subject to a desire not to exaggerate profits too
much, and hence incur needless taxation. The rationale suggested by
W Treue surely impjlies much more subtlety on the part of most businessmen
than this view does.
ii) In fact the years 192<+/5 were years of less than prosperity, of
rapid alterations in the trade cycle etc. 1923 had been a chaotic year.
Such a recent past surely makes the likelihood very high, that busine®-
men revalued their assets conservatively.
iii; The fears of the burden of the reparation bonds surely worked
in the same direction.
Thus in Chapter 8, I will assume:
a) That the values of fixed assets in th "initial" balance sheets
of 192<+/5 were on average correct or too low.
b; If there is any systematic difference in the degree of bias,:
larger firms are more likely to exercise the subtlety, (and be less
apprehensive of bankruptcy; than small firms. Therefore the smaller the
average size of firm in an industry, the more the likelihood of under¬
valuation.
Assumption a; implies:
1; That initial (l92<+/5 capital stock estimates may be too low.
But net investment estimates 192<+ff. may be generally too high (because
depreciation rates - either firms' own or researchers' - may be too lowJ.
Assumption b; would imply if accepted:
2) That estimates of net investment 192<+ff. for industries populated
by large firms may be too low relative to estimates for industries
populated by small firms.
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AFPENDIA V
ESTIMATES 01' THE UTILISATION OF THE FIXED CAPITAL STOCK
V.1 Summary of Notation
V.2 Critique of the Method of A F Mester
V-3 Brief Critique of the Method of B Krengel
V.4 Description of Revised Method
V.5 further Evidence on the Capital-Labour Ratio 1924-28
Summary of the Argument
V.6 Statistical Tables
V.1 SUKM/UiY of NOTATION
Let E = the numbers employed in Gewerbe
e = the rate of employment in Gewerbe (= est.(E/L))
j = the "lower limit" estimate of the "jobs reporting index"
( = est.(E/L*))
= the "upper limit" estimate of the "jobs reporting index"
( = est.(E/L°))
K* = the aggregate extant fixed capital stock in Gewerbe - ie
both in use and idle.
K = the aggregate fixed capital stock in Gewerbe currently in use.
L* = the level of employment associated with the technically
maximum utilisation of K*
L° = the level of employment associated with the technically
optimum utilisation of K*.
L = the total numbers currently in, and seeking employment in
Gewerbe
0 = net output in Gewerbe
r = K/E: the capital-labour ratio pertaining to the capital stock
currently in use in Gewerbe
£ = the capital-output ratio pertaining to the capital stock
0 currently in use in Gewerbe.
k2k Ay/2
est ( ) = estimate of ( )
min ( ). = minimum value of ( ) during period defined for t .
V.2 CRITIQUE of the METHOD of A F KESTEK
There are two published measures of the utilisation of the fixed capital
stock: that of A F Hester and that of R Krengel *1.
Hester's measures refer to the capital stock of the entire economy. I
discuss therefore his method as it would apply either to Gewerbe as a
whole, or to manufacturing and mining on their own. In his view, further¬
more, variations in utilisation concern only the stock of capital
equipment, not the stock of buildings (Hester, pp 72-3J• This view is
however irrelevant to his method.
For the years 1928-36, Hester adopts directly a series evolved by the
Institut fttr Kon.junkturforschung, which I have nicknamed the "jobs
reporting index". A variant of this index is reproduced in Table F
p if37 below. The series indicates the actual levels of employment as
percentages of the maximum levels of employment which the extant capital
stock could afford; it is based on comprehensive sample surveys
(Hester pp 66-7>. Using the notation defined in section v/1 :
est ( ) = j
A number of assumptions would have to be made before this series could
be viewed as an accurate index of the degree of utilisation of the fixed
I " *
*1 A F Hester, 'Eine Zeitreiie der Ausnutzung ...'
R Krengel, 'Anlagevermtfgen ...' pp 86-89.
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capital stock in "Gewerbe".
Firstly, an assumption not made explicit by Wester: that the capital-
labour ratio pertaining to the idle stock must be identical to that
pertaining to the stock in use; ie
,. E K , ... K K*
L» = ■ K* y ^ E = L* = r
The assumption set out in (1) is not strictly supportable. Given the
well-attested evidence of a secular increase in the capital-labour ratio,
(eg Hoffmann ..., Das Wachstum ... pp h9ffj, and the likelihood that the
idle stock is on average older than that in use, it seems likely that
<*> !•> g
If, for example, the "jobs reporting index" stands at 90%, but the average
capital-labour ratio appropriate to the idle stock is only half that
appropriate to the stock in use, the true degree of utilisation of the
capital stock is 9^.7%. If the average life of the stock is 20 years,
this implies an annual rda of increase of the capital-labour of c.h%.
This seems a fairly fast rate of increase, so this arithmetical example
can probably be regarded as providing an upper estimate of the degree of
distortion caused on this account by the use of the "jobs reporting
index" to indicate capital stock utilisation.
A second assumption, implicit in the use of the index as a proxy is more
fully discussed by Kester (pp 59ff)» The index is, as already stated,
expressed as a percentage of the maximum employment potential of the
extant capital stock. But it seems likely that the maximum will exceed
the optimum employment (and corresponding level of utilisation of the
stock;. Businessmen probably regard their fixed capital stock as
insufficient (quite apart from its technical obsoleteness) and in need
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of extension some way below its maximum capacity operation. Hester
therefore provides two limiting indices of capital stock utilisation.
The first identifies the optimum with the maximum:
o K
Lower Limit: L* = L } est ) = j
To get the second he views the employment level associated with optimum
operation as 80% of that associated with the maximum:
Upper Limit: L° = ^L* ; est = est (^o) = 3 = "^3
It is with this upper limit that I work because I wish my utilisation
measure to provide an 'upper bound'on the true utilisation rate. I
think this 'upper limit'measure will provide such a bound if in discussing
the relationship between "optimum" and "maximum" we exclude the possibility
that much marginal plant pressed into service at times of high demand may
be obsolete and hence undesirable, and concentrate on the fact that
"maximum" utilisation may mean more frequent maintenance, less "slack"
in the case of breakdowns, and similar factors. Then it does seem
extreme, to view "optimum" as as low as 80% of "maximum".
And it is_ appropriate to view to the context of section 8.3*, where this
measure of utilisation is required, to exclude factors of technical
obsoleteness, since these aspects are considered separately in another
section.
Hence it seems to me, that Hester's "upper limit," variantis indeed an
upper limit estimate of the utilisation of the fixed capital stock, even
allowing for the bias in the opposite direction implicit in the non-
fulfilment of the condition in expression (1). The substitution of L°
for L» in (1) is the crux, and formally speaking I hypothesise that
(3) 3 ^ Y* because I believe that
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(1a) if L° is constrained to then ~ ^
and hence Jp ^ fv
I therefore deem it safe to use 3 as a test of the hypothesis of
section 4.1; viz that throughout 1924-29 capacity was significantly
underutilised.
One final assumption implicit in the use of the index as a proxy for
Gewerbe should be considered. The index is based on information from
mining and manufacturing only. These are the most cyclical parts of
Gewerbe. For the depression years therefore this index is likely to
understate utilisation in the sector as a whole. One solution is that
of Fester, ie to apply the index to equipment only, and to combine
the equipment utilisation thus calculated with assumed 100% utilisation
of fe buildings stock. However in my case, I doubt whether the appli¬
cation of the index to the entire capital stock in Gewerbe will produce
significant understatement for 1928-29 (the only years where 1 make
direct use of the index); in any case,* much of the discussion in the
text hinges on developments specifically in mining and manufacturing,
because these branches also were responsible for the most cyclical
components of fixed investment.
Hitherto Hester's methods only for I928ff have been considered. For
1923-27 he obtained estimates by extrapolating a regression of the
"jobs reporting index" on the rate of employment, for which he finds a
close fit for the years 19?8~36. The function he fits over 1928-36 is:
* "
(4) j = a + be + u
where a is a constant, b a parameter, and u the random error.
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He uses this function to obtain estimates of j from estimates of
e which he has for 1925-27#
This method is surely faulty. Confining our attention to Gewerbe
(purely for the sake of conformity with the definition of the notation
in V.1), the "structural equation" which he fits can be written;
E E(ha) jp = c + d-|- + v
where c, d, and v correspond to a, b, and u.
There seems no good reason why the relations expressed in (ha) should
generally hold. L° is a function of the size and technical character¬
istics of the capital stock and the capital=labour ratio; L of
demographic and long-term structural shifts; E of the state of the
trade cycle. The excellent fit which Hester obtained for 1928-36 is
a fluke, and is owing to the fact that in these years L° and L were
practically constant, so that in effect he was regressing E upon a
linear transformation of itself. Given that for short periods L°
depends closely on K*, a glance at estimates of K* and L for 1925-55
will show why this regression worked for 1928-56, but would not hold
for 1925-29; Gehrig's capitol stock data and corresponding labour
force data are shown because these are as close as possible to what
Hester himself used:
ESTIMATES of the EaTANT CAPITAL STOCK and NUMBERS IN and SEEKING WORK






SOURCES: K* : Gehrig op.cit. p 56.
L : Phelps Brown and Browne op.cit. p 582, Cols 1 and 2.
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An alternative method of obtaining estimates for 192^-27 will be
described in section V.*u
V»3 A Brief CRITIQUE of the DhTHQD of fi KRENGEL
Krengel's data will be described along with oth<tr data in section V.^.
His method can be briefly sketched.
He postulates that the "true" capital-output ratio is constant over
1925-56, where the "true" ratio is defined as that pertaining to that
fixed capital stock actually in use, and current output. He estimates
this "true',' capital-output ratio by the lowest ratio between the
extant fixed capital stock and current output over 1925-56. Applying
the notation of V.1 to mining and manufacturing alone (the coverage of
Krengel's estimates) we can write:
(5) est (^t) = min (^t) , t = 1925 ••• 1956Ct °t
For any year i , the capital stock actually in use is therefore
estimated thus:
(6) est QO = O^.minC^t) , t = 1925 ••• 1956
and the rate of utilisation of the fixed capital stock in year i by:
K. 0.,min(~t )
(7) est fei) 1 t , t = 1925 ... 1956
K1 K?
l
The basic postulate of this method seems open to question, via that the
"true" capital-output ratio is constant for so long a period. Hather
it seems to be subject to irregular long period movements (Hoffmann ...,
Das Wachstum ... pp ^7ff). In any case it seems better to exploit the
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directly relevant information of the IfK. "jobs reporting index" for
the years for v/hich it is available.
V.4 DESCRIPTION of a REVISED METHOD of APPROACH
I seek an index of the utilisation of the fixed capital stock 192^-29
for Gewerbe as a whole and for mining and manufacturing on their own.
As already indicated, for 1928-29 Hester's "upper limit" variant of
the "jobs reporting index" will be used.
(8; for 1928-29, est (£„) = 3
For 1924-27 the following method is proposed. To estimate the ratio
K/K* we seek separate estimates of K and K*.
For estimates of K*, we use i) for Gewerbe as a whole the series in
Hoffmann. Ideally, a more "gross" measure of the fixed capital stock
might be better, as this should better represent the development of
output potential, but none is available. Hoffmann's is really a year-end
series. Successive estimates were therefore averaged to obtain a mid¬
year series. This will be found in Table E(i; on p 437 below.
ii) for mining and manufacturing on their
own we have Krengel's estimates of gross capital stock (ie the cumulation
of gross investment minus scrapping at constant prices - Krengel pp 86-7;.
See Table E(ii) p 437 below.
Estimates of K, the fixed capital stock actually in use, can be obtained
with the aid of the identity:
K = rE
if independent estimates of E and r can be found for 1924-27.
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Estimates of E - current employment in Gewerbe (or in mining and
manufacturing/ are taken from Hoffmann. See Table H p 437 •
Estimates of r - the capital-labour ratio pertaining to the capital
stock in use have to be devised.
On the basis of the discussion of offsetting biases in section V.2, let
us assume that for 1928 the "jobs reporting index" (upper limit variant)
provides an accurate estimate of the rate of utilisation of the fixed
capital stock in that year, for 1928
K = jK*
Therefore, also for 1928
Wr -Si
This method of estimation of r can be repated for each of the
years 1928-36. The results will be found in Table K(i) and (ii) p if39
A short excursus on the pattern they exhibit is necessary. The first
observation is that the ratio appears to vary concyclically over 1929-35*
This is spurious, and two errors in the estimation of r according to
expression (9) help to produce it:
a) j refers to industry, the most cyclical part of Gewerbe, as already
stated. Hence jK* will decline more than K (of which it is an
estimate) really does during the depression.
b) My estimate of E will decline less than employment in"Gewerbe"
really does, since it takes account only of numbers employed, not
hours worked.
The second observation is that the capital-labour ratio appears to be
higher for later years of high employment (ie after 1936; than for
earlier years of high employment (ie 1928-29)* This can be taken as
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evidence of the well-observed secular upward trend in the ratio
(cf Hoffmann pp 49ff). According to Hoffmann, between 1850 and
1913 the average annual rate of increase of this ratio was, for
"Gewerbe" c*2% (op.cit. p 59)
With the aid of these two observations on the observed pattern of r
for 1928-36, I turn to its estimation for 1924-27.
I am really interested in showing that even in high employment years
(1925, 1927) the capital stock was underutilised. The cyclical problem
in the estimation of r can therefore be ignored.
As a limiting assumption we can say that in no year 1924-27 would the
capital-labour ratio be higher than in 1928. This assumption is based
not only on the above-mentioned secular trend, but also on the likely
effects of post-inflation readjustment and "rationalisation" on r.
On the other hand, the capital-labour ratio could have been increasing
over 1924-27.
On these grounds I used three different assumptions to determine the
values of the ratio over 1924-27:
a. That the capital-labour ratio was constant 1924-28.
b. That the capital-labour ratio rose at 4% p.a. 1924-28.
c. That the capital-labour ratio rose at 3$ p.a. 1924-28.
Remembering that what we wish to calculate is
it can easily be seen that for 1924-27 assumption "a" maximises the bias
against the hypothesis I wish to sustain. From Hoffmann's evidence
mentioned above, the time rate of increase of the ratio was probably
about 2% p.a.
(10) est (j|v) rEK*
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The results of calculating the rate of utilisation of the fixed capital
stock according to (10), and for each of the three assumptions as to
the behaviour of the capital-labour ratio 192^-28 are given in Table C
I. • • ,
p ^+36 below:
(i) For "Gewerbd', where the index is calculated for the entire
capital stock - ie buildings and equipment*
(ii) For mining and manufacturing, buildings and equipment together.
As a sort of footnote to this section of the appendix, I consider the
effect on the utilisation index of errors in the estimates of the actant
fixed capital stock (K*;. 1 assume that the error chiefly arises out of
the process of re-valuation after the inflation (see Appendix IV;? by
contrast that estimates of gross investment from 192^ are accurate.
Expressions (9-> and (10) show that errors in K* effect eriimates of
the utilisation rate both directly, and indirectly as they affect r
via their effect on the capital stock estimate for 1928. These two
effects will offset each other. We can expect that the utilisation
index will therefore not be very sensitive to errors in K*. Our assumed
pattern of error implies however that capital stock estimates become
more accurate through time. For 192^-27 this implies that the error
imported into the index through r will be proportionately less than
that imported directly via K* in the denominator. Given the conclusion
of Appendix I - viz that at 192^ the capital stock was probably under¬
valued, this implies tliat the utilisation estimate is probably slightly
biased against the hypothesis of the chapter, by the error in K*. Even
if the stock were over- valued in 192^ by, let us say 10%, calculations
on Krengel's gross measurement of the stock indicate that the 1925
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utilisation rate should only be higher than in Table C(iii); the
1927 rate less than 0.1$. (Calculations on Hoffmann's net measures
would be harder, because the implicit depreciation rate would have to
"7 ■" ' • .. ;
be adjusted also, but the conclusion would certainly be the same;.
Thus we can conclude (a) that the utilisation index 192^-27 is
insensitive to errors in the estimates of the ektant fixed capital
stock (after 1928 the extant stock ceases to enter the calculation);
(b) to the extent there is an error, it probably biasses the index
apLnst the hypothesis of the chapter.
V.5 FURTHER EVIDENCE on the CAPITAL-LABOUR RATIO 192^-28
Finally, I consider thejatterns shown by three interrelated ratios
reproduced in Tables I, J, and K below pp 438-9 »
The capital-output ratio (Table X). Note that this is defined
as K/0 not as K*/0, as pertaining to capital-stock in use, not
extant, divided by current output.
Output per occupied person (Table J); ie 0/E.
The capital-labour ratio (Table K); ie r = K/E; not K*/E.
% *
Each of these is shown both for Gewerbe as a whole, and for mining and
manufacturing. The data sources are indicated under the Tables.
To calculate the capital stock in use 192^-27 we use the identity K = rE
Hence for 192*f-?7 three different estimates of the capital-output ratio
are shown, corresponding to the three different assumptions about the
behaviour of r.
These three ratios are logically interrelated:
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Thus, given Q/E, the higher the capital-labour ratio, the higher also
the capital-output ratio. This also can be verified from the Tables
for 1925-27.
.
This interrelation affords corroborative evidence by which to discriminate
between the three hypothesised patterns of the capital-labour ratio
1924-27.
i
If assumption "a" is examined it is seen to imply a capital-output ratio
in 1925-26 that was noticeably out of line with all subsequent values.
The big drop in this ratio after 1926 could be ascribed to the "rational¬
isation" boom (on the assumption that this affected the capital-output,
but not the capital-labour ratio!) If my conclusions in pp ^17 ff
°f - Chapter 8 are accepted, viz that this boom was of modest proportions,
then it is more reasonable to suppose that these "maverick" figures in
Table I(i)(a) or I(ii)(a; for 1925-27 are statistical artifacts. Even if
assumptions "b" or "c" about the pattern of r are employed, K/Q still
falls after 1925. (as the fact of the "rationalisation" boom might lead
us to expect), but at a more plausible rate.
Turning to the estimates of the capital-labour ratio itself, in Table K,
and ignoring the artificially induced cone yclicality of the years
1929-35. already discussed, the improbability of assumption "a" is evident,
which constrains the ratio to constancy during 1924-28, as against
assumptions "b" or "c". Examinationcf the patterns of the capital-output
and capital-labour ratios therefore reinforces the view that the latter
ratio increased steadily 1924-28.
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V.6 UTILISATION RATES : STATISTICAL TABLES
General Key to Symbols at Heads of Columns
(i) Coverage: Gewerbe; fixed capital stock, buildings and equipment.
(ii) Coverage: mining and manufacturing; fixed capital stock, buildings
and equipment.
a. Assumes that the capital-labour ratio was constant l92i+-28.
b. Assumes that the capital-labour ratio rose at p.a. 192^-28.
c. Assumes that the capital-labour ratio rose at 3% P*a. 192^-28.





1925 95.1 1925 75 1930 7b 1935 76
1926 82.3 1926 72 1931 59 1936 8b
1927 89.2 1927 89 1932 b8 1937 90
1928-39
See Table F 1928 86 1933 56 1938 9^+
below 1929 86 193^ 68
* Equipment only




** Buildings and Equipment










See Table F below
(ii) Mining and Manufacturing
a. b. c. a. b. c.
85.5 8L.3 76.5 n.a. n.a.
90.2 88.8 i 82.5 91.^ 89.9 83.6
81.4 80.6 76.6 79.8 79.1 75.2
89.9 89.5 87.2 89.9 89.5 87.^
See Table F below
SOURCES: See description of method in preceding sections of this Appendix.
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Tables £ to H (also K) Data for the Calculation of the Rate
F IfK
Buildings + Equipment (Upper Variant)
(i) Gewerbe (ii) Mining and
Mrd 1913 M. Manufacturing
Mrd. 1954 DM.
192^ 60.9 am
1925 62.4 47.7 -
1926 64.1 48.3 -
1927 66.0 49.3 -
1928 68.3 50.5 89.6
1929 70.2 51.2 88.0
1930 71.6 51.5 76.5
1931 72.C 51.4 63.4
1932 71.5 50.6 52.4
1933 70.7 49.8 57.9
1934 70.7 49.3 73.1
1935 71.9 49.1 79.9
1936 73.8 49.6 86.4
1937 76.7 51.2 /93.6_Z
1938 80.7 52.8 Z98.9_/
SOURCES E (i): Hoffmann ... p 245 F: Hester op.cit. p 81,
E(ii): Krengel op.cit. cols. 9 and 10.
G Output H Deployment Mill,
(i) 'Gewerbe' (ii) I
Ill 1913 M. Manufacturing
Mrd. 1950 DM.
Manufacturing
1924 n • a • n.a. 15.2* n«a.«
1925 26.7 36.1 16.3 10.7
1926 24.6 35.5 15.1 9.5
1927 30.6 44.4 17.2 10.9
1928 30.8 43.9 17.8 11.1
1929 31.4 44.5 17.5 10.8
1930 27.8 39.3 15.9 9.7
1931 22.9 32.1 13.7 8.3
1932 20.0 26.1 12.0 7.1
1933 22.3 29.1 12.6 7.5
1934 26.9 1 34.2 14.6 8.7
1935 30.9 37.8 15.6 9.6
1936 34.5 42.0 16.8 10.3
1937 38.5 46.1 17.9 11.2






Hoffmann ... p 455t cols 2+3+5
Krengel op.cit. p 82.
fi (i): Hoffmann ...pp 205-6, cols 2+3+5 (1924 = guess/
HUT): H6ffmann ... p 195t co1 8; p 199 col 15 minus (13+14)
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Tables I to K ABsociated Ratios
I Capital - Output Ratio
(i; 'Gewerbe'
1925 ■ a. b. c.
1925 2..11 2.07 1.93
1926 2.12 2.10 2.00








SOURCE (i): Table E(i) times
Table C(i) divided
by Table G(i)













SOURCE (jj: Table G(i< divided
by Table H(i)













(ii ): Table E(ii.) times
Table C(ii) divided by
Table G(ii)













(i) 'Gewerbe' (ii; lining and Manufacturing
a. b. c. a. b. c •
1924 3-45 3.38 3.07 n n.a. n.a.
1925 3.45 3.40 3.16 0.41 0.40 0.37
1926 3.45 3.42 3.25 0.41 0.40 O.38
1927 3-45 3.43 3.35
. 0.41 0.40 0.39
1928 3.45 0.41
1929 3.53 0.42











• I 3" V"" _...' • . 0.43
1938 4.23 0.44
SOURCES U): Table E(i) times (ii;: Table E(ii) times
Table C(i) divided Table C(ii) divided by
by Table H(i) Table H(ii)
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APPENDIX VI
DID THE INVESTMENT PROGRAMME COME TO A "NATURAL CONCLUSION"?
One conclusion of the chapter is that widespread presence of excess
capacity, the relative modernity of plant etc created only weak stimuli
to sustain the investment upswing that had begun in 1926. As stated or
p 291there exists a fair amount of evidence that contemporary agents
and observers believed that the investment boom was diminishing in 1928/9
because capital expenditux-e programmes were reaching "some sort of a
conclusion" (sind zu einem gewissen Abschluss gekommen). The evidence
of this belief, reproduced below, is of two types:
(i) An analysis of all relevant information in my possession from
company reports. In Table VI.1 Reports attributing the
reduction in investment activity within the firm to the ending of pro¬
grammes are listed. In Table VI.2 reports which attribute the reduction
to other causes are given, and in Table VI.2 reports which indicate
unabated investment activity (from 1929 on) are shown. No report from
which I have any relevant positive or negative information has been
excluded.
(ii) All references in my possession which share the belief in a
"natural conclusion", from books, magazines etc, Table VI.If.
However other explanations of the fixed investment recession found in
such sources are not recorded here; they will be found in the relevant
sections of the chapter*
Clearly the evidence, especially that of the agents themselves, is not
conclusive. They could be hiding something, or err through ignorance of
\
the total picture. It seems clear eg that for the mass of textile firms
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reporting the conclusion of investment programmes in 1928 (see Table
IV.1) the devekpment of the inventory cycle was also an important
' *'
unstated factor. Likewise the Adlerwerke report of 1928/9 and the
N.A.G. report of 1930 omit to mention their recent financial diffi¬
culties. Still "there is no smoke without fire" and surely the statement
for which so many references are tabulated below can be accounted valid
subsidiary evidence for the hypothesis of the chapter.
Table VI.1 Company Reports attributing the Reduction in Capital Expend¬
iture to the Conclusion of Investment Programmes
Company Branch Year
Baumwollindustrie Erlangen-Bamberg Textiles 1928
Bremer Wollkitamerei Textiles 1928
Kltickner A.G. (Hasper Works) Iron/Steel 1928
Meyer Kauffmann Textiles 1928
Norddeutsche WollkHmmerei ... Textiles 1928
Rheinische Ketallwaaren und liaschinenfabrik Mech. Eng. 1928
Schubert und Salzer Textile Machine 1928
Adlerwerke Vehicles 1928/9
A.E.G. Elec. Eng. 1929
F A Hammersen Textiles 1929
Hoesch* Iron/Steel 1929
Kali-Chemie A.G. Chemicals 1929
F Krupp Iron/Steel 1929
i-anne smarm Iron/Steel 1929
Siemens-Schuckert Werke Elec. Eng. 1929
Kali-Chemie A.G. Chemicals 1930
F Krupp Iron/Steel 1930
N.A.G. Vehicles 1930
Ruhretahl A.G. Iron/Steel 1930
Ver. Oberschlesiche HUttenwerke Iron/Steel 1930
Gutehoffnungshfitte Iron/Steel 1931
* This report also contains evidence of other reasons for the reduction
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Table VI.2 Company Reports vhich attribute the deduction in Capital
Expenditure to Factors other than as in Table IV.1
NOTE: (F) = Financial State of Company
(E) = General Economic Climate
Company Reason Branch Year
Eisenhiittenwerk A.G. Bochum (E) Iron/Steel 1929
liarpener Bergbau (F) Hard Coal 1928
Buderus Eisenv/erke A.G.* (E) Iron/Steel 1928
Hoesch (E) Iron/Steel 1930
SOURCE: J Ferfer op.cit. p 130.
no sign of Abatement (from 1928/9 only)
Company Branch Year
M.A.N. Ehg. Vehicles 1928/9
Ilseder Hutte Iron/Steel 1929
Kldckner A.G. (ie in general) Iron/Steel 1929
Mechanische Weberei zu Linden Textiles 1929
Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke Iron/Steel 1929
Freuss. Bergwerks- und Hutten A.G, Iron/Steel etc 1929
Siemens und Halske Elec. Eng. 1929
Deutsche Edelstahlwerke Steel 1930
Eschweiler Bergwerksverein Hard Coal 1930
Gelsenkirchener Bergbau Various 1930
Gutehoffnungschhtte Iron/Steel 193P
Ilseder Hutte Iron/Steel 1930







Table VI.4 Other Sources which attribute the Decline ia the Hate of Fixed
Investment to the Conclusion of Investment Programmes
DBZ 26/8/28 p 1, "Rheinisch-WestfSlischer Eisenmarkt". Rationalisation
and renewal have come to "seme scrt of a conclusion". But local
authority liquidity crisis also blamed.
Kon.j.berichte "West n" 1929 H1 pp 10-11, "Der Konjunkturverlauf 1926-28".
Blames investment decline (dated from 2nd quarter 1928) on the
completion of a substantial part of the "renewal" (Umstellungs-
prozess) in the iron/steel industry itself.
Reiser und Benning op.cit. p 43: conclusion of an investment programme
in lignite.
4'agazin der Wirtschaft 27/12/28 p 1979, "Abklingende Konjunktur":
decline due to completion of expansion plans and the like, but
aggravated by the deterioration in the supply of funds.
Haschinenbau 1929 7/2/29 p W25 (O Veit), "Konjunkturentwicklung und
Kapitalversorgung": 1927 upswing came to an end a) because of a
natural conclusion of investment programmes, b; lack of finance.
Sprechsaal 1929 p "Die deutsche Glasindustrie": The transformation
of the plate-glass section of the industry was largely completed
last year.
E kelter, Stockung ... (1929) P 29• Downsv/ing due to end of Rational¬
isation boom, also due to lack of funds, overcapacity etc.
A Wirtz: "Die Lage der Risen- und Stahlindustrie im Jahre 1929" in.
Jahresberichte der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Industrie- und Handels-
kammern der Ruhrbezirk, 1929 PP 71-3: "Investment programme
coming to some sort of a conclusion."
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APPENDIX VII
A REVISION OP HOFFMANN'£ ESTIMATES OF NET VALUE ADDED BY
AGRICULTURE
Hoffmann defines net value added by the agricultural sector to relate
to the production of the sector as shown in the following Table:
Table VII/1 Hoffmann's Definition of Net Value Added by Agriculture
Crop Yields, Animal Slaughterings etc.
(i) minus (seed grain + feedstuff + loss)
= Production
(ii) minus necessary inputs (eg fertilisers, fuel)
(iii) plus rental value of own dwelling of farm operator
(iv) plus net increase in size of livestock
= Net Output
ft
(v) minus maintenance and depreciation of 'inanimate' capital
(vi) minus other necessary costs (eg property taxes, insurance premia)
* Net Value Added
SOURCE: Hoffmann ... pp 288-95, 31*+.
It can readily be shown that his estimates of net value added for the
arable section, whi h he publishes as calendar year estimates, are in
reality estimates for the harvest year which commenced during the calendar
year in question. His estimates of production can be matched directly
with those of his source (D Grape) as follows:
AVI1/2
Table VII.2 Production in the Arable Section
Reference Period : Grupe 1924/5 1925/6 1926/7 1927/8 .
" " : Hoffmann 1924 1925 1926 1927
Production of wheat: Grupe 2126 2963 2204 2806
" " " : Hoffmann 2126 2965 2204 ?8o6
* Production : as defined in Table 2 p above.
SOURCE : D Grupe: lie EA'hrungsmittelversorg-ung Deutschlands seit 1925.
Teil B p22; Algebraic Sum of the following items:
Nettoverilnderung, - Einfuhrtfberschusse, Verftftterung,
3estandsverfeiderung.
Hoffmann: op.cit. p 293•
The same seems to hold good in the derivation of net value added in
arable from production. Hoffmann derives items (ii;, (iii), (v.J and
(vi) of Table VII/1 (p 444 ) from Stat.Reichsamt data. Where both employ
an identical classification it can be found that Hoffmann has entered
under calendar years elements which in the Stat.Reichsamt source appear
under harvest years, thus:
Table VII.3 Selected Necessary Costs in the Arable Sector Hill.like.
Reference Period: StvReicbBamt 1925/6 1926/7 1927/8 1928/9
" " : 1925 1926 1927 1928
lertilisen Purchases 622 723 690 775
fmaintenance of Buildings 328 331 366 360
Maintenance of Machinery 577 619 704 714
SOURCES: StsLReichsamt, St.Jb.f.d.dt.R. 1936 p 509.
Hoffmann, op.cit. p 318.
The St.Jb. and Hoffmann classify other categories of necessary costs
differently, so that 'switch of period' cannot be directly proved for
these; the above evidence seems sufficient however.
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To obtain estimates of net value added in agriculture on a 'true' calendar
year basis the following rough adjustment procedure is proposed:
a) R«gard Hoffmann's estimates of arable production and of 'necessary
costs' as having reference to the harvest year which commenced during
the calendar year under which he entered them.
b) Obtain rough calendar year estimates of production in arable by
averaging successive pairs of Hoffmann estimates
. * '
(eg estimate of arable production *828 = 7$2?/P. *
Add these 'calendar year' estimates of arable production to
Hoffmann's estimates of livestock and livestock product production,
to obtain calendar year estimates of agricultural production as
a whole.
c) Apply the averaging procedure just described to the algebraic sum
of items (ii), (iii/, (vy and (vi; in Table VII.1 p 444 . Combine
the calendar year estimates for the sum of these items with
Hoffmann's estimate of calendar year change in livestock, and add
this total (algebraically) to the agricultural production estimate
obtained in b), to get an approximation of net value added during
calendar years. The result is shown in Table VII.b
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Table VII.4 Revised Estimates of Net Value Added in Agriculture
Hill.i'ks. Current Prices
Production in Production in
Arable Livestock Livestock Products
1924/25 2891
1925/26 3288 1925 4510 4153
1926/27 2428 1926 4889 3924
1927/28 3735 1927 4939 4249
1928/29 4583 1928 5425 4519





; k ■ ... '■
AKKresate Production Items (ii). Change in
Hoffmann Revised (iii),(v j,(viJ* Livestock Size
1925 11951 11753
-
1926 11241 11671 2490 +250
1927 12973 12320 2703 +790
1928 14523 14099 2873 •+80
1929 14207 14642 2940 -240
1930 12319 12690 2769 +820
























B3 Periodicals and Newspapers
B4.1 Germany: Books and Articles (Pre 1945)
B4.2 Germanyi Books and Articles (Post 1945)
■
B5 Ganeral and Theoretical Works
B1 UNPRINTEI) SOURCES (excluding dissertations)
The following materials in the Bundesarchiv (BA), Koblenz, were used ;
BA R2 (Reichsfinanzministerium)
1274 )
2067 ) Papers concerning the Beratungsstelle




j Deutscher Industrie- und Kandelstag
BA R13 I (Wirtschaftsgruppen)
45 )
70 ) Verein deutscher Eisen- und
336 ) Stahlindustrieller
337 )
BA R43 I (Reichskanzlei)
635 (Reports of the Reichsbank President to the Reich Government)
641 (Reichsbank, Central Committee)
656 (Natters relating to Savings and Credit)
BA Nachlass Silverberg (Silverberg Papers)
10, 22, 30, 204, 248, 481, 497, 540, 541
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B2 WORKS Of STATISTICS
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N.B. The following list contains only works (excluding periodicals/
devoted to the publication of statistical material. Other works
from which statistics have been derived are listed elsewhere.
B Benning and K Nieschlag, Umsatz, Lagerhaltung, und Kosten im
deutschen Einzelhandel 192** bis 1932. Berlin (Institut ftlr
Konjunkturforschung Sonderheft 32)1933-
Board of Trade, Census of Distribution 1950 and 1961. London (HMSO)
1953, 1963-6**.
E H Phelps Brown and M Browne, A Century of Pay. London (Kacmillan) 1968.
Department of Trade and Industry, Business Statistics Office, Report on
the Census of Production 1968, vol. 156. London (HMSO) 1972.
Deutscher Landwirtschaftsrat, VerOffentlichungen Heft 22, Fttnf.lfihrige
Buchftthrungsergebnisse der deutschen Landwirtschaft aus den
Wirtschaftsjahren 192*t/5 - 1928/9. Berlin (Deutsche Verlagsgesell-
schaft; 1930-
C H Feinstein, Domestic Capital Formation in the U.K. 1920-38. (Studies
in the National Income and Expenditure of the U.K. no b) Cambridge
(Cambridge U.P.) 1965.
C H Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United
Kingdom. (Studies in the National Income and Expenditure of the
U.K. no 6). Cambridge (Cambridge U.P.) 1972.
W Galenson and A Zellner, International Comparisons of Unemployment Hates,
University of California Reprint No 86. Berkeley 1957.
G Gehrig, 'Line Zeitreihe ftfr den Sachkapitalbestand* Ifo-Studien ?(196i)
D Grupe, Die Mhrungsmittelversorgung Deutschlands. Hannover (Agrar-
wirtschaft, Sonderheft 3/**: Alfred Strothe Verlag) 1957.
W G Hoffmann, F Grumbach, H Hesse, Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft
seit der Mitte des 19 Jahrhunderts. Berlin (Springer) 1965.
G Keiser and B Benning, Kapitalbildung und Investitionen in der deutschen
Volkswirtschaft 192** bis 1928. Berlin (Institut ftfr Kon.iunktur-
forschung, Sonderheft 22;. 1931.
G Keiser and C Ruberg, Umsatz und Lagerhaltung im deutschen Einzelhandel
seit 192**. Berlin (Institut ftir Konjunkturforschung, Sonderheft 1**)
1930.
Kon.iunkturstatistisches Handbuch. Berlin (Institut ftlr Konjunktur-
forschung; ed. E Wagemann; 1936.
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R Krengel, AnlagevermHgen, Vroduktion unci Beschaftigung der Industrie
im Gebiet der Bundesrepublik 192A-56. Deutsc'hes Institut ftir
Wirtschaftsforschung, Sonderheft N.F. k2 (Reihe A). Berlin
(Duncker und Humblot) 1958.
R Krengel, 'Langfristige Entwicklung der Brutto-Anlage-Investitionen',
in Viertel.jahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 1957 H.1.
A F Hester, 'Eine Zeitreihe der Ausnutzung des Sachkapitalbestandes',
in Ifo-Studien 7(196i).
B R Mitchell and P Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics.
Cambridge (Cambridge UP; 1962.
Statistisches Jahrbuch ftlr das deutsche Reich. Berlin (Statistisches
Reichsamt; various years.
Statistisches Reichsamt, Einzelschriften zur Statistik des deutschen
Reiches:
No 13, Die Uffentliche Verschuldung im deutschen Reich am
31.3.28 und 31.12.29. Berlin (R Mobbing; 1930.
No 1^, Die deutsche Finanzwirtschaft vor und nach dem
Krieget Berlin (R Hobbing) 1930.
No 15, Die Kommunale Betnebe im Rechnungs.jahr 1927/8.
Berlin (R Hobbing) 1930*
No 32, Die Cemeindefinanzen in der Wirtschaftskrise.
Berlin (R Hobbing) 1935.
United States Dept. of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the USA to 1957»
Washington D.C. 1960.
B3 PERIODICALS, NEWSPAPERS
(Where relevant, the trade or industry served by the periodical is noted
in parentheses).
Archiv ffir Sozialwissenachaft und Sozialpolitik. TUbingen.
Bankarchiv, Berlin.
Berliner BUrsen Zeitung, Berlin.
Commerce Reports. U.S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce,
Washington D.C.
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B3 PERIODICALS, NEWSPAPERS (cont'd;
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Deutsche Bergwerks Zeitung, Essen.
Per Deutsche Volkswirt, Berlin.
Economic History Review, London.
Frankfurter Zeitung, Frankfurt am Main.
Glttckauf, Essen (Hard Goal).
Ifo-Studien, Munich.
Industrie- und Handelszeitung, Berlin.
Iron Age. New York (Iron,Steel)
KMlnische Zeitung, Cologne.
Kon.junkturberichte 'Westen', Essen.
Magazin der Wirtschaft, Berlin.
Maschinenbau, Berlin (Mechanical Engineering)
Neue Ztircher Zeitung, Zurich.
Schmollers Jahrbuch. Berlin.
Spinner und Weber, Leipzig (Textile Manufacturing).
Sprechsaal, Coburg (Glass and Ceramics).
A
Stahl und Lisen, Dtlsseldorf (Iron and Steel).
Textil-Woche, Berlin (Textile Retail and Wholesale;.
Viertel.lahrshefte zur Kon.junkturforschung, Berlin.
Viertel.jahrsschrift zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Wiesbaden.
Viertel.lahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin.
Vorwflrts, Berlin.
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv. Kiel.
Wirtschaft und Statistijk, Berlin.
Wirtschaftsdienst, Hamburg.
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Wirtschaftshefte der frankfurter Zeitung, Frankfurt am 1 ain.
Lie Wirtschaftskurve, Frankfurt am Main.
Dement, Berlin (Building i^aterials/.
BA GLRFAKY: BOCKD AMD ARTICLES
BA.1. PBE-19^5 LITERATURE
F Aereboe, Der Einfluss cfes Krieges auf die landwirtschaftliche
Froduktion in Deutschland. Carnegie Stiftung, Wirtschafts- und
Sozialgeschichte des Weltkrieges, Deutsche Serie. Stuttgart/Berlin/
Leipzig (Deutsche Verlagsanstalt) 1927.
Agent-General for Reparations - see Reparations Commission.
J W Angell, The Recovery of Germany. New Haven (Yale U.P.) 2nd edn.1933*
Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Industrie- und Handelskammern des Ruhrbezirks,
Jahresberichte, Das Wirtschafts.jahr. Bochum 1927» 1928, 1929*
R Arzet, 'Die einzelne Fhasen der Zinsenentwicklung. Einzelgutachten',
in Centralverband des deutschen Bank- und Bankiergewerbes,
Faterialien ... (see below).
Ausschuss zur Untersuchung der Erzeugungs- und Absatzbedingungen der
deutschen Wirtschaft. All volumes Berlin (E S Kittler u.Sohn;.
Unterausschuss I, Arbeitsgruppe 5» vol 10, Die deutsche Zellstoff,
Papier-, Hclzchliff-, und Pappenindustrie. 1931-
Unterausschuss I, Arbeitsgruppe 5, vol 11, Die deutsche Bisen- und
Stahlwarenindustrie. 1930•
Unterausschuss I, Arbeitsgruppe 5» vol 20/2, Der deutsche Aussenhandel
unter Einwirkung weltwirtschaftlicher Strukturwandlungen. c.1932.
Unterausschuss I, Arbeitsgruppe 6, Die deutsche Zahiungsbilanz. c.1930.
Unterausschuss III, vol 1, Die deutsche Kohlenwirtschaft. 1929*
Unterausschuss III, vol 2, Die deutsche ElektrizitStswirtschaft 193°.
Unterausschuss III, vol 3t Die deutsche Eisenerzeugende Industrie.1930*
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